




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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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
THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN RUSSIA AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND TO THE RUSSIAN SOVIETS

PART I



JANUARY, 1921

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN RUSSIA AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND TO THE RUSSIAN SOVIETS

PART I

[EDITOR'S NOTE. The first portion of the State Department's *Memorandum on The Bolshevist or Communist Party in Russia and Its Relations to the Third or Communist International and to the Russian Soviets*, with the appendices pertaining thereto, appears in this issue of *International Conciliation*. The remaining portion, including appendices, will be published as Part II in the February issue. The State Department document referred to in the text, *Memorandum on Certain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia*, was published in *International Conciliation* in March and April, 1920.]

MARCH 20, 1920

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State:

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a memorandum prepared in the Division of Russian Affairs on the subject of the so-called Bolshevist or Communist Party in Russia and its relations to the Russian Soviets and to the Third International. The material presented is from original sources, including the utterances of the Bolsheviks themselves, extracts from their party organs, and extracts from the official press and wireless messages of the Soviets and the publications of the Third International. A knowledge of the facts which the memorandum discloses is essential to an understanding of the Russian situation, especially in its international bearings, and I believe that it would be in the public interest to publish the memorandum and distribute it as widely as practicable.

The memorandum shows that the Russian Communist Party is a highly centralized and disciplined party, membership in which is carefully restricted. It dominates the Soviets, especially the central Soviet institutions, such as the Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The leaders of the party occupy the highest official positions in Soviet institutions, both civil and military. The party, as such, performs administrative functions. Its press is closely associated with the official Soviet press.

The Communist Party is a member of the Third or Communist International, having in fact organized it, and the leaders in the party are also the chief executive officers of this world revolutionary bureau. *The leaders of the Third International are also officials of the Soviet institutions.* The propaganda literature of the International is printed in the Soviet printing establishments and *included in the official organs of the Soviets.*

The inter-relation of the Bolsheviks, the Russian Soviets, and the Third International is such, in fact, that while the three may be distinguished theoretically, in practice they represent a single movement, backed by the administrative machinery and the resources of Soviet Russia. This is important, especially from an international viewpoint, because the aim of the Communist or Bolshevik Party is world-wide revolution and the purpose of the Third International is to propagate revolution and communism throughout the world.

Therefore, while the Soviet institutions, as such, may agree to abstain from subversive propaganda abroad, neither the Russian Communist Party nor the Third International would be bound thereby.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) D. C. POOLE,
Chief, Division of Russian Affairs

I

THE ORIGIN OF THE PARTY

The "Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" is the outgrowth of an extreme radical fraction of the "Russian Social-Democrat Workmen's Party" founded in 1897. The split took place in 1903 at a congress held abroad at which the radical delegates were in the majority. For this reason this fraction came to be known as the Bolsheviks, which meant simply those of the majority, that is, the majority at this particular congress. Until the summer of 1917 the official title of this fraction was "Russian Social-Democrat Workmen's Party (Bolsheviks)." At that time the leaders of this group, now organized as a distinct party, were already discussing the formal adoption of the name "Communist" (Lenin, "First Letter on Tactics," May, 1917). They continued, however, to use the name "Bolshevik," by which they had come popularly to be known abroad as well as in Russia. In official documents and writings the term "Bolshevik" was used as late as July, 1918 (Official Stenographic Report, with tables, of Fifth All-Russian Congress). Since about that date there has been a tendency to substitute the word "Communist" in official documents and writings, though the word "Bolshevik" has generally been added in parentheses as indicated above. (See Call to Third or Communist International, "Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia.")¹

II

THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE SOVIETS

During the revolution of 1905 the Bolsheviks represented the radical minority in the workmen's councils of that period. The Russian word for council is "soviet." They opposed bitterly the more moderate fraction of the Russian Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks.

¹ *International Conciliation*, March, 1920.

The Social-Democrats as a party boycotted the elections to the first Duma in 1906, but individual Social-Democrats were elected to this first Russian parliament, particularly from the Caucasus.

During 1906 the Mensheviks secured the majority in the party councils and Russian Social-Democrats participated more actively in the elections to the second Duma, securing a large number of seats. The explanation given for the dissolution of the second Duma was its refusal to unseat 55 Social-Democratic members whom the government charged with revolutionary conspiracy. There was, nevertheless, a small group of Social-Democrats in both the third and fourth Dumas. Among these there were members who, though not specifically elected as such, were generally recognized as adherents of the Bolshevik fraction of the party. It was, for example, these individual Bolshevik members within the Social-Democratic group of the fourth Duma that came out in public condemnation of the war at the special session of the Duma called in August, 1914.

In the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, organized during the first days of the revolution of 1917, party alignment at the beginning was not particularly emphasized. Very shortly, however, particularly after Lenin's arrival, a sharp differentiation took place, and the Bolsheviks, as a separate party, became the most energetic and compact, though minority, group in the Petrograd Soviet.

In the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks had a minority and therefore a minority on the first All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets elected by that Congress. During the summer of 1917 frequent conflict developed between the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, for the former was more radical than the latter, containing a larger percentage of Bolsheviks. By September, 1917, the Bolsheviks had obtained a clear majority in the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky being elected its president.

Against the wish of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd Soviet sent out a call for a Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was announced for November 7. It was on the eve of the opening of this Congress that the Bolsheviks executed their coup d'état. In this Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks had a majority. In view of the refusal of the more moderate Socialist parties, particularly the Mensheviks, to accept the Bolshevik coup d'état, the Central Executive Committee selected by the second Congress was composed largely of Bolsheviks, as was the first Council of People's Commissaries, although a few Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were given places on the Executive Committee and on the Council.

No analysis of the Third and Fourth All-Russian Congresses of Soviets of January and March, 1918, are at hand. At the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets of July, 1918, the Bolsheviks had a majority, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries having about 30 per cent of the total membership and other parties being represented in very small numbers (Summary of Stenographic Report of Congress, Appendix 1). It was at this Congress that Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Right and Center, and the Mensheviks—all anti-Bolshevik but Socialist parties—were excluded from the Central Executive Committee and all local Soviets were urged to do the same (Decree, Appendix 2).

The Sixth All-Russian Congress, held in November, 1918, showed an overwhelming majority for the Bolsheviks; in fact, one can say that they were the only party really represented, having 900 (including 71 sympathizers) out of 914 members (Summary of Stenographic Report, Appendix 3). In the Seventh Congress, held more than 13 months later, in December, 1919, the Bolsheviks were equally dominant, having 970 out of 1,002 members (Appendix 4).

The Bolsheviks have been less completely in control of local Soviets. However, an analysis made by the Bolsheviks themselves shows the gradual elimination of all other parties, and particularly of so-called non-party members, the explana-

tion being given that the latter were formally joining the Communist Party. There were frequent references to "sympathizers with communists" or "candidates for communists." These official Bolshevik figures also indicate that the percentage of Communists or Bolsheviks increased as one went up the scale of Soviet institutions. There were more Bolsheviks in the provincial executive committees and provincial congresses than in the district and cantonal executive committees and congresses. (Appendix 5.) A detailed analysis of the composition of the Petrograd Soviet which was elected in July, 1919, and statistics on the elections of last December also show the elimination of other parties and even of so-called non-party members. (Appendix 6.) From such accounts as have been found in Bolshevik newspapers it appears that in the first stage the elections are by acclamation, at meetings held in factories, barracks, or executive departments and on party lists presented to the meeting. Delegates to higher units would seem to be elected in proportion to party strength. But even so, the party with a bare majority increases its majority as the elections pass through the various grades. The Bolsheviks admit that plenary sessions of Soviets have been irregular during the last year and therefore, the Executive Committees must have elected the delegates to higher units. This last fact would, of course, guarantee to the majority party practically complete control over the higher units, whose functions have increased with the development of extreme centralization, which the Soviet leaders have insisted was made necessary by the extraordinary conditions of foreign and civil war.

A report on the first sitting of the recently elected All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as published in the official *Izvestia*, gives a list of the members, all of whom are prominent Communists. (Appendix 7.) In local Soviets, as for example that of Petrograd, on December 31, 1919, similarly, the Communists have complete control. (Appendix 8).

Special attention is called to the manner in which the Central Executive Committee is elected by the All-Russian

Congress of Soviets, as shown in the summary given as Appendix 1. The members of the Congress meet by parties and draw up lists of their candidates in proportion to the numerical strength of the party in the Congress. Then "each fraction presents a list which the Congress in advance confirms." Therefore, the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress, and also the Executive Committees of all Soviets, are elected on strictly party lines. An interesting statement bearing on the general character of the last All-Russian Congress (December, 1919) and emphasizing particularly the "overwhelming predominance of Communists, at the Congress and in Soviets" is the signed leading article by the responsible editor of the *Izvestia*, Steklov (December 11, 1919), entitled "After the Congress." (Appendix 9.)

It is not very clear on what basis delegates to All-Russian Congresses are selected, though it would seem that they also are selected on the basis of party. The list of the delegates elected by the Petrograd Soviet to the Seventh All-Russian Congress was headed by the three names "Kalinin, Lenin, Trotsky," none of whom takes an active part in the work of the Petrograd Soviet. (Appendix 10.) Lenin also headed the list of delegates to the Seventh All-Russian Congress from the Moscow Soviet.

III

COMMUNIST PARTY'S ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

The Communist Party, as such, has assumed definite administrative functions. This took place first in connection with the organization of the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation in the first months of 1918. At first these commissions were simply local party organizations, though later they became attached to the local Soviets and to the Central Executive Committee. (For discussion of this point see "Certain Aspects

of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia,"¹ in which statements are taken from the official Weekly of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, of October 27, 1918.)

In connection with the mobilization in 1918, instructions were sent out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in which it is stated that the—

Provincial Committee of the Party is responsible for carrying out the cantonal mobilization which was set by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, and by the Soviet of Defense on April 25, 1919.

In these same instructions members of the party were ordered to perform the definite functions of verifying, in collaboration with the Provincial Military Commissaries, the lists of former officers in civil positions. (For text of these instructions, see Appendix 11.) The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party sent instructions not only to Provincial Committees of the Party but also to the above mentioned Provincial Military Commissaries (announcement appearing in the Petrograd Pravda of May 1, 1919, Appendix 12).

In connection with the organization of a "Workmen's-Peasants' University" which was to be a kind of normal school attached to the official People's Commissariat of the Interior, students had to be supplied not only with a certificate of the local Executive Committee, but also with a recommendation of a communist organization. The program of this university included among the subjects taught "The Russian Communist Party and its History." (Appendix 13.) Also, in connection with the development of general educational work in the villages, an extract from the resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held in March, 1919 (Appendix 14) shows that "departments of public education, in provinces and districts, with the assistance and under the control of local party organizations, organize colleges of propaganda * * *."

¹ *International Conciliation*, March, 1920,

Committees of the Russian Communist Party sit in joint session with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, as well as with other official Soviet institutions. Such an instance is described in the *Severnaya Kommuna* of March 7, 1919 (Appendix 15), at which resolutions were passed "in the name of Soviet Russia."

In announcing the reelection of People's Judges in Petrograd, a news item in the *Krasnaya Gazeta* of December 20, 1919, states that "the reelection of judges and the confirmation of the new judges will take place in the ward committees of the party." (Appendix 16.)

A commission was instituted in Petrograd to organize what was called the "Week for the Front." The announcement of this commission (see Appendix 17) shows that not only were representatives of the Communist Party to serve with representatives of Soviet institutions, but the former were mentioned before the latter. A wireless message dated Moscow, December 19, 1919 (Appendix 18), represents instructions to all Provincial Party Committees, sent out by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, for the formation of special commissions, on which the Party Committee is given precedence over the Executive Committee or other official Soviet institutions.

IV

COMMUNISTS IN THE RED ARMY

In the Red Army the Communist Party has played a very important part. Members of the party as such were mobilized in the early spring of 1919. (Appendices 19 and 20.) Later, in October, 1919, when Petrograd was threatened by the Yudenich offensive, local communists as such were called to the colors. Here, also, the order of mobilization was issued by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. (Appendix 21.)

Attached to each unit of the Red Army is a so-called Political Section, which receives instructions from the Central

Committee of the Russian Communist Party. (See Appendix 22.) Trotsky presumably had in mind these Political Sections when in his report to the All-Russian Congress of last December, in speaking of Communists, he said: "The number of members of this party found in the army is about 10,000. The responsible posts of Commissaries are occupied by them in the overwhelming majority of instances." (Appendix 23.)

V

DISCIPLINE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

In a report by Bukharin quoted later (Appendix 40) emphasis was laid on the strict discipline enforced in the Communist Party. An article in the Samara Kommuna of April 11, 1919, on "Iron Discipline" states that—

All Communists who for any reason violate party discipline should immediately be turned over to a pitiless party court, should be boycotted, and finally as a last measure of punishment excluded from the party. (See Appendix 24.)

Communist "Saturday work" was organized in the late summer of 1919 and the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party issued instructions that—

Members of the party are obliged to take part in Saturday work. In these instructions it is stated: "Those not taking part must be re-registered and membership dues are not accepted from them." (See Appendix 25.)

Members of the Communist Party are ordered to report to the local committee, notices of such orders constantly appearing in the official newspapers (see Appendix 26) with the warning that—

Most severe measures, including exclusion from the party, will be taken against all comrades failing to appear within the time set.

This discipline was enforced with respect both to the younger members and to the leaders of the party. An article

on "The Duty of New Members of the Party" (Krasnaya Gazeta, September 27, 1919) outlines duties, the fulfillment of which must be "the first examination . . . in order to receive the honorable calling of Communists." (See Appendix 27.) The Central Committee of the Party ordered "responsible representatives" to various provinces to take charge of organization work. (See Appendix 28.) Among those thus ordered were such prominent leaders as Steklov, Krylenko, Lunacharsky, and Bukharin.

Communists are penalized or punished more severely than non-communists. For example, in an Order published in the Petrograd Pravda of November 4, 1919, Trotsky instructs that—

Communists must be at the most dangerous posts, giving an example of bravery and indefatigability. Communists who will be found guilty of saving themselves will be punished doubly. (Appendix 29.)

VI

MEMBERSHIP IN THE PARTY

The Communist leaders have controlled most carefully the membership of the party. The Moscow Committee, on February 15, 1919, resolved to—

Call on all party organizations to check up in the strictest manner all members of the party and cleanse its ranks of elements foreign to the party, in addition to strengthening party discipline and strict control . . . (Appendix 30.)

After a re-registration and weeding-out, a campaign was started to recruit new members for the party. "Party weeks" were organized and two circular letters were sent by the Central Committee of the Party to party organizations giving strict instructions with respect to the inscribing of new members. (Appendix 31.)

Certain local party organizations evidently were too free in admitting new members. An article in the Petrograd Pravda of November 15, 1919, under the title "Unfortunate

Misunderstanding" reminds comrades in Tver that the party week was organized—

Not in order to bring into the ranks of the party . . . petty-bourgeois elements, but in order to open the doors wide to the workmen and peasants. (Appendix 32.)

Another article in the Petrograd Pravda of December 12, 1919, under the heading "More Care," states that—

The doors into the party are wide open for the workman and the workwoman, but there are strong gates—against every kind of "Soviet employee." (Appendix 33.)

APPENDICES

I

FIFTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, JULY 4—10, 1918

[Official Stenographic Report, published by All-Russian Central
Executive Committee]

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

Stenographic report of speeches, covering 201 pages.

On election of Central Executive Committee we find the following on pages 197—198:

"Now let us pass to the question of the elections of the Central Executive Committee. Allow me to propose the following procedure. At the last Congress the Central Executive Committee was composed as follows: Lists were handed in by fractions in proportion to the number of members in the fraction. At the last Congress we had 1,198 members, and we reckoned one member of the Executive Committee for every six delegates. Now we have 1,150 members, but not all of them will be able to exercise their rights, because of conditions, so I propose to take 1,000 as the basis, so that we can have a few more than 200 in the Central Executive Committee.

"I propose to elect from every five delegates one member of the Central Executive Committee. The fractions are to present corresponding lists prepared on the proportional basis and confirmed, which then will be adopted by the Congress. The fraction of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries can not, as you heard, propose such lists because it has not been able to discuss the question and to gather in a full session. Undoubtedly it will be able to do so in the course of the next days. Let us fix the proportion: From every five delegates one member of the Central Executive Committee. The Congress asks that the list be given to the praesidium, which will then call the first sitting of the Central Executive Committee at which will take place the election of the praesidium, etc. Are there any other proposals? There are none. Let me put it to the vote; from every five delegates one member is elected. Each fraction presents a list which the Congress in advance confirms. All who are for this procedure

raise their hands. Hands may be lowered. Adopted unanimously." (Then follow announcements from party leaders as to where party meetings will take place.)

Protocols of the four sessions giving summary of most important resolutions.

On page 214 it is stated that the constitution "enters into force from the moment of its publication, in final form, in the Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee."

Twenty pages of telegrams of greetings.

List of delegates with decisive voice and table analyzing, from which the following facts are taken:

Total number of delegates, 1,425, of which 868 Bolsheviks, 470 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 4 Socialist-Revolutionary of Right and Center, 37 Socialist-Revolutionaries Maximalists, 7 Anarchists, 28 non-party, 9 Social-Democrats Internationalists, 1 Jewish Social-Democrat Workmen Party (Poali-Zion), and 1 Dashnaktsutium. Total number of electors given as 35,625,000.

2

DECREE EXCLUDING SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES (RIGHT AND CENTER) AND MENSHEVIKS

[All-Russian Central Executive Committee, June 14 (1), 1918]

Whereas:

1. The Soviet authority is passing through an exceptionally difficult moment, resisting simultaneously the attack of international imperialism on all fronts and of the latter's allies within the Russian Republic, who do not hesitate to use any methods in their struggle against the Workmen's and Peasants' Government, from the most shameless slander to conspiracy and armed uprisings;

2. The presence in the Soviet organizations of representatives of parties that clearly strive to discredit and overthrow the authority of the Soviets is absolutely inadmissible;

3. It is clearly revealed from documents already published and from documents read in the present session that representatives of the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (Right and Center) and of the Russian Social-Democratic Workmen's Party (Mensheviks), including even the most responsible, have been found guilty of organizing armed uprisings against workmen and peas-

ants in alliance with frank counter-revolutionaries—on the Don with Kaladin and Kornilov, on the Ural with Dutov, in Siberia with Semenov, Horvat, and Kolchak, and, finally, quite recently with the Czecho-Slovaks and the reactionaries who have joined the latter;

Therefore, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets resolves to exclude from its membership representatives of the parties of Socialist-Revolutionaries (Right and Center), Russian Social-Democratic Workmen's Party (Mensheviks), and also to propose to all Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers', Peasants', and Cossacks' Deputies to remove the representatives of these fractions from their midst.

(Signed) PRESIDENT OF ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Y. SVERDLOV

Secretary—V. AVANESOV

(Collection of Laws and Ordinances, 536.)

3

SIXTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1918

[Official Stenographic Report, published by All-Russian Central
Executive Committee]

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The protocols of the three sittings give an outline of the work of the session.

Then follow stenographic reports of the speeches. The speeches were by Sverdlov, Lenin, Avanesov, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Kursky, Steklov, Pozern, and practically no others. The stenographic report would seem to indicate that there were no debates.

Then follow 80 pages of "telegrams of greeting" from various executive committees and individuals, including foreigners like Liebknecht.

List of members of the Congress arranged by provinces in alphabetical order, indicating number of "mandates" and party affiliation. A "mandate" would seem to indicate a Soviet organization or a Soviet. The number of mandates indicated ranges from 23 to 1,000.

Two tables in back of book indicate further details as to party

affiliation and by whom delegated. The most outstanding facts are the following:

Nine hundred and fourteen delegates had a decisive voice. Of these 829 were Communists, 71 sympathizers with communists, 2 Revolutionary-Communists, 2 Populist-Communists, 1 Maximalist, 6 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 3 non-party. Of these 368 were delegated by district Soviets and organizations, and 216 by urban, while only 26 by cantonal. It is estimated that these represented a population of 109,768,125, of whom 59,306,132 were electors.

Three hundred and seventeen delegates have a consultative voice. Of these 239 are Communists, 60 sympathizers with Communists, 1 Revolutionary-Communist, 3 Populist-Communists, 3 Socialist-Revolutionary-Internationalists, 1 Maximalist, 1 Socialist-Revolutionary, 3 Anarchists, 1 Menshevik, 4 non-party, and 1 Jewish Social-Democratic Workmen's Party. These are stated as representing a population of 45,239,781, of whom 8,558,939 are electors.

A third table combines the other two and indicates as total population represented 148,662,141. (Addition of figures of the two tables.)

4

SEVENTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS (FOURTH DAY, DECEMBER 10)

[Economic Life, December 10, 1919]

The last plenary sitting of the Congress begins with a report of the Mandate Commission.

According to this report, accepted by the Congress, there were present at the Congress 1,366 delegates, of which number 1,002 had votes, and 364 advisory voices. The Communists had 970 votes and 308 advisory voices; non-party delegates had 35 and 26. The remaining places were distributed in small numbers to various parties.

The Congress then adopts without debate resolutions proposed by the committees on food supply, fuel, and Soviet construction.

Comrade Enukidze reads the list of members of the new All-Russian Central Executive Committee as proposed by the fraction of Communists. The list is adopted by the Congress unanimously. Among those elected are: Lenin, Trotsky, Kalinin, Rykov, Chubar, Larin, Miliutin, Nogin, Krasin, and others.

Besides representatives of Communists, a few places in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee were given to Revolutionary Communists and Maximalists.

5

EXTRACTS FROM ARTICLE BY M. VLADIMIRSKY

[Izvestia of November 6, 1919]

The material about the distribution of the members of these congresses according to parties has also been systematized, and although incomplete gives, however, a general picture of the main creative forces of Soviet Russia. All these congresses are divided up according to three periods: from October, 1917, up to July, 1918, is the first period of Soviet construction, from July, 1918, up to January, 1919, second period, when the Soviet work was conducted exclusively by the power of the Russian Communist Party, and the third period from January this year, when in the work of Soviet construction broad non-partisan masses participated. . . .

The members of the Communist Party together with the sympathizers form the principal group of the members of the congresses in all the three periods. In the first period they constituted somewhat more than a half of the members of the congresses. The fourth part of the members were represented by other political parties, principally the Left Social-Revolutionists, 21 per cent of all the members. The number of Right Social-Revolutionists was insignificant, only 1.2 per cent. Still fewer were the representatives of the Mensheviks, 0.9 per cent. The rest, one-fifth, consisted of members not belonging to any party. In the second period the Left Social-Revolutionists after the July adventure amounted to almost nothing, approximately 3 per cent, and the Communist Party with sympathizers constituted more than four-fifths of all the members of the congresses, having grown stronger not only at the expense of other political parties, but also at the expense of non-party. In the village the process of class subdivision goes deeper and sharper. In the towns the non-party join the Communist Party. In the third period the influence of other parties grows still weaker notwithstanding the fact that among them appeared the Maximalists and Revolutionary Communists. On the congresses appear representatives of broad party-

less masses of middle peasants, especially on the district congresses. Thus the Soviet construction was carried on all the time under the influence and leadership of the Russian Communist Party.

In provincial executive committees the Communist Party is represented by an overwhelming majority, 88 per cent of the total, who together with the sympathizers constitute 92 per cent of all the members of the executive committees. In the district the non-party members constitute a somewhat larger number, being 18.6 per cent (at the last district congresses representatives of the middle peasantry were elected to executive committees), and here the number of sympathizers is somewhat larger, constituting 11 per cent. However, the Communists constitute the principal bulk of workers, 69 per cent. The town executive committees take the middle place between these two groups, having four-fifths of Communists and sympathizers and one-fifth of non-party members. . . .

Four-fifths of the members of the executive committees belong to the laboring masses having received scanty education in the schools for beginners or by educating themselves (in prisons). People with higher education—the intelligentsia—constitute a small number, 4 per cent. Members with medium or middle school education constitute 15 per cent. These are various kinds of officials, technicians, from the factories, etc. In the district executive committees the predominance of the people with lower education is expressed especially strongly, and on the contrary in the provincial executive committees is noticeable a participation of people with higher education. There is no need to go here into details—the picture is clear. In Soviet Russia, where the whole belongs to the laboring people, four-fifths of the workers managing the state apparatus consist of workmen and peasants.

The conclusions are clear, the developing Soviet construction is carried out by the laboring masses themselves, under the leadership of the Russian Communist Party by its most experienced and elder members, who had worked for many years in the “underground” revolutionary movement.

6

COMPOSITION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET

[Petrograd Pravda, November 25, 1919. Extracts]

(NOTE.—This is the first detailed analysis of the composition

of a local Soviet that has been found. It is the analysis of the Petrograd Soviet which was elected in July, 1919. Attention is called in the first paragraph to the difficulties prevailing at that moment, in view of hunger, disorganization of industry, and military situation. It is stated, for example, "Hundreds and thousands of supporters of the Soviet authority had gone to ward off the impudent attack on Soviet Russia. Old proletarians, experienced in revolutionary struggle, in the Petrograd factories were practically non-present. In our ranks there was even doubt as to whether we were not making a mistake in organizing re-elections at such a difficult moment.")

The investigation of the composition of the Petrograd Soviet has confirmed once more clearly that the Red Petrograd proletarians in the difficult and confused moments of class struggle do not hesitate or weaken, but simply work harder to bring to complete victory the struggle that has been started, the victory of the Communist International. The Petrograd Soviet is composed of 1,836 members; of these, 1,529 men and 307 women. In the election of these members took part up to 300,000 proletarians, organized in trade unions, voting in 1,060 election meetings. Of the total membership, there are 1,052 Communists (members of the Russian Communist Party), 49 candidates of the R. C. P., 148 sympathizers of the R. C. P., 338 non-party, one Left Socialist-Revolutionary; 248 members did not indicate membership in any political party. . . .

The majority (746) are between the ages of 21-30. Forty-five are between the ages of 18-20, 377 between ages 31-40, 248 between 41-50, and 48 above 51. One thousand two hundred and ninety-seven members have families.

The members of the Soviet receive payment for labor, principally from Soviet institutions: From the party, 26; from a union, 110; from factories, 284; from Soviet institutions, 577; from military institutions, 270; from Red Army, 56; from water transportation, 66; from railways, 85; from street railways, 16; from militia, 30; from hospitals, 32; from printing shops, 16; not indicated, 240.

The above figures show that 266 members were reelected, while 1,570 members were elected for the first time.

In conclusion, we may point out that according to the material on hand it is established that the majority of the non-party mem-

bers of the Soviets have become Communists during the time of their membership in the Soviet. Exact figures on this point will be published after a more detailed study of the material.

STATISTICS ON ELECTIONS

[Petrograd Pravda, January 3, 1920]

In the first City Ward the final figures have been collated for the recent elections to the Petrograd Soviet. In the Ward were held in all 132 meetings for 71,402 voters, of whom 35,588 were present. Two hundred and seventy-five deputies were elected from the Ward, of whom 242 were communists, 29 non-party, and 4 sympathizers.

From Red Army detachments 63 meetings were held, with 14,980 present. There were elected to the Soviet 124 communists, 7 non-party, and 1 sympathizer.

From factory organizations there were 31 meetings, for 11,722 voters of whom 8,073 were present. They elected 43 communists and 1 sympathizer.

From Soviet institutions there were 36 meetings of 29,932 voters, of whom 10,535 were present; and there were elected 60 communists, 22 non-party and 2 sympathizers.

From the total number of deputies in the Petrograd Soviet 47 women were elected, of whom 41 were communists and 6 non-party.

7

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ELECTION AND FIRST SITTING

[Izvestia, December 11, 1919]

Yesterday took place the first sitting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which was newly elected by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The sitting was purely business and lasted a very short time.

The Praesidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was elected to consist of: Comrades Kalinin, Kamenev, Lutovinov, Badayev, Sapronov, Enukidze, Rykov, Nevsky, Bukharin, Kiselev, Muranov, Rakovsky. Candidates for these were elected: Comrades Tomskey, Avanesov, Sosnovsky, Vladimirsky, Kutuzov. As president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was elected M. Kalinin, and secretaries, Enukidze and Lutovinov. To the Mandate Commission: Comrades Maksimovsky, Kiselev, Kutuzov.

The Council of People's Commissary and the Soviet of Defense were confirmed in their present composition.

On the report of Comrades Kamenev and Schmidt the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decrees to combine the Commissariat of Labor with the Commissariat of Social Insurance. The reason for this union is to reduce the apparatus of Soviet institutions working in parallel lines. Comrade Schmidt spoke on certain details of work which required union. The proposal was confirmed unanimously. Comrade Schmidt is confirmed as Commissary of the United Commissariat of Labor and Social Insurance.

Comrade Kalinin reports that the Commander in Chief, S. S. Kamenev, has already received the preliminary reward, a sword of honor, and that now the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decrees to reward him with the Order of the Red Flag.

At the end of the sitting the periodic session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is fixed—the first day of the month every two months. The next session is set for February 1, 1920.

After a series of suggestions, including the preliminary sending to members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of material that is to be discussed, the sitting was declared closed.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE ELECTED BY THE SEVENTH ALL-RUSSIAN
CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Kalinin, M. I. | 15. Aptselovich, I. M. |
| 2. Lenin, N. | 16. Kiselev, A. S. |
| 3. Trotsky, L. D. | 17. Podbelsky, V. N. |
| 4. Zinoviev, G. E. | 18. Ulianova, N. K. |
| 5. Kamenev, L. B. | 19. Maksimov, K. G. |
| 6. Krestinsky, N. N. | 20. Chubar |
| 7. Bukharin, N. I. | 21. Nogin, V. P. |
| 8. Dzerzhinsky, F. G. | 22. Krylenko, N. V. |
| 9. Stalin, I. I. | 23. Sergeev (Artem) |
| 10. Rakovsky, H. G. | 24. Smidovich, P. G. |
| 11. Radek, K. B. | 25. Schlyapnikov |
| 12. Muranov, M. K. | 26. Stasova, E. D. |
| 13. Serebrianov, L. P. | 27. Ivanov, N. I. |
| 14. Tomskey, M. P. | 28. Miasnikov, A. F. |

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 29. Rykov, A. I. | 60. Sharov |
| 30. Vladimirsky, M. F. | 61. Steklov, Yu. M. |
| 31. Evdokimov, G. E. | 62. Piatnitsky, N. A. |
| 32. Enukidze, A. S. | 63. Anin, I. A. |
| 33. Krasin, L. | 64. Eliava, Sh. Kh. |
| 34. Kursky, D. K. | 65. Ignatov, E. N. |
| 35. Petrovsky, G. I. | 66. Smilga, I. P. |
| 36. Sosnovsky, L. S. | 67. Miliutin, V. P. |
| 37. Sapronov, T. V. | 68. Kossior, D. V. |
| 38. Chicherin, G. V. | 69. Larin, M. A. |
| 39. Maksimovsky, V. N. | 70. Ishchenkre |
| 40. Avanesov, V. A. | 71. Medvedev, V. P. |
| 41. Nevsky, V. I. | 72. Yurov, A. Ya. |
| 42. Melnichansky, G. N. | 73. Znamensky |
| 43. Ryazanov, D. B. | 74. Avilov-Glebov |
| 44. Pokrovsky, M. N. | 75. Badaev, M. E. |
| 45. Schmidt, V. V. | 76. Pestkovsky, S. S. |
| 46. Yaroslavsky, Em. | 77. Said-Galiev Sahib Girey |
| 47. Lashevich, M. M. | 78. Vasiliev |
| 48. Obolensky-Osinsky | 79. Razin |
| 49. Stuchko, V. I. | 80. Klinger |
| 50. Smirnov, A. B. | 81. Miasnikov, G. |
| 51. Tsuriupa, A. V. | 82. Borixov (Danilenko) |
| 52. Beloborodov, A. G. | 83. Onkov |
| 53. Lutovinov, M. A. | 84. Sulkovsky |
| 54. Kozyrev | 85. Pankov |
| 55. Samashko, N. A. | 86. Vasiliev |
| 56. Sereda, S. P. | 87. Lunacharsky |
| 57. Kollontai, A. M. | 88. Raskolchin |
| 58. Tsiterovich, G. V. | 89. Muralov |
| 59. Kutuzov, I. I. | |

And so on through 192, the names being given without initial and not including any well-known names.

CANDIDATES

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Kapsukas-Mitskovich | 6. Podvoisky |
| 2. Smirnov | 7. Baranov |
| 3. Berzin-Vinter | 8. Novgorodtseva |
| 4. Bokin | 9. Peters |
| 5. Manuilsky | 10. Lovanov |

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| 11. Voskov | 21. Udlovov |
| 12. Raskolnikov | 22. Ozol |
| 13. Yakovleva | 23. Krol |
| 14. Bubnov | 24. Kuraev |
| 15. Preobrazhensky | 25. Antonov |
| 16. Sokolnikov | 26. Vronsky |
| 17. Fomin | 27. Kingisenn |
| 18. Fokin | 28. Litvinov |
| 19. Lebedev | 29. Rudzutak |
| 20. Zholkov | |

And so on to No. 66.

8

FIRST SESSION OF NEW PETROGRAD SOVIET, DECEMBER 31, 1919

[Krasnaya Gazeta, January 1, 1920]

At 7 p. m. at the table of the Praesidium, which was decorated with a Red flag presented by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets appeared Comrades Zinoviev, Zorin and Evdokimov. The powerful sounds of the "International" which was rendered simultaneously by the orchestra of the theater, by a military orchestra, and by the choir of the theater filled the hall.

"In the name of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of the former session," says Comrade Zinoviev, "I declare the sitting of the new Soviet, of the fifth session, opened."

"We can not give exact figures on the composition of new Soviet. But approximately it will consist of 1,885 members, of whom 1,539 are Communists, 6 candidates for communists, 62 sympathizers with communists, 252 non-party members, 1 Revolutionary Communist, 1 Left-Internationalist, 2 Mensheviks, 2 United Workmen Party, and 10 Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Minority. This is the composition of the new Soviet.

"The present sitting must begin with the election of the Executive Committee and of the Praesidium of the Petrograd Soviet. For declaration from party fractions, I give the Tribune to Comrade Zorin."

Comrade Zorin reads the list of members of the Executive Committee proposed by the fraction of Communists. In this list are included the following: Zinoviev, Antselovich, Moiseev, Evdokimov, Zorin, Sergeev, Badaev, Ivanov, Bitker, Torgulov, Gakharin, Ravich, Zelikson, Pervukhin, Zofkothakov, Joffe,

Lashevich, Sadovskaya, Itkina, Tsyperovich, Shipilo, Sharov, Nikolaev, Muravkin, Kuklin, Eliseev, Aminitsky, Samoilovich, Vasiliev, Osipov, Ilim, Vilgelmson, Teslani, Ogorodnikov, Vilisov, and Zanko. To the Praesidium of the Executive Committee the fraction proposes to elect: As president of the Soviet, Comrade Zinoviev, as members of the Praesidium, Comrades Antseielovich, Moiseev, Evdokimov, Zorin, Sergeev, Badaev.

Both lists are adopted unanimously. Then Comrade Zinoviev reads a telegram just received announcing the capture of Eka-terinoslav by the Red Army. The news is received with loud applause and enthusiastic shouts, "Long live the Red Army," "Long live Comrade Trotsky."

Then Comrade Zinoviev makes his report (gives outline of five previous Soviets and concludes):

"Our friends say that we are not sufficiently democratic. But take France where under universal suffrage with a population of forty million only six and one-half million take part in elections, while with us one-half of the population takes part in elections. With us it is the toiler who elects, while with them it is the bourgeois, the speculator and the rich, while workmen take very little part in their elections.

"As we look back we shall see by the example of our Soviet how the influence of the communist party grows constantly with the victories on the battle ships and in the military divisions. We have attained 82 per cent. We have in the Soviet 252 non-party members. The greater portion of these were elected on lists of Communists and we welcome them. How many of the 300 non-party members in the last Soviet came out of that Soviet non-party? Not more than 30."

9

"AFTER THE CONGRESS" (SEVENTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS)

[Leading Article, by Steklov, *Izvestia*, December 11, 1919]

The seventh Congress of Soviets is over, and now the delegates are returning to their homes to carry out its decisions.

The last Congress differed from its predecessors in the oneness of its composition.

It was almost exclusively Communist. This time even from the opposition we hardly heard the usual complaints of violence practiced at elections. Even our opponents, evidently, have understood that the overwhelming predominance of Communists,

at the Congress and in Soviets, is explained by the fact that the broad toiling masses have acknowledged this party as their own, and have intrusted to it the defense of the conquests of the Revolution and the building up of a new life. Corresponding to the composition of the Congress, the new Central Executive Committee also will be almost exclusively Communist.

Among the decisions of the Congress two are of particular importance. One refers to the conditions for further Soviet constructive work, and the other to the question of peace.

In order to be strong with respect to the outside world, the Soviet Republic must be well organized internally. The Congress took a new step in the direction of building up the Soviet authority, and of bringing the broad workmen masses to active participation in Soviet construction and in the management of the apparatus of government. Having placed the Central Executive Committee in more normal conditions by providing for regular sessions, the Congress at the same time tried to unite the local Soviet organs, organize and coordinate their activities and remove as far as possible the friction between central and local bodies, in order to raise the productivity of the work of the entire Soviet machinery as a whole.

The second most important decision of the Congress is its proposal of peace to all people. We do not believe that this peace proposal will meet with immediate success. But it is addressed not so much to governments as to people, and here it will have an influence without question, and in the second place it is made under circumstances much more favorable than were present when previous peace proposals were made by Soviet Russia. The victory of the Red Army, the destruction of counter-revolutionary forces and the failure of the repeated attempts of the Entente have become clear for all. Under such circumstances the new appeal for peace, coming from the highest authority of Soviet Russia, has the chance of being at least listened to, even if not immediately.

And if it is not listened to, and if the enemies of the Russian Republic do not respond to it? The answer to this question is found in the appeal to the Congress made in the name of Red Army delegates, which was read at the last sitting. The Red Army considers that its task is not yet accomplished. It will be accomplished only when the sword shall be finally knocked from the criminal hands of the Russian counter-revolution, and when

the attacks of the world bourgeoisie on Soviet Russia shall be finally repelled. Only after he has completely beaten counter-revolution and secured an honorable peace for Soviet Russia, will the Red Army soldier receive, from his socialist fatherland and his own conscience, the permission to hang his rifle on the wall.

The peace proposal of the Congress is greatly strengthened by the brilliant success of the Soviet armies on all fronts. At the same time it derives enormous strength from the undoubted strengthening of the internal front. The solidarity of the broad toiling masses and the closest union between the proletariat and the peasantry which has been tempered in the melting pot of sufferings and strengthened by blood shed in common on the fields of battle with world counter-revolution, were testified to by the seventh Congress with irrefutable clearness. Even the parties which before were in opposition (and even armed opposition) to the Soviet authority, appeared through their delegates at the Congress, in order to lay incense at the feet of the struggling proletariat, and their recognition and promise of support in the struggle against the forces of bourgeois society.

The delegates of the Congress, when they return home, and the comrades who sent them will set about with doubled energy to increase Soviet first-fruits, and to extend Soviet sowing. By their loyal work in the rear and at the front they will strengthen the foundations of Soviet Russia and soon will make the latter absolutely invulnerable to all its enemies—internal and external.

YU. STEKLOV

10

MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET

[Petrograd Pravda, November 22, 1919]

Then was heard the report of comrade Evdokimov on the election of delegates to the coming All Russian Congress of Soviets.

The following comrades are elected unanimously from the Petrograd Soviet to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow:

- | | |
|--------------|----------------|
| 1. Kalinin | 6. Zorin |
| 2. Lenin | 7. Raxich |
| 3. Trotsky | 8. Tsiperovich |
| 4. Zinoviev | 9. Joffe |
| 5. Evdokimov | 10. Arsavsky |

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 11. Volodin, from educational unions | 18. 1st City Ward, Kiselev |
| 12. Fushin | 19. 2nd City Ward, Spunbe |
| 13. M. Ivanov | 20. Petersburg Ward, Smirnov |
| 14. Sharov | 21. Vasily Ostrov, Yakovlev |
| 15. Shirokov | 22. Narva Peterhof, Itkina |
| 16. Langis | 23. Moscow Ward, Vasiliev |
| From wards: | 24. Vyborg Ward, Moiseev |
| 17. Smolny, Vasiliev | 25. Porkhov Ward, Lavrov |
| | 26. Nevsky Ward, Vilgelmson |

II

"TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS"

[Petrograd Pravda, May 1, 1919]

Moscow, April 30 (Rosta). In view of the extremely critical situation on all the fronts, the Central Committee considers it necessary to turn to all local party organizations with the present appeal, that they conduct their work in connection with the services for the army with the greatest concentration. The Central Committee orders all party organizations (1) to speed up their work, temporarily concentrating three-fourths of the personnel on hand and sending supplementary workers where regiments are being formed, equipped and clothed, and so forth; (2) one must send off mobilized communists and workmen volunteers, just as soon as their number reaches that of a regiment; (3) (indicated to what points regiments are to be sent, from various provinces, concluding with sentence "Committees of the Party, Provincial Executive Committees of Soviets, Military Commissaries need not wait for further orders from the General Staff"); (4) the provincial and district committees, as well as all members of the party, are responsible for the prompt sending off of the regiments organized; (5) the provincial committee of the party is responsible for carrying out the cantonal mobilization, which was ordered by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, and by the Soviet of Defense, on April 25, 1919; (6) Soviet workers sent to the eastern front must close up and transfer their affairs as quickly as possible, so that only 24 hours shall elapse between the moment of appointment and the moment of departure; (7) all members of the party in provinces and districts, are ordered, together with the provincial military commissary, to verify, and not in bureaucratic manner

but actually, if any former officers have remained in any civil or rear military post. Where such are not absolutely needed for work, report should be sent to the military circuit headquarters. . . .

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK)

APRIL 29, 1919

12

FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
[Petrograd Pravda, May 1, 1919]

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party announces the following: To all provincial committees of the Communist Party, to Provincial Military Commissaries: The All-Russian Central Committee of Soviets, at the session of April 23, unanimously adopted the decree to bring the middle and poor peasants into the struggle against the counter-revolution. According to this decree, every canton must send ten to twenty strong, capable soldiers, who can act as nuclei for Red Army units in those places to which they will be sent.

Attaching enormous importance to the rapid and successful carrying out of this decree, the Central Committee proposes immediately to instruct all district committees, and cantonal party groups, to render the most energetic assistance to executive committees (of soviets), and to district military commissaries, in carrying out this decree. Word must be sent by telegraph to the Central Committee on the receipt of the circular, and every three days on the steps taken by you, and on the progress of the mobilization in your province.

13

WORKMEN'S-PEASANTS' UNIVERSITY
[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, November 15, 1919]

WORKMEN'S-PEASANTS' UNIVERSITY IN HONOR OF COMRADE
ZINOVIEV

[Normal school of People's Commissariat of Interior]

On November 15 begins the course of the third class of the university.

This class numbers 1,000 (men and women). The students of the university are delegated by provincial district and cantonal Executive Committees.

Those delegated must be between the ages of 17 and 40, and (1) stand on the platform of the Soviet authority; (2) not sentenced by court for offense implying moral turpitude; (3) not under trial and investigation; (4) literate; (5) healthy, and (6) supplied with certificate of Executive Committee and recommendation of a communist organization.

Those delegated come to Petrograd at their own expense. During the entire time of their studies they live in dormitories with everything supplied. The course lasts six months. At the end of the course the comrades return at the expense of the university to their homes, and are at the orders of the local Executive Committee.

The university is divided into sections: (1) Soviet work, (2) municipal militia, (3) railway and river militia, (4) criminal investigation, (5) agriculture, (6) municipal sanitation, (7) party work.

Studies are conducted on programs of a general cultural character and of a socialistic character, which are obligatory for all students, and on special subjects.

GENERAL CULTURAL PROGRAM

(1) General history (history of social movements in Western Europe); (2) Russian literature (peasantist literature of the nineteenth century); (3) history of material culture (history of armament, etc.); (4) the Russian and religion ("Bor"); (5) history of Russian literature: Puskin and Tolstoy; (6) natural science (ways, tasks, and accomplishments of contemporary science with respect to nature); (7) course by episodes of chemistry; (8) course by episodes of physics; (9) biology; (10) history, structure and life of the earth and universe.

SOCIAL-POLITICAL PROGRAM

(1) Russian history (the workman and peasant in Russia, especially in the nineteenth century); (2) political economy; (3) history of the workmen movement (trade-union movement in the West and in Russia); (4) history of revolution in Western Europe (especially history of the French Revolution); (5) history of the revolutionary movement in Russia; (6) socialism and its history; (7) the International and its history; (8) the Russian Communist Party and its history; (9) political science (constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic);

(10) commissariats: (a) detailed study of subject of each commissariat; (b) structure; (c) practical carrying out of work.

Further, excursions will be made to the large factories, electric light stations, museums, theaters, etc.

Attendance at sessions of the Soviet will be obligatory.

Lectures will be delivered by Comrades Zinoviev, Bukharin, Nevsky, Miliutin, Ryazanov, Tsiperovich, Lunacharsky, Gorky, Desnitsky, Kudriavtsev, Ninkvich, Rozhkov, Zamyslovskaya, Verkhovsky, Znamensky, Petrov, Misheyev, and others.

For information apply to "Palace of Yuritsky, telephone 48-70"

14

ON POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL WORK IN THE VILLAGE

[Resolution of Eighth Congress of Russian Communist Party (March, 1919).
Pamphlet. Extracts]

In the plan of educational work in the village must enter in deep harmony with one another: (1) communist propaganda, (2) general education, (3) agricultural education.

1. Political propaganda in the village must be carried on for both literate and illiterate. For literates first of all is the distribution of general political and special peasant popular literature and newspapers in a definite communistic spirit.

Teachers must look upon themselves as agents not only of general but also of communist education. In this respect they must be subjected not only to the control of their immediate centers, but also of local party organizations.

The moving picture, the theater, concerts, exhibitions, etc., in so far as they penetrate to the village (and every effort must be made to this end), must be used for communist propaganda, both directly, that is, through their content, and also by coordinating them with lectures and meetings.

Departments of the public education, in provinces and districts, with the assistance and under the control of local party organizations, organize colleges of propaganda, composed in part of residents and in part of travelers who cover a more or less extensive district. . . . General education should aim not only at spreading the light of various sciences to the dark village, but mainly at assisting the developing of self-consciousness and a clear philosophy of life and must be closely connected with communist

propaganda. There are no forms of science or art which have not been associated with the great ideas of communism, or with the various activities toward creating communist economic enterprises. . .

Agricultural education must be conducted in such a way that its facts are connected up with communist conclusions, thus serving as a support to the general aim of the party to change private individual peasant economy into an organized socialistic.

15

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THIRD INTERNATIONAL

[Severnaya Kommuna, March 7, 1919]

The joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet of Workmen's and Red Army Deputies sitting with the Moscow Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, the All-Russian Soviet of Trade-Unions, and of the factory-mills committees of Moscow, which was held on the historic day of the founding of the Communist International, in the name of millions of workmen, peasants and soldiers, who had overthrown czarism and the bourgeoisie, and had taken authority into their own hands—greet the representatives of the Communist Parties of: Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, the United States of America, Jugo-Slavia, Norway, the Balkans, Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Livonia, White Russia, and Estland, who arrived in Moscow for the first congress of the new International. In their persons the joint session sends hearty fraternal greetings to the proletarians of the whole world, who are struggling against capitalistic slavery, for the liberation of the toilers for socialism.

The session welcomes the Communist International as the leader and organizer of the fighting forces of the world proletarian revolution and expresses the firm conviction that under its leadership the dictatorship of capital will be overthrown by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the name of Soviet Russia the session expresses its sincere gratification that the united uprising of the Russian proletariat against imperialism and the bourgeoisie made it possible for the representatives of the international communist movement to hold their first congress in Moscow—this white capital of czars and bourgeois magnates.

The session unanimously adheres to the manifesto of the Communist International and together with the latter calls upon the proletarians of the world to unite in the struggle for socialism.

Long live the Communist International. Long live the Communist revolution.

To the powerful blast of the hymn of the toilers, "The International," the session adjourned.

16

REELECTION OF PEOPLE'S JUDGES

[Krasnaya Gazeta, December 20, 1919]

At the end of December throughout Petrograd the reelection of people's judges will take place. Not all judges will be reelected, but only those who for this or that reason have not been satisfactory in their posts. The reelection of judges and the confirmation of the new judges will take place in the ward Committees of the Party.

But why are judges being changed? Of what defects are they accused? For the most part it is because of a certain leniency in the sentences and the imposition of too mild penalties. For example at the beginning of this week in the Moscow ward the people's judge, Levin, was removed. In the Party Committee he was accused of being too "mild" and of having handed down sentences that were too condescending. Most of the people's judges who are to be removed are presented with accusations precisely of this character.

17

"THE WEEK OF THE FRONT"

[Petrograd Pravda, January 6, 1920]

The first sitting of the Commission for the "Week of the Front" of Petrograd and the Petrograd Province, will take place December 6 at 2 p. m., in Smolny, Room 95.

For work in the Commission, one representative each must be selected by the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the Provincial Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the Provincial Executive Committee (of Soviets), City Executive Committee, Soviet of Trade Unions, Provincial Committee on Deserters, Political Section of 7th Army, Political-

Educational Board of Military Circuit, Provincial Military Committee, Agitation Threes, Agitation Points of Railways.

To the sitting are invited also one representative each from the "Kompros"—the Agitation Section of the Petrograd Committee, Workwomen's Section attached to Petrograd Committee, Administration of Petrograd Commune, editorial staffs of newspapers "Pravda," "Krasnaya Gazeta," and of the "Rosta."

18

SPECIAL WEEK'S WAR PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET RUSSIA
[Wireless message]

MOSCOW, *December 19, 1919*

To all Party Committees:

The Central Committee of the Communists has decided to introduce a "Week of the Front" everywhere, beginning from January 21. In order that this project may be carried out, it is necessary:

Firstly. To form a Special Provincial Commission, on which the Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial Executive Committee, the Provincial Military Committee, the Trade Unions, the Union of Youth and the Provincial Committee for Combating Desertion will be represented.

Secondly. To form a District Commission of the same representatives.

Thirdly. To form Commissions in the cantons and villages whose numbers will be decided by the District Commissions.

Fourthly. To appoint a Secretariat (?) formed of three members of the Provincial and District Commissions, including a member of the Party Committee and bearing full responsibility.

Fifthly. To include in the work all the party Soviet Workers' and Peasants' establishments and organizations, departments for work in the villages among women, village unions of Communists, Students, Red soldiers and teachers, Communes, Unions and Cooperative Societies.

Sixthly. In order to carry out the work for the week, party and Soviet workers must be appointed throughout the districts to assist the local workers.

Seventhly. To request the Provincial Departments of the Russian Telegraph Agency and the local press to publish appeals, proclamations, and posters. The aim of the week is to acquaint

the workmen and peasants with the purpose of the war, the decisive character of the present moment in the fight against the White Guards and the Entente, the nearness of victory and peace and the necessity for supporting the army with all means in our power. The rear must support the front in the following manner:

(1) All deserters must give themselves up or be given up by the population.

(2) Equipment and arms must be given up, in accordance with the telegram of the Central Committee for Combating Desertion of December 9, No. 6883.

(3) Presents for the army must be collected. These should take the form of flour, grain, potatoes, vegetables, dairy produce, meat, etc., tobacco of local production, books, equipment, boots, linen, materials, money and all other things necessary for the Red soldiers.

(4) Relief for the families of Red soldiers and for sick and wounded Red soldiers.

With regard to deserters, equipment and arms, it is necessary to gain the cooperation of the population, threatening them with punitive measures, as laid down by the Committee for Combating Desertion. With regard to the collection of presents, it is not necessary that any one should give much, but every laborer should give something. It is desirable that non-party peasant conferences should be introduced in order to carry out the "Week of the Front." Taking into consideration local conditions, the Week of the Front, may be carried out earlier or slightly later than the given time. Further instructions will be sent to you by the Central Commission for the Week of the Front. Inquiries must be addressed to Moscow Administration of the Central Committee for the Week of the Front.

KRESTINSKY,

Secretary of the Central Committee of the R. C. P.

19

MOBILIZATION OF COMMUNISTS

[News Item, *Izvestia*, April 18, 1919]

TROTSKY'S TRAIN, *April 16*.—The mobilization of Communists and sympathizers, in conformity with the resolution of the Provincial Committee of the Party to call to arms 50 per cent of its members, is going on most successfully. Several hundred com-

rades have come up from the districts. Syzran in five days created a communist regiment of 1,200 men which was called "The Trotsky Regiment." The president of the Military-Revolutionary Soviet confirmed the organization of this regiment and the appropriation of a million rubles for its support and for the forming of other regiments. In Simbirsk, the town committee of the party has mobilized all the Communists. It is proposed to distribute the mobilized comrades, numbering 500, among the various regiments of the army.

20

PARTY MOBILIZATION

[Petrograd Pravda, April 25, 1919]

(Under this headline twenty-two short telegrams from all over Russia announcing the mobilization of members of the Communist Party, of which a few examples are given.)

KALUGA, *April 19*.—In connection with the situation on the eastern front, the Medyn organization of Communists resolved to send immediately to the front to oppose Kolchak 25 per cent of the Communists and their sympathizers. The organization of Communists of Borov has started to train Communists in military science in order to send reinforcements to the Red Army at the earliest possible date.

BORISOV, *April 23*.—By a resolution of the Communist Party all members of the party between the ages of 18 and 25 have been mobilized. The mobilization in the city was carried out in the course of a single night.

NOVGOROD, *April 23*.—At a combination meeting of the Novgorod Provincial Committee of the Russian Communist Party and of the Soviet of Trade Unions of the province it was resolved to mobilize 9 per cent of the working hands, in order to support the eastern front.

SAMARA, *April 23*.—The District Committee of the Communist Party is hastily organizing the first Samara peasant volunteer regiment. It is composed for the most part of Communists and sympathizers. All the volunteers are old soldiers and therefore represent ready fighting material.

VOLOGDA, *April 18*.—By resolution of the Party Committee a portion of the Communists have been mobilized and are being sent to the northern and eastern fronts.

"LET THE ENEMIES OF THE TOILERS PERISH

[Krasnaya Gazeta, October 7, 1919]

TO WORKMEN, RED ARMY SOLDIERS, AND SAILORS

Comrades: By order of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party our Petrograd organization must select a maximum of its forces for the Southern front. Several hundred responsible workers have already been sent there. We have also the task of sending there to the Southern front several thousand rank and file members of our party organization.

To carry out this task of mobilization we have a couple of weeks. This means that during this period we must teach these comrades a smattering of military science and prepare them so that when they appear at the front they can become leaders of the Red Army, not only from the point of view of ideas, but also in the military, technical sense. To this end we should open special short-term courses and occupy ourselves in study.

Comrades: Is there time to do all this? We say Denikin must be defeated and we must learn how to do this. But the communists of Petrograd must show a new method of study. While setting out for the southern front against Denikin we must on the way disperse the pitiable remains of the bands of Rodzianko and Yudenich. In this will consist our science. On the skins of these White-Guardists the Communists of Petrograd will learn how to defeat Denikin and will appear at the Southern front with diplomas of victory.

Gdov must be taken and this must be done as quickly as possible. This must be done not only because we must hurry to the southern front, but also because the Gdov sector is the only place where the White-Guardists of Rodzianko still hold out and continue to threaten Red Petrograd. We consider that the Communists of Petrograd, when they go to the South, should see to it that no danger threatens their city.

Gdov must be taken. On this small sector, covered by lakes and marshes, our brothers of the Red Army have been fighting now for several months and among them are many of our Petrograd brothers. They must not be obliged to spend the winter there; they must be helped to finish this poisonous autumn fly—this Rodzianko, who is always buzzing around our ears and trying to bite Red Petrograd.

The Esthonian White-Guardist government, according to the latest news, has exiled these brave fighters from Esthonia to "the territory of the North Western Government." "The territory" of this joke government is the marsh of Gdov. To date their influence does not extend further, but these rascals would be idiots if they did not count on the possibility of extending the limits of their authority right up to Petrograd.

Comrades: We shall destroy all of their hopes and deprive them of all their chances. We shall drive them back into their marshy "territory" and send them to the White-Esthonians.

Gdov must be taken: This must be done by the Communists of Petrograd. We must bring the war to a close on the Petrograd front and transfer all of our forces from there to the southern front.

PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

22

CONTROL OF MEMBERS

[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, December 15, 1919]

TO ALL PROVINCIAL AND ALSO TO THE PETROGRAD AND MOSCOW
COMMITTEES OF THE PARTY AND TO POLITICAL SECTIONS
OF THE ARMY

MOSCOW, *December 14 (Rosta)*

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party announces:

1. No member of the party can go to the Ukraine for party or Soviet work without the permission of the Central Committee.

2. All who wish to go to the Ukraine can make declaration of this fact to the Provincial Committee, and in Petrograd and Moscow to the city committees, which send these declarations, together with their conclusions and an inquiry sheet, to the Central Committee of the R. C. P.

NOTE.—The inquiry sheet should contain answers to the following questions: (1) full name, (2) work now being performed, (3) work formerly performed in Russia and the Ukraine, (4) when and where entered the organization of the party, (5) when entered the local organization and with whose permission, (6) profession, (7) nationality, (8) family situation, (9) state of health, (10) relation to fulfillment of military service.

3. For minors and sick, and for persons not employed and not previously employed in the Ukraine, provincial committees and the Petrograd and Moscow committees can give permission on own authority reporting immediately to the Central Committee.

4. No appointment of comrades who formerly worked in the Ukraine by local organization or by political sections of the army, to be directed by the Central Committee of the R. C. P. or by the Communist Party of the Ukraine, are allowed except in the above procedure.

KRESTINSKY, *Secretary*

23

TROTSKY REPORT TO SEVENTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

[Red Baltic Fleet, December 11, 1919. Extract]

"Our army consists of peasants and workmen. Workmen represent scarcely more than 15-18 per cent, but they maintain the same directing position as throughout Soviet Russia. This is a privilege secured to them because of their greater consciousness, compactness and revolutionary zeal. The army is the reflection of our whole social order. It is based on the rule of the working class, in which latter the party of Communists plays the leading role."

Comrade Trotsky points out also the significance of this party for the army. The number of members of this party in the army is about 10,000. The responsible posts of commissaries are occupied by them in the overwhelming majority of instances. In each regiment there is a Communist group. The significance of the Communists in the army is shown by the fact that when conditions become unfavorable in a given division the commanding staff appeals to the Revolutionary Military Soviet with a request that a group of Communists be sent down.

Comrade Trotsky points out the following very characteristic fact: every Communist knows that he can not be captured as a prisoner of war, for to be captured means to perish. Thus there is created a psychology which Trotsky defines as a new "Communist Order of Samurai," who know how to die and are teaching this to others. . . .

24

"IRON DISCIPLINE"

[Article by Nicholas Kochukov, Samara Kommuna, April 11, 1919]

Our party, the party of Communists-Bolsheviks, is composed almost entirely of the more conscious workmen and the poorest

peasants. At the present moment the Communist Party is the sole leader of the titanic struggle of labor and capital. The Communist Party as a whole is responsible for the future of the young Soviet socialist republic, for the whole course of the world communist revolution. In the country the highest organ of authority to which all Soviet institutions and officials are subordinate is again the Communist Party.

The capitalists of the whole world openly admit that their chief enemy is the constantly growing bolshevism, with the Soviet authority proclaimed by the Russian Communist Party.

It is quite natural that czars, generals, reactionaries, landlords, and the Allies have joined to fight the Workmen Peasants' Government. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the enemies of the toiling people, are zealously assisting them in their Cain's work. Behind the back of the heroically struggling proletariat they sharpen their knives and plan to attack from the rear.

But the Communist Party, the Soviet authority, rests on the broad masses of the urban and village poor and its strength is unshakable.

It is true that during the year and a half of work many defects have been noted in our party activities. For example, frequently one could see how responsible party workers were out of touch with the broader mass so that the Soviet authority was not sufficiently responsive to the voice of the workmen and peasants. Also there was not sufficient discipline among the party workers.

The practical steps proposed a few days ago at the All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party give one confidence that all these defects will soon be corrected.

Frequently among separate groups of the party arise serious disputes on the questions of the tactics and resolutions just adopted by a party congress. In order to avoid such differences of opinion at the general meetings, one must constantly explain what position each member of the party should take on such questions as "the attitude of Communists toward the middle peasants" or "the attitude toward the petty bourgeoisie."

All Communists who for any reason violate party discipline should immediately be turned over to a pitiless party court, should be boycotted, and finally as a last measure of punishment excluded from the party.

Having now attained political control the Russian proletariat can secure final victory over its class enemy if all the members of the party will be disciplined, organized, and coordinated in one compact whole.

And the world revolution, with the steel sword, will lead in the pages of history the glorious future of our party.

25

APPEAL OF COMMUNIST PARTY ON SATURDAY WORK

[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, September 15, 1919]

The Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party has issued an appeal for the wider application of communist Saturday work. In the instructions issued the following phrases appear: "Members of the party are obliged to take part in 'Saturday work.' Those not taking part must be re-registered and membership dues are not accepted from them. A special bureau of the Central Committee is composed of three comrades appointed by the Moscow Committee."

In another part of the appeal it reads: "Comrades, go to work in a friendly spirit, for a great step forward has been made; the beginning is always hard but any beginning must be carried out to the end. We live in a time when our efforts must be directed in such a way as to liberate production from the grasping hands of capitalism and private property. We have liberated labor and now it is necessary to make labor 'the ruler of the world.' This is the fundamental task of the great movement of the working class and the actual freeing of labor; the complete transition from the kingdom of compulsion to the kingdom of freedom and liberty. Comrades, communistic Friday work days and Thursday work days will develop through the communistic Saturday work days. Thus we shall pass to complete universal communistic labor. Long live communism! Long live free communistic labor!"

26

COLUMN "PARTY LIFE"

[Izvestia, November 15, 1919]

The following comrades, Communists, registered in the political section of the Revolutionary Soviet of the Republic must transfer all business in connection with posts occupied by

them and appear on November 17 before the Political Section of the Revolutionary Soviet of the Republic (address given), to Comrade Zahorab, the chief of the Instruction Department; (806) Baburin, Constantine Vas.; (807) Ben, Ilia Lavrent. (and so on through No. 861).

To attention of Comrade Communists:

The following comrades are called for November 17 to the Political Section of the Revolutionary Soviet of the Republic (Address), to Comrade Kameneva, for personal consultation (list of about 50).

The Committee of Russian Communist Party of the "city" ward publishes a list of the comrades who have been appointed to be sent to barracks in the third contingent. The mobilized comrades hold the following membership tickets:

(1) Golver, Marial Karlovich, membership ticket 3029 (list of names numbered up to 84).

"FROM THE COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY"

[Izvestia, November 1, 1919]

The Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Ward and the Staff of the Battalions for Special Service of this Ward proposes to all comrades whose names are given below to appear within two days of the publications of this list. Where persons for any reason are unable to appear, the factory or party groups should send notice within the term fixed, and are held responsible for the same. Against all comrades failing to appear within the term set the most severe measure will be taken, including exclusion from the party. (1) Antonov, N. S., membership ticket, 1949; (2) Artema, G. G., 1831. (List of 87 names.)

27

"THE DUTY OF NEW MEMBERS OF THE PARTY," BY V. V.

[Krasnaya Gazeta, September 27, 1919]

The new members of the party must not simply carry the party tickets in their pockets. They must set about immediately to fulfill their duties. But what can one demand of the workman, workwoman, or Red Army soldier who has just entered the party?

Of course, one can not make them immediately agitator-orators or organizers. But without any preparation they can fulfill the fundamental duties of party members.

One can agitate not only by making speeches, but by action, by one's personal example. The young party member, if he is a workman, must be a model in observing labor discipline; if he is a soldier, a model in observing the duty of a Red Army soldier. In his everyday work the workman must show the other less conscious workmen how one should fulfill the duties of an honest, toiling workman.

Example is the best method of agitation. Therefore, why should not the young party member show this example during the communist Saturdays, and why should he not be the first to appear for work, unloading wood for example. This does not require preparation; all that is needed is a little common sense; and this work is necessary to strengthen the revolution and bring about the complete triumph of the proletariat.

The figures on those taking part in the communist Saturdays show that approximately 7,000-8,000 Communists turn up for work, while in all Petrograd recently the number of members of the party was reckoned around 13,000-14,000; this means that some 6,000-7,000 do not turn up for Saturday work. And this last figure falls mainly on the young members. Party discipline still gives them an excuse.

But communistic consciousness should not allow them to take advantage of any excuses. Appealing to them we should say: "Young members of the party must first of all turn up for Saturday work."

A second duty is the following. The last city conference declared: every Communist must learn military science; must learn to handle a rifle, a machine gun, and a trench gun and drive an armored motor truck—in general, learn military science. The Central Committee of the party declared to create from all healthy Communists regiments for special service, with regular training in military matters, and to organize women Communists to study sanitation. At present these regiments are being organized in Petrograd.

The young Communist must give the most serious attention to his studies in these regiments. He must know that the calling of Communist imposes on him a special obligation to be ready at any moment, on the call of his party, to come to the defense

of the Soviet authority against the attacks of its enemies—whether it be an internal counter-revolutionary conspiracy or a danger on the external fronts. We must say then: “Young Communists, learn military science!”

The fulfilling of these two fundamental duties must be the first examination for young members of the party, in order to receive the honorable calling of Communists. There is no question that those workmen and peasants who have recently entered our ranks will pass this examination with honor, and will work together with the old Communists tempered in battle, here in the rear, with one hand carrying out their daily tasks, while holding a rifle in the other.

28

FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Petrograd Pravda, May 6, 1919]

For the purpose of carrying out more successfully the mobilization, and becoming acquainted with the party activity of provincial organizations, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has ordered that responsible representatives be delegated for temporary work, as follows: To Viatka province, Steklov; to Vladimir province, Krylenko; to Voronezh, Ermeyev; to Gomel, Pravdin; to Ivano-Voznesensk, Ryazanov; to Kaluga, Yaroslavsky; to Kostroma, Lunacharsky; to Kursk, Bukharin; to Vitebsk, Dmitriev; to Saratov, Rykov; to Ryazan, Ovsyanikov; to Yaroslav, Lyubarsky and Dobrokhoto; to Smolensk and Minsk, Lander; to Moscow, Maksimovsky; to Nizhny-Novgorod, Semashko; to Orel, Preobrazhensky; to Tambov, Podbelsky; to Tver, Sosnovsky; to Tula, Kanatshikov; and comrades from the Moscow organization: Kryukov, Merkulov, Emelyanov, Kolotev, Ilyushin, Osipov, Esikov, Butusov, Bodrov, Zdanevich, Babayev, Gorchatin, Gorpunov, Bochka, Korsinov, Ovsyanikov, and Piskarev.

Each of the above-enumerated comrades will be at the head of a group of comrades who have attended the Soviet lectures organized by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, or a proletarian university, and will lead this group as the responsible representative of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

ORDER FROM TROTSKY

[Petrograd Pravda, November 4, 1919]

The offensive temporarily stopped is commencing again. We have concentrated great masses of artillery and technical equipment. The number of our soldiers considerably exceeds that of the enemy. We have all means for a complete defeat of the bands of Yudenich.

It is necessary that the whole apparatus of the Seventh Army function correctly.

1. The commanders of military supplies of the army must take good care of the soldiers, and see that they are well dressed, shod, fed, and supplied with raw materials. No interruption in feeding and supplying with ammunition is permitted. It is only necessary to supply and distribute. The commanders of the departments of supply are responsible for the punctual carrying out of these instructions.

2. The commanders and commissars must lead their regiments decisively. Fighting orders must be fulfilled accurately. No changes or explanations will be permitted. Commanders and commissars are responsible for their regiments before the Soviet Republic.

3. The infantry must strictly remember that the artillery and armored trains do not replace infantry but only help it.

4. The Communists must be at the most dangerous posts, giving an example of bravery and indefatigability. Communists who will be found guilty of saving themselves will be punished doubly.

5. Severe punishments for cowards and egoists. Those retreating in disorder are to be executed on the spot. Tribunals must so function that executions take place immediately after the reading of sentence.

6. Commanders, Commissars, Communists! Honest soldiers are ordered to see that traitors should not corrupt our ranks; provocatory agents and those bringing about panic must be annihilated on the spot. Everybody at his post must work according to his conscience, must act to the maximum of his

ability, must remember that the solid front of our pressure will annihilate completely the northwestern army of Yudenich.

L. TROTSKY,
*The President of the Revolutionary Military
 Soviet of the Republic,
 People's Commissar of the Army and Navy*

30

RESOLUTION OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Severnaya Kommuna, February 22, 1919]

At the session of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party on February 15, 1919, the following resolutions were carried: taking into account: (1) that the uninterrupted growth of our party during the year of dictatorship has inevitably meant that there have entered its ranks elements having absolutely nothing in common with Communism, joining in order to use the authority of the Russian Communist Party for their own personal, selfish aims; (2) that these elements, taking cover under the flag of Communism, are by their acts discrediting in the eyes of the people the prestige and glorious name of our Proletarian Party; (3) that the so-called "Communists of our days" by their outrageous behavior are arousing discontent and bitter feeling in the people, thus creating a favorable soil for counter-revolutionary agitation—taking all this into account, the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party declares:

(a) That the party congress about to be held should call on all party organizations to check up in the strictest manner all members of the party and cleanse its ranks of elements foreign to the party; (b) that one must carry on a decisive struggle against those elements whose acts create a counter-revolutionary state of mind; (c) that one must make every effort to raise the moral level of members of the Russian Communist Party and educate them in the spirit of true proletarian communism; (d) that one must direct all efforts towards strengthening party discipline and establishing strict control by the party over all its members in all fields of party-soviet activity.

TWO CIRCULAR LETTERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

[Petrograd Pravda, October 1, 1919]

Comrades:

Now, that in accordance with the resolutions of the Eighth Congress of our party the re-registration and weeding out has been almost accomplished in all the party organizations, the Central Committee considers it appropriate to undertake a campaign to recruit new members into the party.

At its session of September 26 the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party resolved to organize in the near future in cities, villages, and among the troops a "party week." The Central Committee does not fix the date of this week, leaving it to the party organizations to establish it locally, in accordance with local conditions, but the Central Committee insists that this work must be everywhere finished during the month of October.

The principal condition which the Central Committee considers essential is that during the "party week" members are to be received only from among working men and women, Red soldiers, and men and women of the peasantry. During this period admission to the party is closed to all others. We want to increase the numerical strength by an accession of working men and women of factories and shops, of peasants, men and women, from the villages.

The Eighth Congress of the party in its resolution regarding organization justly pointed out that a quantitative improvement in the composition of the party must not be attempted at the expense of its qualitative strength. This decision of the party congress must be kept in view constantly during the campaign of the "party week."

In the course of the "party week" we must point out to all the new recruits to whom we appeal that we are calling them to a difficult, but great struggle, against a long line of enemies. The recruits must be told that membership in the party involves tremendous duties, that the difficult times through which we are passing demand from members of the Russian Communist Party an iron discipline and self-sacrifice. Let only those enter our party who knowingly take upon themselves these difficult duties,

who are ready to sacrifice everything to the work of the Russian Communist Party. At the same time we must open the door wide to workingmen, Red Army soldiers, and peasants who want to enter our party.

During the "party week" there must be organized everywhere tens and hundreds of large and small meetings; there must be spread tens and thousands of copies of our program. We must appeal first of all to those workmen who consider themselves non-partisans. In this work we must seek the fractions of trade unions and soviets, the factory and shop committees, etc. During the "party week" entry into the party is not to be conditioned by the presentation of two written recommendations as heretofore.

All the formal requirements for workers, Red Army soldiers, and peasants are during this week suspended. In the shops, in the barracks, after laborers' meetings there is to be offered a chance to those who wish to inscribe themselves as members of the party. The lists thus made up are later published for the general information at the given factory or at the barracks, and afterwards the leaders are passed on by the old party nucleus of the given party or by the local party committee.

In accordance with local conditions comrades may find other forms of attracting better elements of the workers and peasant masses into the party. It is only necessary to get to work, to get rid of red tape, to attempt to dig out new strata and put to the work of recruiting some new members and without exception all the old party members.

Every workman who is a member of the party must attempt to recruit one or two new party members. Every Communist engaged in Soviets must find time during the "party week" to visit that factory or shop where he was employed before in order to enlist one or more new members in the party. If we make the proper effort, we shall thus double the strength of our party.

During the "party week" we ought to increase the membership of our party to half a million, and the results of the "party week" must be communicated immediately in detail by all provincial committees to the organization bureau of the central committee.

To work, comrades!

All honest and thinking workmen ought to be in the ranks of our party.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has addressed to all the party organizations the following letter:

"In the struggle against Denikin there must be utilized all the reserve of revolutionary energy which our party possesses. The whole government machinery must be put at the service of the sole task of defeating Denikin and destroying the man power of his White Guard bands.

"In the name of this task there must be done away all the red tape of the administration; there must be released all Communists from those institutions where they can and ought to be replaced by non-partisan workers, women and invalids of the civil war. These Communists are to be placed at the disposition of the military authorities.

"The principle of administration by 'colleges' must be reduced to a minimum. Discussions and considerations must be given up. The party must be as soon as possible rebuilt on military lines, and there must be created a military revolutionary apparatus, which would work accurately and solidly. In this apparatus there must be clearly distributed privileges and duties. Every Communist must know what his function is, where he ought to be in the moment of danger. Strict accountability is to be maintained for all inaccurate carrying out of instructions, for all looseness.

"Comrades! The advance of Denikin demands that our party immediately manifests to the full its energy. The true representative of the interests of the laboring class, the representative of the world revolution, the Communist Party, will save the Soviet government and destroy the attempts of the counter-revolution to break it. Every Communist must be at his post in this decisive moment, without confusion, without panic, but without lightly underrating the seriousness of the position, and accomplish their obligations as the representatives of the proletarian revolution.

"To work, comrades! Do not lose one moment in the matter of mobilization, agitation, in the matter of help to the southern front. In particular, there must be immediately furnished tens of workers to occupy the posts of regimental commissars. Comrades who are fit for this work must be immediately taken away from their usual occupation and put at the disposal of the political administration of the army. There must be furnished for the organization of cavalry formations all Communists who

have served in the cavalry who are to be released and organized into nuclei of the Soviet Cavalry.

"Denikin must be beaten and will be beaten by a new impetus of revolutionary will of the proletarian Communists."

32

"UNFORTUNATE MISUNDERSTANDING"

[Petrograd Pravda, November 15, 1919]

A writer in the Tver Pravda (No. 121 of November 11) shares his impressions of the "party week":

"Already three days of the 'party week' have passed. The general impression is most encouraging. We Communists feel that we have not become detached from the workmen and peasants' masses. Wherever meetings take place the halls are filled. Factory districts take a sympathetic attitude toward the 'party week' and listen with attention to a long list of speakers. For the most part, conscious people sign up in the party, people of middle age, that is, not very old, up to 60 years. Several trade-union boards have signed up for all the members of the union. In general the signing up progresses successfully."

Thus everything goes well.

But the following lines are very surprising:

"But things are not as satisfactory in the city districts, that is, with respect to the ordinary inhabitant. The latter come to the meetings in order to laugh and criticize, and in general consider this 'party week' as a kind of children's picnic. They either do not understand or do not wish to understand the importance of the present moment * * *.

"But it is particularly discouraging to note the attitude of the Soviet employees, or these nestlings that are living off the Soviet authority—what are they doing? what do they think?"

What does this mean? Have our comrades in Tver forgotten that this "party week" has been ordered not in order to bring into the ranks of the party "Soviet employees" and "ordinary inhabitants"—petty bourgeois elements, but in order to open the doors wide to workmen and peasants.

It is not at all surprising that the comrades in Tver have suffered such a complete fiasco in their efforts to attract non-proletarian elements.

"MORE CARE"

[Petrograd Pravda, December 12, 1919]

In No. 282 of the Petrograd Pravda there is the following communication: "The influx of many members to the collectives (Communist Party Groups) comes not only from the working class but also from the middle bourgeoisie, which formerly considered Communists as its enemies. One of the new collectives is a collective at the estate of Kurakin (a children's colony). Here entered the collective not only loyal employees but also representatives of the teaching staff."

These facts are worth reflecting on.

There is no doubt that at the present moment, when the decisive character of our victories over Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich becomes clear even for the world imperialism, when our enemies on the international arena are ready to admit that their hopes for the downfall of Soviet authority are Utopian, large groups of the "middle bourgeoisie," as our comrades expressed themselves and of the intelligentsia reach out toward the Communists as the ruling party.

But we should not at all facilitate their entrance into our ranks. We have opened the doors wide to workmen and workwomen, and soldiers of the Red Army, and these have rushed to us in a broad stream at this difficult moment, when not Hannibal but only Yudenich was at our door.

But this does not mean that now when our position has become established, we should open the doors to those careerists of the petty-bourgeois groups of the population—these have already done us sufficient harm. To relieve the party of this ballast the so-called "re-registration" took place, which in Petrograd threw out from the ranks of the organizations one-third of the membership of the party, and in some provincial towns reduced the organizations by two and three times.

There is no sense in repeating this bitter experience, and this inrush of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie that formerly considered the Communists as "its enemies," is not at all to our interest. Of course there may be here honest Soviet officials who have in fact shown their loyalty to the great ideas of communism and such can find their place in our ranks.

But just as we must facilitate access to us for the workman, so we must verify more carefully every one who wishes to join our ranks when he comes from the non-proletarian elements of the population.

The doors into the party are wide open for the workman and the workwoman, but there are strong gates—against every kind of “Soviet employee.”

B. V.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
144. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
145. Agreements between the United States and France, and between England and France, June 28, 1919; Anglo-Persian Agreement, August 9, 1919. December, 1919.
146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
148. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part 1. March, 1920.
149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part 2. April, 1920.
150. German Secret War Documents. May, 1920.
151. Present Day Conditions in Europe, by Henry P. Davison; Message of President Wilson to the Congress on the United States and the Armenian Mandate; Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. June, 1920.
152. Switzerland and the League of Nations: Documents Concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations; the United States and the League of Nations: Reservations of the United States Senate of November, 1919, and March, 1920. July, 1920.
153. The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, by George A. Finch. August, 1920.
154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
156. Presentation of the Saint-Gaudens Statue of Lincoln to the British People, July 28, 1920. November, 1920.
157. The Draft Scheme of the Permanent Court of International Justice. December, 1920.
158. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part I. January, 1921.

Special Bulletins:

Yugoslavia, by M. I. Pupin; Declaration of Independence of the Mid-European Union, October 26, 1918; Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, October 18, 1918; Declaration of Corfu, July 20, 1917. January, 1919.

The League of Nations: Proposed Constitution of the League of Nations; speeches delivered before the Peace Conference by members of the Commission on the League of Nations; addresses delivered by President Wilson in Boston, February 24, 1919, and in New York, March 4, 1919. March, 1919.

Criticisms of the Draft Plan for the League of Nations: William Howard Taft, Charles E. Hughes, Elihu Root. April, 1919.

Copies of the above, so far as they can be spared, will be sent to libraries and educational institutions for permanent preservation postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation.


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THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN RUSSIA AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND TO THE RUSSIAN SOVIETS

PART II



FEBRUARY, 1921

No. 159

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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1

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 52.

Subscription rate: twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years.

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[EDITOR'S NOTE. The first portion of this State Department document, with its appendices, was published in the January issue of *International Conciliation*. This section, with appendices, concludes the document.]

PART II

VII

THE HEGEMONY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET RUSSIA

Documents already quoted frequently emphasize that the Communist Party, as such, is and should be the directing party in Soviet Russia, the absolute predominance of Communists in the last All-Russian Congress of December, 1919, was shown by the official figures on that Congress. And the general theory of the rôle of a Communist Party in time of social revolution has been much discussed. The official editor of the Petrograd Pravda, writing on "The Party and the Soviets," says:

It is no secret for anyone that in a country where the working class and the poorest peasantry are in power, that party is the directing party which expresses the interests of these groups of the population—the Communist Party. All work in the Soviets goes on under the influence (of ideas) and the political leadership of our party. (See Appendix 34.)

The leading article in the Petrograd Pravda of November 5, 1919, entitled "Class and Party," written after the collapse of the Yudenich offensive, states that—

All artificial dividing lines were destroyed during the threatening days of great alarm, and also all divisions between that class which unanimously rose to defend communism and its great Communist Party. (Appendix 35.)

In a widely published letter by Lenin, addressed to workmen and peasants on the occasion of the victory over Kolchak, one finds it stated that—

The dictatorship of the working class is carried out by the party of Bolsheviks, which, as early as 1905, and earlier, became one with the entire revolutionary proletariat. (Appendix 36.)

In preparation for the elections to the Petrograd Soviet, the Petrograd Provincial Committee of the Party issued an appeal to "non-party peasants and workmen" (*Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet*, December 15, 1919—Appendix 37), in which the record of the Communist Party was set forth with the exhortation:

Shame on you, workman or peasant, if at this hour you are not fighting in the ranks of the Communist Party.

VIII

THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S PRESS

In the large cities like Moscow and Petrograd the Communist Party has official party newspapers. The Petrograd *Pravda* is the "organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party," this statement appearing immediately under the title. The Moscow *Pravda* is the "organ of the Central Committee, the Moscow City Committee, and the Moscow Provincial Committee of the Russian Communist Party," as indicated in the sub-title. In the smaller cities, on the other hand, as, for example, Olonetz, the one newspaper published is indicated in the subtitle as the organ both of the local Soviet and of the local committee of the Communist Party. (From copies of these papers in files of the State Department.)

The character of the party press of the Russian Communist Party was discussed at a city conference of the Petrograd organizations of the Russian Communist Party. Extracts from the report made at this conference (Appendix 38) show how completely dependent the party press is on official Soviet news agencies. This report also indicates the avowedly propaganda character of the party press.

The Soviet officials have tried to draw a distinction between official Soviet newspapers and strictly party organs. Thus, in the correspondence between Chicherin and the German

consul-general in the autumn of 1918 (*Izvestia*, September 21, 1918), the term "organ of the Soviet authority" is used in contradistinction to "non-official organs of the press." But the editorial offices of both the official *Izvestia* and the Moscow *Pravda*, for example, are in the same building and both papers are set up and printed in the same establishment, as shown by the address and indication of printing office on these newspapers in files of the Department. In any case, these party organs are controlled by the respective committees of the Russian Communist Party, as specifically indicated on each number. The chairman and members of these committees are officials in Soviet institutions, as, for example, Zinoviev and Bukharin.

IX

THE PROGRAM OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The two program writers of the Communist Party are Lenin and Bukharin. Lenin has prepared a whole series of so-called "Theses," the more important and recent being those of March, 1918, on peace and revolutionary war (see "Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia,")¹ and those of March, 1919, on bourgeois and proletarian democracies.² In 1918 Bukharin issued the "Program of the Communist Party," of which Chapter XIX on "World Revolution" has been given in "Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia."³ This chapter opens with the sentence:

The program of the Communist Party is a program not only of liberating the proletariat of one country; it is the program of liberating the proletariat of the world, for such is the program of the "International Revolution."

This program prepared by Bukharin was published in many languages in Moscow, copies in English, French, and German being in the files of the Department. Also, this

¹ *International Conciliation*, April, 1920, p. 11.

² *ibid.*, March, 1920, p. 42.

³ *ibid.*, April, 1920, p. 18.

program was republished with certain omissions in Russian in the United States by the Russian Socialist Federation.

In February, 1919, a "project of the program" of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was published in official Soviet newspapers, as well as in the party newspapers, in order to allow discussion of the program in preparation for the Eighth All-Russian Congress of the party which was held in March, 1919. The first paragraph of this program concludes:

The growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all progressive countries and the simultaneous appearance and development of the Soviet form of this movement, that is such a form as was directed immediately toward the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, finally the beginning and the course of development of revolution in Austria-Hungary and Germany in particular—all this indicated definitely that the era of world proletarian communistic revolution has started. (Appendix 39.)

At this Eighth Congress, Bukharin made a report on the program emphasizing the fact that this program was obligatory on every member of the party, departure from it representing a "violation of our party discipline." The projected program as published was adopted by the Eighth Congress. (See Appendix 40.) The full text of the program as adopted is in the files of the Department.

X

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE RUSSIAN SOVIETS, AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

The Communist Party of Russia, the Russian Soviets and the Third International are so closely interrelated as to constitute actually if not technically one working organization.

The call for the first Congress of the Communist International, later called the Third International, was signed by the "Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Lenin, Trotsky)." (See "Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Move-

ment in Russia.")¹ The delegates to this Congress were present as members of communist parties, and the Communist Party of Russia was represented by Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin, Chicherin, Obolensky (Osinsky), and Vorovsky, four of whom hold the highest official positions in the Soviet hierarchy. ("Communist International—Organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International," No. 1, May 1, 1919.)

The Eighth All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party, meeting a few weeks later, passed a formal resolution adhering to the platform of the Third International in its entirety (Appendix 41). In an introductory speech at the opening session of this Congress Lenin had emphasized the importance of the founding of the Third International (Appendix 42), and in a speech summarizing the work of the Congress said: "We approved the creation of the Third Communist International." (*Severnaya Kommuna*, March 28, 1919.) Attention has already been called to a special session at which the Communist Party in conjunction with official Soviet institutions passed a resolution supporting the Communist or Third International (Appendix XV).

The Third International has an executive committee, the chairman of which is Zinoviev, as shown in a typical "Appeal to the Proletarians of All Countries" issued in the name of the Third International, published in the *Izvestia*, November 2, 1919. (Appendix 43.) Documents already quoted show that Zinoviev is also chairman or president of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In addition, he is the chairman of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party and constantly makes reports at conferences and meetings of that party (Appendix 44).

Bukharin is the vice-chairman of the Executive Committee of the Third International. (Appendix 45.) He is also a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and of the presidential body of the Third Congress of Soviets

¹ *International Conciliation*, March, 1920, p. 37.

of National Economy. In a wireless message dated Moscow, January 24, 1920, it is stated that Bukharin in the name of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Communist International greeted the convening of this congress (Appendix 46). A wireless message dated Moscow, January 16, 1920, tells of a meeting of the Third International in memory of Karl Liebknecht which was addressed by Bukharin as a member of the presidential body and which passed a resolution introduced by him (Appendix 47). Bukharin is also editor of the Moscow Pravda which is an official organ of the Russian Communist Party. He, like Zinoviev, is one of the acknowledged responsible leaders of the party, as shown in many of the documents quoted above (also, Appendix 48). In the Petrograd Pravda of November 20, 1919, A. Balabanova is mentioned as "secretary of the Third International" (Appendix 49). She also has been active in the Russian Communist Party.

The Executive Committee of the Third International has its headquarters at Smolny Institute as shown in a signed article by Zinoviev in the Petrograd Pravda of November 7, 1919 (Appendix 50), and by its official publications. Smolny Institute is also the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party (notices of meetings of these two institutions appear in Bolshevik newspapers in the files of the Department).

The Executive Committee of the Communist International has an official organ called the *Communist International*, the first issue of which appeared May 1, 1919 (in the files of the Department in Russian, French, and German editions, published simultaneously). The editorial office of this publication is indicated on the title page as "Petrograd, Smolny, Office of G. Zinoviev," and on the cover the "Kremlin, Moscow," the headquarters of the central Soviet institutions precedes the indication "Petrograd, Smolny." A wireless dated Petrograd, January 16, 1920, gives the contents of the seventh number of this publication stating that it is "pub-

lished at Petrograd under the direction of Zinoviev, in Russian, English, French, and German" (Appendix 51). This particular number contains articles by Lenin, Trotsky, Sadoul, and Zinoviev. There is also an article entitled "America and the Russian Revolution" by S. Rutgers, and one on "The Revolutionary Movement in America" by Reed. The contents of the sixth number were given in a wireless of November 10, 1919 (Appendix 52). Among the contributors were Trotsky, Zinoviev, Lenin, Joffe, and Krestinsky. The latter is secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Appeals issued in the name of the Third International are published in all Bolshevist newspapers including the *Izvestia*, the official organ of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (Appendix 53), which also publishes statements from communist parties declaring adherence to the Third International (Appendix 54) in numbers as recent as December 21, 1919.

Soviet officials in addressing Soviet institutions constantly refer to the Third International. Thus Zinoviev as president of the Petrograd Soviet, addressing a special session of that body in November, 1919, said: "Long live the future ruler of the world, the great Communist International." (Appendix 55.) Later, on December 31, 1919, in opening the session of the newly elected Petrograd Soviet, Zinoviev refers to Petrograd as the "key of the Third International" and speaks of the Petrograd Soviet as being the "guardian and keeper of this key." (Appendix 56.) Again, Kalinin, who is the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in his "Wishes for 1920" expresses the wish that—

Western European brothers in the coming year should overthrow the rule of their capitalists and should join with the Russian proletariat and establish the single authority of the Soviets throughout the entire world under the protection of the Third International. (Appendix 57.)

In an order to the Red Army, issued by the Petrograd Mil-

tary Circuit, the Third Communist International is mentioned as the "great uniter of the proletarians" (Appendix 58). The "responsible editor" of the Petrograd Pravda, which is the official organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Communist Party, writing under date of January 1, 1920, speaks of the Third International as "perhaps the greatest achievement of the past year" (Appendix 59). In official publications, published by the Soviet publishing enterprise, the men most active in the organization of the Communist International, namely, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, are contributors and writers (Appendix 60). Steklov, the responsible editor of the Izvestia, the official organ of the Soviets, in the leading article of December 17, 1919, emphasizes the importance of the Communist International (Appendix 61). A leading article in the Krasnaya Gazeta, of December 18, 1919, which is an official publication of the Petrograd Soviet, speaks of the English working class as entering into "direct relations with us" and interprets this as "the first step of our English brothers on the road to the Third International" (Appendix 62).

Thus the general attitude of all the Bolshevik leaders with respect to the Third International is that it represents one of their most important activities. As Zinoviev states in an article in the Petrograd Pravda of November 7, 1919:

Our Third Communist International now already represents one of the greatest factors of European history. And in a year, in two years, the Communist International will rule the whole world. (Appendix 50.)

The Communist International as such gives not only encouragement but direction, and even orders to communist parties of other countries, and communications very similar in tone and intent issue also from responsible Soviet officials. Thus, the Communist International settles a dispute between two communist parties of the Ukraine (Appendix 63), and Kalinin, in the name of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, sends a message to the Soviet of the Bashkir Republic (Appendix 64). Zinoviev, in the name of the

Third International, makes certain demands of the communists of the Ukraine (Appendix 65), at the same time Lenin similarly addresses the workmen and peasants of the Ukraine (Appendix 66).

Also, the Communist International issues appeals to the French workmen (Appendix 67) and, as already pointed out, to the "Proletarians of All Countries" (Appendix 48). It will be noted that in both these last instances the appeal is published in the official organ of the central Soviets. Finally, the Executive Committee of the Communist International issues formal statements protesting against the measures of repression with respect to communists in other countries, for example, in Hungary (Appendix 68).

The wireless stations in Russia are under strict official Soviet control. They are used for administrative purposes and also to distribute news through the official telegraph agency, the Rosta. It has been noted that the appeals issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist International are sent out by wireless. Messages to representatives of communist parties in other countries are similarly sent by the official wireless, as, for example, the one quoted above of November 13, 1919, sent by Bukharin to representatives of the Austrian Communist Party (Appendix 45).

The French communist group in Moscow was given recently the use of the official wireless to send their proclamation to the French proletariat (Appendix 69). Delegates from communist parties of other countries are officially received not only by the Third International but also by Soviet institutions. Thus, Tom Paine, who possibly may be John Reed, addressed the Petrograd Soviet on his arrival in Petrograd (Appendix 70) and later the Moscow Soviet (Appendix 71). A delegation of Korean revolutionists spoke before the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets and gave a detailed account of the "movement in their country toward the Third International" (Appendix 72).

The fifth of the communist "Work Saturdays" mentioned above was "for the Third International" (Appendix 73).

Zinoviev presented flags to the Red Army in the name of the Communist International (Appendix 74).

XI

CONCLUSION

The program of the Russian Communist Party is one of world revolution, and the Communist International is avowedly the directing and coordinating center of an international revolutionary movement to establish the "World Soviet Republic." *It is impossible to differentiate as to world policy between the Russian Communist Party, the Third or Communist International, and the official Soviet administration, because of the system of "interlocking directorates" common to all three.*

APPENDICES

34

"THE PARTY AND THE SOVIETS"

[Petrograd Pravda, February 13, 1919]

One of the most important questions of the day is now the inter-relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviets of Workmen's Peasants and Red Army Deputies.

It is no secret for anyone that in a country where the working class and the poorest peasantry are in power, that party is the directing party which expresses the interests of these groups of the population—the Communist Party. All the work in the Soviets goes on under the influence (of ideas) and the political leadership of our party. It is the forms which this leadership should assume that are the subject of disagreement. In order to explain just what should be the normal relations between the party and the Soviets, we turn to the classic explanation of the "Communist Manifesto" with respect to the relations between "communist and the proletariat in general," between the working class party and the representatives (rest of line illegible but undoubtedly the words are "of the Communist Party"). The latter have no interests that are different from the interests of the whole proletariat.

They do not put forward special principles according to which they would like to give the form to the proletarian movement.

Communists differ from other parties only in this that in the various stages of development of the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie they always represent the interest of the movement as a whole.

Communists therefore are in practice the most decisive section of the workmen parties of all countries, that section which aims always to go further theoretically; they have this advantage over the remaining mass of the proletariat, that they understand the conditions, course and world results of the proletarian movement.

Marx and Engels had in view the relation between class and party at a time when the class was still struggling for the con-

quest of governmental power, but their comment does not lose force even for the period when the proletariat, having taken over authority, becomes the ruling class.

Soviets are exactly the ruling organization of the exploited class of proletarians and poorest peasants, whose political leader is the Communist Party.

The Soviets are mass organizations bringing together in their ranks the entire mass of toilers and exploited, while the party brings together in its ranks the advance guard of the toilers, their most conscious and resolute section, that section of the proletariat which has an advantage over the entire working class mass in that it understands the general course and the theoretical condition of the development of the workmen movement.

Therefore in reality there can be no prolonged conflict between the organization of a class and the organization of its most progressive elements.

For the toiling masses push forward to the advanced posts in their governmental organizations the most progressive workers, who are in fact the communists. The Soviets, directing the life of the toilers in this transition from capitalism to socialism are naturally the points of support of the Communist Party. Thus is eliminated the need of any tutelage, of any setting up of party as opposed to Soviets, for the Soviets to which the toilers send their best people, their leading fighters, by reason of the very course of events, develop into the fighting center of revolutionary communists.

The Soviet organization itself decides the problem of establishing normal relations between the class and its advanced guard, a problem over which theoretician and practitioners of Marxism have broken so many spears.

The party and the Soviets represent simply two different forms of the organization of the working class mass. In the activities of the Soviets of workmen and peasants the Communist Party absorbs rich experience for carrying out its leadership of the proletarian movement.

Communists are far from any sectarianism, the distinguished peculiarities of which Marx considered to be "the desire to prescribe for the movement its course in conformity with a given doctrinarian recipe" instead of seeking the real foundation for one's agitation in the actual elements of the class movement. A sect justifies itself not on the ground that it has something in

common with the workmen movement, but on the ground of a special shibboleth, by which it differs from the latter.

And in just this way the practical experience of our Soviets gives us rich material on the basis of which the party is realizing its task of leadership of the working class movement. For as Marx taught us, the principles of communism were not thought out in the study-room, but they are the reflection and the generalization of the class struggle that is going on before our eyes.

Life in its development decides the problem of the relations between the party and the class in the new conditions which develop because the proletariat has become the ruling class, and because its class organizations have become the organizations of governmental authority.

The Soviets create that living experience which is worked over and adopted by the party.

V. BYSTRIANSKY

35

"CLASS AND PARTY"—LEADING ARTICLE

[Petrograd Pravda, November 5, 1919]

The czarist generals and the robbers of the international stock exchange who are behind them, thought to deal a mortal blow to the Workmen's Revolution by their attack on Petrograd, but in actual fact they have only strengthened the revolution.

Obliged at first to retreat because it was exhausted by many months of fighting, the army nevertheless quickly recovered from the first defeats, and became a threatening force before which the enemy retreated in disorder. . . .

Yudenich and his higher masters also counted on a panic in the rear of the Red Army; they thought to introduce confusion among the toiling population of Petrograd; but here also they were greatly mistaken.

The Finnish Conservative newspaper, "Uusi Suomi," whose sympathies are entirely on the side of Yudenich, was obliged to admit that even the "non-Bolshevist" sections of the population "re-acted" with remarkable calmness to the advance of Yudenich.

As for the working class, the threatening danger has consolidated it, forever and completely, with its Communist Party.

All the reports coming from the various wards say that, in spite of the absence of the best Communists, who have gone to the front, party work continues in a most lively manner. Among

the workmen there is an excellent morale, great enthusiasm is noticeable, and collectives are being organized in those factories where before they did not exist. Not only the Communists, but all workmen came forward to defend Red Petrograd, and the non-party sections of the working class were no less active than the Communists, themselves.

During those great and threatening days, almost all the proletarians showed themselves in fact Communists, and those workmen and workwomen who had not yet formally joined the party, stood steadfastly at their revolutionary posts, side by side with Communists.

Further, during those difficult days, the most valuable elements of the non-party groups on their own initiative wished to become members of our party. Workmen and workwomen signed up as members of the party by large groups.

This change took place also among the less conscious groups of the working class: in the more reactionary "services," the railway comrades, we are told, worked without interruption like real revolutionists, and everywhere one thought prevailed: "to finish off the Whites as quickly as possible."

Volunteers joined the fighting groups in large numbers.

The enthusiasm that has seized the working class expressed itself also in an enormous increase in the productivity of labor among those comrades working for the defense, and this in spite of the increased mobilization. In some instances productivity increased by 100 or even 200 per cent. The workmen increased the working day to 12 hours. All trade unions adapted their organizations to assist the revolutionary front.

Further, the wave of enthusiasm reached also those groups of toilers among which petty bourgeois habits of life and thought are most strongly developed. Reports came from various wards that "Soviet employees were very restrained during those alarming days, in no way expressing their joy over the advance of the Whites. In fact, one noted a leaning in the direction of the Soviet authority."

The adventure of Yudenich has cost the working class many sacrifices; many of our best comrades fell on the field of battle. But in the final analysis this ordeal has strengthened the cause of revolution and has strengthened the hegemony of the Communist Party—and has made even closer the bond between it and the proletariat.

All artificial dividing walls were destroyed during the threatening days of great alarm, and all divisions between that class which unanimously arose to defend communism and its great Communist Party.

The duty of party organizations is to bring into its ranks the broader masses of those workmen who are still outside the ranks of the party but have come over to our side, and fuse them definitely with the party.

The workmen and workwomen who defended, together with the Communists, the approaches to Petrograd, must in the future fight with the Communists but in the ranks of the Communist Party. These will be welcomed.

The bond between the working class and its Communist Party will be strong because it has been forged in the fire of struggle.

36

LENIN'S LETTER TO WORKMEN AND PEASANTS

[Poster, 1919 (July). Extract]

Lesson 5. In order to destroy Kolchak, so that he can not rise again, all peasants must, without hesitation, make the choice in favor of the workmen's state. Some, especially Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and even the "left" wing of the latter, frighten the peasants with the bugbear of a "dictatorship of one party," of the party of Bolsheviks-Communists.

Following the example of Kolchak the peasants have learned not to fear bugbears.

Either the dictatorship (that is, iron authority) of landlords and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class. There is no middle course. Small gentry, the intellectuals, the small fry of the so-called gentlemen, who have learned from the reading of bad books, vainly dream of a middle course. Never in the world has there been the middle course and it can not be. Either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, covered by flowery phrases like those of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, about popular will, constituent assembly, liberty, etc., or the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one has not learned this from the history of the entire nineteenth century then one is simply a hopeless idiot. And in Russia we have all seen how the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries under Kerensky and under Kolchak dreamed about the middle course.

Whom did these dreamers benefit? Whom did they help? Kolchak and Denikin. Those that dream of a middle course assist Kolchak.

In the Urals and in Siberia workmen and peasants have compared from actual experience the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the working class. The dictatorship of the working class is carried out by the party of Bolsheviks, which as early as 1905, and earlier, became one with the entire revolutionary proletariat.

The dictatorship of the working class means: the workmen's state without hesitation will suppress landlords and capitalists, will suppress traitors and betrayers who assist these exploiters, will conquer them.

The workmen's state is the bitter enemy of the landlord and capitalist, of the speculator and rascal, the enemy of private property for capital, the enemy of the power of money.

The workmen's state is the one faithful friend and helper of the toilers and peasants. No wavering in the direction of capital.

A union of the toilers to combat the latter, a workmen's-peasants' authority, a Soviet authority—that is what "the dictatorship of the working class" actually means.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries wish to frighten the peasants by these words. They will not succeed. After Kolchak, workmen and peasants even in the most remote villages have understood that these words mean that without it one can not escape from Kolchak.

Down with those that hesitate, who are without character, who go to the assistance of capital because they are captured by the slogans and promises of capital! Bitter struggle against capital and a union of the toilers, a union of peasants with the working class—this is the last and most important lesson to be drawn from that period when Kolchak ruled.

37

"TO NON-PARTY PEASANTS AND WORKMEN"

[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, December 15, 1919]

The Communists have created a powerful Workmen's-Peasants' Red Army, in order to conquer forever from landlords and rich peasants all the land for the peasants, and from the bourgeoisie all the factories and mills for the workmen.

Non-party workmen, peasants, and all the toiling poor of city and village, remember and say: "Who demanded and secured the discontinuing of the robber czarist war?"

"Who opened the eyes of workmen and peasants to the truth?"

"Who turned their bayonets against their oppressors, landlords and factory owners?"

"Who created in the Red Army schools of literacy and constantly worked for its cultural and political enlightenment?"

"Who gives enormous effort and means to protect the families of Red Army soldiers and to cultivate their fields?"

"Who does not know either day or hour of rest in the fight against the oppressors and enslavers of workmen, peasants, and all toilers and has given their best workers to the ranks of the Red Army?"

It is the Communist Party that has done and continues to do all this.

The Red Army has destroyed and sweeps before it on all fronts the White-Guard bands of the czarist generals.

Just one more common effort and the hoped for hour of the decisive and complete victory of workmen and peasants will come.

It is the job of every toiling peasant and workman, without waiting a minute, with all his strength, to help the Red Army finish off our common enemy-enslaver.

Shame on you, workman or peasant, if at this hour you are not fighting in the ranks of the Communist Party.

It is a disgrace to stay to one side when your conscious brothers are fighting and perishing for your very welfare.

All toilers—join the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Non-party comrades, peasant, and workman! Watch and you will see that the last and decisive struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors is in progress. Do not be one who has not taken part in this struggle. Go to relieve your comrades.

Think of the state that is waiting for you if the White-Guard party of your century-long oppressors, blood-suckers, czarist generals, factory owners, merchants, landlords, and rich peasants defeat the Communist Party of workmen, peasants, and all toilers.

Come then to us so that you will not be ashamed before your comrades. We who are stronger in spirit will receive you into our ranks whole-heartedly, as fighter, for your own and for the welfare of the people.

PETROGRAD PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

REPORT ON PARTY PRESS—NINTH CITY CONFERENCE OF PETROGRAD ORGANIZATIONS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Petrograd Pravda, November 27, 1919. Extracts]

The party press further requires not simply workers but party workers. In the party press every line should express the principles of communism. The simplest news item should pass through a kind of prism and be accordingly reflected in the press. In the heading of any communication and in the headline of any telegram, in a word, everywhere there must be this touch.

The absence of party forces working exclusively in the newspapers is one of the reasons for the weakness of our party press.

At the present moment the so-called Rosta (official telegraph agency) plays a very important part in the work of conducting a newspaper. The press in our conditions can not be based on its own private initiative. If a bourgeois newspaper, using the government agency, has developed its success mainly through its "special correspondents," as the special correspondent was a kind of fermenting raisin, with us there can not be this use of special correspondents. Formerly, papers were for the most part commercial enterprises. With us it is a governmental, communist apparatus, created to serve the proletariat. The newspaper can not create its own news-getting apparatus, for then there would be inadmissible competition with the Rosta and a dissipation of forces.

The Rosta is very poorly organized and this fact is reflected in the newspapers. The newspaper receives all of its information from the bulletins of the Rosta. In other words, the character of the information, both in quality and quantity, on the pages of the newspapers depends upon the Rosta.

All of this, the report brings out, is reflected in the newspaper. The newspaper must be a political leader directing and arousing thought in those reading it, justifying and explaining the political slogans put forward and educating the readers. The newspaper must be a lively, clear, militant organ of the party, active, constantly carrying on this or that campaign, and creating such if there is none. The newspaper must be interesting. It must take hold and stir, interest, and arouse the reader. The newspaper must be sensitive to all facts of life, and it must be well

informed and rich in information. Each number of the newspaper must have its definite physiognomy. The paper is not an accidental collection of articles. The paper must be a lash which people fear and at the same time a place where one can bring, without any fear, disclosures, complaints, and criticisms. The editorial staff of the newspaper must be a staff connected by thousands of threads with all the corners of the regions served. It must be the favorite visiting place for every workman.

The reader of the report points out the need of bringing about all the above. Then he passes to the question of the work of the Petrograd Pravda and gives figures which show particularly the work of the literary colleges. With respect to these organizations, Petrograd has been the pioneer. Literary colleges were the prototype of this communist reporting system, without which we shall not be able to establish a large newspaper.

In more quiet times the editorial staff of the Petrograd Pravda used to establish the closest relations with the literary colleges. At one time these colleges held their meetings in the editorial rooms and organized a central bureau. The literary colleges furnished most interesting material and organized very well certain departments: party, workmen, provincial life, and even a general city chronicle. The organ of the Central Committee, the Moscow Pravda, has twice in its columns noted the work of the literary colleges in the pages of the Petrograd Pravda and held it up as an example for the Moscow organization. For reasons which we all know the work of the literary colleges has died out, but it must be revived. The literary colleges at the same time must become organizations to recruit and educate comrades who are capable of literary and newspaper work, who have tendencies in this direction, who like this kind of work.

39

PROJECT OF PROGRAM OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

[Severnaya Kommuna, February 28, 1919]

(This project of program was published a month before the eighth congress of party in order to start discussion. In actual fact this program was accepted with very few amendments as shown in other appendices. Only certain paragraphs of this program are given.)

(1) The revolution of October 25 (November 7th) 1917 in Russia, realized the dictatorship of the proletariat, which began with the support of the poorest peasantry or half-proletariat to build the foundation of a communistic society.

The growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all progressive countries and the simultaneous appearance and development of the Soviet form of this movement, that is such a form as was directed immediately toward the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, finally the beginning and the course of development of revolution in Austria-Hungary and Germany in particular—all this indicated definitely that the era of world proletarian communistic revolution has started.

(15) The imperialistic war could not be concluded by just peace; there could not in general be a conclusion of any kind of stable peace by bourgeois governments. The imperialistic war inevitably developed and is developing before our eyes into civil war of the exploited toiling masses with the proletariat at their head against the bourgeoisie.

The growing pressure from the proletariat and particularly the proletarian victories in neighboring countries, increases the resistance of the exploiters and gives rise to the creation by them of new forms of international cooperation of capitalists (League of Nations and such) which, by organizing on a world scale the systematic exploitation of all the peoples of the world, directs its main efforts toward the immediate suppression of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of all countries.

All this inevitably leads to the starting of civil war within separate states by revolutionary soldiers, both those defending proletarian countries and also the oppressed peoples against the yoke of imperialistic powers.

Under these conditions the slogan of pacifism, of international disarmament in the presence of capitalism, courts of arbitration and such, are not only reactionary utopias but a direct deception of the toilers with the aim of disarming the proletariat and distracting it from the task of disarming the exploiters.

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REPORT OF COMRADE BUKHARIN AT EIGHTH CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Severnaya Kommuna, March 21, 1919]

Our party even now has no definitely written program divided up by paragraphs. The Russian Communist Party has always

acted as the party of the revolutionary proletariat. From its activity there developed a situation by which every step of revolutionary activity was more important than a written program. We are able at the present moment to oppose to a paper program, the unique experience of a party which has been in authority for more than a year. This program of ours, which we are now working out, is not a paper program. It is, however, necessary as instructions for party work. The points of the program must be particularly concrete and business-like, formulating in the first place our organization tasks. Such a program represents instructions that will be obligatory on every member of the party. Departure from this program is a violation of our party discipline. Until now programs of socialist parties presented demands with respect to hostile forces and hostile classes. Our position is in principle quite different. In our demands we include what we ourselves are obliged to do for we have assumed an obligation not only with reference to our own country, but with reference to the entire proletariat of the world. We put forward what we demand of ourselves, for we are a party which is now in authority directly and which aims to create that form of society for the realization of which it took over authority and now holds authority in its own hands. But at the same time we should formulate our program in such a way that it should be a summary of experience by which our foreign comrades could profit, for the program of the Russian Communist Party in a considerable degree is also the program of the international proletariat.

All this distinguishes our program from other programs in the matter of form. (The speaker continued to analyze the character and contents of the program of the party.)

RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE QUESTION OF THE PARTY PROGRAM

Having discussed the project of the party program prepared by the commission of the Seventh Congress of the Party, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party resolves to consider the project of the commission in accord with the demands and tasks of a party of proletarian revolution both as to form and spirit and type of program and also as to the presentation of fundamental principles, tasks, aims, and tactics of our party. Therefore, the Congress resolves to adopt the project of the pro-

gram as worked out by the commission of the Seventh Congress as the basis for the program and to transmit it to the commission for final editing.

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RESOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ON COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

[Severnaya Kommuna, March 31, 1919]

Having heard the report on the Third International, the Congress greets the organized Third International, and adheres in entirety to its platform. The Russian Communist Party will struggle with all its force and means for the realization of the great aims of the Third International and instructs the "Central Committee" to render the most forceful aid to the organization and activities of the Third International.

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SPEECH BY LENIN AT OPENING SESSION OF EIGHTH CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Severnaya Kommuna, March 20, 1919. Extract]

March 18, at 6 o'clock, in the building of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in the Kremlin opened the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Comrade Lenin made the first speech, speaking for the Central Executive Committee of the Party:

(Five paragraphs on general topics.)

Comrades, you all of course know that the founding of the Third Communist International in Moscow is an act of the greatest importance in relation to the defining of our international position. Till now against us still stands an enormous real military force of the strongest powers of the world, and nevertheless we confidently say to ourselves, that this force, which is externally gigantic and from a physical point of view is incomparably stronger than ourselves—this force has begun to totter. It is no longer a force; it has not that firmness which it had formerly. Therefore our task and our aim—to come out victorious in the struggle with this giant—is not utopian. Quite to the contrary, a day does not pass that the papers do not bring us news of the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries, and this in spite of the fact that we have been artificially cut off from the

whole world. More than this, we know, we see, that this growth assumes the Soviet forms. Here we have the guarantee that by realizing the Soviet authority we have discovered the international, world-wide form, the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we are firmly convinced that the entire proletariat of the whole world has started on a similar road of struggle, to create similar forms of proletarian power—the power of workmen and toilers; and that no force in the world will hold back the course of the Communist revolution, leading to the World Soviet Republic.

Then Comrade Lenin in the name of the Workers' Communist Party of Russia, declared the Eighth Congress opened.

To the Praesidium were elected Comrades Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Piatakov, Evdokimov, Smidovich, Preobrazhensky. Then are elected the secretariat of the Congress and the mandate, revision, and editing commissions. The agenda for the Congress are accepted.

Comrade Kamenev is given the floor to speak on the anniversary of the Paris Commune.

43

“TO THE PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES”

[Izvestia, November 2, 1919]

Workmen! Proletariat! Soon the Russian proletariat will celebrate the second anniversary of its great victory. For two years now the Russian comrades are defending your common cause with unprecedented heroism. For two years now Soviet Russia sounds the tocsin for the whole world, calling the workmen of other countries to raise the red flags. For two years Soviet Russia defends itself against enemies surrounding it on all sides, against provocatory agents of the Allies and German traitors to socialism. For two years Russia sheds her blood. White-Guardist generals, with the assistance of their foreign friends took away Russia's oil and coal. They deprived her of bread. Every hour and every minute the teeth of the international brigands bit into her body, and, nevertheless, in spite of all this, the heroic Russian proletariat continues to stand steadfastly at its post.

All the forces of the old world, all the brigands and executioners, bankers and socialist traitors united their efforts against the first proletarian dictatorship of the world—Wilson and Denikin,

Lloyd George and the Roman pope, the disgraceful Noske and Clemenceau, Von der Goltz and Paderewsky, Finnish cannibals and Roumanian rascals, but nevertheless the Russian Communist Party is at the helm of authority, as your glorious advance detachment. In a despicable attack against Russia the White Guardists of all countries are united, together with the Kautskys, but the workmen know the value of these slanderers, and everywhere, wherever the honest revolutionary workman's heart beats, the proletarians march to those watchwords which two years ago were repeated by the Russian comrades: "All power to the Soviets."

Never has the proletariat faced such pressure from the world counter-revolution—such mad pressure—as at present. The international brigands are making their last efforts, are carrying on a desperate game, are making their last bet, in order to stifle and drown in blood the workmen quarters, because Russia gave the factories and mills to the working class, because Russia put the working class into power, because Russia gave to the workers all the riches which had not been exhausted or stolen by the imperialistic war, because the workmen are now the masters of Russia. For all this the imperialists wish to see the Russian revolution destroyed.

Workmen, on the great day of the second anniversary, raise the flag of your protest against the robbers' attack on Russia.

On November 7 let Churchill and Lloyd George see that the English workmen will not allow their work of provocation; on November 7 let the executioner Noske know that his plans in cooperation with Goltz are not going to succeed; on November 7 let Clemenceau learn that Clemenceau will not execute the Soviet Republic but that the French proletariat will finish with Clemenceau.

Comrades, on November 7 let the proletariat express its will by a demonstrative strike of protest.

Down with the international robbers, down with White-Guardist Russia, down with intervention, down with the Allies—Europeans and Americans who have joined with Russian monarchists.

Long live the fraternity of the proletariat, long live the international Soviets.

Executive Committee of the Communist International.

G. ZINOVIEV, *President*

ELECTION OF PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[Petrograd Pravda, November 27, 1919]

On the proposal of Comrade Zinoviev, before passing to the elections of the Petrograd Committee, the following resolution is adopted: "In electing the new Petrograd Committee the Ninth Conference (of the Communist Party) obligates all members of the organization and all wards to remember that the strictest discipline and centralization have always been the main principles of organization of our party.

("All decisions of the Petrograd Committee must be carried out immediately by all, without exception.)

"On the other hand, the Petrograd Committee must maintain the closest relations with the wards, listen to their initiative and work with them in the closest unison. Only under such circumstances will the work of the wards and of the Petrograd Committee be fruitful."

The conference decided to elect to the Petrograd Committee not by lists but by voting on each candidate separately.

The following comrades are elected to the new Petrograd Committee, in the order of the number of votes received: (1) Zinoviev, (2) Zorin, (3) Evdokimov, (4) Joffe, (5) Kexhuts, (6) Badayev, (7) Alekseev, (8) Bolodin, (9) Tsiperovich, (10) Shelavin, (11) Kakabadze, (12) Danilov, (13) Egorova, (14) Moiseev, (15) Zelikson.

As candidates to members of the Petrograd Committee are elected: Avdeev, Gavrilov, Villisov, Sadovskaya, Leolov, Prokhorov, Smirnov, Arshavsky, Ravich, and Klyavs—Klyavin.

Are elected to the Revision Committee: Mushtakov, Gordon, and Zakhar—Nevsky.

Then elections take place to the All-Russian Party Conference. Three candidates are elected, one with a decisive vote and two with consultative votes.

The following list of candidates proposed by Evdokimov is voted on and adopted unanimously: with decisive vote is elected Comrade Zinoviev and with consultative votes Comrades Zorin and Moiseev. The gathering gives the elected ones a loud ovation.

TO RUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN COMMUNISTS

[Wireless message]

Moscow, *November 13, 1919*.—Bucharin, the vice-president of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in a message addressed to the representatives of the Austrian Communist Party, Toman and Koritschoner, states that the Executive Committee of the Communist International has been informed that the Russian proletarian government is prepared to allow a commission of the Austrian bourgeois government to come to Soviet Russia to look after prisoners of war. The only condition put forward by the Russian Government is that the Austrian Government should receive a similar commission from Soviet Russia. As regards the Austrian workmen who are in Soviet Russia in the capacity of prisoners of war, these are regarded as comrades with full rights and are not exposed to greater privations than the Russian workmen who are fighting for the Socialist Republic against the united forces of world imperialism. The Executive Committee of the Communist International sends brotherly greetings to the Austrian Communist Party, and is convinced that the day is not far off on which the Austrian proletariat will overthrow their oppressors and set up in their place the power of the Workers' Councils.

THIRD ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF
NATIONAL ECONOMY

[Wireless message]

Moscow, *January 24, 1920*.—On January 23 the Third Congress of Soviets of National Economy was opened. Two hundred and twenty-five delegates were present at the opening of the Congress, who had the right to vote, and a considerable number with advisory votes. The presidential body of the Congress consisted of Bukharin, Milyutin, Rikoff, Tomskey, Nogin, Kotlyarov, and Kutuzov. Bukharin greeted the Congress in the name of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He pointed out that the Third Congress of Soviets of National Economy must decide the important question of how to best employ the population to build up the economic life of the

country. At the present time, said Bukharin, we must watch the actions of the Entente with great care. The Entente has raised the blockade and changed its policy toward us in the hope that this action will lead to disorganization in our country. This must force us to work at a speed considerably above the average. We are faced by a vast task, unprecedented in history. The Russian proletariat must heroically and nobly stand as a model for the whole country and overcome economic ruin. Professor Lomonosoff made a report concerning transport. The imperialist war and the civil war have greatly disorganized our transport. "When the frontiers are opened," said Lomonosoff, "we shall not, in the first place, receive the brotherly assistance of foreign comrades, but the self-seeking assistance of foreign capital. Owing to this, we must guard the remains of the national wealth which we possess with exceptional care. We must depend on our own individual efforts and not on assistance from abroad. Without railways we can not exist. All the goods which come to us from the western frontiers can not be transported by horses and carts. Therefore all efforts must be concentrated on restoring railway transport. The work in workshops at repairing engines had practically ceased. The reasons for this are many. There is lack of material, bad organization, and a low output of labor. We must take heroic steps in order to remove all obstacles, and at whatever cost to improve and increase engine repairs, as the fate of the working class depends on the organization of railway transport."

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KARL LIEBKNECHT AND ROSA LUXEMBURG—MEMORIAL MEETING AT MOSCOW

[Wireless message]

MOSCOW, *January 16, 1920.*—At Moscow on January 16, a meeting was held in memory of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, late leaders of the proletariat. The following comrades sat at the table of the presidential body: Bukharin, Markhlevsky, Sadoul, Platten, Bersin, Guilbeaux, Rudnyansky, Balabanova, and Rakovsky. The meeting was opened on behalf of the Executive Committee on the Third Communist International. Speeches were delivered by the members of the Praesidium. The meeting unanimously passed this motion brought forward by Bukharin: "On this sorrowful day, the anniversary of the murder of Karl

Liebknicht and Rosa Luxemburg, the leaders of the proletariat, this large international meeting of workmen's unions expresses its contempt for the bourgeoisie and their adherents, the Second International, who killed our leaders. We, the workmen of the Soviet Republic, swear on the bodies of our martyrs to carry out the work begun by them. The Red Army of the revolution, by the defeat of the White Guards has revenged the death of the leaders of the proletariat and the army of labor has laid the foundation stone on which will be erected a memorial to these heroes. Down with the contemptible murderers! Long live the world revolution! Long live communism!"

48

[Wireless Message]

The All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party.

Moscow, December 5, 1919.—The Conference continues to discuss reports on Soviet construction. A decision was taken not to introduce any changes into the text of the constitution. The next question was that of the statutes of the Russian Communist Party. The basis of Zinoviev's report was the scheme from the statutes published formerly in the *Izvestia* of the Central Committee of the Party. A number of changes and additions were introduced, among other changes the institute for "sympathizers" was done away with. The Conference will now discuss the question of the election of new members for the Russian Communist Party.

Bukharin read a report as to party work. The following are the chief sections defining the sphere of work: (1) instruction and education of the members of the party; (2) active work, (this section also includes the great work done during the communist Saturdays and Sundays, and the work of control and inspection); (3) military training.

In conclusion, Kamenev mentioned all that had been done in the three days intensive work among the comrades. The statutes of the party were passed and the work among the new members was discussed in all its aspects. The question of soviet construction was worked out and the question of Ukrainian policy discussed. The present proposal of the Congress of Soviets was accepted. The conference ended its work with Chicherin's report.

FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE ON WORK IN THE VILLAGE

[Petrograd Pravda, November 20, 1919]

The unexpected appearance in the conference of Comrade Angelina Balabanova, the secretary of the Third International, was welcomed with warm ovation.

In a short speech Angelina Balabanova noted the rôle of the Communist International—an organization on which are based now the hopes of the toiling people of all countries. "We only have to establish close connection between the village and the city, and our great task will be completely accomplished. There is no force in the world which could break the great will for struggle and victory which inspires our urban and peasant proletariat." Comrade Nevsky in the name of the assembly answered the prominent representative of Italian communists saying that the very fact of the work of the conference is the best proof of our loyalty to the great covenants which have been established as the basis for the organizing of the Third Communist International. . . .

"OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL"

[Petrograd Pravda, November 7, 1919. Concluding paragraphs]

The proletarian revolution is moving forward with powerful steps. In the unprecedented wave of strikes, which has started in Europe and America, the old, rotten trade organizations and their "leaders" struggle helplessly. These pitiable pigmies are unable to stop the powerful rush of the waves of proletarian revolution. The strike of millions of English railway men, the grandiose strike of American longshoremen, of German metal workers, and of Italian workmen of almost every trade, have a world-wide historic significance. This same strike wave has begun in all Europe, just such a wave as preceded the proletarian revolution in Russia. It is the same "strike excitability" which brought terror to the Russian traitor-socialists, the Mensheviks, several years ago.

Recently in a widely distributed French bourgeois newspaper we saw the following caricature. In the town hall of one of the wards of Paris, a workman appeared to receive some kind of official document. The workman stands in front of the table of

an official, who before issuing the official paper, asks and puts the usual formal questions on age, address, etc. To the question, "what profession?" the workman replies: "Striker, like all workmen." This is a characteristic caricature. On whom is the joke? The joke is on you members of the French bourgeois class.

The powerful strike wave, rushing over the whole world, gives new strength to the Communist International. It could not be otherwise. Humanity has not gone mad. The bloody lesson which the imperialists gave to the workmen of all countries during 1914-1919 will not be lost. In this senseless imperialistic slaughter millions and millions of people perished. But the lesson was not lost for the proletarians of all countries. The workmen will no longer be slaves; the workmen will not leave the power in the hands of the class which brought all humanity to the world slaughter, which converted Europe into a world cemetery, which brought all humanity to the tortures of hunger and cold.

But the Communist International serves as the speaking trumpet of the millions of workmen of Europe and America who have been outraged and thoroughly incensed. The tears of millions of proletarian mothers, the death groans of millions of proletarians who perished on the fields of the imperialistic war, the innumerable sufferings of the working masses who were brought by the imperialists into the abyss of pauperism call for revenge, and the Communist International will make the bourgeois world atone for all this.

The Communist International listens attentively to every movement of the soul of the working class. Like the strings of a sensitive harp, it responds to all this anger, this revolutionary decisiveness, this courage of the working class which has passed through the storm and tempest of 1914-1919.

In communist parties of all countries there is lively movement. Those differences of opinion, on questions of parliamentarism, of participation in trade unions, and other differences, which at times led to the splits in communist parties, simply show that the communist parties are growing and are facing every day new and more important and vital tasks.

The Communist International will continue to grow and become strong as the proletarian revolution develops. The events of November 7, 1918, showed that the day of the October Revolution in Russia is becoming the day of the international proletarian struggle. November 7, 1919, we are firmly convinced,

confirms this fact. Without any preliminary conversation or special agreements, the workmen of all countries decided to convert the day of the October Revolution into a day of international struggle—the day of the Communist International.

"For ten years the International governed one country in European history"—thus wrote Engels of the First International. Our Third Communist International now already represents one of the greatest factors of European history. And in a year, in two years, the Communist International will rule the whole world.

SMOLNY, November 5, 1919

G. ZINOVIEV

51

SEVENTH NUMBER OF "COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL"

'Wireless message]

PETROGRAD, January 16, 1920.—The seventh number of the "*Communist International*," the organ of the Executive Committee of the Third International, published at Petrograd under the direction of Zinoviev, in Russian, English, French, and German.

CONTENTS

When We Shall Awake Among the Dead	Z. Hoeglander
The Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat	N. Lenin
Italy and the Revolution	L. Trotzky
	Jean Longuet
	E. S. Pankhurst
The International of Trade Unions	E. G. Zyperowitz
To the Workmen and Peasants of France	Jacques Sadoul
The Labour Congress at Glasgow	A. Rosmer
America and the Russian Revolution	S. Rutgers
The Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Dictatorship of the Prole- tariat	O. K. Gyper
The Passing and the Coming International	G. Zinoviev
The Revolutionary Movement in America	G. Reed
The Revolutionary Movement in Rumania	Arbary Ralli
Poland and the World Revolution	J. Marchlevski (Karstin)
Terrorism and Communism	M. Bystryansky
Years of the Economic Dictatorship of the Proletariat	W. Miliutin

The Soviet Power and Historical Monuments A. Lunacharsky

The International of Internationals M. Gorky

Correspondence and Documents of the Communistic International.

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SIXTH NUMBER OF "COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL"

[Wireless message]

PETROGRAD, *November 10, 1919*.—The sixth number of the *Communist International*, the official organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, published at Petrograd, has just appeared.

CONTENTS

The October Revolution	Trotsky
The First Proletarian Government	A. Joffe
The Russian Revolution and the International Proletariat	G. Zinoviev
The Spirit of the Revolution	Jacques Sadoul
The October Revolution and its Influence on the French Proletariat	H. Guilbeaux
The October Revolution and the Political Strikes in Western Europe	A. Balabanova
A Russian to an Englishman on Intervention	Timiriaseff
The Foundation of the First International	Riasanoff
Polonia Militans	F. Cohen
The League of Nations and the Small Nationalists	S. Rutgers
Poland and the World Revolution	J. Marchlewski
The Trades Union Movement in Russia	M. Tomski
Popular Instruction in Soviet Russia	A. Lunacharsky
The Co-operatives in Russia	N. Krestinsky
The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the Workshop	L. Kritzmann
Economics and Politics of the Period of the Proletarian Dictatorship	N. Lenin
Revolution or Evolution	F. Lorient
Correspondence and Documents of the Communist International, etc., etc.	

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APPEAL OF THIRD INTERNATIONAL TO WORKMEN AND PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE

[Izvestia, December 20, 1919. Concluding paragraphs]

Ukrainian workmen and peasants! All toilers of the whole world are looking to you!

Long live the militant union of toilers of all countries and nationalities!

Long live the Soviet Workmen's-Peasants' Ukraine!

Long live the union of all Soviet Republics. Long live the world revolution.

(Signed) G. ZINOVIEV,
*President of the Executive Committee of the
Communist International*

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APPEAL OF RUSSIAN SOCIALIST WORKMEN'S PARTY OF INTERNATIONALISTS

[Izvestia, December 21, 1919]

Comrades: The All-Russian Congress of our party after long and careful discussion of the question of the present situation and of the tasks of the working class has decided to merge with the Russian Communist Party. . . .

To members of the Russian Socialist Workmen's Party of Internationalists and all who sympathize with us: Our party which has carried the internationalist flag through the great World War and the social revolution, our party on whose flag from the very moment of its origin was written the great slogan "Third International" is merging not only with respect to ideas but also in matters of organization with that party, which is the very backbone of the Third International. We merge with it because internationalism is communism and communism is internationalism. . . .

Long live the united proletarian communist front.

Long live the International Communist Party.

Long live the Third International.

(Signed) FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
WORKMEN'S PARTY OF INTERNATIONALISTS

Moscow, December 20, 1919.

ZINOVIEV SPEECH AT SPECIAL SESSION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET

[Petrograd Pravda, November 11, 1919. Concluding paragraph]

Long live the great city, Red Petrograd! (prolonged applause). Long live the most glorious of cities of the world proletarian revolution, Red Peter! Long live our pride—the Petrograd workmen! (Applause.) And long live the future ruler of the world—the great Communist International! (Prolonged applause. Shouts: "Hurrah!")

ZINOVIEV'S SPEECH TO PETROGRAD SOVIET

[Krasnaya Gazeta, Jan 1, 1920. Extract]

We are on the eve of a new year. We look back at the old year and we see that many events took place in that year, but the most important historic event was the organization of the Communist International. The Petrograd Soviet is closely associated with the Communist International. We have followed with the greatest interest the course of the struggle of the working class of Western Europe. With pain in our hearts we have lived through the defeats of the Hungarian and Berlin communists, but before our eyes crumbled up the Second International.

Petrograd is the first city of revolution. The eyes of the toilers of the entire world turn to it with hope. Petrograd is the key of the Third International. It has fallen to the Petrograd Soviet to have the great honor of guarding and keeping this key. Petrograd will justify the hopes of the Communist International.

Long live Red Petrograd.

Long live the workmen of Peter.

The speech of Comrade Zinoviev was loudly applauded. The political portion of the session was concluded. Then started the concert section of the program.

KALININ'S NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS

[Krasnaya Gazeta, January 1, 1920]

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE RED NEW YEAR

Another year has passed, a year of struggle of the Russian proletariat against Western European imperialists and a year of enormous victories. The most important victory won by our

revolution is undoubtedly the complete shattering of all illusions with respect to compromise. The parties which at the beginning of the year were at the head of the counter-revolution movement, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, at the conclusion of this year recognized (misprint, but evidently, decision of Central Committee) to fight for the Soviet Authority. Is this not a victory which makes certain the outcome of the entire struggle?

During the past year our Red Army accomplished miracles; in defeats it learned how to win, perfecting itself and becoming a granite cliff in the course of uninterrupted constant struggle. This Red Army will say the last word in the course of the New Year.

During this same year an enormous creative work has been carried out by workmen and peasants. From the bottom of my heart I wish that during the new year the forces of the working class and peasantry should develop and that the petty-bourgeois views of life should be outgrown at the same rate as in the past year, so that at the end of this year each workman and peasant should be able to say that his economic enterprise, his work, is the economic enterprise and work of the entire people.

Let "mine" and "thine" disappear.

Long live the communistic "our."

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ORDER TO RED ARMY, FROM PETROGRAD MILITARY CIRCUIT

[Petrograd Pravda, January 1, 1920. Concluding paragraphs]

The old year was a year of trial, of difficult and joyful moments, but it is behind us. Long live the new year, the year of the victorious triumph of the Workmen's-Peasants' revolution in the whole world!

Long live the Red Soviets of Workmen's-Peasants' and Red Army Deputies.

Long live the great uniter of the proletarians, the Third Communist International.

Long live the powerful weapon in the struggle against tricky and despicable enemies, the invincible Red Army!

VITKER,

Circuit Military Commissar

K. ARSHAVSKY,

Director of Political-Educational Department

"1919," ARTICLE BY V. BYSTRYANSKY

[Petrograd Pravda, January 1, 1920. Concluding paragraphs]

(Long article of 2,500 words outlining international situation, speaking of the yellow Second International, of the strikes in England, Germany, and America, of the blockade and of the great increase in membership of the Communist Party.)

The Communists saved the situation on the fronts; the Communists support by their self-sacrificing work the normal course of the entire life of the country.

In 1919 communism won its greatest victory: under its flag took its stand the new Third International, which is perhaps the greatest achievement of the past year. Communism thus became a world decisive force!

"NEW BOOKS"

[Petrograd Pravda, December 14, 1919]

In an edition of the state publishers in Moscow three large collections of articles have appeared under the titles "The October Revolution and Dictatorship of Proletariat," "On the Eve of the Workmen Movement in Moscow," and "The December Uprising in Moscow of 1905."

The first of these collections is of special interest, having been long expected but delayed, namely, "The October Revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (324 p.; price, 45 rubles).

The collection falls in five large sections: (1) political dictatorship of the proletariat, (2) economic dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) the proletariat and culture, (4) the proletariat and law, and (5) the proletarian revolution in the midst of a capitalistic order.

An introduction precedes the collection containing a compact but clear and most interesting article by Comrade N. Bukharin on the "Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship" and an article of G. Zinoviev on "International Socialism and the Proletarian Revolution in Russia."

The section on political dictatorship is represented unfortunately by only one article, that of M. Reisner on "The October Revolution and State Authority." The section on economic

dictatorship contains articles by I. Stepanov, N. Osinsky, V. Milutin, V. Karvinsky, M. Smit, D. Bogonetov, A. Vinokurov, and others.

The section on "The Proletariat and Culture" begins with an article by A. Lunacharsky on "The Educational Policy of the Soviet Authorities." In the section "The Proletariat and Law" there are articles by P. Stuchka, A. Goikhbart, N. Krylenko, and others. Finally the section "Proletarian Revolution in the Midst of the Capitalist Order" is presented by articles of K. Radek, Stalin, Kursky, Bela-Kun, and others.

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"AN UNSTABLE SITUATION"

[Leading article by Steklov, in *Izvestia*, of Central Executive Committee, December 17, 1919. Concluding paragraph]

(Notes imperialistic tone in all countries and speaks of perspective of new world war.)

But this time the war, if it is to break out, will take place under quite different conditions. The world proletariat has awakened and it can not again be harnessed to the cart of the capitalistic bourgeoisie by any acts of violence or trickery. The position of the bourgeoisie has become even more unstable internally than internationally. Let the brutalized imperialists try again to play their criminal game on the body of tortured peoples. The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress, to answer war by social revolution, will now be carried out for sure, not by the treacherous Second International, but by the working class under the leadership of the Communist International.

(Signed) YU. STEKLOV

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"WORKMEN'S DIPLOMACY"

[Leading article in *Krasnaya Gazeta*, December 18, 1919. Extract]

Over the head of imperialistic diplomacy the English working class recently entered into direct relations with us. It declared at an open meeting at the London organization of the Independent Labor Party that the English proletariat had found it necessary to enter into relations with Soviet Russia. In exactly the same way, according to the communication of December 12, the English trade-unions demanded of the English Government the raising of the blockade of Soviet Russia, the reestablishment

of trade relations with it, and the immediate entering into negotiations with the Soviet Government * * *. Already we are entering directly into international negotiations with the proletariat of that country in whose hands till now were all the threads of the international policy * * *. The demands put forward recently by the English trade-unions were colored so highly in red that to support and carry them out there must be Red leaders—diplomats of a new kind.

We expect, we know, that these will soon appear at the head of the English proletariat.

Long live then the first steps of our English brothers on the road to the Third International. Let their example infect other countries who should long ago have given up completely all compromises with imperialists and taken finally the place and side of the proletariat.

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COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON THE UKRAINIAN PARTIES

[Petrograd Pravda, January 6, 1920]

On December 22, 1919, in Petrograd took place the session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to discuss the Ukrainian question. At the session were present representatives of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks) and of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists). After hearing and discussing the reports of the representatives of these parties, the Executive Committee adopted the following resolution:

1. At the First Congress of the Communist International the Ukraine was represented only by the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks), which party the Congress recognized as the justly empowered representative of the Ukrainian proletariat.

2. From the report of representatives of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) it has become clear that this party, wishing to enter the Third International, adopts the principles of the Third International as the basis for its activity and adopts completely the program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), but being only recently organized, it does not have sufficiently strong support in the urban and village proletariat in the Ukraine and has not yet had time to prove itself sufficiently and to show in practice a correct application of the principles of the Third International.

3. Before answering the request of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) to be included in the Communist International, the Executive Committee considers itself bound to raise the question of uniting all communist forces of the Ukraine in a single party, following the principle that in each country there should be a single communist party and that the cause of the communist revolution in the Ukraine demands complete unity within the ranks of those who are defending in the Ukraine the interests of the working class and of the toiling peasantry.

4. Considering the conference of December 22, as a first step toward settling the differences existing between the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks) and the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) the Executive Committee proposes to the party of Borotbists to give as complete an answer as possible (in writing) to the following questions, in a more detailed memorandum:

(a) Attitude toward the land question.

(b) Attitude toward the national question. (In particular toward national culture.)

(c) Attitude toward the creation of a common Red Army. (In particular the question of partisan bands.)

(d) Attitude toward the creation of a special economic center.

(e) Attitude toward Soviet Russia.

5. To eliminate differences of both parties and to assist in bringing them together the Executive Committee of the Communist International will create a temporary Ukrainian Commission attached to the Communist International which will consist of representatives of both parties (two delegates each) under the chairmanship of the President of the Communist International. All disputed questions will be brought before this commission at the request of one party or on the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

G. ZINOVIEV,

*The President of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International*

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REETING TO BASHKIR REPUBLIC

[Izvestia, December 21, 1919]

Over the signature of the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Comrade M. Kalinin, the following telegram has been sent to Storlitamsk:

"The Praesidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen, Peasants, Cossacks, and Red Army deputies, greeting the Bashkir Republic on the anniversary of the recognition of its autonomy and union with Soviet Russia, in the name of all the toiling masses of workmen and peasants, expresses its firm conviction that the toiling masses of the Bashkir Republic, by the combined efforts of the proletariat of the whole world and of Russia, will overthrow the yoke of imperialism, and will bring the course of Social Revolution to a successful end."

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APPEAL TO WORKMEN AND PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE, FROM THIRD INTERNATIONAL

[Krasnaya Gazeta, December 14, 1919. Extracts]

Comrades, workmen and peasants of the Ukraine.

The hour of freedom has again struck. Soviet Russia, Russia-the-liberator, Russia of the toilers is coming to assist you and its Red Army is destroying the white army of Denikin. The Ukraine will be a free country. The Ukraine will be a Soviet country.

DO NOT REPEAT MISTAKES

The Communist International, this militant fraternity of the toilers of all countries, joyfully hears that the sword of the Red Army is breaking your chains, and looks back to the past with alarm, with alarm thinks of those mistakes which gave Denikin and his predecessors the possibility of throwing you back into the black abyss of slavery and grief.

Let not a single one of you stand to one side in this struggle.

YOUR TASKS

The Communist International demands of you the greatest concentration of strength on your part to reestablish support, strengthen, and defend the Soviet Authority.

66

LENIN'S LETTER TO WORKMEN AND PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE

[Petrograd Pravda, January 6, 1920. Extracts]

Capital is an international force. In order to defeat it there must be an international union of workmen, an international brotherhood of workmen. We are opponents of national hostility, of national antagonism, of national patriotism. We are internationalists.

We aim at the closest union and the complete merging of the workmen and peasants of all nations of the world into a single world-wide Soviet Republic. * * *

But we must be uncompromising with respect to everything that affects the fundamental interests of labor, uncompromising in the struggle for the latter's liberation from the yoke of capital. Therefore, the questions of how to define state frontiers now, for the present—for we aim at the complete destruction of state frontiers—this is a question that is not fundamental or important, but only of secondary interest, and on this question we can wait, and must wait, because national distrust frequently is so very firmly ingrained in the broader masses of peasants and small property holders and one would only increase it by haste, thus injuring the cause of final and complete union. * * *

By our recognition of the independence of the Polish State, of the Lithuanian, Lettish, Esthonian and Finnish States, we are slowly but surely winning the confidence of the most retrograde, deceived, and capitalistically oppressed toiling masses of the neighboring states. Thus we are more surely tearing them away from the influence of "their" national capitalists and bringing them to complete confidence and to the future united international Soviet Republic. * * *

Because experience has shown us hundreds of times that the petty-bourgeois socialists of various countries and the different kinds of so-called socialists—Polish, Lithuanian, Lettish, Georgian, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.—have been recoloring themselves to appear as champions of the proletariat for the sole purpose of putting through by deception the policy of compromise with their own national bourgeoisie, in opposition to revolutionary workmen. We saw this, for example, in the period of the followers of the Kerensky régime in Russia from February–October, 1917, and we saw the same thing, and see it now, in all countries. Mutual distrust between Great-Russian and Ukrainian communists develops accordingly very easily.

How should one combat this distrust, and overcome it, and attain mutual confidence? The best method is to work in common, in the defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the soviet authority, in this fight against landlords and capitalists of all countries and against the latter's attempts to re-establish their omnipotence. Such work in common will show clearly in practice that there must be the closest military-

economic union, whatever be the decision on the question of state independence or of state frontiers between Great-Russia and the Ukraine. Otherwise the capitalists of the Entente, that is, the union of the richest capitalist countries—England, France, America, Japan and Italy—will suppress and stifle us one by one. * * *

All of us—both Great-Russian and Ukrainian, and communists of any other nation—must, however, make no concession or compromises with respect to fundamental basic questions of proletarian struggle, questions of proletarian dictatorship, which are identical for all nations, namely, the inadmissibility of compromise with the bourgeoisie and the inadmissibility of plundering those forces that are defending us from Denikin. * *

This is a long and hard struggle, because the capitalists of the entire world are helping Denikin, and will continue to help all kinds of Denikins. In this long and difficult struggle we, Great-Russian and Ukrainian workmen, must go in the closest alliance, because we surely can not win out if each acts alone. * * *

Therefore, if we shall not know how to preserve the closest alliance with each other, an alliance against Denikin, an alliance against capitalism and against the exploiters of our country and of all countries, then the cause of labor will surely be ruined for many years, in the sense that the capitalists will then be able to suppress and stifle both Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia. The bourgeoisie of all countries, and all kinds of petty-bourgeois parties, compromising parties that permit alliance with the bourgeoisie against workmen, make the greatest effort to split up the workmen of various nationalities, to incite distrust and to disrupt the close international alliance and international brotherhood of workmen. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in accomplishing this, then the cause of the workmen is lost.

Let the communists of Russia and the Ukraine succeed in overcoming the nationalistic intrigues of every kind of bourgeoisie by patient, insistent, and stubborn common action; let them conquer every kind of nationalistic prejudice and show to the toilers of the whole world an example of actual solid alliance of workmen and peasants of various nations in the struggle for the soviet authority, for the destruction of the yoke of landlords and capitalists, for the World Federative Soviet Republic.

N. LENIN

APPEAL TO FRENCH WORKMEN

[Izvestia, December 13, 1919. Concluding paragraphs]

(Quotes letter of Sadoul and comments on this letter.)

Comrades, it is time for you to break your chains, take power into your own hands, and replace the democracy of the bourgeoisie—slave owners, by a proletarian democracy, a democracy of the enslaved classes.

But in order to attain victory it is necessary to close up your ranks, remove all unworthy leaders, all sowers of lies, all agents of the bourgeoisie who aim to disperse and demoralize you. Drive out the Socialist patriots who have deceived you, and the Socialist chauvinists who preach peace and cooperation of classes. Prepare for social revolution, using all legal and illegal means.

Down with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Down with the parliamentary republic.

Long live the republic of Soviets.

G. ZINOVIEV,

*President of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International*

ZINOVIEV'S PROTEST AGAINST EXECUTION OF COMMUNISTS IN BUDAPEST

[Petrograd Pravda, November 29, 1919]

The Anglo-French bourgeois, having bribed the Hungarian socialist-traitors, with assistance of Rumanian reactionary troops inflicted a severe defeat on the Hungarian workmen. The world proletarian revolution at that moment was not sufficiently strong to give assistance to one of our glorious detachments, the Hungarian detachment, and save it from the misfortune that has befallen it.

Surrounded on all sides by enraged, teeth-grinding enemies, left to itself, the Hungarian Soviet Republic, not yet on its feet, suffered a cruel blow. But the day of judgment for the executioners of the Hungarian proletariat is near. The world revolution grows stronger every day in spite of everything. The world

revolution moves and will come to the help of our brothers, the Hungarian workmen who are being crucified.

Comrades! Let us uncover our heads before the glorious heroes of the Hungarian Commune who have given their lives for the cause of the proletariat.

Millions and millions of workmen of all countries will lovingly accompany the Hungarian proletarians as they go to the scaffold, and these workmen will take the oath to defeat the bourgeoisie. The international proletariat sends its fraternal greetings to you, "Hungarian Communists."

The Executive Committee of the Communist International calls on the workmen of all countries to organize, on the day of trial of our Hungarian comrades, manifestations in that form in which it will be possible in each country.

Together with the glorious heroes of the Hungarian Commune let us shout: the Hungarian Republic has died. Long live the Hungarian Republic.

To the white terror of the bourgeoisie we shall answer by arming the workmen, and by organizing them for the last struggle.

Down with the rule of the blood-thirsty bourgeoisie! Down with the executioners of the Hungarian Commune! Long live the Hungarian proletariat! Long live the world revolution!

G. ZINOVIEV,

*President of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International*

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APPEAL BY FRENCH COMMUNISTS IN MOSCOW

[Wireless message]

MOSCOW, November 6, 1919.—The French Communist group in Moscow, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the October revolution, issued a proclamation to the French proletariat, in which the following is stated: "We, who have been forced by circumstances to live at present in the territory of Soviet Russia, appeal to all our French brothers and comrades. The French proletariat must remember the glorious Commune of 1871, which made it possible for Karl Marx to start his communist teaching, which served as an example for Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders. It is imperative that this very winter we should overthrow Clemenceau's French Government. It is necessary that the

Third International should be established in France. The French workmen must seize the power in factories and banks, they must rise against their present leaders, if these should give way to disgraceful opportunism. Further delay must not be allowed. Barracks and arsenals must be broken into, ammunition, machine guns, rifles and guns must be seized. A strike must break out everywhere and must be followed by a rising which will result in workmen's rule being established in France. Rise, comrades, proletariat of France! To arms! The day of the second anniversary of the October revolution must be the beginning of the proletariat revolution in France. Down with dictatorship of the French bourgeoisie! Down with the social traitors who support counter-revolution! Long live the French communist revolution! Long live the French Communist Party! Long live the Third International! Long live the International Soviet Republic!

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AMERICAN COMMUNIST IN PETROGRAD SOVIET

[Petrograd Pravda, November 23, 1919]

Then followed the report of a representative of the Central Committee of the Party who had just come from America, Comrade Thomas Paine, who gave his speech in English.

This speech was then translated into Russian by Comrade Zorin.

The latter also states that the American comrade was in Russia at the time of the October Revolution, and then returned to America, and has now arrived in order to establish relations with the Third International and to transmit a greeting to Russian workmen and peasants from American workmen and Communist Party.

The substance of the speech of the American comrade amounts to the following: "The American workmen, in spite of habitual conservatism, look to Soviet Russia with enthusiasm and joy, deeply sympathize with it, and place all their hopes on it." As, for example, he refers to the attitude of the dockers, who when they learned that ammunition was being loaded for Kolchak and Denikin immediately stopped work and refused to continue to load the ship. Further, the American comrade states that in America and in London the general mood at the present moment is such that the blockade will undoubtedly be lifted very soon.

"You," says the orator, turning to the meeting, "are working

not only for yourself, not only for Russia and for the Russian proletariat and peasants, but also for us. This is particularly valuable, because to date you have not had any support from us. But be quite sure that every honest American workman, every one of our revolutionists is with you whole-heartedly and thanks you for your work.

"In working for the liberation of Russia from the yoke of capitalism and nobility, you at the same time are working for the liberation of the whole world."

The speech of the American comrade was followed by loud and prolonged clapping, after which "The International" was sung.

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SPEECH OF TOM PAINE AT MOSCOW SOVIET

[Petrograd Pravda, November 27, 1919]

Then speaks the member of the American Communist Party, who had recently arrived in Russia, Tom Paine.

Comrade Tom Paine, in a short speech, says that he comes forward as the representative of one of the communist parties which under the influence of the heroic struggle of the proletariat are now fighting in all countries, giving battle to the bourgeois class. He affirms that he has the moral right to speak not only in the name of the comparatively few thousands or tens of thousands of members in this party, but that he expresses the feelings and hopes of enormous masses of American proletariat, which understands that the Soviet authority at the present moment struggles for the freedom of the proletariat of the whole world, wherefore the American workmen refused to load ships with munitions for Kolchak. The members of the full session of the Moscow Soviet greet the statement of Comrade Tom Paine with fervent and long applause.

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KOREAN DELEGATION AT MOSCOW

[Wireless message]

The following was sent from Moscow to Tashkent on December 14, 1919:

"A delegation of Korean revolutionaries, which arrived in Moscow from Korea, attended the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets. One of the delegates, speaking at the Congress, referred to the growth of the socialist movement in Korea

and stated that the revolutionary movement was more and more assuming a left wing tendency and was associating itself with the Russian revolution. The speech of the Korean representative was frequently interrupted by the applause of the meeting. The delegation also gave a detailed account of the social movement toward the Third Communistic International. This account created a deep impression, as it showed the class consciousness of the Korean masses. The Korean delegation pointed out that the Korean Socialists strove to work hand in hand with the Chinese and Japanese Socialists."

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"THE FIFTH SATURDAY WORK," FOR THIRD INTERNATIONAL
[Izvestia of Petrograd Soviet, September 15, 1919]

With each week the institution of Saturday work in the first ward of Petrograd takes on a more organized character so to speak, and develops in the very life and habits of the communists of the ward.

More than 1,500 men appeared on September 13 to work on the Nicholas Railway. On this day the communist volunteers worked for the "Third International" and they cleaned up the freight office of the Nicholas station and were assigned to other work according to their specialties. (Description of activities of one group of 30 that was assigned task of repairing the railway on a certain section; instead of the usual songs chanted by Russian workmen while at work "The International" was sung.)

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PROCLAMATION FROM ZINOVIEV
[Petrograd Pravda, November 5, 1919]

The defense of Red Petrograd against bands hired by the Anglo-French imperialists represented an invaluable service to the world proletariat, and therefore also to the Communist International. The first place in the fight for Petrograd belongs, of course, to you, dear Comrade Trotsky.

In the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International I give you flags which I ask you to hand over to the deserving regiments of the glorious Red Army which you lead.

With communistic greetings.

G. ZINOVIEV,
*President of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International*

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
144. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION


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Swiss Delegation to the Assembly of the League
of Nations
- IV. THE TYPHUS EPIDEMIC IN CENTRAL EUROPE, by
the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour
- V. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON TYPHUS
IN POLAND, TO THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS



MARCH, 1921

No. 160



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135

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 24.

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I

CENTRAL EUROPEAN RELIEF

AN ADDRESS BY HERBERT HOOVER, DELIVERED AT

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

January 13, 1921

This appeal is not for a new venture, not an enlargement of American relief towards Europe. It is an appeal from the great American organizations which have been engaged, one way or another, in saving the lives of children almost since the outbreak of the great war, that they may receive the support necessary to maintain until next harvest the children they already have in their care. I believe it would be reasonable to say that the great American charitable associations have in various ways, through food, clothing, shelter and medical service, saved the lives of upwards of fifteen million since the outbreak of the war in 1914. If we combined the children who were given care by these associations in both allied and liberated countries during the year following the armistice, we would find that in this time of their maximum burden they gave attention to between six million and eight million children. That burden has been steadily diminishing with the growth of peace, the strengthening of the new governments, the steady recuperation of agriculture. About three and a half million children are now dependent upon these associations for service until the next harvest. With the arrival of harvest and the normal progress of recuperation, this burden should again become greatly lessened. This is, therefore, the continuation of the great chapter in America's effort to save life in Europe; it is almost the final paragraph of that chapter. It is an appeal that we may be able to complete the work undertaken by the American people, that we shall not abandon these three million, five hundred thousand children. If we shall be compelled to turn them into the streets, many of them will perish. Many will survive to fill the jails of Europe and the United States.

Nor is this service pauperizing Europe. It has been a fundamental policy of these great organizations that they should so direct their work as to build up self-help and to stimulate the

creation of institutions among these nations directed to the permanent care of their waif, undernourished and orphan children. In every instance local communities have been called upon to take the primary responsibility for these children. They have gladly provided voluntary service of literally hundreds of thousands of women that the children of their race might be preserved. They have asked no service of America but the assurance of those critical commodities which they do not possess and which they cannot obtain, food, clothing, medical supplies, and, where there is a deficiency of medical care, our great American Red Cross has supplied American skill. These people we serve are making a brave effort to save their children; they are doing their share.

We are not asking for money to expend in Europe, but for the purchase of our surplus commodities in the United States with a small and modest proportion to maintain the necessary American personnel devoted to the organization and upbuilding of these local institutions and to supply to them the medical service that they cannot find for themselves.

There are some seventeen thousand clinics, kitchens, canteens, orphan asylums and hospitals depending upon us which need assurance of these essential supplies and services, if they are to continue. One by one, as the local committees recover in strength, our American institutions can and do withdraw without abandoning these children but having provided for them definitely organized and assured care. These organizations are thus doing more than saving lives; they are building up self-help and self-reliance in the countries themselves.

We have been compelled to ask the American people to save this situation in the midst of a great economic depression in our own country, at a time when we have great unemployment and great anxiety in our commercial community, but, great as these anxieties and difficulties are, I cannot survey the economic situation of the United States in its comparative prosperity without the conclusion that we still have the ability to extend at least this helping hand to Europe.

We have in our warehouses and on our farms today eighteen months' food supply for the entire American people. We have a harvest coming again within another eight months. Our shelves are overloaded with clothing, our warehouses with raw material; we have ample coal, and our people are warmly

housed. If there is any hunger or any cold in the United States, it is due to the foolish functioning of either our social, our economic, or our political system. We do not deserve the name of intelligent men if we cannot overcome this self-made handicap at home and still do our duty abroad.

We might have some room for despondency in America if our situation were that of any of the countries of Eastern or Central Europe. If we had but five to seven months' food supply with the harvest eight months away; if our children were undernourished; if we were not possessed of the essential food for children; if they were underclad, without the material with which to remedy it; and if such care as they do receive were the charity of foreign people, we might have a right to complain. If we were ravaged by contagious disease; if we were short of coal; if our currency had broken down; if we had not one atom of national or private credit with which to buy the essential products from abroad, then we would have a right to be despondent.

There is indeed somewhere a weak link in the economic or the social or political system of the world as a whole, when we can contemplate American warehouses bursting with food and raw material, our farmers unable to sell it at their cost of production, and yet people within three hours of communication with us in the midst of starvation and suffering for these very materials, lacking the essentials necessary for the preservation of courage to meet their daily difficulties. No one in the United States has ground for despondency. We will have ground for despondency when we fail to secure that impulse of charity and of economic assistance by which these surpluses of ours can be placed in the hands of the needy.

There are nearly seven million automobiles in the United States, and we have but three and a half million invisible guests. So long as any person in this nation can entertain an automobile, he can entertain an invisible guest. This nation is spending a billion dollars annually maintaining these automobiles, another billion dollars on ice cream, cosmetics and chewing gum, and a few billion more on tobacco and other things, and it has not reached the situation which warrants failure in the purchase of happiness of these children at a price of thirty-three millions of dollars.

It is a sufficient appeal to the heart of the American people to demonstrate the existence of a hungry child. But beyond

this there are reasons of deep import that we should not fail in this matter. The effort of these associations comprises today the only practical service that the United States is rendering to Europe. It is the only moderating influence in a world of contention. It is the only effort being made in the world today by any one nation toward any other nations of moral and real support. It is a protection to your children and to my children in the future that they should not be infected by a mass of moral and physical degenerates from Europe. The planting of the American flag in the hearts of these fifteen million children is a service to your children and to mine; far greater than battleships, and we are asking for the cost of one great battleship.

As a matter of assurance that there shall be a complete control of these supplies and service, and that they reach the most needy, these children must come daily to these institutions for their food, their clothing and for medical attendance. Thus every day of every week and every week of every month until the next harvest this helpless mass of humanity must physically sit at a table spread with American food under the American flag. Surely it is an obligation upon the American heart and the American conscience that the doors of these institutions shall not be closed in the face of this mob of suffering childhood. There has never been such a challenge to American generosity.

II

RELIEF FOR EUROPE

By HERBERT HOOVER

It is for America to decide whether the next generation, over large districts in Europe, shall be of service to the economic and social life of the world or shall be totally unhelpful. The present situation in this country, where we are crying over-production in spite of the fact that hungry stomachs wait for all that we can furnish, is simply proof that no great country can be materially prosperous without regard to the state of the rest of the world. Social unrest overseas is likewise a matter of close concern to us.

Since the invasion of Belgium in 1914 started a train of disasters involving vast groups of helpless children, America has been the means of saving, at one time and another, more than ten million of the war's most innocent and most pitiable victims. In the winter of 1919-20 the American Relief Administration reached more than six million, all of whom would have been without hope had our charity not intervened.

This year some peace and some economic rehabilitation have narrowed the problem to three and a half million children. The need of these children, who are distributed over Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, is imperative. They now receive a daily ration, served them in seventeen thousand feeding stations, hospitals and clinics. Each child has been subjected to scientific tests for undernourishment, and we have attempted to feed only those in grave danger.

It is in order to carry these three and a half million children until the next harvest that the European Relief Council seeks thirty-three million dollars. It is inconceivable that we should turn any of them away from our doors to misery and, in countless cases, death.

This child-feeding task was initiated and its plan of operation evolved by engineers. The same system of local self-help that Captain J. F. Lucey, John Beaver White, Edgar Rickard, Hugh Gibson, Millard Shaler, and Millard Hunsiker worked out with me for Belgium, is being followed in the countries we are now aiding. Pauperization is made impossible, for local charities are required to furnish transportation, warehouses, labor, clerical

help, and such supplies as are locally obtainable, putting up about two dollars in service or goods for every American dollar that is used.

It will be both short-sighted and shameful if America fails to see this elemental charity to a successful conclusion. I cannot believe such a course is possible, and I have no hesitation in saying that the task is every other American's just as surely as it is mine.

III

INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN
IN COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY THE WAR¹STATEMENT AND MOTION SUBMITTED
BY THE SWISS DELEGATION TO THE ASSEMBLY OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, December 2, 1920

Sir,

On behalf of the Swiss Delegation, I have the honour to submit to the Assembly of the League of Nations the text of a Motion, which I propose should be adopted with a view to assisting the various international organisations in their work of alleviating the sufferings of the children in the countries affected by the war.

In addition to the text of this Motion you will find herewith a statement setting forth the reasons for which it would appear to be incumbent upon the League of Nations to take an active part in this charitable work.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) MOTTA

To His Excellency

Monsieur PAUL HYMANS,

*President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva.*MOTION PROPOSED BY
THE SWISS DELEGATION TO THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Assembly of the League of Nations, bearing in mind the misery and hardships endured by children in the countries affected by the war, and the efforts made by both American and European organisations to come to their assistance, invites the Council of the League to appoint a High Commissioner who shall be instructed to consider the best means of furthering and

¹ Reprinted from Assembly Document No. 160, of the League of Nations.

assisting, in collaboration with existing international organisations, all charitable work undertaken on behalf of these children.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The terrible conflicts of which Europe and the Near East have been, and still are, the theatre have had the most disastrous consequences on the health and the growth of children. The whole world has been moved to pity by the fate of these innocent victims destined to disease and death through insufficient food, through privations of all kind, and through lack of heating and clothes.

Governments and public and private charitable institutions have made every effort to come to the assistance of the children. All rivalries, all racial or religious antagonisms have vanished in face of the agony of the children—who are the sacred heritage of the human race. On December 28th last, Holy Innocents' Day, in response to the simultaneous appeal of Pope Benedict XV and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Roman Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox churches, displaying the most magnificent example of mutual solidarity, requested the faithful to devote their offerings to these poor children. Socialist, co-operative and feminist congresses have passed resolutions and have organised collections. The International Socialist Bureau, and the International Syndical Federation have made appeals to their adherents. Certain committees, resolutely putting aside all considerations of politics or creed, have been carrying on vigorous campaigns in various European countries, have collected sums amounting to millions of francs, and have founded an International Union for Helping the Children, which includes among the members of its Honorary Committee, four Delegates to the Assembly—M. Gustav Ador, M. Hjalmar Branting, Lord Robert Cecil and M. Motta. This Union comes to the assistance of the children in the devastated regions of Belgium, France and Italy, as well as to the children of Central and Eastern Europe, the Armenian and the Turkish children.

During this time the United States of America have not been inactive. In Herbert Hoover, the former Director of Belgian Food Supplies during the war, they found the indefatigable apostle, the man of energy, capable of carrying through an enterprise as vast as that of feeding the children of Europe. During the last two years the Americans have fed six million

children. Six million children have every day been given a substantial meal, which has saved them from starvation; and this, in the most various countries, both in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Near East.

But today, after this great effort, their resources are threatened with exhaustion. At this very moment Hoover is addressing a new appeal to his fellow citizens. He is begging them to help him to feed no longer six million children, but only three and a half million. If they are not supported, the American organisations, which have already withdrawn from several countries, will soon be obliged to leave others, and sooner or later, wearied and disappointed, will return to America.

To help in this field of activity appears almost obligatory upon the League of Nations, which has already placed on its programme humanitarian action in Central Europe. Together with the campaign against typhus and the work of the repatriation of prisoners of war, the rescue of the children is one of the most noble tasks of the League.

If the Assembly of the League of Nations is willing to take up this matter, it could request the Council to appoint a High Commissioner to take in hand the question of child rescue, who, like M. Nansen in his work for the repatriation of prisoners of war, would be assured of the most enlightened and devoted assistance on the part of the great international organisations already in existence. His immediate task will be to resume the work begun by the American organisations in the countries now abandoned, and to make sure that none of the countries who have suffered from the war see their children forgotten and their sufferings ignored. The most important task falling to a High Commissioner would be the co-ordination of individual efforts to help the children which are being made in Europe and in the United States. A recent occurrence clearly illustrates the advantages which would accrue from the appointment of a liaison official representing the authority of the League of Nations.

On the 30th November, the International Red Cross received a telegram from the Director of the "Hoover" Mission who, having heard that the International Red Cross had proposed to the Aid Societies of Budapest a concentration of their efforts in order to re-open the Mission, offered the International Committee immediately to open kitchens to feed twenty-five thousand children, if on its part the International Committee

provided the necessary funds for feeding twenty-five thousand other children. The "Hoover" Mission promises to keep these kitchens open during the winter and spring until (say) June 1st if the International Red Cross does the same.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has, in principle, accepted this proposal and has appealed to the International Union for Helping the Children to find the necessary funds. The International Union for Helping the Children, placed under the patronage of the Red Cross, immediately telegraphed to all its affiliated Committees in England, Italy, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, and has taken steps with the Holy See in order to find the half-million francs necessary for this enterprise. The replies have not yet been received, but there is every reason to expect that they will be favourable.

Supported by the moral authority of the League of Nations, the efforts hitherto so devotedly made by private organisations will far more easily achieve their humanitarian aims. The millions of children saved from rickets and death will remember, when grown up, the debt they owe to the League of Nations when it was scarcely established, and will labour to cement the structure of universal brotherhood of which the first stones were laid by the Assembly.

IV

THE TYPHUS EPIDEMIC IN CENTRAL EUROPE²

LETTER FROM THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P.,
CONTAINING A FURTHER APPEAL FROM THE COUNCIL
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE

4, CARLTON GARDENS,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, S.W.1.
21st August, 1920

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

The Council of the League of Nations made an appeal last May to all members of the family of nations for funds to enable them to deal with the growing menace of typhus in Poland and Eastern Europe.

As yet the appeal has met with but scant success; but so convinced is the Council of the greatness and urgency of the peril that they have requested me in their name to repeat it with all earnestness and emphasis.

The facts may be briefly stated. They have been obtained from the leading public health authorities in Europe and America, especially convened to consider the purpose; from the Office international d'Hygiène publique; from a special Commission of the League of Red Cross Societies; from the Medical Commissioner of the League of Nations, who has just returned from Poland and Russia; and from other sources. All these witnesses draw the same picture; all draw it in the darkest colours.

In Russia the disease seems to be epidemic. An eminent doctor who has just returned from that country says that it has been swept from end to end by typhus; that scarcely a town or village has escaped; and that half the doctors engaged in combating the plague have died. His statement, terrible though it be, is confirmed by other witnesses.

From this vast centre of infection the disease is carried westward by an unceasing stream of immigrants. Prisoners returning to their homes, refugees flying for safety, crowd the railways.

²Reprinted from *Official Journal—League of Nations*, September, 1920.

Two millions of these unfortunate persons have passed the Polish Disinfection Stations since the armistice, and doubtless many more have entered Poland without being subject to medical examination. They are pouring into a country in parts already overcrowded, where every circumstance—material and moral—combines to favour the spread of infection.

So much for the present facts. What forecast can be made about the future? Every competent authority is at one in thinking that the evil is on the increase. Typhus is a disease which normally shows itself more in winter than in summer. If, therefore, conditions were constant, the number of cases at this time of year should be very small. As a matter of fact, they are not; and it is safe to conclude that, unless effective steps are immediately taken, the plague will be far more deadly in the winter of 1920-21 than it was in the winter of 1919-20.

Such is the peril which we have to face; and its gravity cannot be easily over-rated. Yet so much in the way of preparation has been already done that, if only funds can be supplied, we may confidently hope to face it successfully. The plan of operations is complete; organisation is ready; it is known how and where medical necessities and necessary clothing can be found; the methods of using them are well understood, are perfectly successful, and can easily be practised. Nor is the cost prohibitive in its character. The task is indeed beyond the means of the Red Cross Societies of Europe and America and other charitable institutions. These are ready to help, and are throwing themselves into the work with the utmost zeal; but they have convinced us that their labours will be relatively ineffective if they are not supported by the authority of the League of Nations and by additional pecuniary resources, which only Governments can supply. The minimum required beyond what can be obtained from private benevolence is £2,000,000, and of this it is urgently necessary that £250,000 should be immediately forthcoming. The months are slipping by. Aid that would be effective in June may be useless in November; and here if ever, the proverb is true that "he gives twice who gives without delay."

But, granting the truth of these arguments, on what ground, it may be asked, should all the world be called on to alleviate a misfortune which, however great, is nevertheless confined to Eastern Europe? The answer is threefold.

In the first place all the world has directly or indirectly some interest—often a very great interest—in restoring the war-worn and plague-stricken areas of Poland and Galicia to a normal condition of well-being. It is safe to say that this object can never be accomplished while the population is under the menace of this terrible disease.

In the second place, if the plague be allowed to spread unchecked from Russia into Poland, it will assuredly spread from Poland to her Western and Southern neighbours. In Central Europe every circumstance—moral and material—favours the disease. A population weakened by war and famine is living in conditions which, even were it vigorous and well-fed, would make resistance to infection difficult or impossible. As infection spreads it becomes harder to deal with, and no European country, not perhaps even an island like Great Britain, can count itself wholly safe if Poland be allowed to succumb.

In the third place, there is the claim of humanity. Poland has not brought this misfortune on herself; she is the victim of circumstances for which she is not responsible. She has done, as our authorities inform us, all within her power to help herself. In helping herself she has greatly helped others; and she deserves not merely their sympathy, but their aid.

It should, moreover, be noted that the evil wrought by typhus cannot be measured merely by statistics of mortality. The disease is one which attacks with peculiar severity men in the prime of life. It is thus the breadwinner of the family who is stricken down by death or long-drawn illness and whole families become a charge on the community through the misfortune of a single member. Even those nations, therefore, who suppose themselves to have no direct interest in the prosperity of Poland and to be in no measurable danger from the spread of the epidemic, may yet, on reflection, feel moved to lighten the load of undeserved misfortune which presses so heavily on those unhappy regions.

Moved by these reasons, the Council of the League of Nations has requested me urgently to repeat their former appeal. It is in their name, therefore, and by their authority, that I venture earnestly to press upon your Government the importance of joining in a movement which, at a cost comparatively small, may confer such signal benefits on mankind.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Signed) A. J. BALFOUR

V

REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON TYPHUS
IN POLAND, TO THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS*

REPORT OF

MM. Professeur Th. Madsen, Director of the State Serum Institute, Copenhagen.

Le Sénateur Dr. Pottevin, Directeur adjoint de l'Office international d'Hygiène publique, Paris.

Dr. F. Norman White, C.I.E., Medical Commissioner Typhus Commission, League of Nations.

invited by the Council of the League of Nations to proceed at once to Poland and to present in person a report to the Assembly as to the exact epidemic in Poland.

Our Commission entrusted with the task of studying existing sanitary conditions in Poland with special reference to the prevalence of typhus fever and cholera arrived in Warsaw on the 1st and 4th of November.

In view of the limited time at our disposal anything in the nature of a comprehensive investigation was out of the question.

We had therefore to limit our inquiry to a small number of representative places which we submitted to as full investigation as possible.

The two areas visited were the northern part of the eastern territories (as represented by the towns of Lida, Grodno and Wolkowysk) and Galicia, where we visited Lemberg, Zolkiew, Nadworna, Zuraki, Bohorodczany, Stanislawow, Cracow, Wadowice, Sucha and Zakopane. In both cases we travelled by railway to the chief centres from which we motored to smaller towns and villages in the neighbourhood.

A résumé of our observations concerning typhus fever and cholera respectively is given below.

I. TYPHUS FEVER

The area visited in the northern part of the eastern territory

* Reprinted from Assembly Document No. 124, of the League of Nations.

is poor and has suffered heavily as a result of the war which has been waged there almost incessantly since 1914. The retreat of the Bolshevik forces had taken place only a few weeks before the time of our visit. The destruction of a large number of houses, especially in the villages, has brought about an almost incredible amount of overcrowding. In one place we saw the entire population of a village which had been completely destroyed, and which had formerly consisted of a hundred houses, herded together in a single building which was itself in an advanced state of disrepair.

Requisitions have impoverished the country. Information given us by the local authorities indicates that food reserves for the winter are non-existent. The number of horses and cattle are reduced to a quarter of the pre-war standard.

Strictly speaking, this part of the country has never possessed a sanitary organisation. Before the war there were no *zemstvos* in these districts and the elements of organisation, insufficient in number which had been created by the Polish Government, had been evacuated or destroyed during the course of the recent military operations: at the time of our visit these were in course of reconstruction.

In spite of the impossibility of obtaining epidemiological statistical data of any value it is known that typhus existed in endemic form in this part of the country. Although the time of our visit did not coincide with the season of maximum incidence of typhus fever, we saw sufficient to indicate that the disease is extremely widespread and of a severe type.

In the towns, hospitals that had only been re-opened a few days already contained typhus patients. At Grodno, for example, the epidemic hospital, which had been re-opened three weeks previously, contained 150 patients suffering from either typhus or relapsing fever, in addition to which a further 70 typhus patients were accommodated in an annex.

In the villages, typhus cases were found in large numbers, sometimes in every house visited. On one occasion we found in a single house eight patients in various stages of the disease in addition to two bodies of persons who had died of typhus, one on the day of our visit, the other the previous evening.

In Eastern Galicia, as in the area described above, warlike operations which have continued with slight intermissions since 1914 almost up to date, have been responsible for very extensive

destruction of dwellings. The resulting conditions of poverty and overcrowding are specially favourable to the propagation of epidemic disease, notably typhus fever.

The sanitary organisation, evacuated or destroyed during the course of the recent campaign, is in process of reconstruction, but at the moment it is impossible to obtain statistical data regarding the present prevalence of typhus fever. As an example of the lack of information we may cite our experience at Zuraki. This small village in the Bohorodczany district had reported no cases of typhus to the sanitary authorities: all the same, half-an-hour's house to house inquiry in a portion of the village resulted in the discovery of two typhus patients in one house, three in another, five in a third, and in a fourth we found all the occupants convalescent from a recent attack of the disease.

At the present time typhus is not prevailing in Eastern Galicia in the acute form in which it prevailed last spring. Nevertheless, the disease is very widespread and we found cases in every place visited, though in most instances few in number. Before the war typhus fever was endemic in a few well-defined areas of Galicia: to-day the whole of Eastern Galicia must be regarded as an endemic focus of the disease.

The results of the personal observations that we have been able to make do not permit of an opinion as to the course of typhus fever in Poland or the dangers that are likely to accrue to other countries. Abundant information concerning these matters is contained in the publications of the Polish Ministry of Health; in the reports made in 1919 to the League of Red Cross Societies by MM. Buchanan, Cummins, Castellani and Wisbeck, and in 1920 by Dr. Chodzko to the London Conference; in the reports of Médecin principal Gauthier, Director of the Health Service of the French Military Mission, etc.

Here we would direct attention to the fact that the years 1919 and 1920 were both characterised by extremely severe epidemics. The number of cases notified—it is hardly necessary to point out that such figures are only an approximation very much below the actual numbers—were most numerous in 1919 in the months of April and May when 34,875 and 34,807 cases respectively were reported, and in 1920 in February, 27,984 cases.

In June, 1920, the last month for which statistics are available, 3,550 cases were notified in Congress Poland, 1,795 in Western Galicia, and 5,850 in Eastern Galicia: these figures concern the

civil population only. The incidence of the disease in the army of the interior varied in different cantonments between 0.01 and 0.60 per cent. (Lwow) with a mean incidence of 0.09 per cent. In prisoners' camps the typhus incidence amounted to 1.38 per cent.

The reports indicate that typhus is very unequally distributed in Poland. The north-western districts are practically free from the disease, as is also the district of Posen: the southern and eastern districts are most seriously affected.

We may conclude that though typhus may not exist at the present time in the form of an acute epidemic (the present is the season of low incidence of the disease) it is very widespread throughout large areas notably in the south and the east. The areas we visited are infected to a degree of which official documents give no indication.

It is impossible to frame a forecast of the future course of an epidemic of disease now endemic over wide areas, but our knowledge of the epidemiology of typhus enables us to foresee that seasonal outbreaks will continue to occur, the gravity of which will be chiefly determined by all social and economic conditions, which are likely to create a state of physical depression among the population submitted or exposed to infection. In any case its persistence institutes a permanent danger to the rest of Poland and for all other countries.

In countries with a high standard of personal hygiene there is not much to fear in the way of extensive outbreaks of typhus fever. But even in such countries there are groups of individuals and communities where lack of cleanliness presents all the conditions necessary for the spread of the disease. The report of the League of Red Cross Societies rightly calls attention to the recent epidemic in Holland as a case in point.

The eradication of typhus in the areas described appears to us therefore to be a question of international importance. Its continued prevalence constitutes a standing menace to other countries according to the intensity of the epidemic. Measures taken at the frontiers of other countries can diminish the danger but they cannot obviate it altogether.

The measures necessary for the eradication of the disease have been studied and defined, notably at the Conference in London.

The Polish Government are alive to the urgency of the work to be accomplished. The organisation that they have created to

fight epidemic disease, notably typhus fever, is excellent and has already achieved results that do them much credit. But the material at their disposal is altogether inadequate for the intensive and extended campaign that it is necessary to wage without delay.

II. CHOLERA

At the end of September cholera appeared in territory reoccupied by the Polish forces in the neighbourhood of Lida and Grodno. Previously there had been a large incidence of this disease in Soviet Russia. Thus an official Soviet statement dated August 30, 1920, reported extensive prevalence of cholera in parts of Soviet territory adjacent to the Russo-Polish armistice line as well as in other parts of Russia. In the first six months of 1920 5,675 cases of cholera were notified in Russia. By the middle of October, 1920, soldiers and prisoners of war had carried infection to various parts of Poland. Up to date (November 17, 1920) 21 foci of infection have been reported and new foci are still being discovered. In Poland proper reported cases number 299 in addition to which 119 carriers have been discovered. Of the 299 cases 30 were civilians; the great majority of the remainder were prisoners of war. In addition to the above, 461 cases of cholera have been notified in the eastern territory now under Polish military administration: of these 100 were civilians.

The occurrence of cholera cases in 21 widely separated places in Poland, their very high carrier rate, and the extremely defective nature of most of the water supplies combine to make the situation full of danger. An unpleasant fact in this connection is the very high incidence of enteric or typhoid fever now prevailing in most parts of Poland. Cholera and typhoid fever are propagated in a similar manner, the one to the other.

The Polish Health Administration is alive to the dangers of the situation; inoculation with a cholera vaccine is being widely carried out. The whole army and all the prisoners of war have now been inoculated as well as large numbers of the civil population.

On our tour of inspection we encountered cholera at Lida, Warsaw, Wadowice, and Zakopane.

At Wadowice we inspected the prisoners' camp. At the time of our visit there were 4,500 prisoners of war in very poor condi-

tion. The Polish authorities are obviously finding it extremely difficult to provide adequate food and clothing for their prisoners. There were 90 cholera cases in the prisoners' hospital at Wadowice as well as 80 cases of relapsing fever and 36 of typhus.

We are informed that there are 80,000 prisoners of war in Poland at the present time. Half of these are in prisoners' camps, the remainder being scattered about the country in working parties. The presence of this large number of prisoners of war with very enfeebled power of resistance to disease is a most unwelcome complication of the already sufficiently difficult health problems of Poland.

CONCLUSIONS

We are of opinion that it is both necessary and urgent to afford effective material assistance to Poland in her struggle against epidemic disease, especially against typhus fever.

We recommend that the League of Nations render this assistance on the basis elaborated by the London Conference and by the Council Meeting at Rome.

Dr. POTTEVIN
Th. MADSEN
F. NORMAN WHITE

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LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
144. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
145. Agreements between the United States and France, and between England and France, June 28, 1919; Anglo-Persian Agreement, August 9, 1919. December, 1919.
146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
148. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part 1. March, 1920.
149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part 2. April, 1920.
150. German Secret War Documents. May, 1920.
151. Present Day Conditions in Europe, by Henry P. Davison; Message of President Wilson to the Congress on the United States and the Armenian Mandate; Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. June, 1920.
152. Switzerland and the League of Nations: Documents Concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations; the United States and the League of Nations: Reservations of the United States Senate of November, 1919, and March, 1920. July, 1920.
153. The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, by George A. Finch. August, 1920.
154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
156. Presentation of the Saint-Gaudens Statue of Lincoln to the British People, July 28, 1920. November, 1920.
157. The Draft Scheme of the Permanent Court of International Justice. December 1920.
158. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part I. January, 1921.
159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
160. Central European Relief, by Herbert Hoover; Relief for Europe, by Herbert Hoover; Intervention on Behalf of the Children in Countries Affected by the War, by the Swiss Delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations; The Typhus Epidemic in Central Europe, by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour; Report of the Special Commission on Typhus in Poland, to the Assembly of the League of Nations. March, 1921.

Copies of the above, so far as they can be spared, will be sent to libraries and educational institutions for permanent preservation postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation.

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DISARMAMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE NAVAL POLICY AND THE NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES

By ARTHUR H. POLLEN

Author of
"The British Navy in Battle," etc.



APRIL, 1921

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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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Pirie MacDonald

ARTHUR H. POLLEN

DISARMAMENT

IN ITS RELATION TO THE NAVAL POLICY AND THE NAVAL
BUILDING PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This document includes correspondence between ex-Senator Henry White, member of the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, the Honorable Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Arthur H. Pollen, an eminent Englishman, together with a series of articles written by Mr. Pollen and published in the *New York Evening Post* from February 21 to 25, 1921. It is reprinted from the "Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, Sixty-sixth Congress, Third Session. Document No. 11".]

2 WEST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, February 27, 1921.

DEAR MR. BUTLER: I am sending you herewith an interesting letter which Mr. Arthur Pollen, the well-known British writer on naval affairs, has prepared for the information of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, in accordance with the request to that effect which I received from you through Mr. Hicks of that committee, and which I lost no time in conveying to Mr. Pollen, who was good enough to say that he would be happy to comply therewith.

I think you will find Mr. Pollen's letter and the articles which he has written recently for the *New York Evening Post* not only interesting and pertinent to the hearings which the Naval Committee has been holding on the question of the reduction of armaments, but also a valuable addition to the congressional document embodying the result of those hearings, which is shortly to be published.

Yours, very sincerely,

HENRY WHITE

Hon. THOMAS S. BUTLER, M. C.,

Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives

New York City, February 26, 1921.

DEAR MR. WHITE: Following up my previous letter to you, and our conversations on this subject, I am sending you, herewith, copies of the five articles that I have just written for the *Evening Post*, the last of which appeared yesterday. They include practically all that I have thought it is proper for me to say on this matter. But, in the very complimentary letter from the Hon. Frederick C. Hicks, which you allowed me to read, it was suggested that I might, perhaps, deal with one or two topics which, though I have not ignored them I have touched on only very lightly. To these points, therefore, I take this opportunity of adding a few words. Further, as the five articles are somewhat long, it might, perhaps, be convenient if I summarized my argument. Finally, it has been freely stated, I notice, in this country, that the British Government has organized a brisk propaganda to create a sentiment unfavorable to the completion of the American naval program. It is right, therefore, that I should make it quite clear that I have not now, and never have had, any such relations with my Government as would bring me into the category of one speaking to an official brief. It will, perhaps, be convenient if I take the last point first.

I. I came to this country in 1917, not as an official propagandist, but as an avowedly hostile critic of Admiralty policy. I came at my own expense, wrote and spoke on my own responsibility, and the only article that, while I was in America, I wrote for publication in Great Britain was refused publication when it reached England. I am in America now upon private commercial business. I have had no previous consultation with the British Admiralty, have no direct knowledge of the Admiralty's present policy, and what I have written in the *Evening Post* has been written without consultation with any British official, and I have no direct means of knowing whether it meets with my Government's approval. All the opinions that I have ever published are therefore mine only and are dictated by such knowledge of naval science as I possess and by the conclusions to which

over thirty years of close intercourse with the American people have led me.

II. On the particular points raised by Mr. Hicks, I take the liberty of observing as follows:

(a) The general argument for the curtailment of armed forces must, of course, be divided into that part of it which applies to navies and that part which applies to land forces. I deal with the first only. There are to-day only three navies that combine the requisite number of ships to make them formidable, and the military efficiency that would make that number of high fighting value in war. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan—I place these countries in the order of their material strength—are individually overwhelmingly stronger at sea than any other country. If no one of the three is in apprehension as to the hostile intentions of either of the other two, then the naval strength of each is to-day redundant, so that any addition to that naval strength would only emphasize the disparity between the force maintained and the policy that should dictate its existence. This redundance must obviously call for a heavy financial sacrifice. There is no country in the world so rich that it can, after the sacrifices of the late war, afford to waste its resources when every dollar that can be saved should be devoted to the economic reconstruction of a ruined world.

(b) It is, then, the first general argument in favor of the curtailment of navies that the present position of the world makes all unnecessary expenditure a threefold deduction from the forces so cruelly needed for reconstruction. There is, first and most obviously, the deduction from the available credit and capital resources of the world, taking capital in its true sense, viz., the saved earnings of industry and trade. But the second deduction is really more formidable. The ships, weapons, and equipment that go to increasing naval forces withdraw from industry materials of the highest value and utility. Finally, labor of the highest skill and discipline only is employed on ships, guns, etc. It is not money only,

then, that is wasted; it is material and labor which should be devoted to the creation of new wealth.

(c) The general argument, therefore, in favor of a naval holiday is overwhelming—unless, indeed, the mutual suspicions and hatreds of the nations make an immediate insurance against future war a less evil than present waste.

(d) Is not this a situation in which the United States is in the best position to take the lead and show the world the better way, or at least to propose its discussion? This Republic, in spite of its great financial contribution to the war, is left with unpledged resources not only exceeding those of any other protagonist in the war against Germany, but probably exceeding those of all the Allies combined. From the point of view of military security it enjoys natural advantages which would make and always have made an attack on its integrity from our side an inconceivably difficult proposition. America as a nation, then, has nothing to fear from all the other peoples, and its attitude since the armistice has made it clear that it has, of set purpose, proclaimed that there is nothing it designs to take from them. It combines, therefore, the two qualities of invincibility and disinterestedness, and can with propriety propose a course to Europe and Japan, with regard to disarmament, which it might be difficult for any other nation to initiate.

(e) Great Britain and France would, I am sure, welcome any proposal that would result in lessening the strain, not only on national finances, but on the already overstrained minds and spirits of their peoples, to whom the obsession of large forces by land and sea has already become a nightmare. For what it is worth, then, I give it as the view of an observer who tries to be impartial, that any move by the United States along the lines suggested would meet with an immediate response from the peoples of Europe and would certainly secure the sympathetic and, indeed, hearty cooperation of their Governments.

III. The argument of the inclosed articles may be summarized as follows:

The whole of the first two papers and one-half of the third are purely technical in their argument. The question of comparative naval force is discussed in the tactical and strategical terms proper to a supposition of war between the two countries. The direction of the argument is to the effect that the United States will, in the future, be saved from any military attack that could possibly be effective, not because she will some day possess a Navy equal to that of any other power, but because the amount of force, military and naval, necessary for conquering them could no more be got together in the future than it was ever conceivable that it could be got together in the past. It is a great tribute to the good will that has substantially marked the relations between this Republic and Great Britain for over a century, that the Senate committee should have attributed America's past safety to British forbearance. But that is not a military explanation of America's freedom from attack. In other words, my first argument is that an overwhelming British fleet could not seriously harm the United States if Great Britain became hostile.

Conversely, and again for strategical and technical reasons, I tried to show that a fleet of equal strength in the hands of a hostile America could not be a fatal menace to Great Britain. So that, viewing the matter technically, the proposed strength of the American Navy seems unnecessarily large for defense, but inadequate if directed against Great Britain for offense.

The second half of the third article and the whole of the fourth and fifth are devoted to what I call "a higher law of war," viz., the psychology, or, as I prefer to call it, the sense of right and wrong, which the two peoples broadly share. I point out that it was difference of standard in this matter that explained the ultimate failure of Germany, and I point out the fact that it was America's realization of this difference which was the deciding thing in making America declare war. I maintain, therefore, that Great Britain is far less concerned over the standard of military and naval strength than the United States maintains than over the question whether

America decides to take an active share in the world's councils, or to stand out of them altogether. If the two countries stand together, they can compel all other nations to comply with their standard of international conduct.

The conclusion of my argument is, that if this is the position, we can, within certain limits, discuss the curtailment of armament without constraint or loss of dignity. And I close by suggesting what the rules or limits of such a discussion should be.

I need not add, in conclusion, that I am extremely flattered by the invitation that has been extended to me, nor that I regard permission to submit my views to so high an authority both as a very great honor and a very great responsibility.

Thanking you, my dear sir, for your very kind offices in this matter, I am

Your obedient servant,

A. H. POLLEN

The Hon. HENRY WHITE,

2 West Fifty-second Street, New York City.

I

The Limits of Sea Power

When I was last in New York, in December, 1917, all the world was wondering whether the sea power of the Allies, which, in point of fact, meant British sea power, would suffice to protect the allied sea communications long enough for the Allies to win the war. Eleven months later the German military command surrendered almost unconditionally, preferring an abject acknowledgment of defeat to the obvious alternative, the invasion of the fatherland. In other words, British sea power, reinforced by a small but priceless useful American contingent, did, in fact, succeed in its highly necessary task.

Now, three years later I find a Senate committee strongly urging that the safety of the United States depends upon this country maintaining a navy "at least equal to that of any other power." "The lessons of history," so this committee tells the Nation, "teach us with indisputable truth that we can not afford to depend for the maintenance of our rights and the defense of the lives and commerce of our citizens upon the mercy, generosity, or good will of other powers with rival and conflicting interests or ambitions."

I confess this doctrine, so authoritatively announced, makes me rub my eyes and wonder whether the distinguished gentlemen who have made it their own have really a grasp of what sea power means, or what "command of the sea" connotes in war. For, observe, the assumption is that if the United States of America does not possess a navy "at least equal to that of any other power," the American Nation exists on the kindly sufferance of any nation more powerful at sea.

I will not stop to observe at any length on the light which "the indisputable truth of history" throws on this curious pronouncement. But a remark or two will be relevant. I make no profession to a profound or even passably close

knowledge of the relative naval strength of the United States and Great Britain at any period between 1772 and the outbreak of the Great War of 1914. But I should be surprised if ever there was a period when the naval strength of Great Britain did not outweigh that of the United States almost incalculably. We are told—and quite convincingly—by the General Board that the capital ship is the supreme embodiment of sea force and it is only upon a fleet of capital ships that great sea power can be founded. I forget the year in which the United States began the building of a modern Navy; it was, as far as I can recollect, toward the end of the eighties. For one hundred years, therefore, after this country had become an independent nation it must, on this theory, have owed its continued, free, integral existence solely to the forbearance of Great Britain, which throughout this period had not only always possessed capital ships, but had for the greater part of it possessed more capital ships than all the other navies of the world combined. And between the late eighties and 1914, the strength of the American Navy in vessels of this class was considerably less than that of even Germany. If, then, the Senate committee's doctrine is correct, this Nation throughout its history has been in a parlous state indeed. Yet neither Mahan nor any other understanding patriot warned the people of their danger. Undisputable history is dead against the committee's doctrine.

The reply to the Senate is, of course, obvious. They have largely misconceived what sea power means and its functions in war. In the War of 1812 the sea power of Great Britain was overwhelmingly greater than that of the United States. But this vast superiority did not in the least enable Great Britain to reconquer her former colonies. If America had no Navy at all to-day and went to war with Great Britain, that possesses a vast Navy, the chances of a British conquest of the United States would be incalculably less than they were one hundred years ago. The truth is, of course, that sea power by itself does not and can not extend beyond the sea. It is one thing to drive your enemies off the sea and keep the

use of it to yourself; it is quite another thing to use this exclusive control of sea communications to get victory.

The loss of sea communications to Germany weakened that nation very greatly, but it did not prevent the German Army from fighting for four and a quarter years on French soil, nor from fighting more successfully toward the end of the fourth year that it had even at the beginning of the first. Sea power would, that is, have been almost useless to the Allies had its function been limited to keeping our ocean communications open and closing those of Germany. Thus restricted, it doubtless lessened the strain of war on the civilian populations of France, England, and Italy, and added greatly—indeed almost cruelly—to the privations of the civilians in Austria and Germany. But it was not this that brought victory.

The function of sea power that enabled us to win was that it turned the ocean into a military highway. It was the sea that made England the base of a British Army in France, that made the factories, the fields, and the arsenals of the United States the source of supply of the American Army in France, and far more than this, it was the sea that took 5,000,000 British soldiers into France and 2,000,000 Americans. It was these soldiers and not the capital ships that won the war.

Now what is true of the Allied war on Germany is far more profoundly true of any possible war in which the United States could be involved with the other maritime powers of the world. The independence and integrity of the United States, the maintenance of its national rights, the defense of the lives and commerce of its citizens, never have and do not now depend upon the mercy, generosity, or good will of other naval powers, whether they have rival and conflicting interests and ambitions or not.

If we could picture to ourselves—frankly I find the effort fatiguing to the imagination—the world so changed that Great Britain, France, and Japan could address themselves cold-bloodedly to the problem of conquering America, it is obvious that it would not be the naval side of the matter that would intrigue them most. The reason is clear enough.

Supposing that absolute success at sea could be assured, the conquest of America would then hardly have begun. This is simply because the loss of sea supply would be a bagatelle to the United States. The federated peoples that make up this Nation produce more of everything than they need and can make everything that any other nation can make, in greater abundance, in shorter time, at a smaller relative cost to the people. The process of siege, then, which to some but not to a fatal degree sapped the strength of Germany, would affect America not at all.

No, the altogether insoluble problem would be the military conquest and occupation of this country. It is, of course, perfectly true that the American Navy is the first line of defense of America; but it is a first line that could be yielded without in the least degree imperiling the main position. And any country that went to war with the United States would surely consider certain quite elementary truths before embarking on so dubious and hazardous an enterprise. Again omitting the question of naval force, the question would present itself in this form: No attack on America would be worth making unless it could be made in such force and with such assurance of rapid progress that the Nation as a whole would be paralyzed before national resistance could be organized.

In the War of 1812 the British seized Washington, but this had as little effect on the war as when, in the Boer War, they seized first Bloemfontein and then Pretoria. If New York or Boston or Philadelphia were seized to-day it might be exceedingly unpleasant for the inhabitants of any of those cities. But the loss of all three certainly would not paralyze America. To paralyze this country there would have to be a military occupation of sources of manufacture and of the avenues of transport and supply so extensive as to be quite unthinkable. Apprehension of what all this would involve is surely a far better and, what is not altogether off the point, a far cheaper defense of this country than any navy, however large, however costly.

ARTHUR POLLEN

II

Some Principles of Attack and Defence

Up to now my argument has been that the safety of the United States from external attack has been due not as the Senate Committee suggests, to the good will and forbearance of those whose sea power was supreme—though, to be sure, for a good deal more than a century that good will has certainly not been lacking—but to the very obvious fact that, unlike Great Britain, the United States can only be brought forcibly to accept the will of an enemy through such a military conquest and occupation as would paralyze the Nation. No power, that is to say, would merely provoke the United States by a naval assault unless it saw its way to completing the job by the only kind of military invasion that would be rapidly effective. And it would have to be rapid precisely, because unless the end came quickly it clearly would not come at all. The people of this country—like the people of Great Britain, and quite unlike the people of Germany—would set the exhaustion point, and not the physical frontier, as the only conceivable term to a war involving its honor, or even any less important but vital interest.

So far as I can see, then, while a navy sufficient for maintaining the national dignity in public appearances, and for enforcing the national will in the lesser disputes that arise between nations, is a clear necessity of this country, one designed on the scale to make a successful sea resistance to the strongest navy afloat is altogether superfluous. It is superfluous because its provision presupposes that the nation possessing the strongest navy may intend to precipitate a war on the United States which that navy itself would be powerless to win; and this, in turn, would stipulate the maintenance, by the naval Power in the hypothesis, of a military establishment out of proportion to the naval establishment required for its safe conduct.

Let us leave this point on one side and imagine the United States with its projected great Navy engaged in a war with a country equally strong at sea and then ask how this force, as projected, would be likely to fare in view of the more recent developments of science as applied to sea warfare. And all the time we ought to bear in mind the business for which navies exist. The mission or task of a navy in war—there is no harm in repeating these truisms—must be distinguished from the purpose which this task or mission is intended to secure. The ultimate purpose is, as we all know, the exclusive control of sea communications. The immediate mission is to remove any possible obstacle to this control. Hence, the first business of a navy in war is to bring to action and destroy, or, failing this, to contain, and thus to neutralize, the sea force of its enemy. The problem, then, is how have changed naval conditions affected the execution of this mission?

Of the many factors that have changed the tactical use of naval force there is one that has held the imagination of the world for more than forty years—the possibility of underwater attack. There is one that now claims an almost equal rank—for the seemingly immeasurable mystery of its possibilities—I mean attack from the air. But the public mind has not in the least been awakened to a third, that to my mind seems more important than either. Let us deal first with subsurface and air attack.

It is well to remember that there is nothing claimed for the possibilities of torpedo warfare to-day that was not claimed for it almost from its first invention by that quiet, soft-spoken, deaf John Whitehead—who among the navies of the world could find only that of Austria to believe that the fish torpedo had a future. It was Aube, of the French navy, who in the early eighties first put the new creed into words, first consciously based the sea power of a great nation on faith in the creed so expressed. All the main arguments about the torpedo, almost every modern use of it, were set out by this imaginative Latin.

It was before the days of submarines, yet Aube did not

hesitate to put first among the advantages of torpedo warfare that its attack would come from an invisible craft. A torpedo boat, operating at twice and a half the cruising speed of capital ships, could, in the half light of dusk and dawn, approach within striking distance with absolute impunity. Aube did not mean that it would be physically impossible to see the torpedo boat; what he did mean was that it could not be seen in time for the capital ship, or for that matter the merchant ship, to defend itself with effect. How the invention of the quick firing gun and of the destroyer countered the torpedo menace; how the torpedo, in turn, gained in range and speed—all the ding-dong involved in the development of attack and defense—need not here be discussed in detail. Its discussion, indeed, would involve a volume of wearisome technical history.

Let us content ourselves with the point that in 1880 Aube was unanswerable on paper and that at each stage of development first one side and then the other seemed to have the better of the argument. But Aube's prophecies came to nothing in the sea engagements between 1880 and 1914, and when just before the war Admiral Sir Percy Scott, seeing the virtue of invisibility of Aube turned into actuality by the submarine, proceeded to repeat the thirty-year-old prophecy that the capital ship was obsolete and that the merchantman, like the capital ship, would be driven from the sea, it was only to find that five years of war proved the undoing of the prophet.

Well, for reasons which need not be stated fully, I am convinced to-day that the threat from the air, like the threat from the underwater vessel—whether the weapon used be the torpedo or the bomb—can and will be countered by defensive methods at least relatively equal to those which the recent war produced. All, it seems to me, that the two new forms of warfare have effected is to introduce into the attack of sea force some, but only some, of the complications with which new inventions have hampered the employment of armies on land. Relatively, in other words, the capital ship, when sur-

rounded and equipped with the right craft and devices for dealing with its new enemies, must remain in the future, as it has certainly been in the past, the unquestioned arbiter of naval battle. And battle, *ex hypothesi*, is the immediate task of navies in war.

But at this point we come to the new factor to which I alluded just now. A century ago the mere possession of an overwhelmingly predominant fleet meant a virtually complete control of the sea, irrespective of the distance of the area controlled from the port on which the predominant fleet was based. This is all changed to-day. It is a commonplace that the submarine has already invaded the old privilege of the fleet of capital ships by its ability to attack, so to speak, sometimes and under favorable circumstances, under its very nose. It was to this capacity of the submarine that all our alarms in 1917 and 1918 were due. But these anxious years also taught us that it was a faculty that could be so reduced as to be negligible. I am not, therefore, thinking of this, but of an intrinsic weakness in the modern capital ship itself.

This weakness is its pitiful dependence upon a well-equipped base in close proximity to the scene of its employment. Here, again, it would be tedious to give precise details or attempt to measure accurately what one may call the law of diminishing power in the modern battle fleet; but all naval officers would, I think, agree that the law itself is inexorable. In the concrete we can put the matter this way. The British Fleet, based mainly on Scapa, was found, before the end of the war, to be too far from the German Fleet, based on the Kiel Canal. A difference of one hundred fifty miles or so made all the difference both to bringing their fleet to action and to containing and to neutralizing it.

Let us accept this as a fact and then ask ourselves what would be the effective force in, say, American waters of a battle fleet based on British waters, and vice versa—how great a relative strength would have to be maintained to make one as predominant over the other as was, say, the British Fleet over the German, with a superiority of, roughly, fifty or

sixty per cent? At a guess I should say that the British Navy could not be a menace to the United States unless its battle fleet strength—and naturally all the auxiliary forces necessary for making that strength effective—were in the ratio of from three to four to one. Turn the argument around the other way and you get the point at which an American fleet would be a conceivable menace to Great Britain. As I see it, then, and looking at the problem purely as one of Anglo-American relations, I should say that the Senate formula for naval strength is redundantly too much for the function of defense—wretchedly inadequate if its function is to be victorious attack.

III

The Higher Law

The new law of sea force suggested in my last paper—viz., that the strength of a battleship fleet diminishes as the distance of its field of operations increases—is, of course, only one of the factors that would make war between Great Britain and the United States a far more complex affair than was England's war with Germany. In Great Britain's favor is the fact that she has bases in Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies. In favor of the United States is the fact that Great Britain would have to defend Canada. So that, at first sight, it would seem as if the obligation of fighting at a long distance from the home base would fall on England. But, against this must be set the further complication that, to win the war, as we have already seen, Great Britain would have to employ sufficient military force to paralyze the States, while the United States, on the other hand, would have to employ sufficient naval force to paralyze British supplies.

The first proposition is, of course, unthinkable. The second would be far from easy of performance, for here, again, a close blockade of Great Britain would be impossible unless the naval strength of America was something like three to one, and a distant blockade would be impossible unless the American fleet could stand astride of, not the Atlantic lanes alone but the Red Sea—a task necessitating not an equal but very superior navy. And an effective long-range blockade would involve paralyzing the world's trade; for a quarrel with the United States, even if it did not involve actual war, would mean that Great Britain would be cut off from American supplies, and, from that moment, the interest of the rest of the world would be in filling the gap. Blockade, therefore, would make all the exporting nations suffer acutely. The mind reels under the confused strategic, economic, and political situation that would result. But one thing seems fairly certain. If it

would need overpowering naval strength to force Great Britain to decisive action, it would need almost as great a force to bring about effective siege.

Hitherto, I have dealt with the subject of the proposed increase of the American fleet solely from the point of view of its strategical and tactical bearing on a war with Great Britain. This, I think, has been necessary because there are well-meaning patriots in this country who have urged persistence in this reinforcement solely because they see in it a necessary protection against British aggression; the only means to insure that American policies shall prevail against the imperialistic, selfish, land-grabbing, aggrandizing tendencies of the British Empire.

My object, therefore, has been to show to them that, if their apprehensions of John Bull's designs were well founded, their preparations for defeating those designs, while undoubtedly formidable, seem hardly adequate for a quick decision. And, similarly, there are well-meaning people in England who have heard these misconceived arguments for strengthening America at sea, and consequently view the proposed program, not only as a possible menace, but as an intended menace to the security of Great Britain, because—the thing can not be repeated too often—Great Britain and the British Empire are the only political unit in the world that exists solely in virtue of their sea communications being untouched and intangible.

Up to now, therefore, I have discussed the matter as an affair of rival force alone, and without in the least presuming either to advise America or to criticise America's plans I have stated the technical grounds for my belief that the proposed Navy is larger than is needed for American safety, but, like all Englishmen of sense, I also recognize that in this matter America has just as much right as power to make her naval force what she pleases.

Frankly, however, it strikes me as senseless to discuss this matter in the terms of tactical and strategical doctrine only. These are but one side of war and in some respects the least

important side. Given a conflict of forces, the dynamic laws that govern force will regulate the fighting process till it is over. But when all is said, war is the outcome of an irreconcilable conflict of national wills, and the major point is not the laws that govern war but those which control the wills which alone can produce war.

How true this is, the briefest reflection on the war just over should teach us. It was, of course—as were all other wars—a tale of strategic and tactical errors. It would be hard to say which side was the greatest offender. In all probability these blunders balanced. The Allies can hardly say their victory was due wholly to better leading; the Germans can hardly ascribe their defeat wholly to the failure of their military command.

The secret of German defeat is something more fundamental; something which antedates the recourse to force altogether. The Germans, while conscious no doubt that the effect to be obtained with a given force will certainly depend on its being employed in consonance with strategic principle, or in conflict with it, failed altogether to see that the ultimate amount of force brought into the war will depend upon something quite different—nothing less, indeed, than the judgment of mankind as to whether the war is just or unjust.

The Germans failed, therefore, because they were unable to see that their policy would outrage the conscience of mankind as a whole. It is fashionable to say that they were bad judges of psychology. I prefer a homelier statement of the same truth. The Germans did not know the difference between right and wrong.

Now, it is exactly a conscious effort to adjust national policy to agreed canons of right and wrong that is the distinguishing mark of American and English history. I do not pretend, of course, that there is nothing in English history—no passage of national policy, long pursued perhaps—inconsistent with this claim, and doubtless the same is true of American history also. In our case there are passages in the reigns of the eighth Henry, of the first James and Charles, and of the third George

which all of us would most heartily disown. Our dealings with Ireland at the present day are undefended simply because they are indefensible, and continue only because the methods of our opponents are worse than ours.

And no doubt there are many things in the history of the States that right-minded people could wish to have been otherwise. Yet, in spite of these exceptions, with many blunders, with some hypocrisy, both nations, it seems to me, have on the whole tried to make conscience their guide. Each has certainly done remarkable and quite disinterested things on no other impulse. And where either has followed a course that posterity has condemned, it will be found that this judgment was anticipated by a score or hundred of voices at the time of the transgression. I need only point to the fact—let it suffice for an illustration—that when the American Colonies proclaimed their independence the young men of England, warned by Chatham and by Burke of the inequity of the court's policy, could not be made to volunteer. It is this that explains how it was that when the United States troops first went into action in France they were beginning America's second land war against the Germans.

Sometimes, in the early months of the war, as the tale of Prussian rape and arson grew, I wondered whether it was possible that civilized men could really do such heartless savagery, and, when proof was piled on proof and the cruel truth stood bare, I wondered how the thing could be. And then the thought came that the German soldiers of to-day had, by some trick of atavism, learnt again what the Iroquois had taught the Hessians five generations ago. Then they were mercenaries hired by a German king to fight against those who stood for the freedom our common English forebears had planted at Runnymede, Evesham, and Worcester. And it seemed that the sins of our fainthearted fathers of King George's day were being visited on us indeed.

We owe this conscious reference of national policy to so high a standard to a quality inherited from our earliest forebears. Long before the Norman conquest, the administration of civil

and criminal law, and, to a great extent, the incidence of taxation, were based upon the findings of twelve plain men. They were at once witnesses to the custom of the country and spokesmen of the moral judgment of the neighborhood. It was out of the jury that representative government grew; and, despite many shortcomings and much misleading, the real justification of democracy to-day is that it continues in our time what the Saxon juries began more than a thousand years ago. Democracy does not produce either the subtlest or the most masterful rulers. Its ethos may be against breeding the most adroit of statesmen, but on the whole it does produce policies that are the closest approximations to justice and right dealing.

The military statesmen of Germany saw in democracy either a dangerous source of social discontent or a mere hypocritical cloak for the pursuit of purely material gains. It was their master error to ignore its moral condemnation. I will not say that no British or American statesman would be incapable of a like blunder. But I am quite certain that neither the British nor the American people would tolerate a Government that persisted in such a blunder once made.

In 1901 the British took the surrender of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In 1914 the whole British South African community had already been for seven years subject to Dutch domination. It was the two Boer leaders, Botha and Smuts, who saved the Empire in South Africa. Great Britain had won the war, but the vanquished, by the conquerors' free gift, were in possession of the spoils.

It is just because there is a law higher than that of force that this question of comparative force should not be discussed as if it were not itself governed by a prior sanction, and it is because sane Englishmen know this that they attach far less importance to the strength of the American fleet than to the strength of America's conscience in coming to grips with wrong dealing in the world.

IV

The Common Task

It is a summary of my argument to this point to say that, looking on the naval position in the light of technical principles alone, we can lay down the following propositions: First, if the United States does not increase its Navy at all it will have, and can have, nothing to fear either from the British Navy or from the British Navy allied with all the other navies of the world. Next, if the United States completes its projected program and Great Britain continues its policy of the last five years and adds nothing to the material of its fleet, then, while Great Britain would have more to fear from the American Navy, yet, for various reasons, the purely strategic position would be very far from menacing.

Then I went on to maintain that it was mere imbecility to argue this matter in terms of material force alone, because fundamental as are the laws of military dynamics, yet there is in war a force greater than any material force.

This is, first, the national sense of right and wrong, and next, the world's indorsement and cooperation with it. So that the relations of Great Britain and America to each other, and to the world at large, should be argued, not in terms of rival fleets, but in terms of a common sense of right and wrong. And I maintained that on this point there had been in the two nations an absolute identity of intention, that this was broadly shown by the course of history. I now pass on to the conclusion of my argument—which is as follows:

Aptly to my hand, and on the anniversary of George Washington's birth, comes a curious statement of that remarkable, and as I can not help thinking, honest man, Count Bernstorff. Looking back on his three years in America during the war, he says that "the diplomatic fight in Washington was a wrestling for the soul of the American people, to win which would have been impossible for the Entente without the introduction of

the unrestricted submarine warfare." There were some of us in England who had had a long and intimate acquaintance with the people of this country. We thought we knew and understood the American mind. We watched the ebb and flow of American sympathy during these anxious years with an intentness that was painful. We never doubted but that, if the issues were really understood, the Americans would take the stand that, ultimately, they did.

But, in the dust and confusion of controversy, the true issues were hard to disentangle. Count Bernstorff is undoubtedly right when he says that it was the unrestricted submarine warfare that made the issue plain. Where Count Bernstorff is wrong is, first, in his assumption that the ultimate judgment of America was really decided by this particular phase of German policy, and, secondly, in supposing that it was a contest in diplomacy that ended in the Allies' favor. For this policy was, when all is said, of a piece with all the rest of Prussian policy. It served because it happened to bring home to the American people the true character of what it was that Imperial Germany stood for. Once that was understood, there was neither hesitation nor ambiguity about the American judgment. But this was not a triumph of diplomacy. It was conscience in action.

Now, as I see it, it is precisely the verdict of the American conscience in the affairs of the world that the world needs, both now and in the future. It is a mere commonplace to say that the future of civilization will be decided by one or the other of two alternatives: Either the separate peoples of the world will regulate their relations with their neighbors by the principles of right and justice or these relations will be governed by force without reference to justice. Either right will be right or might will be right. Which is it to be?

As a mere question of might, the old order has greatly changed. Russia—potentially the greatest of military powers a decade ago—seems destined to lapse into at least two decades of barbarism and impotence. Germany may be revengeful and impenitent; its junkers may dream of striking

back at the first opportunity, but for twenty years at least the exhaustion of war will make all such plans wholly visionary. Austria has ceased to exist, and the new nations cut out of the ruins of that empire have not yet even an assured existence. Italy is hardly less exhausted than Germany. France has made sacrifices of life and treasure beyond any country in the world, but is inspired by so firm a national faith, so indomitable a spirit, that one can not conceive any circumstances in which her resisting power would not be almost incalculable. But the lessons of her past, no less than her present sufferings, have long since taken France out of the category of conquering and aggressive peoples.

Of nations militarily strong in 1914 Japan is the only one stronger to-day than then, but the strength of Japan has never seemed greater, and does not seem greater now, than sufficient for the defense of her island and continental possessions—so long as the future of the soviet government of Russia is uncertain. Great Britain and the British Empire, hideously crippled by debt, bereaved of a million of the flower of her manhood—out of the six million who were not drafted but volunteered to fight—is in no mood, and for a generation can be in no mood, to look at war light-heartedly. But relatively to the rest of Europe she has not suffered, by death and wounds, as heavily as her neighbors, and though her financial sacrifices will ultimately be far the heaviest of all, yet her immediate earning power and the undeveloped resources of the British Empire promise her the earliest and the most complete economic recovery of all the Allies.

The machinery of her banking and finance—that until 1914 made London the financial center of the world—is still intact, and the bill of exchange on London is still the chief currency of the world's trade. In point of available wealth England is, of course, to-day immeasurably behind America, but the old channels of trade and finance have not greatly altered, and, for a long time certainly, even if London loses its supremacy, it can not lose its prestige. If, then, in the course of the next twenty or thirty years the affairs of Europe should lead again

to war, Great Britain should be of all countries far the best able to stand the strain.

The United States, it need hardly be said, though greatly inconvenienced economically and financially by the war, has, in the sense in which we feel the thing in Europe, hardly been touched at all. Her enormous resources are still intact; the extent to which her future earnings are pledged is inconsiderable, and the losses of her manhood—tragic though they be to the families that mourn and glory in their loss—have not sapped but simply inspired the vigorous millions who survive. Hence it is almost true to say that were America so minded, she could to-day dictate terms to the world with the easy confidence of having behind her the naval, military, and financial resources to enforce her dictates.

Unquestionably, then, America and Great Britain, working without treaty or bond to common and unselfish ends, can now and for the next century determine which of the alternatives the nations of the world shall follow.

I am not suggesting—because it is quite unnecessary to suggest—that the United States should maintain great military forces and adopt the principle of interfering in every European or Asiatic dispute. Nothing could be less in consonance with American traditions; nothing less necessary to the part that America can so effectively play. But I do maintain that the two great communities, the United States and the British Empire, stand broadly for the same standard of international conduct, and that, working in harmony, that standard can, without resort to force at all, surely be made to prevail. This is the conviction of most instructed and thoughtful Englishmen, and it is obvious that it can not be sincerely held without there being an inevitable corollary.

What the world suffers from to-day is not that America intervened in the war too soon, but if anything, too late. Not that America is making her force felt in the world to-day too much, but too little. We do not fear America because her power is or promises to be menacing. We are, if anything, impatient with America because she is so reluctant to use her

power at all. And this being so, how, finally, do sane Englishmen look upon the proposal of a great American Navy? Certainly not with apprehension, suspicion, distrust.

Two and a half years ago, in England, I suggested to my countrymen that as we had no enemy in the world that had a fleet, we could with safety, and should if we were wise, not only build no ships at all but maintain no greater naval establishment out of the ships we already possessed than was necessary to keep the naval art alive and carry out such police duties as the execution of the treaty then under discussion might involve. Broadly speaking, that policy has been followed. Sincerely speaking, we should see nothing to lament if America took some of these lessened duties off our hands.

Believing as we do that the "soul of the American people" is not a fit object for contests between rival diplomatists, but a force that could mold the world's history if only it kept contact with the world's affairs, we see that a great American fleet is not a threat to British supremacy, but a harbinger of American backing of those principles of justice which both nations uphold. And if so far I have carried my readers at all with me, we can pass on to the last subject left for discussion, viz., disarmament, in a spirit very different from that which some advocates of naval strength on both sides have made the burden of their case.

In March, 1916, the *North American Review* published an article by me on the needs of the American Navy. It was separately printed as a pamphlet and circulated by hundreds of thousands by some patriotic organization. It was, by resolution, embodied in the records of the Senate. It brought me many compliments and was not forgotten when I visited this country a year later. There is one passage in it that bears on the suggestions for disarmament recently made in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, and in the British Parliament.

"The military power which a nation needs," I said, "either on land or on sea is settled for it by its circumstances and its

policy. If Great Britain lost command of the sea—that is, the certainty of being able to use it as the high road of its supplies—the country holding an adverse command could impose its own terms of surrender on us in about six weeks' time. For practical purposes, we should be starving. * * * This set our standard of naval strength. * * * Has America in this matter any guide as unmistakable as was ours?
* * *

"It is obviously not for a foreigner to suggest what the standard of American naval strength should be. And yet it looks like putting the cart before the horse to discuss the character and composition of the new navy without knowing first what it is for. The fleet America needs is the fleet that its circumstances and policies require. * * * Put into plain English, the words 'circumstances and policy' mean this: From what powers do you expect trouble? Mr. Gardner and the General Board seem in this matter to take quite a definite and intelligible line. They say that the American Navy should be equal to the most powerful which any other nation maintains. The most powerful navy is the British. It has maintained its standard of strength for purely defensive purposes. It has been built to prevent being altered, to Great Britain's disadvantage, the existing balance of power in the world. It stands to-day for the sanctity of international contract, for the liberty of small nations, for the right of Christendom to resist unscrupulous aggression and the public denial of justice, humanity, and law. All these are fine things. The United States stands for them also. It would be to the world's benefit if they put themselves in a position to stand for them with effect."

This was written, it will be remembered, before America came into the war, when many of those in Europe who had hoped for American intervention had abandoned that hope. The strict account to which, in February, 1915, Germany was told that she would be held should a single American life be lost in the submarine war, had ended in what to many seemed little more than an angry scolding. First the *Lusitania* and

then one ship after another went down, and the American lives lost in them went unavenged. Great Britain was at war. America was neutral. It was not for an Englishman to deal with this question as if urging America to prepare for the gallant share that ultimately was hers. I discussed the thing, therefore, really as an after-war problem. The crucial value of sea command to us was clearly stated. Note that I was presupposing a new Navy on this side of the Atlantic equal to our own. How much of a threat this would be to our sea command were this country unfriendly to us was manifestly clear to me.

But I was not alarmed, and I gave my reasons for my faith. I enumerated the fine things for which we were actually fighting, and I took it for granted that America at the right time would stand for these same standards. Well, I am still of the same opinion, and even Admiral Huse can not impute to me that I am a convert to a new doctrine invented for the occasion and convenient to Great Britain if, with this opinion as my starting point, I suggested the limits within which disarmament can be discussed. They are really not difficult to define.

What I said in 1916 was proved to be true in the following year. Four years have passed since then. Is it true now? We can not have forgotten that for eighteen months we fought in a common cause. We have not forgotten what we were fighting about, why we were fighting side by side. Indeed, the memory of that comradeship can never die among those who shared it. And as long as that memory and the fact that its records remain our guide: as long, that is to say, as we stand for the same fine things for which we fought, so long as we can talk over, discuss, and agree upon the amount of naval force that each should conveniently maintain to make our separate policies, that have a common purpose, prevail. Let there be no mistake about it: this is a matter on which we can confer, on which we may agree. It is not a matter in which either side can dictate or need cajole. This is the first rule that should be laid down for guiding the discussion.

Next, when debating the propriety of such a conference let

us never forget the cardinal fact of the situation—a fact of which Lord Grey has just reminded us—one strangely, it seems to me, ignored so often by fire-eating controversialists. It is simply that Great Britain and the United States are already protected against any precipitate quarrel by a treaty of arbitration that takes precedence of all other British treaties and governs and limits all other alliances in which Great Britain had entered before that treaty was passed by the Senate or has entered into since. Great Britain is, for example, for certain purposes, bound to protect the integrity of the Japanese Empire. But Japan's relations with the United States are excluded from the provision of this alliance, precisely because Great Britain's relations with the United States are regulated by the treaty to which I have referred.

Similarly we are bound by a special treaty to defend France if France is again attacked by Germany. Both Great Britain and France had hoped the United States would form a third party to this agreement. It is binding on England already, but it would not be binding if it could conceivably mean such a conflict as the British-American treaty is intended to make impossible.

Now, with all possibility of war between England and America removed, with a very high probability that if Great Britain goes to war for the good reasons which prevailed in 1914 we should do so with the clear sympathy and almost certain support of the United States, we can lay down the third rule. We may confer on diminishing armaments or we may not confer. If the two countries have a common policy, then I imagine that their joint naval strength is more than is needed for enforcing it. If we agreed mutually to desist from increasing it, either at once or at some future time, two obvious advantages would follow. It would lessen taxation in both countries. It is more to the point that such a gesture would allay the fever of military unrest from which so many nations are suffering more seriously than either of us. But we must not, because such ends are good, despair if we fail to agree. Our third rule, then, is clearly that all parties enter the conference with free hands.

Finally, we should each try to avoid arguments that put the other in the wrong. The aspect of the disarmament problem that attracts me most is less the immediate prospect of the thing itself, with its consequential material advantages. It is the fact that so many thoughtful people can not escape the conviction that there must be something wrong when armaments anywhere are increasing. Now, if anything is wrong let it disclose itself.

For my own part, I stand by the position that I took five years ago. My country, I believe, has since the battle of Jutland added but one capital ship, and that an experimental ship, to her fleet. Since the armistice not even so much as a chaser or a destroyer has been built. For the five years since the words I quoted at the beginning of this article were written Great Britain has, therefore, increased her naval force only by what was urgently needed at the time for victory. And for half that period she has added nothing to the fleet at all.

In 1916 I said it was not for a foreigner to suggest how strong America should be at sea. If the position made such a precept from such a source improper then, the position to-day is surely more delicate still. In 1916 we were fighting; America was not. To-day America is building; Great Britain is not. It is clear from which side the initiative must come.

The business is one in which the people of this country must choose for themselves, and it is with this conviction very firmly in my mind that I have written what I have to say. The ties of gratitude and affection that hold me to this great people date from before my first visit to this country two and thirty years ago and, in sum, face me with a debt that I can not even try to pay. It would be unpardonable to presume on a position so much against me already. All I have tried to do, therefore, is to set out some chief elements of the situation as I see them. I can not pretend to have exhausted the subject. But I shall be content if, without offense, I have made even a little more clear certain factors that should not be ignored when this people makes its choice.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1910). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
144. Reply to the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
145. Agreements between the United States and France, and between England and France, June 28, 1919; Anglo-Persian Agreement, August 9, 1919. December, 1919.
146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
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148. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part II. April, 1920.
150. German Secret War Documents. May, 1920.
151. Present Day Conditions in Europe, by Henry P. Davison; Message of President Wilson to the Congress on the United States and the Armenian Mandate; Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. June, 1920.
152. Switzerland and the League of Nations: Documents Concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations; the United States and the League of Nations: Reservations of the United States Senate of November, 1919, and March, 1920. July, 1920.
153. The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, by George A. Finch. August, 1920.
154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
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159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
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161. Disarmament in its Relation to the Naval Policy and the Naval Building Program of the United States, by Arthur H. Pollen. April, 1921.

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ADDRESSES ON GERMAN REPARATION

BY THE

Rt. Hon. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

AND

DR. WALTER SIMONS

London, March 3rd and 7th, 1921



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I

ADDRESS OF THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPARATIONS CONFERENCE,
LONDON, MARCH 3, 1921

Dr. Simons and gentlemen,—I have been asked by my colleagues of the British and Allied Governments to make a statement on their behalf in reply to the speech delivered by Dr. Simons on Tuesday and to the document which he subsequently put in. The Allied Governments consider that the statement made by Dr. Simons on behalf of the German Government constitutes a definite challenge of the fundamental conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, and must be dealt with accordingly.

The Paris proposals, following the line of Boulogne and Brussels, involved a substantial relaxation of the full demand of the Treaty both in respect of disarmament and reparation. These proposals were tendered in a spirit of concession to induce an amicable settlement with Germany. The counter-proposals mock the Treaty. The Allies come to that conclusion not only from the character of these counter-proposals themselves, but also from the perusal of the speeches delivered by Dr. Simons in Germany after the Paris proposals and the support accorded to those speeches in the German Press and Reichstag.

One of the most serious statements made by him was contained in a speech delivered if I recollect rightly, at Stuttgart, when he repudiated German responsibility for the war. This repudiation was acclaimed throughout Germany, and therefore may be taken to represent the real attitude of Germany towards the Treaty of Peace. For the

Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the Treaty has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is repudiated or abandoned, the Treaty is destroyed. The Allies, therefore, feel that they have to take into account the fact that the German Government with the apparent support of German public opinion, is challenging the very foundation of the Treaty of Versailles. Proposals such as those made by Dr. Simons are simply the necessary corollary of this new attitude. If Germany approaches her obligations in that frame of mind, such proposals are inevitable.

We wish, therefore, once and for all to make it quite clear that German responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a *chose jugée*. The Treaty of Frankfurt, in 1871, was based on the assumption that France was in the wrong, and consequently Germany not merely demanded reparation, but the payment by France of the whole of the cost of the war. Germany would never permit France to challenge that verdict, and we must insist that the verdict of the late war, supported, as it was, by the declared assent of almost the whole of the civilized world, must be respected. Until Germany accepts that position and consents to interpret her obligations accordingly, these conferences will be futile.

A perusal of the speeches delivered in Germany and of the articles appearing in the German Press has driven me reluctantly, very reluctantly, to the conclusion that Germany does not realize in the least the true character of the demands made upon her. I followed these very closely. The German people are under the impression that our demands are an intolerable oppression designed to destroy their great country and to enslave their great people. Let me say at once that we regard a free, a contented, and a prosperous Germany as essential to civilization, and that we regard a discontented and an enslaved Germany as a menace and a burden to European civilization. We have no desire to oppress Germany. We have no desire to impose a bondage upon her

people. We simply ask that she should discharge obligations she has entered into to repair injuries inflicted by a war which her Imperial Government was responsible for provoking.

Under the Treaty of Frankfurt she laid down the principle, and acted upon it, that the nation that was responsible for provoking a war ought to pay the costs of the war. We are not asking for the costs of the war. Not a penny. Not a penny. We are not going as far as the principle of the Treaty of Frankfurt. The war charges of the Allied countries in the aggregate are so enormous that it would be quite impossible to ask any country—any single country—to bear them. That we realize. In fact, we are each of us groaning under a load of taxation to pay debts which each of us incurred to defend ourselves in this war, and to place the whole of them upon one country we fully realize would be an impossible proposition.

We have, therefore, deliberately, in the Treaty of Versailles, not asked Germany to pay one single paper mark for the cost incurred by the Allied countries in defending themselves in this war.

What have we asked, then, of Germany? And I think it is important that the German public should thoroughly understand the character of the demand, because I am certain that they are not appreciating it. We have simply insisted that Germany shall pay reparation in respect of the charges cast upon our respective countries by material damage to property and by injuries inflicted upon the lives and limbs of the inhabitants. We have asked for no more, we can take no less. These are not imaginary wrongs, they are injuries, the reparation of which is imposing a crushing burden at this moment upon the resources of the Allied countries. Take France. France has this year to arrange in her budget for an expenditure of 12,000,000,000 francs towards restoring her devastated areas. This is apart from the gigantic sum she has to provide for pensions. This provision will have to be made year by year for at least ten

years. What charge is there in the German budget comparable with this? I feel certain that the people of Germany have no notion of the devastation wrought in the Allied countries as a result of the action of the Imperial Government in August, 1914.

Having regard to the incalculable importance of coming to a real understanding, I think it is vital that the German public should be informed as to the character and the extent of the devastation wrought. I cannot help thinking that when they realize it their attitude of mind will change. They are under the impression that the Allies are seeking to extort money out of them beyond their needs, and I am quite sure that they have not the least notion of the terrible extent of the ravages inflicted by the war in the Allied countries.

I will give a few figures which will indicate the extent of the injuries inflicted. In France nearly 21,000 factories have been destroyed. The mines in the north of France have been destroyed; it will take ten years or more to re-establish them. The whole of the metallurgical, electrical, and mechanical factories in the devastated area have been wiped out. Four thousand textile factories, 4,000 alimentary factories, have been destroyed or stripped of their equipment, which was either taken away to Germany or destroyed on the spot. One thousand six hundred and fifty-nine communes or townships have been completely destroyed; of 707 townships, three-quarters have been destroyed; of 1,656, at least 50 per cent. have been destroyed; 319,269 houses have been completely destroyed and 313,675 houses partially destroyed—that is, 630,000 houses either completely destroyed or partially destroyed. Twenty thousand six hundred and three factories have been destroyed; 8,000 kilometres [5,000 miles] of railway, nearly 5,000 bridges, 52,000 kilometres [32,500 miles] of roads, 3,800,000 hectares [9,000,000 acres] of soil which must be restored to condition, of which 1,740,000 [4,350,000 acres] is cultivated soil. There is a reduction of 50 per cent. of the total coal production of

France—21,000,000 tons instead of 42,000,000 tons—and these figures are the minimum.

I have passed through this devastated area pretty well from one end to the other, and it is perfectly appalling. The very soil is churned up and destroyed. A good deal of this devastation was wrought through bombardments and movements of war. But an incredible amount of damage was done deliberately with a view to destroy essential means of production. This is true both of France and of Belgium.

In the words of General von Bissing at the first meeting of the German Economic Mission to Belgium on June 19, 1915—these are his words—"The object being to provide that Belgium's recovering industry should not prejudice German industry;" great factories were wantonly destroyed, the machinery shattered, sometimes essential complicated mechanism, which it would take a long time to replace, removed, bridges, concrete foundations, blast furnaces destroyed by dynamite, apparatus destroyed by oxyhydrogen flames merely in order to cripple French and Belgian industries and to make it impossible for them to compete with German industries when the war was over.

I can supply the German Delegation with a large number of cases of this kind. There is a very numerous class of cases where machinery and equipment were broken up in order to furnish Germany with metal. Many of the mines in the north of France were deliberately destroyed with a view to making it impossible to work them for years—not by bombardment, but by deliberate acts of destruction. The machinery in many of the textile and other factories was either destroyed or essential equipment taken away.

Take the case of the French flax industry, a most important industry in France. This was practically wiped out by the process of destroying all the machinery, so that Germany, which supplied France before the war to the extent of 8.5 per cent., now supplies 50 per cent. of the flax products. Take the case of the blast furnaces and the rolling mills in Belgium. They were deliberately blown up by dynamite,

the place left in ruins so that when the war was over Belgian industry would take years to be in a position to compete with Germany. I can supply many other cases where factories in Belgium and France which constitute a menace to their competitors in Germany were deliberately put out of action.

On the other hand, the houses of Germany, with comparatively few exceptions in East Prussia, have sustained no damage; the factories of Germany are quite intact. The moment the war was over they were free to manufacture their fabrics and to sell them to the world, while their rivals had their factories and workshops destroyed, and their machinery removed or broken up.

Therefore, unless reparation is made by Germany, it means that the victors will pay the price of defeat and the vanquished will reap the fruits of victory. I have been informed by the Belgian Ministers who are present that the destruction of Belgian factories and machinery proceeded to such an extent that the German Army in Belgium deported 150,000 Belgian workmen to Germany on the ground that they were unemployed.

But this does not represent the whole of the devastation wrought as a result of the war provoked by the German Imperial Government. I have not given the figures for Italy; I have not given the whole of the figures for Great Britain. I have simply taken these as samples of the destruction which took place. There is the destruction of millions of tons of mercantile shipping. Britain, a country more dependent on its shipping than any other, had 8,000,000 tons sent to the bottom of the sea.

But this summary is incomplete without reference to the still more poignant and devastating loss inflicted upon the Allied countries by the killing and the crippling of multitudes of their young and vigorous men in the prime of their strength. France lost 1,400,000 in killed and has to pay pensions to 3,500,000 people. The British Empire lost 1,000,000 in killed, and the crippled who are drawing pensions number

about 1,700,000. I have not by me the figures for Italy and Belgium. These casualties represent not merely a loss to the country of real strength and capacity for wealth production, but a heavy annual burden upon the resources of the country to maintain dependents and the crippled and the maimed who cannot earn a living for themselves.

France alone and Great Britain alone in this respect each bears an annual burden which is almost three times the amount of the whole annual payment now offered by Germany to meet the claim of reparation for damages of all kinds. Germany no doubt has suffered from the war, but in loss of life it is not comparable in proportion to the population with that sustained by France, and as to the material damage, the devastation in East Prussia is trivial compared with that which has been inflicted on France.

With all this gigantic injury, what is now offered to France, staggering under the load of expenditure cast upon her by her war debt, and by this wanton destruction which made of her richest provinces a hideous wilderness of ruin and despair, with the urgent need that she should rebuild shattered homes, restore factories which are the sole means of livelihood for the poor people who had endured for five years the horrors of war in their devastated provinces, and with her enormous pension liabilities added on to the rest? What is offered to Britain, with her gigantic debt and a pension list incurred in enforcing a treaty which her King signed with the King of Prussia, but which was broken by the latter's descendants? What is offered to Italy and to Belgium, to relieve their burdens? What is offered? Not one-fourth of the sum required to repair the damage, and that only on condition that those who need it most find it out of their own pockets first on highly privileged terms, when they can with difficulty raise money in their own markets to carry on the essential work of government.

That is the offer. I cannot understand the psychology which permits the representatives of a country whose Government was responsible for the most devastating war the world

has ever seen to come solemnly with such terms to a conference with the representatives of the countries that have been the victims of that devastation.

Had the German Government come here with some proposal which indicated a sincere desire to discharge their obligations we should have given it the fairest and most patient consideration. If they had said, "Forty-two years is too lengthy a period," if they had said, "A levy of 12 per cent. upon our exports is not the best method of meeting our liabilities or of ascertaining the amount Germany is at a given moment capable of paying; we have other ways which, while they suit us better, will equally meet the case," then we should have sat down at these conference tables with the German Delegation to examine in perfect good faith their counter-proposals with a view to arriving at a reasonable accord. These differences perpetuate an atmosphere of disaccord and distrust, and that is fatal to the peace which is so essential to enable the world to renew its normal tasks. We know that—we were prepared to make allowances for that—we were prepared to make all legitimate allowances for the real difficulties under which the German and all other peoples labour as a result of the war, but these proposals are frankly an offence and an exasperation, and, as one who is anxious that real peace should be restored in Europe between all its peoples, I deeply deplore that such proposals should ever have been put forward, for they indicate a desire not to perform, but to evade obligations which Germany has incurred, obligations which are far short of those which, according to the precedent she herself set in 1871, we might have imposed.

Had the German Government imposed taxation on their people comparable with the taxes laid by the Allied countries on their citizens, they would be in a better position to confront us at the conference table. But here again the vanquished insist upon being let off more lightly than the victor.

The German debt, nominally high, is not even nominally as heavy in percentage to the population as that of Great

Britain. Britain during the war raised £3,000,000,000 sterling in taxation towards the cost of carrying on the war. Germany made no such effort. To-day her apparently gigantic debt has been reduced almost to the amount of her pre-war liabilities by a process of depreciating her currency. She has nominally imposed very heavy direct taxes on wealth, but every one knows that they are not fully collected. Her indirect taxes, which are the taxes which affect the bulk of the population, are ridiculously low compared with Great Britain.

	GERMANY (gold marks)	ENGLAND (gold marks)	FRANCE (gold marks)
Beer (per hectolitre)	0.5	34	3.25
Wine (per hectolitre)	20% of retail price	about 40% of retail price	about 27% of retail price
Spirits (per hectolitre)	80	2,392	316
Tobacco (per kilogramme)	2	13	...
Sugar (per 100 kilogrammes)	1.4	44	12.5
Coffee (per 100 kilogrammes)	15	28	...
Tea (per 100 kilogrammes)	23	133	...

Let me give a few examples. For the purpose of this computation, I have taken 10 paper marks, four paper francs, and 1s. 6d. sterling as the equivalent to one gold mark. I do not think, having regard to the relative value of these coins, that this standard is an unfair one, but I am prepared to test the comparative taxation of British and German citizens by any standard of value which Dr. Simons would accept for the coins in which the taxation is paid in these respective countries.

The German budget provides for a subsidy of 20,000,000,000 of marks for the railways and the post; and for food subsidies 10,000,000,000. In this country we have abolished

both these subsidies and imposed upon the traveling and consuming public the full cost, in the one case of running the railways, the post, and the telephones; and in the other case, of the food supplies.

Those subsidies are a reduction, are an abatement of taxes in Germany, and constitute a subsidy to her industries. Her failure to bring up her taxation to the level of the taxes in the Allied countries constitutes in itself an infringement of the Treaty of Versailles, and until she imposes at least equal taxation, she is not in a position to plead that she is unable to meet the demands of the Paris proposals.

Now I come to the conclusion of this statement. As I indicated in the short statement I made on Tuesday, as President of the Conference, the counter-proposals do not even afford a basis for examination or discussion. They are simply provocative. Further reflection confirms our first impression. It would therefore be a sheer waste of time to devote any sittings to their consideration.

The Allies have been conferring upon the whole position, and I am now authorized to make this declaration on their behalf:—

The Treaty of Versailles was signed less than two years ago. The German Government have already defaulted in respect of some of its most important provisions: the delivery for trial of the criminals who have offended against the laws of war, disarmament, the payment in cash or in kind of 20,000,000,000 of gold marks [£1,000,000,000]. These are some of the provisions. The Allies have displayed no harsh insistence upon the letter of their bond. They have extended time, they have even modified the character of their demands; but each time the German Government failed them.

In spite of the Treaty and of the honourable undertaking given at Spa, the criminals have not yet been tried, let alone punished, although the evidence has been in the hands of the German Government for months. Military organizations, some of them open, some clandestine, have been allowed to spring up all over the country, equipped with arms that

ought to have been surrendered. If the German Government had shown in respect of reparations a sincere desire to help the Allies to repair the terrible losses inflicted upon them by the act of aggression of which the German Imperialist Government was guilty, we should still have been ready as before to make all allowances for the legitimate difficulties of Germany. But the proposals put forward have reluctantly convinced the Allies either that the German Government does not intend to carry out its Treaty obligations, or that it has not the strength to insist, in the face of selfish and short-sighted opposition, upon the necessary sacrifices being made.

If that is due to the fact that German opinion will not permit it, that makes the situation still more serious, and renders it all the more necessary that the Allies should bring the leaders of public opinion once more face to face with facts. The first essential fact for them to realize is this—that the Allies, whilst prepared to listen to every reasonable plea arising out of Germany's difficulties, cannot allow any further paltering with the Treaty.

We have therefore decided—having regard to the infractions already committed, to the determination indicated in these proposals that Germany means still further to defy and explain away the Treaty, and to the challenge issued not merely in these proposals but in official statements made in Germany by the German Government—that we must act upon the assumption that the German Government are not merely in default, but deliberately in default; and unless we hear by Monday that Germany is either prepared to accept the Paris decisions or to submit proposals which will in other ways be an equally satisfactory discharge of her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles (subject to the concessions made in the Paris proposals), we shall, as from that date, take the following course under the Treaty of Versailles.

The Allies are agreed:

1. To occupy the towns of Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Düsseldorf, on the right bank of the Rhine.

2. To obtain powers from their respective Parliaments requiring their nationals to pay a certain proportion of all payments due to Germany on German goods to their several Governments, such proportion to be retained on account of reparations.

That is in respect of goods purchased either in this country or in any other Allied country from Germany.

3. (a) The amount of the duties collected by the German Custom houses on the external frontiers of the occupied territories to be paid to the Reparations Commission.

(b) These duties to continue to be levied in accordance with the German tariff.

(c) A line of Custom houses to be temporarily established on the Rhine and at the boundary of the *têtes des ponts* occupied by the Allied troops; the tariff to be levied on this line, both on the entry and export of goods, to be determined by the Allied High Commission of the Rhine territory in conformity with the instructions of the Allied Governments.

II

REPLY OF DR. WALTER SIMONS, HEAD OF THE
GERMAN DELEGATION TO THE REPARA-
TIONS CONFERENCE, LONDON,
MARCH 3, 1921

Mr. President and gentlemen,—The German Delegation is going to examine the speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the documents he has transmitted to us and has promised to transmit with the care due to their extent and their importance. We undertake to state our answer before Monday noon, but here I may already be permitted to state that the British Prime Minister seems to mistake the intentions of the German Government, and in our opinion no occasion would arise for the sanctions stated by the Allied Powers.

III

ADDRESS BY DR. SIMONS TO THE REPARATIONS
CONFERENCE, LONDON, MARCH 7, 1921

Mr. President and gentlemen,—The British Prime Minister, at the close of his speech on Thursday last, declared in the name of the Allied Governments that from to-day certain sanctions would be resorted to against Germany if she did not make a declaration that she was ready either to accept the Paris Agreement or to submit proposals which would in another, but equally satisfactory, way fulfil her obligations arising from the Treaty of Versailles.

Permit me first to sum up the present situation. Our counter-proposals of March 1 have been rejected and have not been found worthy to form the starting point of further discussions. On the other hand, for the reasons explained to you, we are not in a position to accept the Paris proposals of January 29. On account of the far-reaching differences of opinion of both parties at this moment, and the grave difficulties in the way of a perfect solution of the reparation problem, we are under the necessity of abandoning the idea of presenting to you a new plan to-day for the total reparation.

Thus, in spite of serious objections, we have decided to revert to the idea of a provisional arrangement. I may draw attention to the fact that Allied experts have unanimously recommended their Governments to provide in the Paris Conference for German reparation demands only over a period of five years, because after long and thorough investigation they are convinced that that enormous problem could not be solved in such a short time. I further may remind the Conference that even some of the Allied Governments just before the decision of Paris had emphatically denied the possibility of at once determining the total indebted-

edness of Germany, and had, therefore, asked for a provisional arrangement covering from three to five years.

All these considerations have induced us to consider the definite settlement for the next five years in order to prove that we want to satisfy the Paris demands of the Allies as far as possible. We should be prepared to pay the fixed annuities provided for for the first five years, and in addition to give full equivalent for the levy of 12 per cent. on our exports which has been demanded from us, but which we do not think to be practical. We know very well that such tremendous payments are only possible if a large part of them can be financed by way of a loan. We are, however, led to make such a proposal only if there were a chance of its being taken into consideration by the Allied Governments; but we can make the proposal only on the understanding that Upper Silesia, by virtue of the plebiscite, will remain with Germany, and that the restrictions which are imposed upon us in the commerce of the world shall be abolished. Both would be necessary to enable Germany to promise such high payments in an honourable way.

Whether we shall present to you to-day a proposal of that kind is entirely for you to decide. If you should agree to it we would do our best to cooperate with your experts to discuss the details of the proposal and then to establish as soon as possible a comprehensive plan of reparation for the period of thirty years. If, however, in spite of what I have said, you should insist upon the demand that we immediately have to make to you a fixed offer, a fixed total offer, it will be necessary for me to ask for a delay of about a week in order to consult personally in the matter with the Cabinet at Berlin.

And now I beg leave to make a few remarks in reply to the reflections upon which the President of the Conference has based the resolution of the Allied Governments, because I think it immensely important in these decisive hours that no mistake may stand between the Allied Governments and the German Government.

If there is such a large difference between the Paris Agreement of the Allied Powers and the London counter-proposals made by Germany, this is not to be explained by any intention upon the part of the German Government to evade their Treaty obligations or even to mock the Treaty, but by the fact that they differ from the Allies in estimating on the one hand the effects of the Paris Agreement, and, on the other, the capacity of Germany's economic organization. We are fully aware of the immensity of the damage wrought by the war in all belligerent countries and of the extent of that part of this burden which we have undertaken to shoulder by the Paris Treaty, but we are also aware that nobody would be benefited by our fixing now for many decades our obligations in a manner which, according to the result of careful examination, far exceeds our own capacity as well as that of our children and grandchildren.

In the time which has elapsed since Thursday, I have left nothing untried to explain the spirit in which our counter-proposals have been made, to clear up mistakes, and to try to find other ways to an understanding. I should like once more to lay stress upon the fact that our counter-proposals have been based on the sincere desire to find a settlement which would also for our adversaries be acceptable and correspond to their requirements. It is a mistake on the part of the President of the Conference that we wanted to find the money for the loan to mobilize our reparation debts in the pockets of our adversaries. The loan was to be issued, according to our proposals, in all countries which wanted to participate in it, and it is so understood also in Germany. Just the issue of this loan would have furnished the means in Germany to get at the capital which wanted to evade taxation and to make it serve the purposes of reparation. If an Allied country would have refused participating in this loan it would have been free to do so without, therefore, any necessity arising of giving up the whole of this idea.

We have been ready to resort to a provisional arrangement for five years. We are aware that such an arrangement

would entail the heaviest sacrifices for Germany and would, above all, suffer from the fault of not taking away the burden of uncertainty as to the final total debt. In spite of this we were, in the interests of a peaceful understanding, ready to enter upon the soil of such an agreement. We would for the sake of a final settlement even have gone so far as to accept the principle of the Paris resolutions that the total reparation would have to consist of the fixed annuities and variable factors which would increase with the increasing capacity of Germany. On the other hand, we have, even in the way of careful examination in accordance with the unanimous wish of the Government and of the nation in Germany, not been able to resolve to accept the rest of the resolutions of the articles of the Paris Agreement on our part. According to the declaration of the other adversaries the Paris Agreement is meant to meet us halfway. We prefer for the time after the lapse of five years not to make use of this intention to meet us but to keep intact the present provisions of the Peace Treaty. I am not able to see how far this might be regarded as a wilful and deliberate refusal on the part of Germany.

In order to prevent mistakes I may here remark that it is understood that the German delegation would prefer the settlement of the total reparation debt to be calculated according to the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

The British Prime Minister has pointed to the fact that Germany's guilt in the world war is to be considered as the basis of the Peace Treaty, and that, consequently, Germany, according to the principle set by herself in the Treaty of Frankfurt, is bound to pay not only, as their Treaty provided, the costs of the war, but also all the damages of the war. He expressed the opinion that an understanding on the execution of the Peace Treaty was not possible until Germany acknowledged this obligation. I have deliberately avoided speaking here of the question of war guilt, because I am, on the contrary, of opinion that that should make an understanding more difficult. The Treaty of Frankfurt started

from the assumption that not the guilty party but the vanquished party had to pay the costs of the war. On the other hand, peace after the Napoleonic wars renounced payment of war costs in favour of France.

The question of war guilt is to be decided neither by the Treaty, by acknowledgment, nor by sanctions; only history will be able to decide the question as to who was responsible for the world war. We are all of us still too near to the event. I have always been far from wishing to absolve the German Government of any responsibility for the war, but whether a single nation can be taken to be exclusively guilty of this terrible war, and whether this nation would be the German people, has not been finally decided by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

For us, this Treaty is lawful, because we have put our signature to it. In doing so we have not only admitted that we have lost the war, but we have also signed a judgment. The President of the Conference has laid stress on the fact that it is a *chose jugée*, but, as you know, any law reserves the possibility of invalidating even a *chose jugée* if the condemned party succeeds in furnishing new proof which could shake the reasons of that *chose jugée*.

In so far I agree with the President of the Conference that the condemned party has to obey the lawful judgment. It is the treaty law for us that Germany has to make reparation according to the Peace Treaty for the damages caused by the war. I entirely agree with Mr. Lloyd George in the view that the world should realize as clearly as possible the extent of these damages, in order to wake on all sides the real and energetic determination to soften the distress consequent upon it and to restore the destroyed values. I have myself been travelling four times through a large part of the devastated areas, and have been deeply stirred by their sight. I am conscious of uniting with the large majority of my countrymen in the conviction that we must do our utmost to cooperate in the work of reparation.

If we have not been able to contribute more than we have

done to the restoration of Belgium and northern France, the reason has not been a lack of readiness on our part to do so. The working population of Germany is particularly alive to the feeling that they ought to assist the damaged inhabitants of the former hostile districts destroyed by our occupation. But this is a technical and social task of such an immense difficulty that our proposal to meet it has up to now met with doubts and refusal rather than with approval. On the basis of the inquiries we have made in order to solve our own housing questions, we believe we are in a position to put before the Allied Governments new proposals which perhaps might serve to scatter those doubts.

Besides, I cannot help pointing to the powerful advance which even now has been made by Germany towards reparation and restoration. I grieve to state that these achievements are not being duly appreciated by public opinion in the Allied countries, and that it is still being pretended that Germany shows bad intention and avoids fulfilling the Treaty. There may be disagreement as to the figures expressing the value of Germany's achievements, but no impartial critic could deny that for a nation impoverished and exhausted by the war and the blockade these achievements mean a vast exertion and have at the same time been of material assistance in the restoration of the devastated areas.

In this connection Mr. Lloyd George has again laid stress on his view that the burden of taxation was in Germany lower than in the Allied countries. This view seems to us to be based on a wrong method of calculating adopted by the Allied experts. One cannot compare the charge of taxation per head of the population as computed in gold marks. Impoverished countries, it is self-evident, are only able to bear a lower quota per head than wealthy countries. One must rather compare the charge of taxation per head with the income per head. In order to compare those two items I accept the figures given by the memorandum of the League of Nations. From them it appears that, deducting taxation, there remains an income per head of the population:—

In England, 1,387.5 gold marks

In France, 702.5 gold marks

In Germany, 330.0 gold marks

From this it clearly results that, according to its economic capacity, Germany has to bear the largest burden. I also point to an official English source, the general report of the Department of Overseas Trade on the industrial and economic condition of Germany, in which it is stated that taxation in Germany takes away 43 per cent. of the single income (individual head of taxation). That the direct taxation in Germany would not bear further increase is acknowledged even by the Allies. The indirect taxes in Germany have for certain reasons, upon which I will not here enter into details, and which are exposed in detail in our memorandum, been up to now partly lower than in some of the Allied countries, but the German financial administration considers increasing them strongly. But even such an increase will for the present moment not be able to result in surpluses in the budget.

I should like to caution the Allies not to attempt to press out of Germany more payments than she can give. Nor is the menace of sanction justified by the provisions of the Peace Treaty, for only three of such provisions can serve as a starting point:—(1) Paragraph 18 of Annex 2 to Part VIII; (2) the concluding sentence of Article 429; and (3) Article 430.

First of all, none of these provisions permits the occupation of German territory outside the country west of the Rhine and the Têtes des Ponts. On the contrary, according to Article 429, only the evacuation of the troops from the occupied territory may be deferred in order to gain a guarantee against German attacks and, according to Article 430, evacuated territory can again be occupied if Germany refuses to execute her obligation of reparation.

On the ground of Paragraph 18 any right of occupying German territory cannot be based, as, according to the whole connection in which this Paragraph occurs, there is only a

question of economic measures. The economic sanctions with which we are now confronted would, according to Paragraph 18, only refer to the case of non-execution of our reparation duty. The British Treasury has acknowledged this only recently. This Paragraph is not to be applied to defaults against provisions concerning war criminals or disarmament. A default against the German reparation debt is in our opinion not given. The term at which, according to Article 235, the amount of 20,000,000,000 [£1,000,000,000] in cash or in kind should be delivered to the Allies has not yet been reached. According to our estimate the German payments and deliveries amount besides already to the above-mentioned sum. In any case there can be no question here of a deliberate default against the Treaty. The non-execution of any further plan of payments can only lead to sanctions if this plan in accordance with Article 232 of the Peace Treaty would have been arranged by the Reparation Commission.

Lastly, the second sanction would be definitely in contradiction to the undertaking which the Belgian and British Governments have given in virtue of the resignation of their rights under Paragraph 18 of Annex 2 to Part VIII.

The measures whereby a lien will be put on part of the payments to be made to German nationals for goods delivered would not be applicable neither in Germany nor in the United Kingdom in so far as bank credits which have arisen from the sale of goods are concerned.

In regard to the third sanction, the erection of a special Customs tariff in the Rhineland is only permissible under Article 270 for the protection of the economic interests of the Rhineland population and not for the punishment of the whole German people in respect of unfulfilled Treaty obligations.

I will permit myself to give the remainder of my legal remarks to the protocol in writing, and only state in conclusion that the menace of sanctions cannot be based on the Peace Treaty, and that it also is in contradiction with

the League of Nations pact. According to Article VII of the League of Nations pact, in quarrels between members of the League of Nations and a State which is not a member of the League, the procedure of arbitration provided for by Article XV is also to be applied. Germany is not a member of the League, but she has signed the pact of the League, and I therefore announce in the name of the German Government an appeal to the Assembly of the League of Nations against the sanctions with which we are menaced.

Mr. President and Gentlemen,—I come to my conclusion now. More important for me than the question of right is the reflection that any sanction, if it fails to attain its purpose, must call for new sanctions, and so, finally, instead of executing the Treaty, lead up to preparing a new state of violence. But we all of us very badly want to get out of the unhealthy atmosphere of compulsion and into the wholesome atmosphere of voluntary cooperation. Mr. Lloyd George has said that it is not the intention of the Allies to ruin and enslave Germany, but that they recognize a restored and flourishing Germany as a condition of their own welfare. These generous words meet with a lively echo on our side. We are likewise conscious that Germany can never come under the restoration of her own destroyed economic life so long as her former adversaries have to suffer so immensely under the consequences of the war. However the question of war guilt may one day be decided, we are all in a common distress which can only be removed by a common effort. Believe me that Germany is ready to exert herself more than the others.

We ask the Allies to assist us in finding ways to fulfil our obligations. We believe that the manner of our payments should be examined separately for each of the Allied countries. Perhaps we shall have to adopt different methods of balancing payments in cash and payments in kind to France as compared with England and to Belgium as compared with Italy. We shall also have to examine how far the demands which other Powers which are not parties to the Peace Treaty

will put to us will be able to be satisfied on the basis of our agreement with the Allies.

All these questions, in order to be practically solved, require being thoroughly studied by technical experts to be appointed from both sides. I hope that the joint labours of these authorities in the economic life of Europe may succeed in finding a way out of the labyrinth of grave economic difficulties under which we all of us jointly struggle.

IV

REPLY OF THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
TO THE GERMAN DELEGATION,

MARCH 7, 1921

Dr. Simons and gentlemen,—I very much regret that I have to state on behalf of the Allied Governments that not only the proposals made by Dr. Simons this morning are not acceptable, but that, in spite of the interval which has occurred since our last meeting, they do not represent such an advance upon the first proposals as to justify us in postponing the execution of the sanctions. I need hardly say that we all very deeply deplore having to come to this decision. In the interests of the peace of the world, and in spite of the fact that our action was liable to a good deal of misapprehension in our own countries, we made an effort to secure a better understanding, and it is not for lack of effort and discussion that I have now to announce on behalf of the Allies this failure to come to anything like an approximate understanding with Germany.

I will now indicate as shortly as I possibly can why we regard Dr. Simons's last proposals as inadequate. It is common ground to all the parties concerned that it is essential in the interests of the peace of the world that there should be a definitive settlement of the outstanding questions between us. Germany urged it. The Allies pressed the same consideration. And the neutrals were equally insistent. In fact, the friends of peace throughout the world said to us, "Settle up as soon as you can the amount of your liabilities, so that every country should know exactly where it stands."

Germany appealed to us to do so, and for obvious reasons. Germany said, "How can we settle down to our business to rebuild our economic life when there is an indefinite, unknown liability hanging over us?" Quite right. The Allies said,

"How can we restore devastated provinces unless we can make some kind of plan, some kind of scheme—unless we know something of the resources at our disposal?" So it suited them. And the neutrals said, "How can we trade with either Germany or the Allies until we know what their financial position is?" Therefore, all those who are responsible for the direction of the affairs of a very shaken, distracted, and uncertain world said, "Do settle once for all what your differences are and let us know the worst!"

It was an appeal to common sense. It is perfectly true experts, failing to come to an agreement, made some suggestion about trying to agree for five years, but that was not a plan which was adopted by any conference of statesmen in either country. For the reasons which I have indicated we wanted each of us to know exactly where we stood, so as not to be building on a rocking foundation, but on something which, however low it was, was firm and touched bottom.

Now I am going to examine Dr. Simons's proposals in the light of what I consider to be the paramount interest of Germany, the Allies, the neutrals—in fact, the whole people of this world; and it is in the light of that examination that I think they completely fail, and until we get proposals from Germany that will mean a definite, unchallenged settlement there can be no peace between us.

What is Dr. Simons's proposal? There is an appearance of accepting the Paris proposals for five years, and five years only. But that is apparent and not real. It is subject to conditions which make it uncertain, which might terminate it in the course of the next few weeks. It is subject to the plebiscite in High Silesia. If the plebiscite in High Silesia, or in part of it, is adverse to Germany, Dr. Simons, if we accepted his proposal, would be perfectly justified in coming here and saying, "The situation has changed. Germany has been deprived of the territory upon which she depended to pay those annuities, and therefore the arrangement which I made in London is at an end."

That is, it is not a proposal for five years; it is a proposal

for five weeks. It is subject to other conditions, which I do not want to dwell upon at the present moment because they have not been elaborated; proposals with regard to guarantees for German trade—I do not examine those now because the first condition is in itself a complete demonstration of the fact that so far from settling anything we are unsettling; we are not looking ahead a couple of months, let alone five years. Then what happens after the end of five years? Supposing High Silesia voted in favour of remaining in Germany; supposing we were ready to accept the conditions about German trade, and all went well for five years, what happens afterwards?

After the five years we have no proposal; not even a conditional one; not a figure. Not even a precise method of arriving at a figure. There is no minimum, even. It is perfectly vague. There is nothing the Allies, especially those who want to raise money for repairing their ravaged country; there is nothing they could raise one paper franc in the market upon in the proposals made—not one; letting alone a gold mark. There are some indications which are disquieting; for instance, it is part of the five-year proposals that Germany should pay even the low figures fixed for the annuities for those five years not out of her current revenue, but by means of a loan. She is to borrow. By borrowing she mortgages her future. She will borrow—must necessarily borrow—with a guarantee of priority for those who lend even over reparations. So that what happens after the five years is that Germany, not anticipating that she will be able to pay out of her current revenue for the first five years, will mortgage her income for the years that come after in order to pay the annuities of the first five.

Now that is the only indication of what is in the German mind as to what is likely to happen after five years. There is no other test; there is no other promise; and there is only one certainty. We have been asking for some sort of certainty—there is only one certainty, and that is the certainty that it will be inadequate.

But there are certain significant sentences used by Dr. Simons which show clearly that Germany has not yet faced her problem. He talked about the enormous sacrifices which are to be necessary for Germany to make in order to pay the annuities for the first five years. Let me give the cases of Great Britain and France. Even if High Silesia is torn entirely from the side of Germany, Germany will have a population which will be ten millions in excess of Great Britain, even if you include Ireland. This year we have about a little over one million unemployed here. That is the direct result of the war, but we have to find for paying our debt charges and for pensions and disability allowances five hundred millions sterling. If Germany carries out this year the Paris proposals she will have to find one hundred and twenty millions sterling, not for Great Britain but for all the Allies—one-fourth of what Britain alone has to find with a million unemployed for war debt charges and for pensions.

The case of France is more striking. France, in addition to her war charges and her very heavy pension list, has to find 12,000,000,000 francs for repairing her devastated area. She must find it this year somewhere or leave those provinces unrestored. Germany would have to find, therefore, this year one-ninth of what France has to find; one-ninth for the whole of the Allies of what France has to find herself for the charges of the war. And we are told that the effort Germany puts forth with her 55,000,000 as against France with 42,000,000 or 43,000,000 is a colossal sacrifice! It shows that Germany has not yet quite realized the essential facts of the situation, and that has impressed me more each time I have attended these conferences and heard these proposals being made.

I am quite prepared to make an allowance for the difficulty of paying beyond the frontiers. That is not a question of sacrifice; that is a difficulty of currency that can easily be overcome by any well-thought-out arrangement for deducting from the price of German sales to Allied countries a proportion of the purchase money.

The other very significant part of Dr. Simons's speech, in view of the character of the proposals, was his refusal to accept on behalf of Germany the responsibility for the war, which is the very basis of the Treaty of Versailles. Not only did he refuse to accept that basis, but he appealed to history for a revision of the sentence. When does history begin? When I see a proposal limited by five years it leaves an uneasy feeling in my mind that there is an inclination in Germany to consider the possibility of history beginning five years hence and an appeal for the revision of that sentence being one of the considerations to be examined at the end of this short period.

The Allies cannot possibly enter into any discussions upon that basis. The responsibility of Germany for the war is, with them, fundamental. The whole Treaty of Versailles depends upon it, and unless Germany—whatever she may think of the verdict—is prepared to act upon it, then no arrangement which is made can give confidence between the parties and restore that atmosphere of neighbourly good will which is essential to the peace of Europe.

The Paris proposals represented a considerable abatement of the full claims of the Allies, but that abatement was made in order to ensure a settlement. As I have already indicated to Dr. Simons on behalf of the Allies, we are willing to discuss with Germany the length of the period of the annuities. We are willing to discuss with Germany any other method besides the 12 per cent. for adjusting the annuity to German prosperity.

But we must insist on a settlement now of two questions. The first is the amount of the payments, or the factors which should determine those amounts automatically according to the prosperity of Germany. What those factors should be we are prepared to discuss. Whether the index of German prosperity should be 12 per cent. on her exports or some other method of arriving at that essential element, that we are prepared to discuss, but we must have something that will either determine the amount or determine the index which will settle the variable amount.

The second point upon a settlement of which we must now insist is the method of payment. A mere paper agreement promising payment is unsatisfactory and insufficient. It means endless disputes. We must arrange now how the money is to be paid, so that there should be no possibility of further discussions or quarrels. We have plenty of paper money in our various countries, and we do not want further to dilute our currency with paper promises. Those are the two questions which must be settled between Germany and ourselves, and settled immediately.

The proposals put forward by Dr. Simons do not carry out any of these objects. They are neither the Paris proposals nor their equivalent. I am afraid, and Dr. Simons will forgive me for saying this, he is not really in a position to negotiate. He represents and he is returning to report to a public opinion which is not ready to pay this debt. In the interests of the Allies, in the interests of Germany, in the interests of the world, we must have a settlement, we must have a definite settlement, and we must have an immediate settlement.

Proposals such as those which we have heard are not a settlement. They simply evade and postpone settlement, and very regretfully we have come to the conclusion that the sanctions must be put into operation immediately.

V

REPLY OF DR. SIMONS, MARCH 7, 1921

Mr. President and gentlemen,—I must say I regret that also to-day the purpose of our new proposals has been mistaken. For us, just as for you, the disadvantages of a provisional settlement are beyond doubt. But we have taken refuge to such a provisional settlement under pressure of your ultimatum, which ended to-day, and which forced us to come forward with definite proposals. We should have preferred to put before you a plan of a total arrangement, a plan like that which we originally started with.

Even now we should prefer to come forward with a plan for a total arrangement, but I regret to say that we had no second proposals in our pocket, and this is the reason why we had to try to find a new way, a way which we have striven to find both here in the Delegation and in Berlin in the Cabinet. I have been charged, and I have acted according to this charge, to ask you for a brief delay in order that we might get into touch with the Cabinet at Berlin. I may here state that we have been refused even this short delay. From this fact it already appears that the fear is unfounded that we should want to make use of the provisional settlement to strive towards a revision of the whole Treaty after the lapse of those five years.

On the contrary, the German nation has undertaken its obligation of making reparation, and it is ready to fulfil the whole of this obligation to the limits of possibility. We are, therefore, ready to enter upon the idea of the President of this Conference to furnish the Allies part of the means which would be required for purposes of reparation by laying hold of part of the purchasing prices of German goods delivered into the Allied countries on reparation account.

I have submitted and recommended this proposal to my

Government, and I can only say I regret that this proposal should have been discredited in the public opinion of Germany by having been placed by you among the sanctions to be taken against Germany. We agree with the President of the Conference also on this point, that it would be advisable as quickly as possible to get the fixed sums determined, and to get also determined the factors of the varied payments in the case of her economic recovery which Germany would have to make towards reparation. We further agree with your intention to set up an examination of the method of the fixed and varied payments to the different countries. Also these points in our opinion should be deliberated on by a joint committee of experts as soon as possible, and I can only state that it is a pity that when these experts are going to meet the atmosphere in which they will meet will be embittered by the sanctions which are to be put in force against us.

I feel obliged at this moment, when the sanctions are definitely going to be put into force against us, once more to enter with all due stress a protest against this your procedure.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
144. Reply to the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
145. Agreements between the United States and France, and between England and France, June 28, 1919; Anglo-Persian Agreement, August 9, 1919. December, 1919.
146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
148. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part II. April, 1920.
150. German Secret War Documents. May, 1920.
151. Present Day Conditions in Europe, by Henry P. Davison; Message of President Wilson to the Congress on the United States and the Armenian Mandate; Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. June, 1920.
152. Switzerland and the League of Nations: Documents Concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations; the United States and the League of Nations: Reservations of the United States Senate of November, 1919, and March, 1920. July, 1920.
153. The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, by George A. Finch. August, 1920.
154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
156. Presentation of the Saint-Gaudens Statue of Lincoln to the British People, July 28, 1920. November, 1920.
157. The Draft Scheme of the Permanent Court of International Justice. December, 1920.
158. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part I. January, 1921.
159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
160. Central European Relief, by Herbert Hoover; Relief for Europe, by Herbert Hoover; Intervention on Behalf of the Children in Countries Affected by the War, by the Swiss Delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations; The Typhus Epidemic in Central Europe, by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour; Report of the Special Commission on Typhus in Poland, to the Assembly of the League of Nations. March, 1921.
161. Disarmament in its Relation to the Naval Policy and the Naval Building Program of the United States, by Arthur H. Pollen. April, 1921.
162. Addresses on German Reparation by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George and Dr. Walter Simons, London, March 3rd and 7th, 1921. May, 1921.


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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

I

INTRODUCTION

Editorial from *Journal des Débats* ¹

The celebration of November 11 brings to a fitting close the series of ceremonies which, for the last two years, have signalized the victory of justice. At the same time it commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of the régime which, after receiving at the fall of the Empire the heritage of a defeated and dismembered France, has had the honor to lead the sorely wounded nation back to strength and to establish it again in the high place earned by its past history and services to humanity. On the day when an unknown soldier symbolizes the anonymous heroism of the nation, no one can doubt that the restoration of France is due above all to her own efforts. M. Millerand, in his epoch-making address at the Panthéon, misunderstood neither the weaknesses nor the faults that have at times hindered the progress of the Republic towards the supreme goal where she has at last arrived. But a universal and invincible determination has dominated and guided everything toward better paths. There is not a Frenchman, either statesman or man of the people, who has not preserved at the bottom of his heart the will—at times obscured but always firm—to accomplish his patriotic duty.

Certainly no one dreamed of resorting to war to regain the lost provinces. None of those who have governed France from Thiers to Poincaré would have been willing to assume the responsibility of a resort to force to efface the wrongs inflicted by force. M. Millerand recalls that "immanent justice has decreed that the war, as a result of which just reparation should come, should be initiated by the very

¹ Translated from *Journal des Débats*, November 19, 1920.

perpetrators of the crime." Those who do not comprehend the providential character of this origin of the late war have never comprehended the tragic beauty of Gambetta's appeal to "immanent justice."

It is to the honor of the French people and of the Republic that they have preserved in their hearts the unchangeable attachment to the brothers lost in 1871 and at the same time the ineradicable confidence that the hour of justice would strike without the need for the victims to take the initiative in bloodshed. There is no more profound homage to ideal justice than this attitude assumed quite naturally by an entire people. When our great orators, our great poets, our great educators and all our great spiritual leaders preached the *sursum corda* to the masses, they were listened to because they rendered the latent aspirations of all minds into magnificent language.

"Demosthenes has been unable to accomplish anything against Philip," remarked the President of the Republic, because he spoke to sceptics while our national Demosthenes, although less eloquent, have been more successful because they had the popular soul with them.

One may in all good faith have no love for the democratic régime and prefer to it the France of olden times, but barring a prejudice that neither misleads nor persuades anyone, he cannot deny that, on the whole, the Third Republic has done its full duty at a time when its duty was neither mediocre nor easy. That is why the Republic has deserved to survive and to conquer.

All difficulties have not been smoothed out! Certainly not, and it is even necessary to admit that a "régime of liberty and of justice" as M. Jonnart yesterday defined the Republic, is a régime always at work and in activity, because the path of progress toward liberty and justice is an infinite upward slope. There is stability, in the ordinary sense of the word, only in a régime of blind conservation, but even that stability is only apparent and deceptive for it leads finally to revolutions. We have had no revolutions in the last half-century. Count those

of the preceding half-century: the fall of the first Empire, the fall of the Restoration, the fall of the July Monarchy and the fall of the Second Empire. Moreover, these different régimes had their days of glory and their years of prosperity. But they believed that they could stabilize history and put an end to reforms. They did not comprehend what was repeated yesterday by M. Jonnart, in the same address at the monument to Waldeck-Rousseau, when he made clear what the latter's policy aimed to be, not always successfully:

"Concord and peace are durable and fruitful only on condition of orderly progressive growth in an atmosphere of fraternity."

II

COMMEMORATIVE ADDRESS

By M. MILLERAND, President of the Republic¹

What events have happened, what a transformation has taken place in the half century from September 4, 1870, to September 4, 1920.

Crushed in disaster the Empire fell. The Republic rose up, having for its program the title of the new government: The National Defence. This program is typified by a single man—the tribune whose grateful country has just borne his heart side by side with the nameless and glorious remains of one of his soldiers to the Panthéon.

With an unconquerable faith in the destiny of France, Gambetta did not limit himself—together with his colleagues, the representatives of Alsace and of Lorraine—to the affirmation of the certain revenge of justice at the very hour when force was triumphant. To render possible that revenge which the voice of Paul Déroulède constantly demanded, he consecrated the twelve short years reserved to him by destiny to the work of rebuilding France, to utilize all the resources of most glowing eloquence and flexible policy in order to raise up and develop his party to the point where it should include the entire country; to discipline the party and to transform it from a party of opposition to a party of government; and, simultaneously with the restoration of France, to establish the Republic on unshakable foundations. His work is completed. Under these vaults I salute the representatives of reconstructed France and of the triumphant Republic.

Certainly we deny nothing of what belongs to the French patrimony. The sons of the revolution are truly "the zealots of Jeanne d'Arc." It does not diminish the grandeur of past

¹ Translated from *Journal des Débats*, November 19, 1920.

ages to hold that the nineteenth century—the century of disquietude, of preparation and of research—is one of the most stirring and pathetic.

The period from 1870 to 1920 was hard, but its painful labors themselves attach us the more closely to the soil we tread. Now that the danger has passed, a new and closer bond unites us to those who led us through the perilous situation and who have saved us. Of that order are the indissoluble bonds which today attach France to the Republic.

At Rome, it was a mark of honor and nobility to have the right to keep the images of ancestors in the atrium and to have them borne in certain solemn ceremonies. The Republic has won its patent of nobility. On this anniversary it has the right to have borne before it the images of those who have guided it and who, in tragic circumstances, have supplied it with the power to live and to grow. In time of need it has always been the marvellous destiny of France to see rise from its soil the men indispensable to her safety. We will only name the dead; Gambetta, Jules Ferry, Waldeck-Rousseau. Have not all those who succeeded them been, if not always pupils of their methods, at least disciples of their thought?

Gambetta

Gambetta, who in 1870 was the great organizer of the national defence; Gambetta, who, after the treaty of Frankfurt, looked forward to the revenge of immanent justice; Gambetta, whose enthusiasms, warmth of heart and spiritual impulse were, on the morrow of the catastrophe, the song of hope rising above the ruins! Gambetta, of whom my illustrious predecessor, in the beautiful book that he consecrated to him a few months ago, said "his name forms part of the religion of France;" Gambetta who had, in fine, the signal honor of personifying the very fortune of our country to the eyes of the foreigner! Immediately after the funeral of the great patriot Jules Ferry wrote "Let us allow our conquerors to persuade themselves that Gambetta, has carried to his tomb the last remnant of the spirit of revenge; it is well, it is useful

that they believe it, but not one of those who have seen and understood the great and consoling spectacles of these incomparable days will dare to blaspheme the heart of France." "To blaspheme the heart of France"—one understands what such words signify; one hears the secret echoes that they express of the soul of him who pronounced them.

Jules Ferry felt the heart of France beat in his own breast; he felt it bleed from the wounds of yesterday and palpitate for all that with hopes for future life. To that resurrection he consecrated himself. With a tenacity, seemingly indifferent but nevertheless profoundly sensitive to the most furious and unjust attacks, without faltering because it was not he but the country that was in jeopardy, he followed the program that he had laid out, a program of national reconstruction, of national education and of national expansion. On the fields of battle in Flanders and on the Somme, on the Marne and on the Meuse, at Ypres as at Verdun, everywhere where you, our Marshalls, have led the allied armies, we have seen not heroism alone, but the very soul of those young men who were pupils of Jules Ferry; we have seen the exploits of those soldiers from Africa and Asia whom Jules Ferry has given us.

On the 4th of July, 1899, in the Chamber of Deputies, in a most serious crisis President Waldeck-Rousseau cried "The Republic will live" and was applauded by the majority. Waldeck-Rousseau! The Minister of Commerce of 1900 could not evoke without emotion the figure of the great statesman who, at one of the most critical epochs of French life, had the courage to accept governmental power and was able, through his serenity, poise and ability to reestablish peace in the minds of the people as well as in the streets of the capital. "The Republic will live," he cried. The Republic has lived. The Republic has conquered. The Republic still lives.

Those republicans were admirable who had the strength of mind never to despair, who suffered in their hearts from the disquietudes born of tragic events and of violent attacks upon them, and who nevertheless remained calm and were able to dissimulate their anguish and suffering, fully determined to

reach the goal they knew must be attained. But those men, whatever their importance might be, would not have been sufficient for the task if they had been alone. Demosthenes was unable to accomplish anything against Philip. Their strength was in the people on whom they relied and the essential worth of the Republic is shown by the fact that it made it possible for this people to develop, to expand, and if one may so express it, to rise to the height of the occasion.

Immediately after the victory of the Marne, that five-day battle during which a world filled with foreboding had seen, with astonishment, admiration and delight, an army supposed to be defeated and in flight turn about suddenly and force into retreat a victorious army that believed that it already held definitive triumph in its hands, General Joffre telegraphed to the government: "The Republic can be proud of the army it has organized." By this understand: the Republic can be proud of the people it has raised, for was it not the whole French people who were under arms, who fought and held firm and conquered with the aid of its allies?

The Work of a Half-century

Fifty years have doubtless not passed without weaknesses and the commission of faults. To err is human and we are men; but even when we erred, there was something that never weakened—the love of France.

The deep love of country, the passionate desire to make each day more noble and more splendid, more prosperous and more just, to restore its natural frontiers, to guarantee it against fresh crimes; the impassioned desire to bring it about that in sweet France life be made daily easier and more humane,—is not that the sentiment that will forever inspire us all? It matters little that methods differ, the unique goal is there that may not be forgotten.

Look at the position of France on September 4, 1870; look at the position of France on September 4, 1920. We should call to mind the sad voyage of M. Thiers in Europe during that cruel winter of 1870, in search of support that everywhere

eluded him. Recall, on the other hand, the Belgians, the British, the Italians, the Russians, the Americans and the volunteers of all races and all tongues who threw themselves forward from 1914 to 1918 to shed their blood on French soil for a cause, at the same time our cause and that of civilization. Call to mind the army of 1870 and its six months calvary. It saved our honor. It added to the anthology of our glory new names and immortal pages: Reichshoffen, Gravelotte, Bazeilles; Chanzy, Faidherbe, Denfert-Rochereau. What an abyss, however, between the army of 1870 and the French army of 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918!

Let us recall the continuity of the foreign policy of the Republic that was able to prepare, organize and maintain those friendships and alliances that we were to find ready in the day of peril.

Let us think of the soldiers from Asia and Africa, whom I invoked just now with the memory of Jules Ferry. It was the colonial policy of the Republic that made it possible for us to acquire and preserve these magnificent over-seas domains, where in the midst of a general upheaval, peace has not ceased to reign. Remember the sad meeting of March 1, 1871, at Bordeaux, where was heard the pathetic protest of the deputies from Alsace and Lorraine; remember the incomparable days of November and December, 1918, in Alsace and Lorraine and say whether the Republic has not brought to success its impassioned effort for the grandeur of France.

But the redemption of France has not been brought about only in the military and political sense. It has been accomplished in all the branches of human activity, in agriculture, in public works, in commerce and in industry.

In social legislation we should recall the measures taken for the protection of child labor, for the regulation and limitation of working hours, from the point of view of hygiene and of safety; for assistance to minors, the aged and infirm; the great laws on labor accidents, on the weekly holiday, on the housing of laborers and the development of mutual aid. Under the action of two laws, those of March 21, 1884 and July 1,

1901, syndicates and associations have multiplied. Also the prodigious development of social conceptions and accomplishments has been one of the features of this period. Thought for these grave problems made its way into all parties. It has given to parliamentary eloquence two of the orators who have reflected the highest brilliancy on the French tribune—Jean Jaurès and Albert de Mun. All the moral values, all the social values and all the spiritual values that make up the grandeur of a people have had occasion to manifest and affirm themselves in that space of fifty years. The Republic can rightly take glory in them; and to future generations we do not present ourselves empty-handed.

The coming generations have been the object of constant thought to the governments that have succeeded each other since 1870. If, in the constitution of the Year III there is inscribed the obligation of the state to watch over national education, our Republic has not evaded this duty. There are no cares that it has not given to this work; material cares, intellectual cares, administrative cares. And among its best workers, beside and not far from the name of Jules Ferry, it is only just to inscribe the name of René Goblet. There was construction of schools in all districts of France, organization of girls' education, development of primary, secondary and higher education, and creation of professional education.

The value of that education we have judged by the results it has obtained.

Need of an Ideal

In the life of a people, there is something more, and there ought to be something more than the quest for material prosperity. Men have need of an ideal to guide them, to sustain them in their daily troubles, to enable them to rise above their troubles. Is not the double purpose of education fulfilled when, at the end of school, the young people are equally equipped for action and for thought? And if the young people of France have proved of what they are capable in action, have they not also proved of what they are capable

in thought? They have had illustrious masters of whom it can be said that without them the world would not have been raised to its present level. They have followed these masters, and, if it has been sometimes claimed that science has no country, it can never be denied that there is a manner of conceiving science that is peculiarly French.

The names of Pasteur, Berthelot, Henri Poincaré and Pierre Curie are universal but they are above all French by that clarity, that boldness, that breadth, that confidence and that quality of thought that are truly our own. Is it not the same quality that is found in our artists, and is anything more admirable than the surprising mixture of realism and of lyricism, that marvellous life whose disinterestedness is a perpetual lesson, contained in works like those of Rodin in sculpture, of César Franck and Debussy in music, of Puvis de Chavannes and Carrière, of Renoir and Cézanne in painting? And finally in literature, philosophy and history, in criticism and romance, in poetry and drama, from Taine and Renan to Charles Péguy, the movement of ideas has been so rapid, so abundant that it is easy to follow therein the moral history of the generations of the Third Republic.

After the war of 1870 there was a sort of uneasiness; one saw the generations that had lived through the war clutched, as it were, by despondency toward life, taking refuge in the ivory towers and seeking that ideal whose pain each Frenchman feels in symbols sometimes obscure but whose inspiration affirms its worth. Others pleased themselves with mental activity. Pessimism had its day. But, one morning, rumors from without penetrated the ivory towers. A moment always comes when, weary of the dream in which one is wrapped, the window is opened to the outside air. Through the open window suddenly enter the voices of life which has resumed full strength. While some slept in dreams, others toiled. The song of labor resounds. The isolated dreamer then feels that he ought to add his effort to the universal effort, his verse to the universal song, that he ought to labor to realize that ideal which he had believed could be cultivated only in a secluded retreat.

Sometimes the ideal changes but it is always the ideal. It is not a question of knowing whether these poets, novelists, dramatists and historians are republicans or not; it is not a question of knowing whether they were revolutionists or reactionaries, catholics or free thinkers. It is enough to establish that, by their care for moral, social and religious questions, they have disengaged themselves from that dilettantism whose disintegrating charm is more harmful to a people than the violence of prejudice.

Generations of the beginning of the twentieth century, who were so keen in battle and who entered the arena with such ardor, whose cruel wounds are so deplored, we may ask ourselves today if we should not congratulate ourselves on those struggles that were struggles for an idéal, so that in 1905, when external danger appeared abruptly to all eyes, the parties commenced to unite so as to make but one French party. Generations that reached the age of manhood with the war, we must appeal to them in this academic quarter which they left to go to the front with that youthful enthusiasm which detracts nothing from good judgment—they have understood in advance, they have comprehended, they have acquiesced.

The Work Is not Finished

1870 to 1920—what a period of accomplishment! In philosophy and in history, in criticism and in romance, in the drama and even in poetry is manifested unceasingly that thought for those lofty problems that make the honor and the grandeur of mankind. It is true that, among these philosophers and these historians, among these critics and these novelists, among these dramatists and these poets, all do not celebrate the Republic; but the Republic celebrates all of them for it is precisely its glory to have made it possible for them all to make known their thoughts, which sometimes they clothed in magnificent language; and if we cannot foresee what judgment posterity will render on our era, we can feel assured that if it does not retain certain names it will nevertheless

retain the memory of an epoch of free and unpassioned seeking for truth and beauty.

The work is not finished. If, as Gambetta wished, France has preserved intact and ever present the memory of the dear lost provinces, it has never occurred to the thought of any of the governments that it could take the responsibility of appealing to force to attempt to regain the property that had been ravished from it. Immanent justice has decreed that the war, as a result of which just reparation should come, should be initiated by the very perpetrators of the crime.

Aggression interrupted the peaceful work of hands and brain. After more than four years of a terrible war this work has been resumed. New duties have been added to our duties. We have ruins to restore, reparations to assure and guarantees to maintain. May the past give us confidence for the future!

Oh, unknown soldier, nameless and triumphant representative of the heroic host of poilus; Ye dead who sleep your last sleep under the soil of Flanders, of Champagne, of Verdun, of so many famous or unknown battlefields; young heroes who rushed from beyond the Atlantic, from the British Isles, from far off Dominions, from Italy, from Belgium, from Serbia, from all parts of the world to offer your lives for the preservation of the ideal that once again France typified, sleep in peace.

You have fulfilled your destiny.

France and civilization are saved.

III

THE WORK OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC: FOREIGN
POLICY 1870-1920By AUGUSTE GAUVIN ¹

Born out of defeat, the Republic celebrates its fiftieth anniversary on the morrow of a victory which is transforming the face of the world. If, as there are many reasons for belief, Bismark favored the establishment of our Republic after Sedan, in the fear that France again might become too strong under a monarchy, it proves that his genius, composed of will, of promptness in seizing opportunity and of brutality, lacked foresight and psychological perception. A restored monarch would have always been suspected by our neighbors of preparing for revenge in order to consolidate his dynasty. His diplomacy would have suffered constantly from these suspicions. One recalls the declaration of Napoleon III: "*L'Empire, c'est la paix.*"

However reserved the foreign policy of a king might have been, and assuming that his counsellors would not have urged him to imprudent measures, it would have been difficult for that policy to follow a glorious path through internal difficulties under the surveillance of Germany always on the watch. Bismark had too much scorn for the Republic and his successors had too much scorn for the citizens of the Republic. Those errors of judgment explain in part the aggression of 1914.

Modest and reserved, careful to give no excuse for attack to the enemy who sought a pretext to finish the work of 1871, the Third Republic enjoyed from its birth the good-will of old friends of France who had been estranged from us by the mischief-making, fanciful and blustering policy of Napoleon

¹ Translated from *Journal des Débats*, November 19, 1920.

III. In 1875, Czar Alexander II and Queen Victoria obliged Bismark to abandon the so-called preventive war he planned against us. These two sovereigns were, however, strongly impregnated with Germanism. They had tranquilly permitted Prussia to consummate its crime of 1871. Neither of them had cared to stop the war after September 4, 1870. But when the government of the Republic showed itself to be wise, peaceful and wholly consecrated to internal reconstruction, it did not suit them that France should be sacrificed again to Prussian appetites. Bismark grumbled but did not repeat his attempt. He changed tactics. Obligated to allow France to reconstruct her forces and to put herself in a state of defence, he played the part of encouraging her to develop beyond the seas. Himself without colonial ambitions, active in strong unification of the empire, in perfecting his military machine and in strengthening his European alliances, he opened to us the path of a colonial policy.

Even in that path the French government at first advanced only with extreme prudence. In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, it declined Lord Salisbury's offer to complete our African domain by the occupation of Tunis. It only carried this proposal into effect in 1881, when it was proved that if we did not take the initiative we should be outstripped by Italy. Jules Ferry, who was in power at that time, established the system, which consisted simply in not being hypnotized, as it was expressed then, by the gap in the Vosges as well as in profiting by the good-will of Germany to found a colonial empire. But in his mind there was no question at all of a political *rapprochement* with our conquerors nor of renunciation of future reparation. Since there was no reason to hope that reparation would come at an early date he refused to treat Berlin ill-naturedly and met its advances in order to be able to develop freely our over-seas possessions. He would have been wrong if Bismark's intention had been to lay a trap for us and to attack us at the moment when our troops were occupied at far distant points. But under the circumstances the astute chancellor was not laying a trap for us. He

counted only on the fact that our foreign enterprises would turn our minds from the thought of revenge and would put us in conflict with those powers with which he feared we might enter into alliances.

On his side Jules Ferry wished to increase our resources of every kind in order that we should be in better position to resist the German hegemony and to defend our interests everywhere. It is also to be supposed that he foresaw that some day it might be possible to exchange a great colony for the *Reichsland*. Certainly this was profoundly repugnant to German sentiment. But it agreed so well with Germany's true interest that it was possible to believe that during some European crisis a great German statesman could be brought to accept a bargain so advantageous to both parties and so promising for world peace. On any hypothesis it was skillful on our part to make sure of those elements for negotiation which were at the same time a source of wealth and a valuable field for military training.

Unfortunately the aggressive internal policy of Jules Ferry raised so much hatred against him that his policy of colonial expansion was criticized from the beginning. His adversaries, whom he abused without regard, made no distinction between the man and his work. The elections of 1881 weakened him to such an extent that he felt it necessary to resign in the month of November.

Monarchists perhaps will claim that the instability of our foreign policy at that time was an inevitable result of the republican régime which also is responsible for the abandonment of Egypt in 1882. It is true that at the time of the incidents in Alexandria in July of that year, M. de Freycinet, president of the Council, did not dare to take the initiative boldly and that the Chamber disapproved the little that he tried to do. That was a serious check. But, with a perspective of the thirty-eight years which have elapsed, and by ignoring passing considerations, we ought to judge the event from another aspect. If the weakness of the republican government in 1882 placed us for many years in a pitiable position, it did not

compromise the chances for a general arrangement with England, a very necessary condition of our independence as regards Germany. Furthermore, it did not exclude some particular arrangements that the Cabinet at London would have been willing to conclude with us as compensation. Impartial historians ought then to recognize that, on the whole, the inconveniences of the timidity and the incoherence of the parliamentary régime were compensated for by its advantages.

The same was true at the time of Fashoda. If we assume that a monarchical government, supposedly strong and careful to avoid all apparent humiliation, had broken with England in 1898, what would have become of France and of Europe? Without jeopardizing our national destiny we were able to utilize to a certain extent the diplomatic aid of Germany to defend ourselves against the rivalry of the English colonials.

But at any cost, it was our duty to avoid committing ourselves with Berlin in such manner that we should have become dependent. Doubtless Wilhelm II would have been delighted to brandish his sword at our side as in 1909 he did with Austria. Only we would have become his vassals. Now it is clear what the "great diplomatic success" of the Bosnian affair has cost the Hapsburgs. Such a success in the affair of Egypt and the Upper Nile would have lead us to a catastrophe.

It is, then, not a paradox to claim that the republican régime, with its congenital weaknesses, has rendered greater services to France than a monarchy could have rendered. Contrary to the prophecies of the partisans of the fallen régimes, it did not prevent the conclusion of alliances and understandings with the great monarchical states. The Russian alliance, negotiated in 1891 by MM. de Freycinet and Ribot, and the *Entente Cordiale* with England, arranged in 1904 by M. Delcassé under the auspices of the great king Edward VII, constitute two great treaties comparable with the most important of those which our kings have signed. The manner in which the French ministers have put them into effect is not entirely

above criticism. On the whole, however, they have effected what could be reasonably expected from them. They saved us in 1914. If the Russian alliance did fail us in 1917, that was not the fault of the French Republic. On the contrary it was the autocratic régime in the most extensive empire of the world that failed.

In 1920 the republicans of France feel that they are justified in comparing with pride their diplomatic work with that of the most powerful monarchies. It is true that they have been negligent and have committed faults that might have been avoided with relative ease. It would be stupid to set up some of our statesmen for the admiration of posterity. But the Republic has done its duty. In particular it has been patient. If the genius of the individual is shown by consistent patience the essential element of the political genius of a people is also patience. We say of a people—for in foreign policy as in the trenches,—it has been the citizens themselves, the mass of the nation, that has held firm. Perhaps the Republic has not possessed what one calls great men. But great men, in the historic sense, are often plagues to the world and to their own nations.

They are more tempted to make their countries serve themselves than themselves to serve their countries. The important thing is that at decisive moments the Republic, with the men at her disposal, has triumphed over difficulties and has sustained gloriously the French flag. It is still her task to restore public prosperity. Let her not seek to abandon her rôle and let her be patient.

IV

THE THIRD REPUBLIC AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

By ADRIEN LANNES DE MONTEBELLO

Former President of the Army Commission ¹

The work of national defense accomplished by the Third Republic has received the glorious consecration of victory. On November 11, 1918 the German armies gave up the struggle and abandoned not only the territories they had held since August, 1914, but also the two provinces where they had been encamped since 1871. The French Republic, born from the painful indignation aroused throughout the country by the capitulation of the last imperial army at Sedan, saw Germany at bay capitulate in her turn. At the same time the German empire, consolidated by our defeats, crumbled before our victory. The brilliancy of that victory was so triumphant that the date, November 11, when it was an accomplished fact was selected to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic.

Immediately after the proclamation of the Republic our armies were prisoners or besieged and the enemy a short distance only from the capital. In such necessity for action it could not be a question of reconstructing our military institutions but only of exerting all the energy and all the force of the country to resist the invader. France could not bring herself to accept as final the threatening defeat after but a few weeks of combat and the government of the national defense, sustained by the unanimous opinion of the country, decided to continue the struggle. If victory did not come then to crown the efforts made, these efforts had at least the merit of saving the honor of France.

¹ Translated from *Journal des Debats*, November 19, 1920.

When the war was over and peace had been signed the National Assembly comprehended the necessity to remold completely our military organization or rather to place it on the footing of an army capable of accomplishing its task.

The ideas of revenge that developed rapidly made it possible to find in public opinion the solid foundation necessary for the accomplishment of such a difficult matter; and if the very first thoughts of Thiers and Gambetta, who were the leaders of the National Assembly, were to protect the country against a repetition of the disasters of invasion, the hope of regaining Alsace and Lorraine from the enemy made them accept unhesitatingly the necessary sacrifices.

We lacked everything in 1870—troops, divisional organization, artillery, fortifications and general staff. From the moment when the peace treaty was signed the work was begun. But though the country was willing to make every effort demanded to assure the national defense, the government felt the danger of too great publicity to its plans, from the point of view of foreign policy, in the presence of an enemy who openly declared his determination to crush us for many years.

The expenses to be incurred were nominally on a so-called account of liquidation and under the control of a liquidation commission. The account and the commission were in reality much less intended for the liquidation of the situation created by the war than for the reconstruction of our military strength.

Thanks to the credits thus obtained, the reconstruction of our military forces could be undertaken without delay; in the five years from 1872 to 1877 a sound and well-planned organization was established, a large number of the features of which still existed in 1914 and made it possible for us to resist and to conquer.

The recruiting law of 1872 was a compromise between the system of the nation under arms and the professional army. This was true in greater or less degree of the three subsequent recruiting laws.

Although the law imposed the principle of universal obligatory service, established the categories of the active

army, the reserve army and the territorial force and fixed the duration of active service at five years, still a portion, determined by lot, served only six months; another portion was permitted to volunteer for a year; and finally, the sons of widows, ecclesiastics and members of the teaching profession were relieved from all service. This system made it possible for us to have the large number of troops that were so sorely lacking in 1870. This law was supplemented the following year, 1873, by the law on the organization of the army from which was to result the establishment of regional army corps. In this manner the territorial organization in time of peace fitted in with the organization of the army to be mobilized in case of war. This mobilization was thereby assured and the disorder that marked the mobilization in 1870 was provided against. In 1875 the army law fixed the status of officers.

A great source of weakness for the inadequate and badly organized army of 1870 was the insufficiency of staff officers. Without doubt our defeats of the month of August in Alsace and Lorraine were almost entirely due to the officers. The valor of the soldiers was remarkable, their training perfect and their steadiness and morale incomparable. But they were almost invariably sent into badly-planned battles where the officers had been surprised by the enemy and lacked the precise information necessary to defeat the enemy. And moreover, many actions begun under most unfavorable conditions could have been carried through to victory if the staff officers had been well enough versed in their profession to manoeuvre their troops and had not allowed some units to remain inactive while others were uselessly destroyed.

In order to prevent a like danger there was founded in 1876 the War College, to provide us with the staff officers indispensable to a modern army. Enmities and prejudices have arisen against our staff officers graduated from the War College and we must recognize that sometimes they have themselves contributed to this state of affairs. Nevertheless the eminent services they have rendered in the course of the world war ought a long time since to have exonerated

them. By their strenuous exertions they have not only cared for the maintenance of the French army and the conducting of the fighting, but they have also, thanks to their unquestioned valor, been able to take a considerable ascendancy over their comrades of the allied armies. The reorganization of the Serbian, Roumanian and Greek armies, carried through under most difficult conditions, has particularly demonstrated their organizing ability which they owed to their training at the War College. Military art in its highest achievement is the manifestation of genius; but genius is impotent if it lacks the resources of military science. The glory of having established and developed this science in our army belongs to the Republic.

This large army, well organized and ably commanded, was equipped with a modern armament worthy of it. In 1874 the infantry was supplied with a new rifle well designed and particularly durable. In 1914, forty years later, we were very fortunate to have a large reserve supply of these rifles. In 1877 the artillery was equipped with "de Bange" guns which provided a series of calibers systematically worked out to meet all the needs of the field of battle. The special qualities of these guns were so notable that it was possible to employ them without too great disadvantage against the powerful German artillery at the end of 1914 and during the long months following.

As for the employment of this army in time of war it is plain that under the influence of recent defeat it was planned to be principally defensive. Séré de Rivi re undertook to assure the protection of the national territory and of the capital, seriously threatened because of its geographical situation. For this purpose he planned his very complete system of first and second lines of defence along our north and northeast borders, with intentional open spaces to permit manoeuvring through these lines, and to the rear up to the central fortification composed of the intrenched camp of Paris. The execution of this plan, based on truly prophetic vision, was undertaken immediately after our disasters and,

resolutely carried through. Furthermore, the security of the country did not rest only on the stones of our fortresses but also on the army of campaign and manoeuvre. The concentration of our troops was carefully prepared for as well as the arrangements for strategic transportation. A high railroad commission was newly established whose studies and records were always kept up to the minute and in 1914 made it possible to mobilize and concentrate our troops without any difficulty or serious accident. Finally, the creation of the geographic service completed the equipment of our armies.

The reorganized French army could face the future with confidence.

But the progress of science did not allow the country to relax its efforts. Twelve years after the adoption of the "74" rifle the appearance of repeating rifles obliged us to transform the weapons of our infantry. The troops received the Lebel rifle, model "86." At the same time the discovery of a new explosive, melinite, was calculated to bring about for the artillery somewhat later, after considerable developments, the transformation of our fortifications by the necessary adoption of the concealed cupola.

Shortly after, by the active initiative of M. Freycinet, a series of regulations of the highest importance for our military staff was adopted. There was first the decree of 1888 which created the general staff of the army; the substitution of this body for the general staff of the ministry assured a greater stability and a greater continuity of views. At the same time the High War Council was created with the duty to give its advice in all great questions of interest to the national defense. Its vice-president was the commanding general of the French armies. The later decrees (notably those issued by M. Messimy) merely developed the principles then established. On the other hand the internal organization of the army, as far as its officers were concerned, was assured by the decree creating classification commissions.

In the year following (1889) it became necessary to revise the law of 1872 on the recruiting of the army. In spite of the

political situation, still troubled by incessant strife in parliament, the government succeeded in having a new law passed constituting the three years service but incorporating the entire contingent. The reduction of length of service did not injure the troops nor the army as a whole. While the principle of obligatory service was confirmed by the suppression of exemptions and substitutions, it is true that too many dispensations were granted to such classes as those who supported families or who had certain educational qualifications, limiting their service to a single year; this was one of the principle defects of the law.

But interest in the complete assurance of the national defense remained keen. After 1891 considerable development was given to manoeuvres on a large scale, in which as many as four army corps participated, and to manoeuvres by squadrons. Some years later in 1897, the artillery in its turn was modernized following the adoption of the cannon of 75 millimeters. This was a serious burden for the country but every one knows how well it paid. The only thing to be regretted is that the really incomparable qualities of the "75's" have led people to consider them adequate for all necessities of the battlefield.

In 1899 the French army was increased in power by the law providing for the colonial army. The former marine infantry was again attached to the ministry of war and the foundations for its development were laid. That law permitted the organization of native colonial troops who played such an important rôle in the world war.

Moroccans, negroes, Annamites were able to stand beside the children of the attacked metropolis and the very indignation of the Germans against the use of these troops in Europe demonstrates to us what an invaluable reinforcement they were and again may be for us. At the same time the colonial army is an admirable training school for officers of all ranks.

Unfortunately the adoption of the last-mentioned law coincided almost exactly with a relaxation of our effort that almost resulted fatally for us.

From about 1900 the party in power ceased to believe in the possibility of a war and in the need of having a strong army. The radical socialists were not unpatriotic but they facilitated the work of the anti-militarists by their ill-judged measures. The army would have been only slightly shaken by the Dreyfus case if that case had not been made the occasion of a formidable campaign against everything military. The men who at that time occupied the ministry of war made no struggle against this movement. The army was abandoned, morally and materially.

Everyone remembers the scandals of the André ministry. The corps of officers, deteriorated in all ways after the suppression of the classification committees, lost confidence. As they believed no more in war they began to be niggardly; under pretext of economy they neglected upkeep and reduced manufactures; indispensable improvements were postponed under pretext of preliminary studies.

Finally a last serious blow was dealt to our military organization by the passage of a new recruiting law in 1905—a political law in which the good of the army was the least care of its author. That law established the two years service without exception or dispensation. No provision was made to compensate by judicious organization for the weakening of the army by the loss of a third of its numbers. It was simply a question of relaxation of military duty. The length of the periods of training for men in the reserve was shortened at the same time as that of the men in active service.

Hardly was that law passed when the Moroccan incident came to show the disadvantages of such a careless policy. Important credits were obtained outside of Parliament in order to resume manufacture. But very quickly carelessness again was in control. The great improbability of a war was officially proclaimed. During the long ministry of M. Clemenceau the war budget was continually reduced with regard to expenditures for supplies. It was at the moment when the power was in the hands of the man, who, in 1917, by a marvellous chance, was going to represent the will of France

to resist, that the development of our military equipment was the most delayed. This delay could not be compensated for before the war. In spite of the efforts of MM. Millerand and Etienne, French equipment was not developed as it ought to have been. Meanwhile a number of well-taken measures succeeded in raising the morale of the army.

The country, and Parliament also, would have granted demands for more important efforts to insure its safety. In spite of some opposition, the necessity was admitted of a new recruiting law increasing to three years the length of active service. This was a compromise solution as our equipment was still insufficient, but it indicated the will to live that animated the nation.

However that may be, the collection of laws and decrees of the Third Republic relative to the army assured us of numerous well-trained contingents when the enemy invaded us again. There was a satisfactory organization of large units and perfect transportation for mobilization and concentration. The general staff knew its profession. Without doubt serious lacks were revealed at the beginning of the war. We had no heavy artillery, very few machine guns and our high command was surprised by the German strategy (this because of the discredit thrown by the Dreyfus affair on the work of the instruction service). But in spite of all these imperfections, the French Army, in the first weeks of the war, almost alone saved the country and the whole world from German domination. Then the army learned to adapt itself to war conditions and finally conquered the enemy. While it was aided by the allied armies, it supplied the commander-in-chief who forced the victory. The race has lost nothing of its warlike qualities. The Republic has supplied the military institutions which make it possible for the race to put force to the service of justice. As our glorious Joffre said after the victory of the Marne, "The government of the Republic may well be proud of its army."

V

SOCIAL LEGISLATION

By ANDRÉ LIESSE

Member of the Institute ¹

The term "social laws" is today currently employed to designate those laws whose object is either to regulate the conditions of classification of employers and employees, to intervene in agreements relative to contracts for the performance of labor, to impose regulations in regard to labor, or to organize prudential institutions on bases more or less authoritative and of differing forms, of which industrial insurance is the most generally adopted; in fine, the legal relief carries out a plan whose limits have been much broadened during the last generation.

From all points of view one of the most important of the social laws among those that have been passed and made effective under the Third Republic is certainly the law of March 21, 1884, authorizing the creation of trade syndicates. This importance is measured by the consequences produced by it which existing facts make notable.

The law of March 21, 1884, rests on a principle which it was indispensable to apply to meet new technical conditions of economic production. When Turgot, by the celebrated edict of February, 1776, the preamble of which is one of the most beautiful bits of economic literature, abolished the privileged corporations, company wardens and company freedom, he only met the economic necessities of the period and performed an act of high justice.

It is known how and why that edict, registered March 12, 1776, became shortly after a dead letter through the fall of the great minister whom Louis XVI had the weakness to dismiss.

¹ Translated from *Journal des Debats*, November 19, 1920.

That liberal measure was so necessary that it was taken up again by the National Assembly and consecrated by the law of March 2, 1791. Chapelier was the one who reported on that law. By it especially is the name of that statesman known. And moreover, in the critical moments at the beginning of the revolution he played an important rôle: it was on his proposal that the Assembly of the States General organized itself into the National Assembly and swore not to adjourn until they had given a constitution to France. It was he again who proposed the "Oath of the Tennis Court" and took part in the declarations made during the famous night of August 4.

Subsequently that law of March 2, 1791, has been much criticized. At the time it was necessary. It was necessary to clean the slate and to snatch out by the roots those privileges, "fruits," as Turgot wrote, "of avarice and contrary to humanity and good manners." The measure was not too radical, for, under the Restoration serious attempts were made to return to the corporations of the old régime. But the foundation had been too thoroughly demolished for this to succeed.

The Republic of 1848, even though its leaders have laid claim in general to the principle of association, did not adopt a law relative to trade classification of employers and employees. At that time it is true that it was a question especially of what has been described by that vague formula "association of capital and labor." Meanwhile, as fast as new scientific discoveries of every kind were applied to the different branches of industry, concentration of enterprises was worked out and the enterprises, growing in importance, grouped the increasing number of workers about steam-driven machinery, one of the prime elements of that concentration. At the same time the development of railroads contributed to this transformation. Under these conditions the relations between employers and employees could not longer be established on the old bases.

In this new state of affairs conflicts between employers and employees took on a particular character which brought about the law of March 25, 1864, authorizing strikes and combinations. However, the law only created a deadlock

and brought about a chaotic condition which it was necessary to relieve by an organic law on trade classifications. It was reserved for the Third Republic to set to work at that difficult task, grave in its consequences.

These circumstances were, moreover, favorable to the elaboration of a law on the subject. The government of the Republic was then firmly established. France, in spite of a crisis due in large part to an absolute lack of prudence in the great public works undertaken at that epoch, showed genuine conditions of economic prosperity. On the other side of the channel the English trade unions offered at that moment the cheerful spectacle of a wise development, maintained by an entirely practical method, supported on the principle of trade interests.

Financial resources were devoted to funds for necessary aid, for enforced idleness and for investment, in general proportion greater than funds for strikes. The doctrines of Marx had, it is true, crept into these classifications but it was only some years later that they were to assume an importance which has since developed to the point we know.

It was, then, with rather optimistic views that the law of March 21, 1884, was elaborated in France. It was necessary, as we have said. In the years that preceded its promulgation syndicates had already been formed without legal status in Paris, and had been an example of veritable trade organizations before these were legalized. We will not enter into an examination of the law of March 21, 1884. It is known that it applies to employers as well as to employees in industry, commerce, agriculture and the liberal arts. We will limit ourselves to recalling that it contained and still contains an omission relating to the right of the syndicates to hold property. The fact has a particular importance as regards the responsibility of syndicates of employees. However, at the moment when the law of 1884 was adopted those who then represented the workers or pretended to represent them did not claim this right and at the present time the leaders of syndicalism, as a result of the revolutionary methods they

have adopted, are clearly opposed to the establishment by law of arrangements that would create real financial responsibility of the syndicates.

But on the contrary, other provisions have been introduced into the law that would make the trade syndicates of employees enter into the path where their leaders have drawn them. I refer to the law providing for the formation of unions of syndicates and of general federations uniting the syndicates of all trades. I will not insist on that point. We know in what manner revolutionary syndicalism has been able to make use of this law. Recent events have demonstrated that it could become, as has been said, "a State within a State." The General Federation of Labor grew out of the Congress of Limoges of 1895. From its birth it stated its opinion as to the goal it should strive to reach.

Without connection with any political school it grouped the class conscious workers from the point of view "of the struggle to bring about the disappearance of the wage and employment systems." Thus, the syndicates of employees, created for discussion with their employers, carry on their suppression—and today by revolutionary methods. The law of 1884, enacted to be an instrument of conciliation, has become a weapon of combat. These consequences were only foreseen by a very few persons at the time the law of 1884 was under discussion. But their objections did not prevail over an optimism based on ignorance of history. A circular emanating from the Minister of the Interior drawn up for the application of that law, and inspired, it is said, by Waldeck-Rousseau, bore witness to a confidence so complete that it reached the point of ingenuousness. The limited economic education of future syndics could not authorize such extensive hopes.

What shall we think today of the future action of the law of 1884? Recent events which are the real tests, including the experiment of which Soviet Russia offers us the spectacle, make it possible for us to believe that, thanks to the good sense of the mass of French employees and workers, enlightened by experience, the syndicates of employees will return to the

primary rational function which the original principle of the law assigned to them.

To that end the government has a clear duty—to make the freedom of labor really respected, and this primarily in the interest of the workers themselves.

The laws that regulate industrial labor have been very numerous under the Third Republic. There is one of them, the earliest in point of date, which can not be criticized in principle. This is the law of May 19, 1874, on child labor and labor of minor girls employed in industry. In 1827 a manufacturer of Mulhouse, M. Dollfus, called the attention of the Industrial Society of that city to the necessity of regulating the daily working hours for child labor. In 1840, the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences directed one of its members, M. Villermé, to make an inquiry into the conditions of the working population. The law of March 22, 1841, was the result. Though the law of 1874 was not perfect we must recognize that it had a certain usefulness. But once started along that path the interventionists did not hold themselves within the limits marked by the principle of freedom of labor. As long as it was a question of children and minor girls we can understand that the State should constitute itself their guardian by virtue of the principle that they could not personally defend their own interests. For adults it should be otherwise as they are responsible for their acts. The law of November 2, 1892, had for its object to control the labor of women in factories and this law was modified by the law of March 30, 1900, the results from which were not what were hoped for. It had one bad immediate result—to injure apprenticeship.

The law of July 13, 1906, on the weekly holiday, is in the category of interventions. We do not need to recall the practical difficulties that it caused. As for the work day for labor for adults, first fixed at twelve hours by the decree of September 9, 1848, this, by the law of 1900, was reduced to ten hours for laborers working with children protected by the law of 1892. It was proposed, before the war, to pass a law fixing

the maximum work day at ten hours for all laborers and employees. It is known that the law of April 25, 1919, has fixed it at eight hours. Generalizations of this sort are in actuality seriously in error. Here again the application of this law has raised up many difficulties. It is absolutely inapplicable in agriculture. As for railroad administrations, where it was necessary to establish it immediately in the midst of an unprecedented crisis, they have been and still are in the grasp of problems difficult of solution causing trouble in railroad management and considerable increase in expenses. In this connection let us recall that a law on safety of navigation and of employment on ships, intended to serve as a basis for actual organization was passed in 1907, and that it established by decree, even at that time, the eight-hour day for all the crew whose work was of a laborious nature. Since that time this limitation of the work day has been extended to all employed on ships.

We should also consider the question of workmen's insurance. On this point an attempt has been made to follow the example of Germany as regards workmen's and peasants' pensions, by inserting in the laws of April 5, 1910, and February 27, 1912, the principle of obligatory insurance. This principle, however, was not accepted by those interested as is proved by the investigations made on the subject. Nevertheless Parliament preferred this system to that which has been called "subsidized" liberty. Some difficulties in application have arisen that have not yet been solved, as regards the withholding by the employers of a percentage of the salaries or wages of the employees. The employers and the State participate in providing these pensions.

Accident insurance gave rise to the organic law of April 9, 1898. Following the example of Germany, it establishes the employer's liability but does not make the insurance obligatory for it establishes the principle of contractual responsibility. Obligatory insurance, however, exists in the case of sailors, and we may remember that by the law of June 29, 1894, insurance must be provided for working minors.

Space does not permit us to extend this outline. Under the Third Republic other social laws have been passed and put into effect, such as the laws relative to conciliation and arbitration, to the registration of laborers and employees and to other regulations. It is enough for us to give the terms of the principal of these laws in order to indicate their character.

Certainly many of these laws are essential and their usefulness cannot be disputed. But on the slippery ground of social legislation there is a tendency, with the aid of political rivalry, toward interventionism without limit. Those who worked at the beginning to draft these laws and have them adopted, and even the Chambers that voted for them, in the great majority of cases did not intend to bring about thus such a radical transformation of society, the modern bases of which, established by the French revolution, are: the freedom of labor and the responsibility implied in the principles of equality before the law and the freedom of individual property.

At the same time, as, little by little, one regulation leads to another when one passes the limits beyond which the beneficial action of the freedom of labor is no longer clear, a tendency too often exists to diminish the responsibility of individuals by imposing upon them the guardianship of the State.

That was Bismark's conception when he advocated the development of the social laws in Germany. In France our socialists in the government, developed from the platform socialists, have played too much with fire in endeavoring to gain their objects. The revolutionary socialists have profited by this situation to urge to an exaggerated degree intervention relating especially to the regulation of labor and of syndicalist organization, neglecting in general laws for insurance and assistance as bourgeois means of hindering revolutionary action. Meanwhile, in spite of this policy some indications permit us to hope that lessons of experience will turn away those workers, who are truly "conscious" of realities, from the path into which the doctrinaires of paradox and of chimera, aided by clever exploiters of the credulity of the masses, would wish to lead them.

VI

FRENCH LITERATURE

By ANDRÉ CHAUMEIX ¹

It would be difficult to sum up in a brief formula what French literature has been during the past fifty years. The proper characterization of the period that stretches between the two wars rests precisely on what has been an aspiration marked by different stages of development. At first glance one sees clearly some of the features of that epoch which correspond to a part of the truth, but they are all incomplete. Thus the majority of writers have had more scientific preoccupations than had Racine, Boileau or Lamartine. On the other hand they interested themselves not only in the individual but in the whole group of individuals that compose society. Furthermore, in almost all cases, curiosity has not been simply artistic, it has more often been accompanied by more general cares, and if not with social concepts, at least with social preoccupations. If literature has for its object the knowledge of the human mind and through this means the bringing of life to perfection, the effort of French literature for the last fifty years might be described by saying that it has tended increasingly toward more and more complete realism, at the same time taking into account the material elements of nature, the spiritual elements of humanity and the poetic elements of language.

Immediately after 1870 the realistic influence dominated. That great doctrine which has intervened so fortunately many times in our literature, again brought to honor the qualities neglected by romanticism. The work of Flaubert, as of Renan, Leconte de Lisle, and Taine, while bringing art nearer to nature has regenerated the *esprit* and style and has found again precision, plenitude and solidity. But this was com-

¹ Translated from *Journal des Débats*, November 19, 1920.

promised by their successors, and extreme realism became quite the contrary of what it was originally and essentially. It ended in a narrow and systematic vision of the real. By demanding of science not only a method but also certitudes, by considering only the external and mechanical representation of things and beings, it emptied nature of a part of its content in order to arrive at a convention that was in its own fashion entirely romantic. Though Maupassant remains with his great art the best disciple of Flaubert, the most celebrated author of that period was Zola who built up a powerful and vulgar dream of life, but who certainly did not simply record reality. The very excess of that realism brought about its downfall. In a romanticist like Alphonse Daudet, there appeared already a spontaneity, a grace and a sensibility that far surpass the theories of that school. Approximately between 1880 and 1895 the greatest writers were clearly outside of realism. Anatole France, Paul Bourget, Pierre Loti and a little later Maurice Barrès show in their books a strength and an accuracy of psychology, a breadth of mind or a poetical power that mark a new current in those who wrote and those who read. And the peasant life described by René Bazin as well as by Emile Pouillon and later by Francis Jammes had nothing in common with *La Terre*.

The domination of the romance in this period makes it fitting, that in defining the development of ideas, the romanticists be first cited. But the poets, historians and critics collaborated. It is by extreme precision that writers seek to express reality and to make us feel life. If one did not fear to mention pell mell these diverse works there might be mentioned at the same time *La Science Expérimentale* by Claude Bernard, the beautiful *Recherches sur les Problèmes d'Histoire* by Fustel de Coulanges, the works of Ribot, books by Sorel, the historic works by Taine and by Renan, so full of recurrences when one compares them with their earlier writings, and the works of Hugo himself, who, after having been the all-powerful god of romanticism tended simultaneously toward the classic form and toward the ideas that influenced the

epoch. Parnassian poetry, on its side, by its exactitude, presents history with Heredia; and Leconte de Lisle, the most unimpassioned or the most despondent of poets, has related in full detail the conceptions of universal life in all the ages—the different steps of the eternal dream of humanity.

The stage alone has been less directly involved in this intellectual movement because it remained more closely attached to formulas and to rules and because it maintained the ancient traditions. Except for light comedy where the gracefulness of French authors is always sprightly, realism has given us only Becque, and analytical writing was only renewed with de Porto-Riche. It is curious to note that the greatest successes like that of *Cyrano* simply bear witness to the success of a style still entirely romantic. And perhaps it was by the quest for certain sociological plays that the stage endeavored most strongly to free itself from excessive realism. The work of d'Augier and of Dumas already marked a reaction against the deadly dullness of an art which pretended to be independent of life. The work of Hervieu and of Brieux is aimed at problems of collective morality, and in greater degree the work of Currel has a tendency toward philosophic conception.

Everything worked together so that in the last years of the nineteenth century the realism of Zola finished its decline. Today we discern better the bearing of certain methods of thought and of writing which have in their time given rise to criticism. Dilettanteism and impressionism have extended the curiosity of the mind and refined the sensibility. Who does not remember that one of those accused of impressionism was Jules Lemaitre and who does not know today that we owe to him one of the works in which is found the most solid observation and the most exact definition and analysis—the *Contemporains* and the *Impressions de Théâtre*? As illustrated by Mallarmé, symbolism itself, of which for a long period we have preserved only the excesses, the incongruous and the din, has also worked according to its means to recast the customary forms of poetry to bring, finally, flexibility to the language and to give a more complete conception of things. Freed little

by little from what was obscure and bizarre in theory, poets appeared and some beautiful works were created such as those of Henri de Régnier, Verlaine, Samain and Moréas. At the end of the century a notable phenomenon completed the regeneration of our literature, namely, the taking up of the study of foreign literatures. Much, as has been remarked, only echoed ideas and sentiments that originated with us and dated from Rousseau, Chateaubriand or George Sand. But these forgotten ideas were thus brought back to our minds. There were George Elliott, Dostoievsky, Tolstoi, Ibsen, Schopenhauer and others, some of whom were powerfully realistic in that they practised the rule of making everything subservient to the object in view, but who brought to their task a care for psychology, an ability to depict human beings, a pity and a charity which completed the liberation of minds from pseudo-realism. And by a peculiar chance, the Théâtre Libre, at first so indulgent to our extreme realists, gave hospitality to the foreign authors whose realism was, it has been said, swollen with thought and poetry.

Thus about the year 1900 there was a possible harvest of minds freed from theories, when the series of political crises brought about a more general revision of ideas. Literature was never more militant than in the years preceding the war of 1914. With rare exceptions there were few writers who, going beyond individual impressions and purely lyrical themes, had not a humanitarian and national turn of mind. Each, according to his temperament, wrote, if not polemics, at least controversial and dogmatic matters. This animated period was one of the most fruitful, through the abundance of ideas that were brought into play, of analyses that were remade and of definitions that were determined. The war did not interrupt this work for it broke out at the moment when results were being obtained. Even at a distance of some years we see today that the work then undertaken consisted in bringing into a clearer light the eternal traits of French *esprit*, and in the search for the real by putting aside all that cast a shadow on it. To the investigation of realism, already dead,

was joined a critical investigation of the eighteenth century, a critical investigation of romanticism and a critical investigation of scientific materialism. There resulted a more profound knowledge of *esprit*, of its laws and traditions, and a renaissance of classic taste. The famous phrase of Michelet, "The great century, I mean the eighteenth," has ceased to be considered incontestable. There are the notions of the seventeenth century, its passion for reality deprived of ideology, its Cartesian sense for clear and distinct ideas, its taste for reasoning, its order, and, it is necessary to add, its freedom and boldness of mind which appeared to contain all truth proper to our nation and all truth in general.

It is curious that this intellectual elaboration was the work of men quite different in their convictions and in the nature of their talent. It was a collective work and, as it were, the common result of divergent efforts and this is what gave it such great force. The results have little by little become evident by their own weight; the effort of a Brunetière or of a Faguet to analyze the eighteenth century, the effort of a Maurras to define romanticism and to free the law from organizing empiricism, fit in at a certain point with the constructive work of Bourget, with the analytical work of Anatole France who, whatever his theories in other directions, never ceases to be spontaneously the flower of Latin genius, with the work also of Péguy or Cladel, the studies of Boutroux and of Henri Poincaré, and the entirely Aristotelian renaissance of spiritualism which we owe to Henri Bergson and which has so powerfully contributed to spread French thought beyond our borders. After the victory, at the moment when new generations are appearing in their turn, all ready to think and to write, their elders leave them the great lesson of what they have accomplished—a definition of the traditions which alone make possible new necessary and progressive steps, a liberation of intelligence with regard to narrow theories, and, to sum up, the bringing forward of the two concepts without which literature would never have existed—the double respect for nature and for the human mind.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.


142. Treaty of Peace with Germany. September, 1919.
 143. Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. October, 1919.
 144. Reply to the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace. November, 1919.
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 148. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
 149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part II. April, 1920.
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 155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
 156. Presentation of the Saint-Gaudens Statue of Lincoln to the British People, July 28, 1920. November, 1920.
 157. The Draft Scheme of the Permanent Court of International Justice. December, 1920.
 158. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part I. January, 1921.
 159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
 160. Central European Relief, by Herbert Hoover; Relief for Europe, by Herbert Hoover; Intervention on Behalf of the Children in Countries Affected by the War, by the Swiss Delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations; The Typhus Epidemic in Central Europe, by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour; Report of the Special Commission on Typhus in Poland, to the Assembly of the League of Nations. March, 1921.
 161. Disarmament in its Relation to the Naval Policy and the Naval Building Program of the United States, by Arthur H. Pollen. April, 1921.
 162. Addresses on German Reparation by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George and Dr. Walter Simons, London, March 3rd and 7th, 1921. May, 1921.
 163. The Fiftieth Anniversary of the French Republic. June, 1921.
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CONVENTION FOR THE CONTROL OF THE
TRADE IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION,
AND PROTOCOL, SIGNED AT
SAINT-GERMAIN-EN-LAYE,
SEPTEMBER 10, 1919



JULY, 1921

No. 164

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CONVENTION FOR THE CONTROL OF THE TRADE
IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION, AND PROTOCOL,
SIGNED AT SAINT-GERMAIN-EN-LAYE,
SEPTEMBER 10, 1919¹

The United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, the British Empire, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam and Czecho-Slovakia;

Whereas the long war now ended, in which most nations have successively become involved, has led to the accumulation in various parts of the world of considerable quantities of arms and munitions of war, the dispersal of which would constitute a danger to peace and public order;

Whereas in certain parts of the world it is necessary to exercise special supervision over the trade in, and the possession of, arms and ammunition;

Whereas the existing treaties and conventions, and particularly the Brussels Act of July 2, 1890, regulating the traffic in arms and ammunition in certain regions, no longer meet present conditions, which require more elaborate provisions applicable to a wider area in Africa and the establishment of a corresponding régime in certain territories in Asia;

Whereas a special supervision of the maritime zone adjacent to certain countries is necessary to ensure the efficacy of the measures adopted by the various Governments both as regards the importation of arms and ammunition into those countries and the export of such arms and ammunition from their own territory;

And with the reservation that, after a period of seven years, the present Convention shall be subject to revision in the

¹ Some of the signatures were affixed in Paris and some at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Reprinted from the the British Treaty Series, No 12 (Cmd. 414).

light of the experience gained, if the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority, so recommends;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

The Honourable Frank Lyon Polk, Under-Secretary of State;

The Honourable Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris;

General Tasker H. Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council;

His Majesty the King of the Belgians:

M. Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State;

M. Jules van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Minister of State;

M. Emile Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State;

The President of the Republic of Bolivia:

M. Ismail Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia at Paris;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., His Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Right Honourable Andrew Bonar Law, M.P., His Lord Privy Seal;

The Right Honourable Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C. M.G., His Secretary of State for the Colonies;

The Right Honourable George Nicoll Barnes, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.

And

for the Dominion of Canada:

The Honourable Sir Albert Edward Kemp, K.C.M.G.,
Minister of the Overseas Forces;

for the Commonwealth of Australia:

The Honourable George Foster Pearce, Minister of
Defence;

for the Union of South Africa;

The Right Honourable Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.
M.G.;

for the Dominion of New Zealand:

The Honourable Sir Thomas Mackenzie, K.C.M.G.,
High Commissioner for New Zealand in the United
Kingdom;

for India:

The Right Honourable Baron Sinha, K.C., Under-Secretary of State for India;

The President of the Chinese Republic:

M. Lou Tseng-Tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
M. Chengting Thomas Wang, formerly Minister of
Agriculture and Commerce;

The President of the Cuban Republic:

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of Law in the University of Havana, President of the
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The President of the Republic of Ecuador:

M. Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
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The President of the French Republic:

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- The Honourable Guglielmo Marconi, Senator of the Kingdom;
- The Honourable Silvio Crespi, Deputy;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

- Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-

potentiary of H.M. the Emperor of Japan at London;
 M. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H.M. the Emperor of Japan at Paris;
 M. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H.M. the Emperor of Japan at Rome;

The President of the Republic of Nicaragua:

M. Salvador Chammorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies;

The President of the Republic of Panama:

M. Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid;

The President of the Republic of Peru:

M. Carlos G. Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Madrid;

The President of the Polish Republic:

M. Ignace J. Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
 M. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee;

The President of the Portuguese Republic:

Dr. Affonso da Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers;
 Dr. Augusto Luiz Vieira Soares, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Roumania:

M. Nicolas Misu, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Roumania at London;
 Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voevod, Minister without Portfolio;

His Majesty the King of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes:

M. N. P. Pachitch, formerly President of the Council
of Ministers;

M. Ante Trumbic, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

M. Ivan Zolger, Doctor at Law;

His Majesty the King of Siam:

His Highness Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of H.M. the King of Siam
at Paris;

His Serene Highness Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic:

M. Charles Kramář, President of the Council of Min-
isters;

M. Edouard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated their full powers found in
good and due form,

Have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

Export of Arms and Ammunition

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to prohibit the export of the following arms of war: artillery of all kinds, apparatus for the discharge of all kinds of projectiles explosive or gas-diffusing, flame-throwers, bombs, grenades, machine-guns and rifled small-bore breech-loading weapons of all kinds, as well as the exportation of the ammunition for use with such arms. The prohibition of exportation shall apply to all such arms and ammunition, whether complete or in parts.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding this prohibition, the High Contracting Parties reserve the right to grant, in respect of arms whose use is not prohibited by International Law, export licences to meet the requirements of their Governments or those of the Government of any of the High Contracting Parties, but for no other purpose.

In the case of firearms and ammunition adapted both to warlike and also to other purposes, the High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to determine from the size, destination, and other circumstances of each shipment for what uses it is intended and to decide in each case whether the provisions of this Article are applicable to it.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties undertake to prohibit the export of firearms and ammunition, whether complete or in parts, other than arms and munitions of war, to the areas and zone specified in Article 6.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding this prohibition, the High Contracting Parties reserve the right to grant export licences on the understanding that such licences shall be issued only by their own authorities. Such authorities must satisfy themselves in advance that the arms or ammunition for which an export licence is requested are not intended for export to any destination, or for disposal in any way, contrary to the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 3

Shipments to be effected under contracts entered into before the coming into force of the present Convention shall be governed by its provisions.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties undertake to grant no export licences to any country which refuses to accept the tutelage under which it has been placed, or which, after having been placed under the tutelage of any Power, may endeavour to obtain from any other Power any of the arms or ammunition specified in Articles 1 and 2.

ARTICLE 5

A Central International Office, placed under the control of the League of Nations, shall be established for the purpose of collecting and preserving documents of all kinds exchanged by the High Contracting Parties with regard to the trade in, and distribution of, the arms and ammunition specified in the present Convention.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall publish an annual report showing the export licences which it may have granted, together with the quantities and destination of the arms and ammunition to which the export licences referred. A copy of this report shall be sent to the Central International Office and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Further, the High Contracting Parties agree to send to the Central International Office and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations full statistical information as to the quantities and destination of all arms and ammunition exported without licence.

CHAPTER II

Import of Arms and Ammunition. Prohibited Areas and Zone of Maritime Supervision

ARTICLE 6

The High Contracting Parties undertake, each as far as the territory under its jurisdiction is concerned, to prohibit the importation of the arms and ammunition specified in Articles 1 and 2 into the following territorial areas, and also to prevent their importation and transportation in the maritime zone defined below:

1. The whole of the Continent of Africa with the exception of Algeria, Libya and the Union of South Africa.

Within this area are included all islands situated within a hundred nautical miles of the coast, together with Prince's Island, St. Thomas Island and the Islands of Annobon and Socotra.

2. Transcaucasia, Persia, Gwadar, the Arabian Peninsula and such continental parts of Asia as were included in the Turkish Empire on August 4, 1914.

3. A maritime zone, including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, and bounded by a line drawn from Cape Guardafui, following the latitude of that cape to its intersection with longitude 57° east of Greenwich, and proceeding thence direct to the eastern frontier of Persia in the Gulf of Oman.

Special licences for the import of arms or ammunition into the areas defined above may be issued. In the African area they shall be subject to the regulations specified in Articles 7 and 8 or to any local regulations of a stricter nature which may be in force. In the other areas specified in the present Article, these licences shall be subject to similar regulations put into effect by the Governments exercising authority there.

CHAPTER III

Supervision on Land

ARTICLE 7

Arms and ammunition imported under special licence into the prohibited areas shall be admitted only at ports designated for this purpose by the Authorities of the State, Colony, Protectorate or territory under mandate concerned.

Such arms and ammunition must be deposited by the importer at his own risk and expense in a public warehouse under the exclusive custody and permanent control of the Authority and of its agents, of whom one at least must be a civil official or a military officer. No arms or ammunition shall be deposited or withdrawn without the previous authorisation of the administration of the State, Colony, Protectorate or territory under mandate, unless the arms and ammunition to be deposited or withdrawn are intended for the forces of the Government or the defence of the national territory.

The withdrawal of arms or ammunition deposited in these warehouses shall be authorised only in the following cases:—

1. For despatch to places designated by the Government where the inhabitants are allowed to possess arms, under the control and responsibility of the local Authorities, for the purpose of defence against robbers or rebels.

2. For despatch to places designated by the Government as warehouses and placed under the supervision and responsibility of the local Authorities.

3. For individuals who can show that they require them for their legitimate personal use.

ARTICLE 8

In the prohibited areas specified in Article 6, trade in arms and ammunition shall be placed under the control of officials of the Government and shall be subject to the following regulations:

1. No person may keep a warehouse for arms or ammunition without a licence.

2. Any person licensed to keep a warehouse for arms or ammunition must reserve for that special purpose enclosed premises having only one entry, provided with two locks, one of which can be opened only by the officers of the Government.

The person in charge of a warehouse shall be responsible for all arms or ammunition deposited therein and must account for them on demand. For this purpose all deposits or withdrawals shall be entered in a special register, numbered and initialled. Each entry shall be supported by references to the official documents authorising such deposits or withdrawals.

3. No transport of arms or ammunition shall take place without a special licence.

4. No withdrawal from a private warehouse shall take place except under licence issued by the local Authority on an application stating the purpose for which the arms or ammunition are required, and supported by a licence to carry arms or by a special permit for the purchase of ammunition. Every arm shall be registered and stamped; the Authority in charge of the control shall enter on the licence to carry arms the mark stamped on the weapon.

5. No one shall without authority transfer to another person either by gift or for any consideration any weapon or ammunition which he is licensed to possess.

ARTICLE 9

In the prohibited areas and zone specified in Article 6 the manufacture and assembling of arms or ammunition shall

be prohibited, except at arsenals established by the local Government or, in the case of countries placed under tutelage, at arsenals established by the local Government, under the control of the mandatory Power, for the defence of its territory or for the maintenance of public order.

No arms shall be repaired except at arsenals or establishments licensed by the local Government for this purpose. No such licence shall be granted without guarantees for the observance of the rules of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 10

Within the prohibited areas specified in Article 6, a State which is compelled to utilise the territory of a contiguous State for the importation of arms or ammunition, whether complete or in parts, or of material or of articles intended for armament, shall be authorised on request to have them transported across the territory of such State.

It shall, however, when making any such request, furnish guarantees that the said articles are required for the needs of its own Government, and will at no time be sold, transferred or delivered for private use nor used in any way contrary to the interests of the High Contracting Parties.

Any violation of these conditions shall be formally established in the following manner:—

(a) If the importing State is a sovereign independent Power, the proof of the violation shall be advanced by one or more of the Representatives accredited to it of contiguous States among the High Contracting Parties. After the Representatives of the other contiguous States have, if necessary, been informed, a joint enquiry into the facts by all these Representatives will be opened, and if need be, the importing State will be called upon to furnish explanations. If the gravity of the case should so require, and if the explanations of the importing State are considered unsatisfactory, the Representatives will jointly notify the importing State that all transit licences in its favour are suspended and that all

future requests will be refused until it shall have furnished new and satisfactory guarantees.

The forms and conditions of the guarantees provided by the present Article shall be agreed upon previously by the Representatives of the contiguous States among the High Contracting Parties. These Representatives shall communicate to each other, as and when issued the transit licences granted by the competent authorities.

(b) If the importing State has been placed under the mandatory system established by the League of Nations, the proof of the violation shall be furnished by one of the High Contracting Parties or on its own initiative by the Mandatory Power. The latter shall then notify or demand, as the case may be, the suspension and future refusal of all transit licences.

In cases where a violation has been duly proved, no further transit licence shall be granted to the offending State without the previous consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

If any proceedings on the part of the importing State or its disturbed condition should threaten the public order of one of the contiguous State signatories of the present Convention, the importation in transit of arms, ammunition, material and articles intended for armament shall be refused to the importing State by all the contiguous States until order has been restored.

CHAPTER IV

Maritime Supervision

ARTICLE 11

Subject to any contrary provisions in existing special agreements, or in future agreements, provided that in all cases such agreements comply with the provisions of the present Convention, the sovereign State or Mandatory Power shall carry out all supervision and police measures within territorial waters in the prohibited areas and zone specified in Article 6.

ARTICLE 12

Within the prohibited areas and maritime zone specified in Article 6, no native vessel of less than 500 tons burden shall be allowed to ship, discharge, or tranship arms or ammunition.

For this purpose, a vessel shall be considered as a native vessel if she is either owned by a native, or fitted out or commanded by a native, or if more than half of the crew are natives of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, or the Gulf of Oman.

This provision does not apply to lighters or barges, nor to vessels which, without going more than five miles from the shore, are engaged exclusively in the coasting trade between different ports of the same State, Colony, Protectorate or territory under mandate, where warehouses are situated.

No cargoes of arms or ammunition shall be shipped on the vessels specified in the preceding paragraph without a special licence from the territorial authority, and all arms or ammunition so shipped shall be subject to the provisions of the present Convention.

This licence shall contain all details necessary to establish the nature and quantity of the items of the shipment, the vessel on which the shipment is to be loaded, the name of the ultimate consignee, and the ports of loading and discharge. It shall also be specified thereon that the licence has been issued in conformity with the regulations of the present Convention.

The above regulations do not apply:

1. To arms or ammunition conveyed on behalf of the Government, provided that they are accompanied by a duly qualified official.

2. To arms or ammunition in the possession of persons provided with a licence to carry arms, provided such arms are for the personal use of the bearer and are accurately described on his licence.

ARTICLE 13

To prevent all illicit conveyance of arms or ammunition within the zone of maritime supervision specified in Article 6 (3), native vessels of less than 500 tons burden not exclusively engaged in the coasting trade between different ports of the same State, Colony, Protectorate or territory under mandate, not going more than five miles from the shore, and proceeding to or from any point within the said zone, must carry a manifest of their cargo or similar document specifying the quantities and nature of the goods on board, their origin and destination. This document shall remain covered by the secrecy to which it is entitled by the law of the State to which the vessel belongs, and must not be examined during the proceedings for the verification of the flag unless the interested party consents thereto.

The provisions as to the above-mentioned documents shall not apply to vessels only partially decked, having a maximum crew of ten men, and exclusively employed in fishing within territorial waters.

ARTICLE 14

Authority to fly the flag of one of the High Contracting Parties within the zone of maritime supervision specified in Article 6 (3) shall be granted only to such native vessels as satisfy all the three following conditions:

1. The owners must be nationals of the Power whose flag they claim to fly.
2. They must furnish proof that they possess real estate in the district of the authority to which their application is addressed, or must supply a solvent security as a guarantee for any fines to which they may become liable.
3. Such owners, as well as the captain of the vessel, must furnish proof that they enjoy a good reputation, and especially that they have never been convicted of illicit conveyance of the articles referred to in the present Convention.

The authorisation must be renewed every year. It shall contain the indications necessary to identify the vessel, the name, tonnage, type of rigging, principal dimensions, registered number, and signal letters. It shall bear the date on which it was granted and the status of the official who granted it.

The name of the native vessel and the amount of her tonnage shall be incised and painted in Latin characters on the stern, and the initial letters of the name of the port of registry, as well as the registration number in the series of the numbers of that port, shall be painted in black on the sails.

ARTICLE 15

Native vessels to which, under the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 13, the regulations relating to the manifest of the cargo are not applicable, shall receive from the territorial or consular authorities, as the case may be, a special licence, renewable annually and revocable under the conditions provided for in Article 19.

This special licence shall show the name of the vessel, her description, nationality, port of registry, name of cap-

tain, name of owner and the waters in which she is allowed to sail.

ARTICLE 16

The High Contracting Parties agree to apply the following rules in the maritime zone specified in Article 6 (3):—

1. When a warship belonging to one of the High Contracting Parties encounters outside territorial waters a native vessel of less than 500 tons burden flying the flag of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the commander of the warship has good reason to believe that the native vessel is flying this flag without being entitled to do so, for the purpose of the illicit conveyance of arms or ammunition, he may proceed to verify the nationality of the vessel by examining the document authorising the flying of the flag, but no other papers.

2. With this object, a boat commanded by a commissioned officer in uniform may be sent to visit the suspected vessel after she has been hailed to give notice of such intention. The officer sent on board the vessel shall act with all possible consideration and moderation; before leaving the vessel the officer shall draw up a *procès-verbal* in the form and language in use in his own country. This *procès-verbal* shall state the facts of the case and shall be dated and signed by the officer.

Should there be on board the warship no commissioned officer other than the commanding officer, the above-prescribed operations may be carried out by the warrant, petty, or non-commissioned officer highest in rank. ,

The captain or master of the vessel visited, as well as the witnesses, shall be invited to sign the *procès-verbal*, and shall have the right to add to it any explanations which they may consider expedient.

3. If the authorisation to fly the flag cannot be produced, or if this document is not in proper order, the vessel shall be conducted to the nearest port in the zone where there is a competent authority of the Power whose flag has been flown and shall be handed over to such authority.

Should the nearest competent authority representing the Power whose flag the vessel has flown be at some port at such a distance from the point of arrest that the warship would have to leave her station or patrol to escort the captured vessel to that port, the foregoing regulation need not be carried out. In such a case, the vessel may be taken to the nearest port where there is a competent authority of one of the High Contracting Parties of nationality other than that of the warship, and steps shall at once be taken to notify the capture to the competent authority representing the Power concerned.

No proceedings shall be taken against the vessel or her crew until the arrival of the representative of the Power whose flag the vessel was flying or without instructions from him.

4. The procedure laid down in paragraph 3 may be followed if, after the verification of the flag and in spite of the production of the manifest, the commander of the warship continues to suspect the native vessel of engaging in the illicit conveyance of arms or ammunition.

The High Contracting Parties concerned shall appoint in the zone territorial or consular authorities or special representatives competent to act in the foregoing cases, and shall notify their appointment to the Central Office and to the other Contracting Parties.

The suspected vessel may also be handed over to a warship of the nation whose flag she has flown, if the latter consents to take charge of her.

ARTICLE 17

The High Contracting Parties agree to communicate to the Central Office specimen forms of the documents mentioned in Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15, as well as a detailed list of the licences granted in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter whenever such licences are granted.

ARTICLE 18

The authority before whom the suspected vessel has been

brought shall institute a full enquiry in accordance with the laws and rules of his country in the presence of an officer of the capturing warship.

If it is proved at this enquiry that the flag has been illegally flown, the detained vessel shall remain at the disposal of the captor, and those responsible shall be brought before the courts of his country.

If it should be established that the use of the flag by the detained vessel was correct, but that the vessel was engaged in the illicit conveyance of arms or ammunition, those responsible shall be brought before the courts of the State under whose flag the vessel sailed. The vessel herself and her cargo shall remain in charge of the authority directing the enquiry.

ARTICLE 19

Any illicit conveyance or attempted conveyance legally established against the captain or owner of a vessel authorised to fly the flag of one of the Signatory Powers or holding the licence provided for in Article 15 shall entail the immediate withdrawal of the said authorisation or licence.

The High Contracting Parties will take the necessary measures to ensure that their territorial authorities or their consuls shall send to the Central Office certified copies of all authorisations to fly their flag as soon as such authorisations shall have been granted, as well as notice of withdrawal of any such authorisation. They also undertake to communicate to the said Office copies of the licences provided for under Article 15.

ARTICLE 20

The commanding officer of a warship who may have detained a vessel flying a foreign flag shall in all cases make a report thereon to his Government, stating the grounds on which he acted.

An extract from this report, together with a copy of the *procès-verbal* drawn up by the officer, warrant officer, petty or non-commissioned officer sent on board the vessel detained

shall be sent as soon as possible to the Central Office and at the same time to the Government whose flag the detained vessel was flying.

ARTICLE 21

If the authority entrusted with the enquiry decides that the detention and diversion of the vessel or the measures imposed upon her were irregular, he shall fix the amount of the compensation due. If the capturing officer, or the authorities to whom he is subject, do not accept the decision or contest the amount of the compensation awarded, the dispute shall be submitted to a court of arbitration consisting of one arbitrator appointed by the Government whose flag the vessel was flying, one appointed by the Government of the capturing officer, and an umpire chosen by the two arbitrators thus appointed. The two arbitrators shall be chosen, as far as possible, from among the diplomatic, consular or judicial officers of the High Contracting Parties. These appointments must be made with the least possible delay, and natives in the pay of the High Contracting Parties shall in no case be appointed. Any compensation awarded shall be paid to the person concerned within six months at most from the date of the award.

The decision shall be communicated to the Central Office and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

CHAPTER V

General Provisions

ARTICLE 22

The High Contracting Parties who exercise authority over territories within the prohibited areas and zone specified in Article 6 agree to take, so far as each may be concerned, the measures required for the enforcement of the present Convention, and in particular for the prosecution and repression of offences against the provisions contained therein.

They shall communicate these measures to the Central Office and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and shall inform them of the competent authorities referred to in the preceding Articles.

ARTICLE 23

The High Contracting Parties will use their best endeavours to secure the accession to the present Convention of other States Members of the League of Nations.

This accession shall be notified through the diplomatic channel to the Government of the French Republic, and by it to all the signatory or adhering States. The accession will come into force from the date of such notification to the French Government.

ARTICLE 24

The High Contracting Parties agree that if any dispute whatever should arise between them relating to the application of the present Convention which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to an arbitral tribunal in conformity with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 25

All the provisions of former general international Conventions, relating to the matters dealt with in the present Convention, shall be considered as abrogated in so far as they are binding between the Powers which are Parties to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 26

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

Each Power will address its ratification to the French Government, who will inform all the other signatory Powers.

The ratifications will remain deposited in the archives of the French Government.

The present Convention shall come into force for each Signatory Power from the date of the deposit of its ratification, and from that moment that Power will be bound in respect of other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications.

On the coming into force of the present Convention, the French Government will transmit a certified copy to the Powers which under the Treaties of Peace have undertaken to accept and observe it, and are in consequence placed in the same position as the Contracting Parties. The names of these Powers will be notified to the States which accede.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Done at Paris,¹ the tenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and of which authentic copies will be sent to each of the Signatory Powers.

¹ Some of the signatures were affixed in Paris and some at Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

PROTOCOL

At the moment of signing the Convention of even date relating to the trade in arms and ammunition, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare in the name of their respective Governments that they would regard it as contrary to the intention of the High Contracting Parties and to the spirit of this Convention that, pending the coming into force of the Convention, a Contracting Party should adopt any measure which is contrary to its provisions.

Done at Saint-Germain-en-Laye,¹ in a single copy, the tenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.


¹ Some of the signatures were affixed in Paris and some at Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

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ADDRESSES AT THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By the Hon. ELIHU ROOT



AUGUST, 1921

No. 165

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 27.

Subscription rate: twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years.

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AT THE FIFTEENTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

April 27, 1921¹

By ELIHU ROOT

The American Society of International Law may appropriately renew its discussions of the subject to which it is devoted, by a review of the effects of the World War both as to the law itself and as to the international relations under which the law is to be applied.

It is obvious that we can not go on assuming that the laws and customs of war on land and at sea, the rules which regulate the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in case of war, retain the authority which we supposed them to possess in the month of July, 1914. These rules imposed their obligation upon all parties to the great conflict, and, when violated by one party, they could not reasonably be deemed to restrain the other belligerents. So, the world went on for several years without much reference to them; and the question now is: How far do they exist? In many ways the conditions which gave rise to these rules have been materially changed. The new modes of conducting war under which practically entire peoples are mobilized either for combat or supply have apparently destroyed the distinction between enemy forces and non-combatant citizens, so that the differences which underlie the law of contraband disappear. The whole people would seem to be an enemy force, and all goods destined for their use would appear to be contraband. The historic declaration of Paris that "the

¹Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*.

neutral flag covers enemy goods with the exception of contraband of war" and that "neutral goods with the exception of contraband of war are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag" would seem to have been swallowed by the exception, and the doctrine that "free ships make free goods" and that "blockades in order to be binding must be effective" appear to have become idle phrases. The submarine, the Zeppelin and the airplane, wireless telegraphy, the newly achieved destructive power of high explosives and of poisonous gases, have created conditions affecting both belligerents and neutrals not contemplated when the old rules were established, and in many respects the old rules are not adapted to deal with the new conditions.

More important still is a fact which threatens the foundation of all international law. The doctrine of *kriegsraison* has not been destroyed. It was asserted by Bethman Hollweg at the beginning of the war when he sought to justify the plain and acknowledged violation of international law in the invasion of Belgium upon the ground of military necessity. The doctrine practically is that if a belligerent deems it necessary for the success of its military operations to violate a rule of international law, the violation is permissible. As the belligerent is to be the sole judge of the necessity, the doctrine really is that a belligerent may violate the law or repudiate it or ignore it whenever that is deemed to be for its military advantage. The alleged necessity in the case of the German invasion of Belgium was simply that Belgium was deemed to be the most advantageous avenue through which to attack France. Of course, if that doctrine is to be maintained, there is no more international law, for the doctrine can not be confined to the laws specifically relating to war on land and sea. With a nation at liberty to declare war, there are few rules of peaceful intercourse, the violation of which may not be alleged to have some possible bearing upon a military advantage, and a law which may rightfully be set aside by those whom it is intended to restrain is no law at all.

The doctrine has not been abandoned. It was formally and authoritatively declared by the German Government and acted upon throughout the war. We can find no ground to justify the conclusion that a plainly unrepentant Germany does not still maintain the soundness of the doctrine as a part of its historic justification, nor has there been any renunciation by the allies of Germany. We must, therefore, face the fact that the law which during the course of three centuries had become apparently firmly established upon the universal acceptance and consent of all the members of the community of civilized nations is shaken to its foundation by the repudiation of its moral obligation on the part of the four Central Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, which at the outbreak of the war had over 144,000,000 of inhabitants.

Few more futile public performances can be found in the history of international intercourse than the long diplomatic discussions which accompanied the earlier years of the war between neutral nations and Germany, about the rules of international law and their application to the conduct of Germany's military and naval proceedings, while Germany had already publicly declared that she would not deem herself bound by any rules she found to be disadvantageous to herself. The same will be true in the future if the same condition exists. It will be impossible to maintain the restraint upon national conduct afforded by the rules of international law so long as so great a part of the civilized world asserts the right to disregard those rules whenever it sees fit. Either the doctrine of *kriegsraison* must be abandoned definitely and finally, or there is an end of international law, and in its place will be left a world without law, in which alliances of some nations to the extent of their power enforce their ideas of suitable conduct upon other nations.

Another threatening obstacle to international law exists in the rapid development of Internationalism. This is presented by the avowed purposes of the Third Internationale aiming at the destruction of national governments and the universal

empire of the proletariat; by the fact that the brutal and cruel despotisms of Lenin and his associated group has been able to maintain its ascendancy over the vast territory and population of Russia, calling itself a dictatorship of the proletariat but making itself a dictatorship over the proletariat as well as all other classes, and ruling in the name of a world revolution for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Third Internationale. It is presented also by the universal propaganda carried on with almost religious fervor in all countries and seriously affecting the leadership of labor in many countries. That propaganda, exceedingly subtle and ingenious, throughout the world has toppled over the wits of parlor Socialists from their insecure foundations of education superior to their intelligence, and is making them the unconscious agents of promoting political principles which they would abhor if they understood them and in aiding sinister projects for profit in which they personally have no part. The organization of the civilized world in nations is confronted since the war with a vigorous and to some degree prevailing assertion that a much better organization would be that of government by class existing in all nations and superior to all.

International law, of course, is based upon the existence of nations. There is no common ground upon which one can discuss the obligations of international law with the Third Internationale, and just so far as the ideas of Lenin and Trotsky influence the people of a civilized country just so far the government of that country is weakened in the performance of its international obligations.

The existence of nations is not an accident of locality or of language or of race. It is one phase of the struggle of mankind for liberty. The independence of nations is an assertion of the rights of different groups of men having in the main different customs, traditions, habits of thought and action, ideas of propriety and of right, to have local self-government. This is true whatever the form of government; whether it be a monarchy or an aristocracy permitted by the people of

the country or a republic in which rulers are elected by the people, the distinction is the same between government in accordance with the people's own conceptions of right and propriety and government by an alien force having different and incongruous conceptions. There are few more injurious influences in international affairs than the inability of the people of one country to understand or to realize the differences between themselves and the people of other countries in fundamental and often unexpressed preconceptions. These differences affect the understanding in the different countries of every act done and every word used. They are not matters of reason to be solved intellectually like a problem of Euclid. They are the results of long ages of tradition, modes and habits of thought, inherited assumptions regarding the conduct of life. One race of men take off their shoes and keep on their hats, another race take off their hats and keep on their shoes under similar conditions to express similar sentiments of respect. To the people of one country polyandry is the natural social organization, to the people of another polygamy, and to the people of others monogamy is natural and appropriate. The people of some countries consider that justice is best attained by applying a system of excluding evidence according to rigid rules of relevancy and competency, while the people of other equally civilized countries consider that the same result may be best attained by admitting in evidence anything that anybody chooses to say on the subject. None of these differences is the result of the working out of problems by pure reason. They come from the fact that peoples of different countries and of different races do not think alike and can not think alike, because their intellectual processes are the resultants of different traditional conceptions combined with the apparent logical premises of each problem.

The most grinding, possible tyranny is to be found in the intimate control of a people by other races or rulers who do not understand the people whom they rule. The vice of tyranny is so widespread, the tendency to tyrannize over

others is so universal, especially among those who think themselves better than others, that only the highest intelligence creates exceptions to the rule of oppression in alien control. The declaration of the independence of nations, large and small, is an assertion of the right to be free from the oppression of alien control. Internationalism would fasten that oppression upon the world without recourse.

The fundamental ideas of international law are, first, that each nation has a right to live according to its own conceptions of life; second, that each national right is subject to the equal identical right of every other nation. International law is the application of these principles through accepted rules of national action adapted to govern the conduct of nations toward each other in the contacts of modern civilization. Internationalism, by destroying the authority and responsibility of nations and the law which is designed to control their conduct toward each other, would destroy the most necessary bulwark of human liberty, the chief protection of the weak against the physical force of the strong, and substitute the universal control which the nature of men will make an inevitable tyranny.

The long, slow process of civilization with its peaceful attrition between individuals and between local and tribal groups tends towards the steady enlargement of nations through the reconciliation of ideas and the adoption of common standards, making it easy for different groups to live together under the same government. Every great country shows the results of this process. Burgundy, Provence and Brittany, Wessex, Sussex, and Northumbria, Wales, England and Scotland, Piedmont and Naples have come to live peaceably together under governments in which each has a voice and in which each is understood. But that process cannot be forced any more than the growth of a tree can be forced. It can be promoted as the growth of a tree can be promoted. The parliament of man may come just as the parliaments of Britain and France and Italy have come, but it must be by growth and not by force nor by the false pretence

of agreement where there is no real agreement, nor by international majorities overbearing minority nations through majority votes.

The great force of Russia which aims to impose internationalism upon the world, therefore, halts the development of international law, the very foundations of which the existing government of Russia now repudiates. As the basis of international law is universal acceptance, either Russia must be excluded from the category of civilized nations or the law must wait upon the downfall of the present régime in Russia. In the meantime, every act which tends to support that régime, whether for sentiment or for trade, is a hindrance to the restoration of law and the rule of international justice.

Under these circumstances, how are we to take up the task of promoting the development of the Law of Nations? The task cannot be abandoned. The process which owes its impulse towards systematic development to Grotius and the horrors of the Thirty Years' War cannot be abandoned. Never before was the need so great. The multitudes of citizens who now control the national governments of modern democracies and direct international policies can not safely follow the passion of the moment or the idiosyncrasy of the individual public officer in their international affairs, without accepted principles and rules of action, without declared standards of conduct, without definition of rights, without prescription of duties too clear to be ignored. Otherwise the world reverts to chaos and savagery.

To determine how this Society and its members may be effective in efforts to promote the development and authority of international law, some further examination of the existing international situation will be useful. The armistice of November 11, 1918, left for the successful Allied Powers two quite distinct and in some respects incongruous tasks. The first task was to decide upon the terms of peace and to require compliance with those terms. That was a matter of power, of force. It was the imposition of the will of the conquerors upon the conquered. Only the belligerent nations were con-

cerned in it. It was a part of the war. Disarmament, reparation, disposition of conquered colonies, transfers of territory, were to be dictated as alternatives to further military punishment by the successful armies and navies. It was to be affected by the principles of reward for assistance in winning the war, of penalty for offences against civilization in beginning and carrying on the war and by treaties between the belligerents.

The second task in necessary sequence was to give effect to the universal desire of the civilized world by bringing all civilized nations into agreement for the future preservation of peace. That was a matter, not of force, but of reason, humanity, universal instinct of self-preservation. It must be voluntary, not compulsory. It was the concern of all neutral nations equally with all belligerent nations. It presupposed a world at peace in which peace, already attained, was to be preserved. It was to follow, not to be a part of, the compulsions of conquest.

The Versailles Conference undertook to include both of these separate, distinct and incongruous processes in the same treaty. They framed a League of Nations for the future, they invited all neutrals to join and at the same time and in the same instrument they undertook to impose penalties to which they required the defeated belligerents to submit. The defeated belligerents were not admitted to the League and had nothing to say about it, while the neutral members of the League naturally had no right or authority respecting the terms of peace imposed by the treaty. The two processes were tied together, however, by provisions making the League of Nations the agent of the conquerors to see to the execution of the terms imposed upon the other defeated nations. Thus certain powers were vested in the League including neutrals, regarding the administration of occupied territory, plebiscites, scrutiny of government under mandates. These functions plainly were to be in exercise of derivative not original authority of the League, which became a mere agent of the belligerents for those purposes. Spain, Holland,

Norway, for example, and any organization which represents them can have no authority regarding a plebiscite in Silesia or the government of Danzig, except within the limits of a specific agency created by the nations which had a right won by conquest or created by treaty between such nations and Germany.

Another peculiarity of the treaty was that, although it contemplated the participation of all the belligerents, it was expressly made separable, by the provision that it should take effect when ratified by any three of the principal Powers. Accordingly, when the other principal Powers ratified the treaty and the United States refused to do so, the terms of peace became binding between Germany and the ratifying Powers, although not between Germany and the United States. And the League of Nations, no longer a mere project, came into being and still exists, uniting for specified purposes substantially all the civilized countries except the United States, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.

The natural tendency of these arrangements and the discussion and controversy which they engendered was towards great delay and confusion. The imposition of terms of peace was a matter calling for prompt decision and compliance while the conquering armies were in being and able to compel compliance. Under the distractions and discussions incident to the formation of a League for future peace, this vital process of closing the war dragged along until the Western armies had mainly disappeared; and many of the issues of the war have passed into a new and prolonged stage of discussion.

In the meantime, the Supreme Council of the belligerents, in which the United States continued entitled to a place which she ceased to fill, has held the center of the international stage trying to bring about the state of peace which the League of Nations was formed to preserve, and at the same time the League has been struggling with its special agency under the treaty without ever having been put by its principals in the position of recognized authority; and the organization for future peace has remained incomplete in the face of con-

tinual actual war involving a majority of the people of Europe and the Near East.

In considering our course as students, lawyers, American citizens, united by common interest in the Law of Nations, I think we must assume that the conditions which I have described are temporary; that before very long the immediate issues of the war will be settled for the time being and peace will be restored; that republican Germany and her associates will abandon the arrogant assertion of the *kriegsraison*, that the brutal and cruel despotism which now oppresses the people of Russia will meet the fate which awaits the violation of economic laws and, failing to be rescued by those friends who are coming to its assistance in this and other countries, will fall, and the people of Russia will come to their own.

When these results have been reached, there will remain the hindrances of differing forms and methods favored by the nations within and the nations without the existing League. But the idea that by agreeing at this time to a formula the nations can forever after be united in preventing war by making war seems practically to have been abandoned; and the remaining differences are not of substance and ought not to prevent the general desire of the civilized world from giving permanent form to institutions to prevent further war. In the long run, from the standpoint of the international lawyer, it does not much matter whether the substance of such institutions is reached by amending an existing agreement or by making a new agreement.

The necessary things are that there shall be institutions adapted to make effective the general civilized public opinion in favor of peace; and that these institutions shall be developed naturally from the customs, the habits of thought and action, and the standards of conduct in which civilized nations agree, and that they shall be of such a nature that the habit of recourse to them will have an educational effect and be a means of growth in justice and humanity.

The Covenant of the League, under which so many nations are now included, commits its members fully to these funda-

mentals, and, while it undertakes to go farther and do too much, the evident tendency of its members is to reduce this excess by interpretation and amendment and bring it down to the character of real representation of the common customs and common opinions of civilized peoples in favor of peace.

On the other hand, the United States is certain to be ready to join in some form, in seeking the same result by these same essential methods. That will follow necessarily from the traditional policy of our country and the responsible declarations of our government in both the legislative and the executive branches.

Considering this field of preventive provisions as separate and distinct from the temporary exigencies of compulsory war settlements, if we examine both the League agreement and the declared policy of the United States for information as to common purposes, we shall find several different kinds of united action upon which there is practically agreement in principle, with difference only in degree or as to specific means.

We may pass over, as least important, although extremely useful, provisions for international cooperation in administrative services to facilitate trade and intercourse, or to apply regulations by common consent in matters of common interest. The International Postal Union, the control of wireless telegraphy, the ice patrol of the North Atlantic for the safety of the ships of all nations, are examples of this kind of cooperation. The labor provisions of the Treaty of Versailles come under the same head, although they were put into the treaty without the discussion and consideration necessary to ascertain whether they ought to be adopted or whether they met a general demand or were adapted to world conditions. Much of the time of the League organization has been devoted to matters of this character, which are really local, affecting particular groups of countries and which would be arranged, naturally and probably better, between the countries concerned, without burdening or involving the countries not concerned.

Most important for dealing with immediate danger to international peace is a system of international conferences upon questions of international policy. This is a natural growth from experience. The Algeciras Conference is a type. The Conference in London, which limited the effect of the Balkan wars, is another. It is a general belief that if Sir Edward Grey had secured the conference he sought in July, 1914, the war would have been averted. Whether it be by dispelling misunderstandings, allaying fears, soothing irritation, or by the repressive effect of general adverse opinion, a formal general conference of the principal nations ordinarily leads to a situation in which it is extremely difficult for any nation to begin war.

The weakness of the practice hitherto has been in the fact that no one had a right to insist upon a conference; no one was under obligation to attend a conference. The step in advance plainly indicated as the natural development of this most useful practice into a systematic institution, is to establish an administrative agency whose duty it shall be to call such a conference in time of threatened danger on suitable request, and to place all nations under obligation to attend the conference when called. Upon the substance of this there is no disagreement. The Council of the League does this and something more, and the difference is over the something more. The Council of the League is a perpetual, permanent conference, as distinguished from conferences *ad hoc*, to be called automatically whenever grave cause arises. No one seems to question that in one way or another there should be obligatory conferences.

Such conferences, however, deal with policy in particular exigencies, and they proceed upon motives of expediency. They are not steps in the development of the rule of right among nations. In that direction also, however, we find elements of general agreement.

The Covenant of the League of Nations in its preamble states one of its objects to be "in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security

. . . by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments"; and in the 14th article it provides: "The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice."

The American Congress in a statute enacted August 29, 1916, expressed the American view in the most solemn form. The statute says:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided. . . . In view of the premises, the President is authorized and requested to invite, at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe, all the great Governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal, to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement.

The latest message of the President of the United States to Congress on the 12th of the present month, said:

The American aspiration, indeed the world aspiration, was an association of nations based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and cooperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the world might share. . . . In the national referendum to which I have adverted, we pledged our efforts towards such an association, and the pledge will be faithfully kept.

The pledge to which the President plainly referred in the paragraph just quoted, was contained in the Republican Platform, in these words:

The Republican Party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice, and must provide methods which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war.

While this pledge was in the platform of one party, it was not, in fact, the subject of party controversy, and the enormous majority of over seven million votes given to the candidate standing by that platform justifies the assertion that these words state the true attitude of the American people, as that attitude is now certified in the passage which I have quoted from the President's message to Congress.

It is apparent that the attitude of the League and the attitude of America toward this subject do not differ in substance, however much they may differ as to the specific modes of effectuating the common purpose.

The duty imposed upon the Council of the League, "to formulate and submit plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice," has been performed, and a convention establishing such a court has been adopted by the League and has already been ratified by many of its members. It provides for a permanent court of judges elected for fixed periods, paid fixed salaries, engaging in no other occupation, and bound to proceed under an oath which imposes upon them judicial obligation as distinguished from a sense of diplomatic obligation. To this court all nations may repair for the adjudication of their differences.

So much for the nations in the League. It is also true that this court is in substance, in everything essential to its character and function, the same court which under Mr. Roosevelt's administration was urged by the United States upon the Second Conference at The Hague in 1907, and which, at the instance of the United States, was provided for in subsequent treaties between the United States and the principal European Powers, negotiated under Mr. Knox as Secretary of State in Mr. Taft's administration, but not finally consummated when the war intervened.

Here plainly there is agreement in substance, and the difficulties are formal.

The technical commission which in the summer of 1920 drafted the plan for a permanent court that has been adopted by the League, accompanied the plan by a unanimous recommendation as follows:

The Advisory Committee of Jurists, assembled at The Hague to draft a plan for a Permanent Court of International Justice,

Convinced that the security of states and the well-being of peoples urgently require the extension of the empire of law and the development of all international agencies for the administration of justice,

Recommends:

I. That a new conference of the nations in continuation of the first two conferences at The Hague be held as soon as practicable for the following purposes:

1. To restate the established rules of international law, especially, and in the first instance, in the fields affected by the events of the recent war.

2. To formulate and agree upon the amendments and additions, if any, to the rules of international law shown to be necessary or useful by the events of the war and the changes in the conditions of international life and intercourse which have followed the war.

3. To endeavor to reconcile divergent views and secure general agreement upon the rules which have been in dispute heretofore.

4. To consider the subjects not now adequately regulated by international law, but as to which the interests of international justice require that rules of law shall be declared and accepted.

II. That the Institute of International Law, the American Institute of International Law, the Union Juridique Internationale, the International Law Association, and the Iberian Institute of Comparative Law be invited to prepare with such conference or collaboration *inter sese* as they may deem useful, projects for the work of the Conference to be submitted beforehand to the several Governments and laid before the Conference for its consideration and such action as it may find suitable.

III. That the Conference be named Conference for the Advancement of International Law.

IV. That this conference be followed by further successive conferences at stated intervals to continue the work left unfinished.

Plainly, these recommendations can not receive effect now, nor until the present emergencies of an unsettled war have been disposed of. But when the time comes, they will point the way to the performance of the object of the League "for the firm establishment of the understandings of international law," and the identical purpose of the people of the United States, so often declared by their representatives.

It is to be observed that these two—the establishment of a permanent court and the restoration of the authority of international law—are correlative parts of the same world policy, upon the substance of which the civilized nations are in agreement.

There can be no real court without law to control its judges, and there can be no effective law without institutions for its application to concrete cases. This is the traditional policy of the United States—to establish and extend the law declaring the rules of right conduct accepted by the common judgment of civilization and to substitute in international controversies upon conflicting claims of right impartial judgment under the law in the place of war.

The existing situation presents difficulties and embarrassments in arriving at a common understanding regarding the precise modes in which this general world policy shall receive effect; but I, for one, am not willing to assume that the patience and good sense of the diplomacy of the world, including our own country will be unequal to the task of so disposing of the formal difficulties as to achieve the great object upon which all are agreed.

It is further to be observed that conference upon matters of policy, either permanent or occasional, on the one hand, and the establishment of law and judicial disposal of questions of right, on the other hand, are not alternative and opposing methods. They are mutually supplemental parts of one and the same scheme to prevent war. Both are methods of bringing the public opinion of the world to bear upon the settlement of controversies. Neither covers the field without the other. Never before has there been such evidence of the power of public opinion as has been afforded by the vast propaganda through which the contending nations in the great war have tried their cases at the bar of public judgment of the world, and have sought to commend their conduct to the peoples of other nations.

The idea that any formula can be devised under the working of which the world can be made peaceable by compulsion, is

manifestly in course of abandonment. The public opinion of mankind is so mighty a force, that it is competent to control the conduct of nations as the public opinion of the community controls the conduct of individuals. But it must be an intelligent, informed and disciplined opinion. The exit of autocracies leaves the direction of foreign relations under the ultimate control of multitudinous, ill-informed and untrained democracies. In place of dynastic ambitions, the danger of war is now to be found in popular misunderstandings and resentments.

How are these vast democracies to be justly informed as to the rights and wrongs of controversies, and the fairness of policies? It seldom happens that the great multitude of citizens can argue out from first principles the complicated and difficult questions of right and wrong involved in international relations. It seldom happens that the subject is not obscured by misinformation and misleading suggestion, and by appeals to passion rather than to judgment. The only mode of meeting this great and vital need, dictated by reason and approved by experience, is the establishment of institutions through which, when strife is not flagrant, the deliberate and unbiased opinion of mankind may declare and agree upon the rules of conduct which we call law, by which in times of excitement judgment may be guided, and by which the peoples may be informed of the limits of their rights and the demands of their duties; and by the establishment of institutions through which disputed facts may be determined and false appearance and misinformation may be stripped away and the truth be made known to the good and peaceful peoples of the world by the judgment of impartial and respected tribunals. In such institutions rests the possibility of growth of development for civilization. Through them may be established by usage the habit of respecting law. They may create standards of conduct under which the thoughts of peoples in controversy will turn habitually to the demonstration of the justice of their position by proof and reason, rather than by threats of violence, so that the time

will come when a nation will know that it is discredited by the refusal to maintain the justness of its cause by the procedure of justice.

This is the work of international law, applied by an international court. The process will be slow, but all advance of civilization is slow. Not what ultimate object we can attain in our short lives, but what tendencies towards higher standards of conduct in the world we can aid during our generation, is the test that determines our duty of service. The conditions which will hinder and delay effective action for the re-establishment of law are many and serious, but we must prepare. When the time for action comes, it must find the results of study, discussion and matured thought ready, as material for authoritative judgment by the nations, and, meantime, the voice of the least of us may be of some avail, urging that force be repressed and expediency be guided by the public opinion of the world made effective by declared and accepted rules of public right applied by competent and impartial international tribunals.

II

ADDRESS AT THE BANQUET OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

April 30, 1921

By the Hon. ELIHU ROOT

It has been a rule of these dinners that they should not be prolonged beyond the limit to which an ordinary, private dinner would run. The American Society of International Law felt that there was no better place for it to begin in reforming the world than by abjuring those dreadful functions in which a lot of tired people are obliged to sit hour after hour listening to people who are making the greatest efforts of their lives, and, accordingly, we restrain ourselves and by example we restrain our guests to a period ending from ten o'clock to half past ten; and you will then be going home to your wives and husbands and children.

I was told the other day by a friend of a visit he made to a great public institution in which there was provision for the insane. He was taken to a room in which there were twenty-odd women in rocking chairs, all rocking as hard and as fast as they could—rock, rock, rock—saying nothing, doing nothing but rocking. He said: "What does this mean?"

"Well," the director said to him, "these women are all violent lunatics and this rocking enables them to work off steam and it satisfies their strong impulse to do something violent. If they were not able to do this they would be doing the most outrageous things."

Now, in the disturbed condition of international affairs, with the one hundred persons in this room, each one of whom knows perfectly well what ought to be done and what can be done for the reconstruction and regeneration of the world, a very useful thing it is to get together here and rock

for a while, to restrain our dispositions towards great and violent deeds by genial good fellowship, by that magnetic influence which comes from association with others and the realization that other people have ideas too, and that perhaps we do not all have the same ideas, and that it is useful to compare, and that, after all, one of the most beneficial things for the world may be to set the example of consideration for other peoples' ideas.

Some years ago in Russia I was taken to see a very great anarchist, Prince Kropotkin, a close friend of Tolstoi's, and after Tolstoi's death the leader of all the guilds and sects of anarchists of Russia. I had a delightful afternoon with him. He was one of the most genial and philosophical fellows I ever knew.

When we were coming away the gentleman who had made the arrangements and who had taken me there, a man who bore a great name in Russia, said to me, "You are going to have a revolution in America."

I said, "Is that so? Why? People there make their own laws and they select the people to execute them. I don't see why they should revolt."

"Oh," he said, "you are going to have a revolution. You cannot have real freedom in America until you have destroyed two things."

I said, "That is very interesting. Pray, tell me what they are."

He said, "One is capital and the other is public opinion."

I have thought a great deal about that. He was a man of intelligence. He was not one of the class of men anxious to pull everything to pieces with a view to picking up the pieces for himself. He was a man of position and standing.

It seemed to me that what was really in the back of his head was that the public opinion of the community constrained by its force individual conduct and that that constraint was tyranny; that to be truly free every member of civil society should be at liberty to do just what he chose to do without any reference to the unwritten laws of society.

I am inclined to think that, without its being stated so boldly, the world at large is pursuing that idea. One of the results of the war is an intolerance of the restraint of those rules which have grown up through the centuries for the conduct of civil society in the state, in the conduct of nations, and in the conduct of individuals. I am inclined to think that under the disruptive force of war the cement which binds the members of civil society together has been running out, that cement which consists of tradition, respect for that past upon which we found our efforts for a more glorious future, respect for the laws which embody and express the common judgment of the millions of sane and honest people who have lived through the generations and centuries, the laws which were the growth from their lives and their sense of need for order. All over the world, I believe it to be true that the great need of civilization now is a renaissance of respect for law. And when that comes you will find a decrease in the hold-ups and the exploits of Dick Turpin on our highways, and the multitude of crimes which we call a crime wave.


To one field of human thought and human struggle for effective organization this Society is devoted, and effective influence or action in that direction cannot come from individual effort alone. It must be by associated effort, and associated effort requires a consideration of others, respect for the opinions of others, a conception of liberty which is not liberty for one's self alone but a willingness to accord the same liberty to others, a conception of justice which means not getting an allowance of one's own claims but a willingness to do justice to others, and the attrition of intercourse and good fellowship and kindly feeling and personal recognition, all of which are being promoted by a thousand gatherings of various kinds all over the country. All are playing their part towards the accomplishment of the great end of the restoration of law in the world, which, when it comes, will be indeed the real, not the ephemeral or phantasmal end of war.

Priscilla said to John Alden, "Why don't you speak for yourself, John?" and I feel bound to apply the rule in regard to these dinners I announced a little while ago and say, "Why don't I stop speaking myself?" and, accordingly, I have the very great pleasure and honor of introducing to you as the first speaker the one whom I should select, if I were called upon to designate the man who of all the men in America, not merely by reading but by personal association, intelligent observation, and human contact was the best informed regarding the public life of Europe, Mr. Nicholas Murray Butler.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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- I. Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission
- II. Terms of the "C" Mandates
- III. Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920
- IV. Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States Respecting Economic Rights in the Mandated Territories
- V. The San Remo Oil Agreement



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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 56.

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I

CONSTITUTION OF THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

Approved by the Council on November 29th, 1920.¹

The Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with Paragraphs 7 and 9 of Article 22 of the Covenant, namely:

"In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an Annual Report in reference to the Territory committed to its charge."

"A Permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the Annual Reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates."

has decided as follows:

a. The Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in Paragraph 9 of Article 22 of the Covenant, shall consist of nine Members. The majority of the Commission shall be nationals of non-Mandatory Powers.

All the Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Council and selected for their personal merits and competence. They shall not hold any office which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their Governments while members of the Commission.

The International Labour Organization shall have the privilege of appointing to the Permanent Commission an expert chosen by itself. This expert shall have the right of attending in an advisory capacity all meetings of the Permanent Commission at which questions relating to labour are discussed.

b. The Mandatory Powers should send their Annual Report

¹ Reprinted from the *Journal of the First Assembly of the League of Nations*, Geneva, 1920.

provided for in Paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the Covenant, to the Commission through duly authorised representatives who would be prepared to offer any supplementary explanations or supplementary information which the Commission may request.

c. The Commission shall examine each individual report in the presence of the duly authorised representative of the Mandatory Power from which it comes. This representative shall participate with absolute freedom in the discussion of this report.

d. After this discussion has ended, the Commission shall decide on the wording of the observations which are to be submitted to the Council of the League.

e. The observations made by the Commission upon each report shall be communicated to the duly authorised representative of the Mandatory Power from which the report comes. This representative shall be entitled to accompany it with any comments which he desires to make.

f. The Commission shall forward the reports of Mandatory Powers to the Council. It shall annex to each report its own observations as well as the observations of the duly authorised representative of the Power which issued the report, if the representative so desires.

g. When the Council publishes the reports of the Mandatory Powers and the observations of the Permanent Commission, it shall also publish the observations of the duly authorised representatives of those Mandatory Powers which have expressed such a desire.

h. The Commission, acting in concert with all the duly authorised representatives of the Mandatory Powers, shall hold a Plenary Meeting to consider all the reports as a whole and any general conclusions to be drawn from them. The Commission may also utilise such a Meeting of the representatives of the Mandatory Powers to lay before them any other matters connected with Mandates which in their opinion should be submitted by the Council to the Mandatory Powers and to the other States, Members of the League. This Plenary

Meeting shall take place either before or after the presentation of the Annual Reports as the Commission may think fit.

i. The Commission shall regulate its own procedure subject to the approval of the Council.

j. The Commission shall sit at Geneva. It may summon technical experts to act in an advisory capacity for all questions relating to the application of the system of Mandates.

k. The Members of the Commission shall receive an allowance of 100 gold francs per day during their Meetings. Their traveling expenses shall be paid. Expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the League of Nations.

II

TERMS OF THE "C" MANDATES

I

MANDATE FOR THE GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN THE
PACIFIC OCEAN SITUATED SOUTH OF THE
EQUATOR OTHER THAN GERMAN
SAMOA AND NAURU²

THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

Whereas, by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her oversea possessions, including therein German New Guinea and the groups of islands in the Pacific Ocean lying south of the Equator other than German Samoa and Nauru; and

Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that in accordance with Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, a Mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to administer New Guinea and the said islands, and have proposed that the Mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, has agreed to accept the Mandate in respect of the said territory and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and

Whereas, by the afore-mentioned Article 22, paragraph 8, it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory not having been

² Official text from the League of Nations. The Mandate for German Samoa was bestowed upon New Zealand, and for Nauru to Great Britain. The terms of these are identical with the texts presented here.

previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprises the former German Colony of New Guinea and the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying south of the Equator, other than the islands of the Samoan group and the island of Nauru.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Commonwealth of Australia, and may apply the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.

The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present mandate.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.

The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending the same.

The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 4

The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.

ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

ARTICLE 6

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ARTICLE 7

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate.

The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920.

2

MANDATE FOR THE GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN LYING NORTH OF THE EQUATOR *

THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

Whereas, by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her oversea possessions, including therein the groups of islands in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator; and

Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that in accordance with Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty a Mandate should be conferred upon His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to administer the said islands and have proposed that the Mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and

Whereas His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has agreed to accept the Mandate in respect of the said islands and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and

Whereas, by the afore-mentioned Article 22, paragraph 8, it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations:

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The islands over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Majesty the Emperor of Japan (hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprise all the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the Equator.

* Official text from the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Empire of Japan, and may apply the laws of the Empire of Japan to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.

The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present mandate.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.

The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending same.

The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 4

The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.

ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

ARTICLE 6

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ARTICLE 7

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present mandate.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920.

MANDATE FOR GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA⁴

THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

Whereas by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her oversea possessions, including therein German South-West Africa; and

Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that, in accordance with Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, a Mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned, and have proposed that the Mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa, has agreed to accept the Mandate in respect of the said territory and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and

Whereas, by the afore-mentioned Article 22, paragraph 8, it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations:

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa (hereinafter called the Mandatory)

⁴ Official text of the League of Nations.

comprises the territory which formerly constituted the German Protectorate of South-West Africa.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.

The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present Mandate.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.

The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending the same.

The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 4

The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.

ARTICLE 5

Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall

ensure in the territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.

ARTICLE 6

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ARTICLE 7

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present mandate.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920.

III

FRANCO-BRITISH CONVENTION OF DECEMBER
23, 1920, ON CERTAIN POINTS CONNECTED
WITH THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA AND
THE LEBANON, PALESTINE
AND MESOPOTAMIA⁵

The British and French Governments, respectively represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, wishing to settle completely the problems raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, all three conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, have agreed on the following provisions:—

ARTICLE I

The boundaries between the territories under the French mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other are determined as follows:—

On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory

⁵ Reprinted from the British White Paper (Cmd. 1195).

under the French mandate; the frontier will in principle leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadyie. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communication to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerkerah, which will remain in the territory under the British mandate, and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aioun and Es Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 2

A commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present convention to trace on the spot

the boundary line laid down in article 1 between the French and British mandatory territories. This commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the commission, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground; the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate; one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

ARTICLE 3

The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British mandate in Mesopotamia.

ARTICLE 4

In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government.

ARTICLE 5

1. The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake of Tiberias and Nasib. This arrangement shall be concluded between the railway administrations of the areas under the French and British mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular the agreement shall allow the administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to settle the points as to which a difference of opinion exists and immediate effect shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3. The French Government consents to the nomination of a special commission, which, after having examined the ground, may readjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Nasib in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe line connecting Palestine with the Hedjaz Railway and the valley of the Euphrates, and running entirely within the limits of the areas under the British mandate. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French mandate.

The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the British Government must be utilised within a maximum period of ten years.

The above-mentioned commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments.

4. In the event of the track of the British railway being compelled for technical reasons to enter in certain places the territory under French mandate, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

5. In the event of the British Government making use of the right mentioned in paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article will determine three months after the completion of the construction of the said railway.

6. The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognised by the local Governments in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 6

It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement of San Remo regarding oil.⁶

ARTICLE 7

The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective mandatory areas in the way of the recruit-

⁶ See Page 52 of this document.

ment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary, and in eventual agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from customs formalities.

ARTICLE 8

Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months after the signature of the present convention the employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the production of hydro-electric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French mandate.

In connection with this examination the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

To the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature, or measures taken with the object of reafforestation and the management of forests.

ARTICLE 9

Subject to the provisions of Article 15 and 16 of the man-

date for Palestine, of Articles 8 and 10 of the mandate for Mesopotamia, and of Article 8 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction, of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British nationals possess and direct at the present moment in their respective mandatory areas to continue their work freely; the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in the mandatory area of the other.

The present convention has been drawn up in English and French, each of the two texts having equal force.

Done at Paris, the 23rd December, 1920, in a double copy, one of which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and the other in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST
G. LEYGUES

IV

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR RESPECTING ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN MANDATED TERRITORIES⁷

No. 1

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)

Embassy of the United States of America,

My Lord,

London, May 12, 1920.

PURSUANT to the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Government of the United States has been unofficially informed that the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine have been assigned to Great Britain; the mandate for Mesopotamia being given subject to friendly arrangement with the Italian Government regarding economic rights.

2. The Government of the United States desires to point out that during the peace negotiations at Paris leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, it consistently took the position that the future peace of the world required that, as a general principle, any alien territory which should be acquired pursuant to the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers, must be held and governed in such a way as to assure equal treatment in law, and in fact to the commerce of all nations. It was on account of, and subject to this understanding that the United States felt itself able and willing to agree that the acquisition of certain enemy territory by the victorious Powers would be

⁷ Reprinted from the British White Paper (Cmd. 675).

consistent with the best interests of the world. The representatives of the principal Allied Powers, in the discussion of the mandate principles, expressed in no indefinite manner their recognition of the justice and far-sightedness of such a principle, and agreed to its application to the mandates over Turkish territory.

3. The administration of Palestine and Mesopotamia during the interim period of military occupation has given rise to several communications between the United States Government and that of Great Britain relative to matters that had created the unfortunate impression in the minds of the American public, that the authorities of His Majesty's Government in the occupied region had given advantage to British oil interests which were not accorded to American companies, and further that Great Britain had been preparing quietly for exclusive control of the oil resources in this region. The impression referred to has, it is believed, been due in large part to reports of authoritative statements regarding the general oil policy of Great Britain, and of actual work such as the construction of pipe lines, railways and refineries, the operations of certain oil wells, the acquisitions of dockyards, cotton investigations, and permitted researches by certain individuals whose activities, though stated to be solely in behalf of the civil administration, were attended by circumstances which created the impression that some benefit at least would accrue to British oil interests.

4. Certain of the occurrences above referred to have been explained by His Majesty's Government as due to military necessity, and certain others as due to laxity on the part of local authorities. It must be realised, however, that it has been difficult for the American people to reconcile all of these reports with the assurance of His Majesty's Government that "the provisional character of the military occupation does not warrant the taking of decisions by the occupying Power in matters concerning the future economic development of the country," and that the invitation of new undertakings and the exercise of rights under concessions would be prohibited. The

United States Government has confidence in the good faith of His Majesty's Government in attempting to carry out the assurances given by His Majesty's Foreign Office, but desires to point out that the considerations above referred to indicate the difficulty in ensuring the local execution of such undertakings, and the necessity for careful measures to guarantee the practical fulfilment of the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris.

5. With this thought in mind the Government of the United States ventures to suggest the following propositions, which embody or illustrate the principles which the United States Government would be pleased to see applied in the occupied or mandated regions, and which are submitted as furnishing a reasonable basis for discussions. In the event of such discussions, it would be assumed that the legal situation as regards economic resources in the occupied or mandated regions would remain *in statu quo* pending an agreement—

(1.) That the Mandatory Power strictly adhere and conform to the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris, and to the principles embodied in mandate "A" prepared in London for adoption by the League of Nations by the Commission on Mandatories.

(2.) That there be guaranteed to the nationals or subjects of all nations treatment equal in law and in fact, to that accorded nationals or subjects of the Mandatory Power with respect to taxation or other matters affecting residence, business profession, concessions, freedom of transit for persons and goods, freedom of communication, trade, navigation, commerce, industrial property, and other economic rights or commercial activities.

(3.) That no exclusive economic concessions covering the whole of any mandated region or sufficiently large to be virtually exclusive shall be granted, and that no monopolistic concessions relating to any commodity or to any economic privilege subsidiary and essential to the production, development, or exploitation of such commodity shall be granted.

(4.) That reasonable provision shall be made for publicity

of applications for concessions and of governmental acts or regulations relating to the economic resources of the mandated territories; and that in general regulations or legislation regarding the granting of concessions relating to, exploring, or exploiting economic resources, or regarding other privileges in connection with these, shall not have the effect of placing American citizens or companies, or those of other nations or companies controlled by American citizens or nationals of other countries, at a disadvantage compared with the nationals or companies of the mandate nation, or companies controlled by nationals of the mandate nation or others.

6. The fact that certain concessions were granted in the mandated regions by the Turkish Government is, of course, an important factor which must be given practical consideration. The United States Government believes that it is entitled to participate in any discussions relating to the status of such concessions, not only because of existing vested rights of American citizens, but also because the equitable treatment of such concessions is essential to the initiation and application of the general principles in which the United States Government is interested.

7. No direct mention has been made herein of the question of establishment of monopolies directly or indirectly by or in behalf of the Mandatory Government. It is believed, however, that the establishment of monopolies by or in behalf of the Mandatory Government would not be consistent with the principles of trusteeship inherent in the mandatory idea. His Majesty's Government has stated its conception of the necessity for the control of oil production in these territories in time of national emergency. The Government of the United States does not intend at present to suggest arrangements that shall extend to any consideration not included in an enlightened interpretation of what constitutes its legitimate commercial interests. The question of control in times of national emergencies of supplies which may be deemed essential by Great Britain is a subject which the United States Government deems a matter for separate discussion.

8. The Government of the United States realises the heavy financial obligations which will arise in connection with the administration of the mandatory. It believes, however, that any attempt toward reimbursement by the adoption of a policy of monopolisation or of exclusive concessions and special favours to its own nationals, besides being a repudiation of the principles already agreed to, would prove to be unwise even from the point of view of expediency both on economic and political grounds. It also believes that the interests of the world, as well as that of the two respective countries, can best be served by a friendly co-operation or a friendly and equal competition between the citizens of the two countries and citizens of other nationalities.

9. The Government of the United States would be glad to receive an early expression of the views of His Majesty's Government, especially in order to reassure public opinion in the United States.

10. I have the honour, further, to acquaint your Lordship that this note is not designed by way of reply to the Allied note from San Remo, which will be answered separately.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS.

No. 2

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 29.)

Embassy of the United States of America,

My Lord, *London, July 28, 1920.*

PURSUANT to the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to recall to your Lordship the statement in my note of the 12th May, 1920, that the Government of the United States would be glad to receive an early expression of the views of His Majesty's Government with respect to its economic policy in the mandate regions of the Near East.

2. The Government of the United States appreciates that, with respect to the inauguration of the administration of the mandate territories, His Majesty's Government will consider it necessary to proceed with due deliberation. His Majesty's Government will recall, however, that the Government of the United States is primarily interested in the effective application to these territories of general principles, already clearly recognised and adhered to during the peace negotiations at Paris, that such territories should be held and governed in such a way as to assure equal treatment in law and in fact to the commerce of all nations.

3. It is the opinion of the Government of the United States that the treatment of the economic resources of the regions which will be held under mandate by Great Britain or other nations involves a question of principle transcending in importance questions relating merely to the commercial competition of private interests or to control for strategic purposes of any particular raw material. The Government of the United States in its note of the 12th May, 1920, suggested certain considerations that indicate the necessity for careful measures to guarantee the practical application of the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris. Unfortunately, occurrences subsequent to the sub-

mission of this note have not served to clarify the situation or to diminish the concern felt by the Government and people of the United States.

4. The Government of the United States has noted the publication of an agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government making certain provisions for the disposition of petroleum produced in Mesopotamia, and giving to France preferential treatment in regard thereto. It is not clear to the Government of the United States how such an agreement can be consistent with the principles of equality of treatment understood and accepted during the peace negotiations at Paris.

5. The Government of the United States desires to record its views that such an agreement, in light of the position the British Government appears to have assumed toward Mesopotamia and its economic resources, will, as a practical matter, result in a grave infringement of the mandate principle which was formulated for the purpose of removing in the future some of the principal causes of international differences.

6. In the interests of a frank discussion of the whole subject the Government of the United States desires further to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the existence of reports to the effect that the officials charged with the administration of Tanganyika territory have accorded privileges to British nationals that have not been accorded to the nationals of other countries.

7. The Government of the United States desires to express anew the hope that in an early reply to the note of the 12th May, 1920, His Majesty's Government will find it possible to elucidate fully its policy regarding the mandated territory of the Near East and other regions.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS.

No. 3

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis*Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August 9, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the notes dated the 12th May and 28th ultimo which you were good enough to address to me, and in which your Excellency, referring to the mandates assigned to Great Britain, had occasion to point out the general principles stated to be advocated by the United States Government and agreed to by the Allied Powers which should be adopted and applied to the mandates over former Turkish territory.

2. You at the same time drew my attention to the existing vested rights of United States citizens in this territory and to the impression which had arisen in the minds of the American people that the authorities of His Majesty's Government in the occupied territory of Mesopotamia had given advantages to British oil interests which were not granted to American companies, and that His Majesty's Government were taking steps calculated eventually to bring the oil resources of Mesopotamia under their exclusive control. Instances of activities in various directions were quoted which had led to such conclusions. In view of this impression and of the necessity for the adoption of careful measures which would ensure the practical fulfilment of the principles enunciated, you put forward certain proposals which the United States Government would be glad to see applied in the mandated territories, and explained the necessity for giving practical consideration to certain concessions in those regions granted by the Turkish Government, in some of which United States citizens claimed vested rights.

3. The various points and suggestions which have formed the subject of your note have had the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, and I desire to furnish you in regard to them with the following observations:—

4. I would wish, **at the** outset, to refer to the last sentence of the first paragraph of your note of the 12th May, to the effect that the assignment to Great Britain of the mandate for Mesopotamia was made subject to a friendly arrangement with the Italian Government regarding economic rights, and to state categorically that the assignment of the mandate has been made and accepted subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any Government regarding economic rights.

5. I will next deal with the alleged action of the authorities of His Majesty's Government in the occupied territories in giving facilities to British oil interests which, it is contended, were denied to United States companies. The matter, as you will recollect, has formed the subject of previous communications between us, and the hope was entertained that whatever doubts had existed in regard to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the matter had been satisfactorily dispelled. The authoritative statements to which you have alluded in the third paragraph of your note of the 12th May, and which would appear to be the basis for the reports that actual work has been undertaken in Mesopotamia, are not founded on fact. Such reports would lead to the assumption that the development of the oilfields has already been taken in hand, which is not the case. No pipe-lines or refineries for dealing with Mesopotamian oil have been constructed. In fact, the only existing work of this nature is a small refinery now in course of erection at Bagdad which was started for purely military requirements and is intended to deal with oil obtained from the Persian oilfields.

6. The difficulty and cost of conveying supplies of oil by river from the base at Basra to military stations situated north of Bagdad and in the Mosul region have compelled the military authorities in that region to consider the problem of securing sufficient supplies locally, and have led to the working of an oil-well which had been partially developed by the Turkish authorities previous to and during the war. The operations at this well have been conducted for purely military purposes under the immediate supervision of the army

authorities and at army expense, and no private interests whatever are in any way involved.

7. In regard to the building of railways and dockyards, I need hardly dwell upon the imperative necessity for providing every possible means of transport during the period of military operations and facilities of every kind at the ports for the landing of troops and stores. The construction of railways in a country utterly destitute of any properly organised means of communication has throughout the period of the war and since the cessation of hostilities been of paramount importance from the military as well as from the administrative point of view.

8. The suggestion that Great Britain during the period of military occupation of the mandatory territories has been preparing for exclusive control of their oil resources is equally devoid of foundation, and the claims of British commercial interests in those regions, whatever they may be, are to-day no stronger, as they are no weaker, than they were at the outbreak of war.

9. I would like here to make a passing reference to the very mistaken impressions which appear to be current in the United States in regard to the oil policy of His Majesty's Government. The output of oil within the British Empire is only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the world's production, and if the production of Persia be included, in virtue of certain oilfields in that country being owned by a British company, the total amounts to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Against this small percentage, the United States produces some 70 per cent. of the world's output, besides which United States companies, who own at least three-fourths of the Mexican output, are estimated to produce a further 12 per cent. of the world's output. This overwhelming proportion, over 80 per cent., of the petroleum production of the world is under American control, and the predominance of the United States in regard to oil production is assured for many years to come. There is, in any case, no justification for supposing that Great Britain, whose present oil resources are altogether insignificant in comparison, can

seriously threaten American supremacy, and any prophecies as to the oil-bearing resources of countries at present unexplored and quite undeveloped must be accepted with reserve.

10. The nervousness of American opinion concerning the alleged grasping activities of British oil interests appears singularly unintelligible in view of these facts, and yet it is notable that the United States, notwithstanding their assured supremacy, have taken powers to reserve for American interests the right to drill for oil on United States domain lands and have on various occasions used their influence in territories amenable to their control with a view to secure the cancellation of oil concessions previously and legitimately obtained by British persons or companies. Thus, on the occupation of Hayti by United States forces in 1913, the United States Administration refused to confirm an oil concession which had been approved by the Haytian Government and Legislature and for which the caution money had been deposited in the republic; and more recently the United States representatives at San José urged the present Costa Rican Government to cancel all concessions granted by the previous Government, the only concession in question being an oil concession granted to a British subject.

11. Very different has been the attitude of the British Government. In assuming the administration of the occupied Turkish territories they have remained fully alive to their obligation, as a temporary occupant, to protect not only the natural resources of the country against indiscriminate exploitation, but also the absolute freedom of action which the authority to be created eventually for administering those regions would have rightly expected to enjoy.

12. Mindful of this obligation, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to suspend during the period of occupation the grant of facilities and opportunities to British as well as to other private interests to investigate the natural resources of the country with the view of acquiring new claims or strengthening old ones, and there is no reason for assuming that the Administration either of Mesopotamia or of Palestine

has at any time failed to carry out the policy which has been laid down by His Majesty's Government.

13. I will now refer to the propositions enumerated by you on which discussion is invited and which have been put forward with the object of guaranteeing to the commerce of all nations the practical fulfilment in the mandated regions of the principles of equal treatment in law and in fact. Reference is made in this connection to the desirability of the adherence of the mandatory Power to the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris, as well as to the principles embodied in mandate (A) prepared in London by the Commission on Mandates, for adoption by the League of Nations.

14. I would first point out that, in consequence of a divergence of views, the Commission on Mandates proceeded no further with the draft of the mandate form (A), which was consequently abandoned.

15. The draft mandates for Mesopotamia and for Palestine, which have been prepared with a view to secure equality of treatment and opportunity for the commerce, citizens and subjects of all States who are members of the League of Nations, will, when approved by the Allied Powers interested, be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government, while fully appreciating the suggestion for discussing with the United States Government the various propositions mentioned by you, with which they are in full sympathy, are none the less of the opinion that the terms of the mandates can only properly be discussed at the Council of the League of Nations by the signatories of the Covenant.

16. In the matter of concessions granted in the mandated territories by the Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government fully agree with the views of the United States Government that due consideration must be given to all rights legally acquired before the outbreak of hostilities. Provision for the consideration and recognition under certain conditions of concessions situated in territories detached from the

Turkish Empire has, moreover, as you no doubt know, been made in the treaty of peace with Turkey. His Majesty's Government are aware that certain rights were acquired in Palestine before the war by American citizens, while British interests, such as the Turkish Petroleum Company and other groups, claim similar rights either in Mesopotamia or in Palestine. These claims will naturally have to be given practical consideration and receive equitable treatment consistent with the interests of the mandated territories.

17. As part of the administrative arrangements under the treaty of peace with Turkey and the mandate, the oil deposits in Mesopotamia will be secured to the future Arab State, but it is far from the intention of the mandatory Power to establish on its own behalf any kind of monopoly.

18. In view of long-standing interests which the French Government possessed in the Mosul district, arrangements were made whereby the French Government should, on renouncing those interests, be assured of a certain participation in the Mesopotamian oil production. It was accordingly decided that, in the event of the Mesopotamian oilfields being developed by the State, France should be entitled to purchase 25 per cent. of the oil production at ordinary market rates, or, in the alternative of the oilfields being developed by private enterprise, that French participation should not be less than 25 per cent. in the share-holdings, while provision was made that the Mesopotamian Administration should likewise have a certain share.

19. In consideration for such participation, the French Government agreed to permit the laying of a pipe-line from the Mesopotamian oilfields through Syria, besides providing for other facilities. These arrangements, including others for mutual co-operation in other countries, were embodied in an agreement which has been published.⁸ The practical outcome of the arrangement, so far as Mesopotamia is concerned, is that, while France secures a share in the output of oil at ordinary market rates, the Mesopotamian State is afforded, in

⁸ See Page 52 for the San Remo Oil Agreement.

return, facilities for placing the production of the oilfields within easy reach of the world's markets. The agreement aims at no monopoly, it does not exclude other interests, and gives no exclusive right to the mandatory Power, while the Mesopotamian State is free to develop the oilfields in any way it may judge advisable, consistent with the interests of the country.

20. I feel bound to observe that, even if any special privileges were assigned to France under this agreement, such a proceeding would be consistent with the interpretation consistently placed by the United States Government on most-favoured-nation clauses in treaties, namely, that special privileges conceded to particular countries in return for specific concessions cannot, in virtue of such a clause, be claimed by other countries not offering such concessions. The United States Government have indeed recently taken a further step in the case of the "Jones" Act, and have taken powers actually to withdraw treatment secured by treaties which in some cases contain no provision for denunciation.

21. As regards the alleged action of the Administration of Tanganyika territory referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your note of the 28th ultimo, I should be obliged if you would furnish me with the names of any persons who have been refused privileges granted to British subjects and the dates of their applications.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 4

*Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 7.)**Embassy of the United States of America,*

My Lord,

London, December 6, 1920.

WITH reference to my note of the 22nd November last, in which I communicated to you a note from the Secretary of State of the United States concerning the mandate and Mesopotamian oil situation, I have now the honour to transmit, herewith enclosed, the communication addressed to your Lordship upon this subject, dated the 20th November, 1920, and signed by the Honourable Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State of the United States of America, a comparison of the text of which with that as transmitted in my afore-mentioned note will disclose certain relatively unimportant changes in the verbiage.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Mr. Bainbridge Colby to Earl Curzon.**Department of State, Washington,*

My Lord,

November 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your note of the 9th August regarding the application of the principle of equality of treatment to the territories of the Near East to be placed under mandates and specifically to the petroleum resources of those territories as affected by that principle.

Before considering the observations of His Majesty's Government on the general principles advocated by the United States and agreed to by the Allied Powers for application to the mandates over former Turkish territory as outlined in the

notes of the 12th May and of the 28th July addressed to you on behalf of this Government, I think it will clarify the discussion to indicate certain of your statements and assurances which this Government has been pleased to receive. Thus I note that the assignment to Great Britain of the mandate for Mesopotamia was made and accepted subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any third Government regarding economic rights, which of course would have been wholly at variance with the purpose and contemplation of any mandate.

It is also gratifying to learn that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the several propositions formulated in the note of the 12th May above referred to, which embody or illustrate the principles which this Government believes should be applied in the mandated regions and which are essential to the practical realisation of equality of treatment.

The statements of your note, to the effect that the British Government has refrained from exploiting the petroleum resources of the mandated territories in question; that the operations referred to have been conducted for purely military purposes under the immediate supervision of the army authorities and at army expense; and that no private interests whatever are in any way involved, are accepted with a full sense of the good faith of the British Government.

The Government of the United States notes that His Majesty's Government has found it necessary to suspend, during the period of occupation, the grant of facilities and opportunities to British as well as to other private interests to investigate the natural resources of the country, either for the purpose of acquiring new claims or strengthening old ones, and that there is no reason for assuming that the Administration, either of Mesopotamia or of Palestine, has at any time failed to carry out the assurances of His Majesty's Government.

This Government welcomes your pledges to the effect that the natural resources of Mesopotamia are to be secured to the people of Mesopotamia and to the future Arab State to be established in that region and that it is the purpose of the

British Government, fully alive to its obligation as a temporary occupant, not only to secure those resources to the Mesopotamian State, but also its absolute freedom of action in the control thereof, and in particular that it is far from the intention of the Mandatory Power to establish any kind of monopoly or preferred position in its own interest.

The Government of the United States appreciates likewise the concurrence with its view that the merits of all claims to rights alleged to have been acquired in the mandated territories before the outbreak of hostilities must be duly established before recognition of such claims will be accorded.

Adverting, at this point, to the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the nature of the responsibilities of Mandatory Powers under the League of Nations, I desire to call to the attention of His Majesty's Government the fact that, while the draft mandate, form "A," was not adopted at Paris, it was the understanding of the American representatives there present, that the British Government entertained and had expressed convictions favourable to said form, and that, presumably, its representatives would exercise their influence in conformity with those convictions.

I need hardly refer again to the fact that the Government of the United States has consistently urged that it is of the utmost importance to the future peace of the world that alien territory, transferred as a result of the war with the Central Powers, should be held and administered in such a way as to assure equal treatment to the commerce and to the citizens of all nations. Indeed, it was in reliance upon an understanding to this effect, and expressly in contemplation thereof, that the United States was persuaded that the acquisition under mandate of certain enemy territory by the victorious Powers would be consistent with the best interests of the world.

It is assumed accordingly that your statements with reference to mandate "A," together with the statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine have been prepared with a view to secure equality of treatment for the commerce and citizens of all States which are members of the

League of Nations, do not indicate a supposition on your part that the United States can be excluded from the benefits of the principle of equality of treatment.

This Government is pleased to find that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the principles formulated in its communications of the 12th May and of the 28th July. But it is unable to concur in the view, contained in paragraph 15 of your note, that the terms of the mandates can properly be discussed only in the Council of the League of Nations and by the signatories of the Covenant. Such powers as the Allied and Associated nations may enjoy or wield in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers. The United States as a participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful issue cannot consider any of the Associated Powers, the smallest not less than itself, debarred from the discussion of any of its consequences, or from participation in the rights and privileges secured under the mandates provided for in the Treaties of Peace.

This Government notes with interest your statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and for Palestine, which have been prepared, with a view to secure equality of treatment and opportunity for the commerce, citizens and subjects of all States which are members of the League of Nations, will, when approved by the interested Allied Powers, be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. The United States is undoubtedly one of the Powers directly interested in the terms of the mandates, and I therefore request that the draft mandate forms be communicated to this Government for its consideration before their submission to the Council of the League. It is believed that His Majesty's Government will be the more ready to acquiesce in this request, in view of your assurance that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the various principles contained in the two previous notes of this Government upon this subject.

The establishment of the mandate principle, a new principle in international relations, and one in which the public

opinion of the world is taking a special interest, would seem to require the frankest discussion from all pertinent points of view. It would seem essential that suitable publicity should be given to the drafts of mandates which it is the intention to submit to the Council, in order that the fullest opportunity may be afforded to consider their terms in relation to the obligations assumed by the Mandatory Power and the respective interests of all Governments which are or deem themselves concerned or affected.

The fact cannot be ignored that the reported resources of Mesopotamia have interested public opinion of the United States, Great Britain and other countries as a potential subject of economic strife. Because of that fact they become an outstanding illustration of the kind of economic question with reference to which, the mandate principle was especially designed, and, indeed, a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the principle. This principle was accepted in the hope of obviating in the future those international differences that grow out of a desire for the exclusive control of the resources and markets of annexed territories. To cite a single example: because of the shortage of petroleum, its constantly increasing commercial importance, and the continuing necessity of replenishing the world's supply by drawing upon the latent resources of undeveloped regions, it is of the highest importance to apply to the petroleum industry the most enlightened principles recognised by nations as appropriate for the peaceful ordering of their economic relations.

This Government finds difficulty in reconciling the special arrangement referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 of your note, and set forth in the so-called San Remo Petroleum Agreement, with your statement that the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia, and freedom of action in regard thereto, will be secured to the future Arab State, as yet unorganized. Furthermore, it is difficult to harmonise that special arrangement with your statement that concessionary claims relating to those resources still remain in their pre-war position, and

have yet to receive, with the establishment of the Arab State, the equitable consideration promised by His Majesty's Government.

This Government has noted in this connection a public statement of His Majesty's Minister in charge of petroleum affairs to the effect that the San Remo Agreement was based on the principle that the concessions granted by the former Turkish Government must be honoured. It would be reluctant to assume that His Majesty's Government has already undertaken to pass judgment upon the validity of concessionary claims in the regions concerned, and to concede validity to certain of those claims which cover apparently the entire Mesopotamian area. Indeed, this Government understands your note to deny having taken, and to deny the intention to take, any such *ex parte* and premature action. In this connection, I might observe that such information as this Government has received indicates that prior to the war, the Turkish Petroleum Company, to make specific reference, possessed in Mesopotamia no rights to petroleum concessions or to the exploitation of oil; and, in view of your assurance that it is not the intention of the Mandatory Power to establish on its own behalf any kind of monopoly, I am at some loss to understand how to construe the provision of the San Remo Agreement that any private petroleum company which may develop the Mesopotamian oilfields "shall be under permanent British control."

Your Lordship contrasts the present production of petroleum in the United States with that of Great Britain, and some allusion is made to American supremacy in the petroleum industry. I should regret any assumption by His Majesty's Government or any other friendly Power that the views of this Government as to the true character of a mandate are dictated in any degree by considerations of the domestic need or production of petroleum, or any other commodity.

I may be permitted to say, however, for the purpose of correcting a misapprehension which your note reflects, that the United States possesses only one-twelfth approximately of the petroleum resources of the world. The oil resources of no other

nation have been so largely drawn upon for foreign needs, and your Lordship's statement, that any prophecies as to the oil-bearing resources of unexplored and undeveloped countries must be accepted with reserve, hardly disposes of the scientific calculation upon which, despite their problematical elements, the policies of States and the anticipations of world production are apparently proceeding. The Government of the United States assumes that there is a general recognition of the fact that the requirements for petroleum are in excess of production, and it believes that opportunity to explore and develop the petroleum resources of the world, wherever found, should without discrimination, be freely extended, as only by the unhampered development of such resources can the needs of the world be met.

But it is not these aspects of oil production and supply, in so far as they are of domestic interest to the United States, with which I am concerned in this discussion. I have alluded to them in order to correct confusing inferences liable to arise from certain departures, which I believe I discern in your Lordship's communication, from the underlying principles of a mandate, as evolved and sought to be applied by the Allied and Associated Powers to the territories brought under their temporary dominion by their joint struggle and common victory. This dominion will be wholly misconceived, not to say abused, if there is even the slightest deviation from the spirit and the exclusive purpose of a trusteeship as strict as it is comprehensive.

Accept, my Lord, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

BAINBRIDGE COLBY,

*Secretary of State of the United
States of America.*

No. 5

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, February 28, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 6th December, enclosing a communication dated the 20th November from the Secretary of State of the United States, relative to the application, in territories placed under mandate, of the principles of equality of treatment and opportunity, and referring more especially to the petroleum resources found in the Near East. His Majesty's Government are pleased to observe that the United States Government appreciates the general policy adopted by His Majesty's Government in territories under military occupation. I notice, however, that Mr. Colby makes certain observations with regard to the San Remo Petroleum Agreement which appear to indicate that the scope of that agreement is not fully understood.

2. The co-operation of British and French interests in regard to oil production in various countries was first suggested in the early part of the year 1919 by the French Government, when it was proposed that some arrangement should be arrived at whereby French interests might be given some participation in the production of petroleum in various regions. The proposal put forward by the French Government was carefully considered, and it was found possible to come to an agreement based on the principles of mutual co-operation and reciprocity in various countries, especially where British and French interests were already considerable, and on the whole greater than those of other Allied countries. The agreement aimed at no monopoly or exclusive rights, and could only become effective if its application conformed to the desires and laws of the countries concerned.

3. As regards the provisions in the agreement relating to

Mesopotamia, I desire to make it plain that the whole of the oilfields to which those provisions refer are the subject of a concession granted before the war by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company. The position of such concessions in territory detached from Turkey is expressly safeguarded by articles 311 and 312 of the Treaty of Sèvres. The history of this concession is as follows:—

Prior to the war the position in regard to the Mesopotamian oilfields was as follows:—

The concessions for all the oilfields of the two vilayets (provinces) of Mosul and Bagdad were bestowed by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid on his Civil List in 1888 and 1898 respectively, and private enterprise had long been debarred thereby from acquiring any oil rights in those particular districts. This situation was so far admitted and recognized that in 1904 the Anatolian Railway Company, nominally a Turkish company, but in reality a German concern, obtained a contract from the Civil List by which the company undertook to carry out preliminary surveys of the oilfields and secured the option for their development on joint account.

4. The Civil List in 1906, considering the agreement with the Anatolian Company at an end, entered into negotiations with a British group with a view to the development of the oilfields. These negotiations, which had the full support of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, continued during the year 1907; they were suspended during the political crisis which broke out in 1908, but were resumed in 1909 with the Turkish Ministry of Finance, to which Department the Mesopotamian oil concession had been transferred from the Civil List, by firmans issued in 1908 and 1909. The general upheaval caused by the events in those years impeded the progress of the negotiations during the years 1910 and 1911.

5. In 1912 endeavours were made by German interests to obtain the confirmation by the Turkish Government of the arrangements concluded in 1904 between the Anatolian Railway Company and the Sultan's Civil List, and, with the apparent object of pursuing the matter and of widening the scope of

their activity in oil operations in other parts of the Turkish Empire, they formed a British limited liability company called the Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited), the capital of which was partly British and partly German.

6. This development was succeeded by a series of negotiations entered into between the British group and members of the Turkish Petroleum Company for the amalgamation of the rival interests and for pursuing jointly the application before the Turkish Government for the grant of a concession for the Mesopotamian oilfields. These negotiations, in which the British and German Governments took an active interest, terminated in the early part of 1914, when an agreement was reached for the fusion of the interests of the original Turkish Petroleum Company and of the original British group in the new Turkish Petroleum Company. This agreement was signed not only by the parties immediately interested, but also on behalf of the British and German Governments respectively. The German share in this new company was fixed at 25 per cent.

7. In consequence of this arrangement, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was able to make the necessary representations to the Turkish Government for the grant to the Turkish Petroleum Company of the oil concessions in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, while representations of the same nature were made simultaneously to the Porte by the German Ambassador. The negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government was not confined to the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but covered a wide field and involved mutual concessions of very material importance. As a result the Turkish Government, on the 28th June, 1914, through the Grand Vizier, informed His Majesty's Ambassador, in an official communication, that the Turkish Ministry of Finance having been substituted for the Civil List in the matter of the petroleum deposits known or to be discovered in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, had consented to lease the said deposits to the Turkish Petroleum Company, the Ministry reserving the right to fix later on its

share in the enterprise as well as the terms of the contract. I should add that during the war the German interests in the company were liquidated, and thus came into the hands of His Majesty's Government.

8. From the facts as narrated, it will be seen that the Turkish Petroleum Company's right to the lease of the oilfields in the two vilayets rests on an official undertaking given by the Turkish Government to the two Governments concerned after prolonged diplomatic negotiations. In the circumstances the oil rights in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul cannot be treated merely as a matter of abstract principle or without reference to the special character of the negotiations which preceded the war. Had no war supervened, and had Mesopotamia remained till now under Turkish rule, the exploitation of these oil deposits would long since have begun. It can hardly be contended that His Majesty's Government should now question the validity of an undertaking granted by the Turkish Government in return for consideration received. And I may add, since the United States Government will presumably expect His Majesty's Government to recognise the rights acquired by the Standard Oil Company in Palestine from the Turkish Government, that these rights, which are based entirely on the grant of a prospecting licence, are no stronger than those of the Turkish Petroleum Company, to whom the Turkish Government had definitely undertaken to transfer a valid and already existing concession.

9. In this connection I feel bound to remind you that the attitude of the United States Government in suggesting that His Majesty's Government should disregard the rights acquired by the Turkish Petroleum Company is scarcely consistent with that adopted by the United States Government in regard to similar United States interests in oil properties in Mexico. For instance, in his letter of the 25th November, 1920, to M. Pesqueira, the Mexican representative in Washington, Mr. Colby expressed particular satisfaction at the statements made in M. Pesqueira's letter, then under reply, to the effect that President de la Huerta and President-elect

Obregon had declared that article 27 of the new Mexican Constitution "is not, and must not be, interpreted as retroactive or violative of valid property rights."

10. It will be seen from the above facts that the acquisition by the French Government under the San Remo Agreement of an interest in the Mesopotamian oilfields represents the allotment to the French Government of the former German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company in return for facilities by which Mesopotamian oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean. The agreement, so far as it relates to Mesopotamia, may therefore be said to be the adaptation of pre-war arrangements to existing conditions, and in this respect His Majesty's Government, far from acting in any selfish or monopolistic spirit, may reasonably claim to have consulted the best interests of the future Arab State. Neither the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company nor the provisions of the San Remo Oil Agreement will preclude the Arab State from enjoying the full benefit of ownership or from prescribing the conditions on which the oilfields shall be developed.

11. I have not failed to observe the large amount of public attention directed to the reported resources of Mesopotamia which, Mr. Colby states, furnish a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the mandate principle. Apart from the fact that these resources are as yet entirely unproved, I can discern nothing in this principle which compels the mandatory Power to discriminate against its own nationals, who, after years of arduous negotiation, secured certain rights, and would, but for the war, have long since been actively at work, in order to afford an equal opportunity to other groups which before the war were not actively concerned in the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia.

12. I have noted with interest the allusions which Mr. Colby makes to the estimates which have been framed of the distribution of the petroleum resources of the world. While I agree that such calculations are of subsidiary importance in this discussion, I think it desirable that they should be placed

in the proper perspective. It is stated in Mr. Colby's note that the United States possesses only one-twelfth approximately of the world's petroleum resources, but I may be permitted to point out that in 1919 the chief geologist of the United States Geological Survey stated that "the criteria on which such estimates can be based vary in every degree of inadequacy in the different regions," and he was then referring to estimates dealing with the United States only, and was not taking into account the infinitely more problematical resources of countries still partially or wholly unexplored, from a geological standpoint.

13. My object in referring to this aspect of the question in a previous note was to show that the United States controls a home production of petroleum which, whether it is about to reach its maximum point or not, is actually and potentially vast, while in neighbouring countries it possesses a predominant interest in oil-bearing regions of exceptional promise. The United States Government will doubtless agree that this statement of the existing situation admits of no dispute.

14. While the potentialities of the future are necessarily problematical, the undisputed fact remains that at present United States soil produces 70 per cent., and American interests in adjoining territory control a further 12 per cent. of the oil production of the world. It is not easy, therefore, to justify the United States Government's insistence that American control should now be extended to resources which may be developed in mandated territories, and that too at the expense of the subjects of another State who have obtained a valid concession from the former Government of those territories.

15. His Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, glad to find themselves in general agreement with the contention of the United States Government, that the world's oil resources should be thrown open for development without reference to nationality. I observe, however, that by article 1 of the Act of the Philippine Legislature of the 31st August, 1920, participation in the working of all "public lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas" is confined to citizens or

corporations of the United States or of the Philippines, and I cannot but regard this enactment as in contradiction with the general principle enunciated by the United States Government. In this connection I observe that Mr. Colby does not attempt to refute the statements contained in my note of the 9th August last concerning the action taken by the United States Government to prevent the exploitation by British interests of such resources in Hayti and Costa Rica.

16. In your note of the 28th July the attention of His Majesty's Government was called to the existence of reports to the effect that the officials charged with the administration of Tanganyika territory have accorded privileges to British nationals that have been denied to the nationals of other countries. It is from no mere love of controversy that I recall this matter to your attention, but rather from the conviction that misunderstandings between our two countries over oil questions, and indeed our present correspondence, are largely due to the spirit engendered by reports of precisely this nature, which, on dispassionate examination, can frequently be found to lack any basis of truth. In the absence of particulars, which the United States Government were requested to furnish, I can only express my regret at being unable to prove positively that the reports quoted by you are based on misapprehension.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

V

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT between M. Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires politiques et commerciales au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, and Professor Sir John Cadman, K. C. M. G., Director in Charge of His Majesty's Petroleum Department.⁹

BY order of the two Governments of France and Great Britain, the undersigned representatives have resumed, by mutual consent, the consideration of an agreement regarding petroleum.

2. This agreement is based on the principles of cordial co-operation and reciprocity in those countries where the oil interests of the two nations can be usefully united. This memorandum relates to the following States or countries:—

Roumania, Asia Minor, territories of the old Russian Empire, Galicia, French Colonies and British Crown Colonies.

3. The agreement may be extended to other countries by mutual consent.

4. *Roumania*.—The British and French Governments shall support their respective nationals in any common negotiations to be entered into with the Government of Roumania for—

(a) The acquisition of oil concessions, shares or other interests belonging to former enemy subjects or bodies in Roumania which have been sequestrated *e.g.*, the *Steaua Romana*, *Concordia*, *Vega*, &c., which constituted in that country the oil groups of the *Deutsche Bank*, and of the *Disconto Gesellschaft*, together with any other interests that may be obtainable.

(b) Concessions over oil lands belonging to the Roumanian State.

5. All shares belonging to former enemy concessions

⁹ Reprinted from the British White Paper (Cmd. 675).

which can be secured and all other advantages derived from these negotiations shall be divided, 50 per cent. to British interests and 50 per cent. to French interests. It is understood that in the company or companies to be formed to undertake the management and the exploitation of the said shares, concessions, and other advantages, the two countries shall have the same proportion of 50 per cent. in all capital subscribed, as well as in representatives on the board, and voting power.

6. *Territories of the Late Russian Empire.*—In the territories which belonged to the late Russian Empire, the two Governments will give their joint support to their respective nationals in their joint efforts to obtain petroleum concessions and facilities to export, and to arrange delivery of petroleum supplies.

7. *Mesopotamia.*—The British Government undertake to grant to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent. of the net output of crude oil at current market rates which His Majesty's Government may secure from the Mesopotamian oilfields, in the event of their being developed by Government action; or in the event of a private petroleum company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oilfields, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent. in such company. The price to be paid for such participation to be no more than that paid by any of the other participants to the said petroleum company. It is also understood that the said petroleum company shall be under permanent British control.

8. It is agreed that, should the private petroleum company be constituted as aforesaid, the native Government or other native interests shall be allowed, if they so desire, to participate up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of the share capital of the said company. The French shall contribute one-half of the first 10 per cent. of such native participation and the additional participation shall be provided by each participant in proportion to his holdings.

9. The British Government agree to support arrangements by which the French Government may procure from the Anglo-Persian Company supplies of oil, which may be piped from Persia to the Mediterranean through any pipe-line which may have been constructed within the French mandated territory and in regard to which France has given special facilities, up to the extent of 25 per cent. of the oil so piped, on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed between the French Government and the Anglo-Persian Company.

10. In consideration of the above-mentioned arrangements, the French Government shall agree, if it is desired and as soon as application is made, to the construction of two separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments.

11. Should such pipe-line and railways cross territory within a French sphere of influence, France undertakes to give every facility for the rights of crossing without any royalty or wayleaves on the oil transported. Nevertheless, compensation shall be payable to the landowners for the surface occupied.

12. In the same way France will give facilities at the terminal port for the acquisition of the land necessary for the erection of depots, railways, refineries, loading wharfs, &c. Oil thus exported shall be exempt from export and transit dues. The material necessary for the construction of the pipe-lines, railways, refineries and other equipment shall also be free from import duties and wayleaves.

13. Should the said petroleum company desire to lay a pipe-line and a railway to the Persian Gulf, the British Government will use its good offices to secure similar facilities for that purpose.

14. *North Africa and other Colonies.*—The French Govern-

ment will give facilities to any Franco-British group or groups of good standing, which furnish the necessary guarantees and comply with French laws, for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French colonies, protectorates and zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. It should be noted that the French Parliament has resolved that groups so formed must contain at least 67 per cent. French interests.

15. The French Government will facilitate the granting of any concessions in Algeria which are now under consideration as soon as applicants have complied with all the requirements of the French laws.

16. *British Crown Colonies.*—In so far as existing regulations allow, the British Government will give to French subjects who may wish to prospect and exploit petroliferous lands in the Crown Colonies similar advantages to those which France is granting to British subjects in the French colonies.

17. Nothing in this agreement shall apply to concessions which may be the subject of negotiations initiated by French or British interests.

18. This agreement had to-day been initialled by M. Philippe Berthelot and Professor Sir John Cadman, subject to confirmation by the French and British Prime Ministers respectively.

J. CADMAN.
P. BERTHELOT.

San Remo, April 24, 1920.

Confirmed:

D. LLOYD GEORGE.
A. MILLERAND.

April 25, 1920.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-141 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
148. Certain Aspects of Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part II. April, 1920.
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152. Switzerland and the League of Nations: Documents Concerning the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations; the United States and the League of Nations: Reservations of the United States Senate of November, 1919, and March, 1920. July, 1920.
153. The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, by George A. Finch. August, 1920.
154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
155. Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland. October, 1920.
156. Presentation of the Saint-Gaudens Statue of Lincoln to the British People, July 28, 1920. November, 1920.
157. Draft Scheme of Permanent Court of International Justice. December, 1920.
158. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part I. January, 1921.
159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
160. Central European Relief, by Herbert Hoover; Relief for Europe, by Herbert Hoover; Intervention on Behalf of the Children in Countries Affected by the War, by the Swiss Delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations; The Typhus Epidemic in Central Europe, by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour; Report of the Special Commission on Typhus in Poland, to the Assembly of the League of Nations. March, 1921.
161. Disarmament in its Relation to the Naval Policy and the Naval Building Program of the United States, by Arthur H. Pollen. April, 1921.
162. Addresses on German Reparation by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George and Dr. Walter Simons, London, March 3rd and 7th, 1921. May, 1921.
163. The Fiftieth Anniversary of the French Republic. June, 1921.
164. Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 19, 1919. July, 1921.
165. Address at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, by the Hon. Elihu Root. August, 1921.
166. Convention of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Terms of the "C" Mandates, League of Nations Convention, of December 23, 1920; Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States Respecting Economic Rights in the Mandated Territories; The San Remo Oil Agreements. September, 1921.

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CONFERENCE OF PRIME MINISTERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA,
HELD IN JUNE, JULY AND AUGUST, 1921



OCTOBER 1921

No. 167

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 86.

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CONFERENCE OF PRIME MINISTERS AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,
THE DOMINIONS, AND INDIA,
HELD IN JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, 1921
SUMMARY OF THE TRANSACTIONS

I. PRELIMINARY NOTE

THE proceedings of the Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, opened at 10, Downing Street, on 20th June, 1921, and were continued until 5th August. During that period thirty-four plenary meetings took place, which were normally attended by the following:

Great Britain

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council.

The Most Hon. The Marquess Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Canada

The Right Hon. A. Meighen, Prime Minister.

The Hon. C. C. Ballantyne, Minister of Naval Service.

Australia

The Right Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister.

New Zealand

The Right Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister.

South Africa

General The Right Hon. J. C. Smuts, Prime Minister.

The Hon. Sir Thomas Smartt, Minister of Agriculture.

Colonel The Hon. H. Mentz, Minister of Defence.

India

The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India.

His Highness The Maharao of Cutch.

The Hon. Srinivasa-Sastri.

SECRETARIAT

Great Britain

Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

Sir Henry Lambert.

Sir Edward Grigg.

Colonel S. H. Wilson.

Canada

Mr. C. H. A. Armstrong.

Australia

Mr. P. E. Deane.

New Zealand

Mr. F. D. Thomson.

South Africa

Mr. G. Brebner.

India

Mr. G. S. Bajpai.

In addition, the following attended meetings for the discussion of subjects which particularly concerned their respective Departments:

The Right Hon. Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. F. G. Kellaway, Postmaster-General.

Sir Eyre A. Crowe, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Field-Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bart., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Sir C. J. B. Hurst, Legal Adviser, Foreign Office.

Sir B. P. Blackett, Controller of Finance, Treasury.

Sir G. L. Barstow, Controller of Supply Services, Treasury.

Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, Controller-General of Civil Aviation.

Captain E. F. C. Lane, Private Secretary to General Smuts.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Captain The Right Hon. F. E. Guest, Secretary of State for Air.

Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Air-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bart., Chief of the Air Staff.

Sir Phillip Lloyd-Greame, Director of Overseas Trade Department.

Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Chief Economic Adviser to His Majesty's Government.

Rear-Admiral Sir E. P. F. G. Grant, First Naval Member of Naval Board and Chief of Australian Naval Staff.

Captain B. E. Domvile, Director of Plans Division, Admiralty.

Mr. C. Hipwood, Mercantile Marine Department, Board of Trade.

Mr. L. C. Christie, Legal Adviser to Department of External Affairs, Canadian Government.

Apart from the plenary meetings, the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions met on eleven occasions, and eight meetings of Committees were held at the Colonial Office.

The greater part of the proceedings, particularly that relating to Foreign Affairs and Defence, was of a highly confidential character, comparable rather to the work of the Imperial War Cabinets of 1917 and 1918 than of the Imperial War Conferences of those years. Other parts, though not so secret in their nature, were intermingled with matter which must for the present be kept confidential. In regard to such discussions only an indication has been given here of their general tenor.

II. OPENING STATEMENTS

Mr. Lloyd George, as Chairman, opened the proceedings with a comprehensive review of the situation in which the Conference had assembled. He outlined its tasks, stated broadly the principles of policy which commended themselves to the British Government, and dwelt upon the significance of the Conference and the importance of its work. He was followed in turn by all the other Prime Ministers, by Mr. Sastri for India, and by Mr. Churchill for the Colonies and Protectorates. This preliminary discussion occupied two days. The speeches were published in full immediately afterwards, and are attached to this summary.

III. FOREIGN POLICY

The Conference then addressed itself to a detailed consideration of the Foreign Policy of the British Empire. The discussion on this was opened by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who made an exhaustive statement upon the course of foreign affairs since the Peace Conference. His statement was supplemented by Mr. Churchill, who dealt with the special problems of the Middle East.

There followed a series of important discussions, which were largely conversational in form, each representative in-

tervening in turn as occasion prompted, without formality of any kind. The objects in view were threefold: first, that the members of the Conference should all put their ideas into the common stock and thus gain a thorough understanding of each other's point of view; second, that the principal questions of foreign policy should be examined by this means from every point of view; and third, that there should be a free and full discussion of the general aims and methods to be pursued. The discussions, which covered the whole area of foreign policy, and extended over many days, proved most fruitful in all these respects. They revealed a unanimous opinion as to the main lines to be followed by British policy, and a deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs. In this context, very careful consideration was given to the means of circulating information to the Dominion Governments and keeping them in continuous touch with the conduct of foreign relations by the British Government. It was unanimously felt that the policy of the British Empire could not be adequately representative of democratic opinion throughout its peoples unless representatives of the Dominions and of India were frequently associated with those of the United Kingdom in considering and determining the course to be pursued. All members of the Conference expressed a vivid sense of the value of this year's meeting in that respect, and a desire that similar meetings should be held as frequently as possible.

A precedent created by the Imperial War Cabinet was also revived with valuable results. From 1916 till the Armistice, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representatives of India frequently sat with members of the British Cabinet to determine the measures necessary for the prosecution of the War. This method of procedure was also adopted by the British Empire Delegation during the Peace Conference in Paris, when all cardinal decisions were taken by the delegation as a whole. In accordance with this precedent, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representa-

tives of India present in London this year were invited to meetings with members of the British Cabinet called to deal with Imperial and foreign questions of immediate urgency which arose in the course of the sittings.

One of the most important of these was the Upper Silesian question, which during the session of the Conference assumed an acute form, and was debated at each stage by the members of the Conference, whose interest in a matter so closely affecting the relations of Great Britain and France was incontestable. The main lines of British policy in connection with the solution of this problem received the unanimous approval of the Conference, and it was with satisfaction that they heard, before the termination of their sitting, that, the preliminary difficulties having been resolved, the final settlement of the question of the Silesian frontier was remitted, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, to an immediate meeting of the Supreme Council at Paris.

The problems of the Western Pacific and the Far East, together with the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, were also fully discussed; and President Harding's invitation to a Conference on Disarmament was warmly welcomed by all the members of the Conference. The following statement, made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on 11th July, represents the general view of all members of the Conference on the main issues of the Pacific, as also on the question of disarmament:

"The broad lines of Imperial policy in the Pacific and the Far East were the very first subjects to which we addressed ourselves at the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, having a special regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the future of China, and the bearing of both those questions on the relations of the British Empire with the United States. We were guided in our deliberations by three main considerations. In Japan, we have an old and proved ally. The agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East. In China

there is a very numerous people, with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist and advance. In the United States we see to-day, as we have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us, not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult and co-operate. Those were the main considerations in our meetings, and upon them we were unanimous. The object of our discussions was to find a method combining all these three factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy naval expenditure in the Pacific, with all the evils which such an expenditure entails, and would ensure the development of all legitimate national interests of the Far East.

"We had, in the first place, to ascertain our exact position with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. There had been much doubt as to whether the notification to the League of Nations made last July constituted a denunciation of the Agreement in the sense of clause 6. If it did, it would have been necessary to decide upon some interim measure regarding the Agreement pending fuller discussions with the other Pacific Powers, and negotiations with this object in view were, in point of fact, already in progress. If, on the other hand, it did not, the Agreement would remain in force until denounced, whether by Japan or by ourselves, and would not be actually determined until twelve months from the date when notice of denunciation was given. The Japanese Government took the view that no notice of denunciation had yet been given. This view was shared by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but, as considerable doubt existed, we decided, after a preliminary discussion in the Imperial Cabinet, to refer the question to the Lord Chancellor, who considered it with the Law Officers of the Crown, and held that no notice of denunciation had yet been given.

"It follows that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement remains in force unless it is denounced, and will lapse only at the

expiration of twelve months from the time when notice of denunciation is given. It is, however, the desire of both the British Empire and Japan that the Agreement should be brought into complete harmony with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that wherever the Covenant and the Agreement are inconsistent, the terms of the Covenant shall prevail. Notice to this effect has now been given to the League.

"The broader discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific policy to which we then turned showed general agreement on the main lines of the course which the Imperial Cabinet desired to pursue. I have already explained that the first principle of our policy was friendly co-operation with the United States. We are all convinced that upon this, more than any single factor, depends the peace and well-being of the world. We also desire, as I have stated, to maintain our close friendship and co-operation with Japan. The greatest merit of that valuable friendship is that it harmonizes the influence and activities of the two greatest Asiatic Powers, and thus constitutes an essential safeguard to the well-being of the British Empire and peace of the East. We also aim at preserving the open door in China, and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity of peaceful progress and development.

"In addition to these considerations, we desire to safeguard our own vital interests in the Pacific, and to preclude any competition in naval armaments between the Pacific Powers. All the representatives of the Empire agreed that our standpoint on these questions should be communicated with complete frankness to the United States, Japan, and China, with the object of securing an exchange of views which might lead to more formal discussion and conference. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accordingly held conversations last week with the American and Japanese Ambassadors and the Chinese Minister, at which he communicated to them the views of the Imperial Cabinet, and asked in turn for the views of their

respective Governments. He expressed at these conversations a very strong hope that this exchange of views might, if their Governments shared our desire in that respect, pave the way for a conference on the problems of the Pacific and the Far East.

"The views of the President of the United States were made public by the American Government this morning. It is known to the House. Mr. Harding has taken the momentous step of inviting the Powers to a Conference on the limitation of armaments, to be held in Washington in the near future, and he also suggests a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions between the Powers most directly interested in the peace and welfare of that great region, which is assuming the first importance in international affairs. I need not say that we welcome with the utmost pleasure President Harding's wise and courteous initiative. In saying this I know that I speak for the Empire as a whole. The world has been looking to the United States for such a lead. I am confident that the House will esteem it as an act of far-seeing statesmanship and will whole-heartedly wish it success. I need hardly say that no effort will be lacking to make it so on the part of the British Empire, which shares to the full the liberal and progressive spirit inspiring it."

In accordance with the suggestion which was believed to have been made by the American Government, that the Conference on Disarmament should be preceded by friendly conversations or consultations between the Powers who were principally concerned in the future of the Far East and the Pacific, the Imperial Conference, anxious that for the Anglo-Japanese Agreement should be substituted some larger arrangement between the three Great Powers concerned, namely, the United States of America, Japan, and Great Britain, and holding the firm conviction that the later discussions on disarmament, to which they attached a transcendent importance, could best be made effective by a previous mutual

understanding on Pacific questions between those Powers, devoted many hours of examination to the question how such an understanding could best be arrived at, where the proposed conversations could best be held, in what manner the representatives of the British Dominions, who were so vitally affected, could most easily participate in them, and upon what broad principles of policy it was desirable to proceed. It was difficult for the Dominion Prime Ministers, owing to the exigencies of time and space, to attend at Washington late in the autumn. On the other hand, advantage might be taken of their presence in England to exchange views with representatives of the other Great Powers who had been invited to Washington later on. It was in these circumstances that the idea was mooted that the preliminary conversations or consultations, to which the American Government had in principle agreed, should be held in London.

When it transpired a little later that there was some misunderstanding as to the nature of the preliminary conversations which had been suggested, the British Government, in the earnest desire to remove any possible misconception, and to meet what they believed to be the American views at each stage of the impending discussions, volunteered to attend a meeting on the other side of the Atlantic, at which the agenda of the forthcoming Conference at Washington could be discussed, and a friendly interchange of views take place in order to facilitate the work of the main Conference later on. The British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, together with the Dominion Prime Ministers, were prepared to attend such a meeting, if invited to do so by the American Government.

The Japanese Government signified their willingness, if invited, to take part in the suggested conversations.

The American Government, however, did not favour the idea, which was accordingly dropped.

This conclusion was viewed with the utmost regret by the members of the Imperial Conference, who had devoted no small portion of time to the working out of an arrangement,

which they understood would be equally acceptable to all parties, and the abandonment of which could not, they feared, be otherwise than prejudicial to the great objects which all had in view. At no stage had it been suggested that the results of such a consultation as was contemplated should either anticipate the work or tie the hands of the Washington Conference at a later date. On the contrary, holding, as they do, the firm belief that without a Pacific understanding the Conference on Disarmament will find it less easy to attain the supreme results that are hoped for by all, the Imperial Conference made the proposal before referred to anxious to remove every possible obstacle from the path of the Washington Meeting, which they desire to see attended with complete and triumphant success.

IV. LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A discussion took place in regard to the League of Nations during which Mr. Balfour explained at length the work which had been carried out by the League and the special difficulties with which it has to contend.¹

While a more equitable distribution between its members of the cost of the League was considered essential to its future, there was general appreciation of its work and of the League's claim to the support of the British Empire as a step forward in the regulation of international affairs.

V. EGYPT

Close consideration was given to the question of British policy in Egypt, and the future status of that country, and general agreement was reached regarding the principles by which His Majesty's Government should be guided in the negotiations with the Egyptian Delegation.

VI. IMPERIAL DEFENCE

(a) *Naval*

Several plenary meetings and several meetings of the Prime Ministers alone with the Secretary of State for India,

¹Mr. Balfour's statement was published in full in the official report of the Conference.

were devoted to considering the Naval Defence of the Empire, and the following Resolution was adopted:

"That, while recognizing the necessity of co-operation among the various portions of the Empire to provide such Naval Defence as may prove to be essential for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned, and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on Disarmament."

In addition, a number of useful consultations took place between the Admiralty and the Representatives of the several Dominions and India, at which were discussed such matters as the local co-operation of each Dominion in regard to the provision of oil tanks, local naval defence, etc.

(b) Military and Air Defence

A discussion took place on the Military and Air Defence of the Empire, and the views of the General and Air Staffs on the principles which should be adhered to in order to ensure co-operation in these matters were laid before Ministers.

VII. IMPERIAL COMMUNICATIONS

The question of improved communication throughout the Empire, including Air, Telegraphy, Telephony, and Shipping, was considered, and a special Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was appointed to go into the whole question. This Committee reported to the main Conference, and eventually the following conclusions were arrived at:

(a) Air.

"The Conference, having carefully considered the report of the expert Sub-Committee on Imperial Communications, are of opinion that the proposals contained therein

should be submitted for the consideration of the Governments and Parliaments of the different parts of the Empire.

"On the understanding that the cost involved will be in the region of £1,800 per month they recommend that, pending such consideration, the existing material, so far as useful for the development of Imperial Air Communications, should be retained."

(b) *Imperial Wireless Scheme.*

"It is agreed that His Majesty's Government should take steps for the erection of the remaining stations for which they are responsible, as soon as the stations are designed; that the Governments of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and India, should take similar action so far as necessary, and that the Governments of Canada and New Zealand should also co-operate."

The above scheme was accepted by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth subject to giving full freedom of action to Australia to decide the method in which Australia will co-operate.

(c) *Shipping.*

As regards the Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on Bills of Lading, it was decided to adopt the following Resolution:

"The Conference approves the recommendations made in the Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability by Clauses in Bills of Lading, and recommends the various Governments represented at the Conference to introduce uniform legislation on the lines laid down by the Committee."

A Resolution was also adopted to the effect that, pending the constitution of a permanent Committee on Shipping, the existing Imperial Shipping Committee should continue its inquiries.

The representatives of His Majesty's Government and the Governments of New Zealand and India were ready to agree to a wider resolution recommending the constitution under Royal Charter of a permanent Committee to carry out the duties specified in the Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee dated 3rd June, viz.:

- (i.) To perform such duty as may be entrusted to them under laws in regard to Inter-Imperial Shipping, applicable to the whole or to important parts of the Empire;
- (ii.) To inquire into complaints in regard to ocean freights and conditions in Inter-Imperial trade or questions of a similar nature referred to them by any of the Governments of the Empire;
- (iii.) To exercise conciliation between the interests concerned in Inter-Imperial Shipping;
- (iv.) To promote co-ordination in regard to harbours and other facilities necessary for Inter-Imperial Shipping.

The representative of Canada, however, did not agree to this wider resolution, and the representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa reserved the matter for further consideration.

The position as regards rebates was discussed, and strong representations were made by Dominion Ministers in regard to it, but no resolution was passed, it being understood that the matter is at present under consideration by the Imperial Shipping Committee.

(d) Wireless Telephony.

The present position regarding the development of Wireless Telephony was explained, and the following Resolution was adopted:

"That the Radio Research Board be asked to investigate the subject of Wireless Telephony and to report on its development, whether Governmental or private.

"That the Postmaster-General shall supply to the Governments of the Dominions and India technical reports showing its position and possibilities."

(e) *Cable and Wireless Rates for Press Messages.*

The Special Committee on Communications received a deputation representing the Empire Press Union and the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, and subsequently Mr. Robert Donald, Chairman of the Empire Press Union, made representations to them on the subject of wireless telegraphy. The following Resolution was agreed to and thereafter adopted by the main Conference:

"The Committee agrees with the Resolution passed at the Second Imperial Press Conference, held at Ottawa in 1920, that any assistance given by the Governments of the Empire towards the reduction of rates for Press services by wireless and cable should appear specifically in the Estimates of Public Expenditure, and should be so directed as not to affect the quality of the news service supplied or the freedom of the newspapers so served.

"The Committee is in full sympathy with the object of reducing rates, both by cable and wireless, for press messages, and recommends the most favourable examination by the Governments concerned of any practicable proposals to this end."

VIII. REPARATIONS

The Conference agreed that the Reparation receipts under the Treaty of Versailles should be apportioned approximately as follows:

United Kingdom	86.85
Minor Colonies80
Canada	4.35
Australia	4.35
New Zealand	1.75
South Africa60
Newfoundland10
India	1.20
	<hr/>
	100.00

IX. POSITION OF BRITISH INDIANS IN THE EMPIRE

The question of the position of British Indians in the Empire was discussed first at a plenary meeting when the representatives of India fully explained the situation and the views held in India on the subject. The question was then remitted to a special Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. At a final meeting on the subject the following Resolution was adopted:

"The Conference, while reaffirming the Resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1918, that each community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities, recognizes that there is an incongruity between the position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire. The Conference accordingly is of the opinion that in the interests of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth, it is desirable that the rights of such Indians to citizenship should be recognized.

"The representatives of South Africa regret their inability to accept this resolution in view of the exceptional circumstances of the greater part of the Union.

"The representatives of India, while expressing their appreciation of the acceptance of the resolution recorded above, feel bound to place on record their profound concern at the position of Indians in South Africa, and their hope that by negotiation between the Governments of India and of South Africa, some way can be found, as soon as may be, to reach a more satisfactory position."

X. EMPIRE SETTLEMENT AND MIGRATION

The question of Empire Settlement and Migration was considered by a special Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the following Resolution was finally adopted by the Conference:

"The Conference having satisfied itself that the proposals embodied in the Report of the Conference on State-Aided Empire Settlement are sound in principle, and that the several Dominions are prepared, subject to Parliamentary sanction and to the necessary financial arrangements being made, to co-operate effectively with the United Kingdom in the development of schemes based on these proposals, but adapted to the particular circumstances and conditions of each Dominion, approves the aforesaid Report.

"The South African representatives wish to make it clear that the limited field for white labor in South Africa will preclude co-operation by the Union Government on the lines contemplated by the other Dominions.

"(2) The Conference expresses the hope that the Government of the United Kingdom will, at the earliest possible moment, secure the necessary powers to enable it to carry out its part in any schemes of co-operation which may subsequently be agreed on, preferably in the form of an Act which will make clear that the policy of co-operation now adopted is intended to be permanent.

"(3) The Conference recommends to the Governments of the several Dominions that they should consider how far their existing legislation on the subject of land settlement, soldier settlement and immigration, may require any modification or expansion in order to secure effective co-operation; and should work out, for discussion with the Government of the United Kingdom, such proposals as may appear to them most practicable and best suited to their interests and circumstances."

XI. EMPIRE PATENT

A memorandum prepared in the Board of Trade on the demand for an Empire Patent was considered by a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the following recommendation, which was concurred in by the main Conference, was agreed to:

"The Committee recommends that a Conference of representatives of the Patent Offices of His Majesty's Dominions shall be held in London at an early date to consider the practicability of instituting a system of granting Patents which should be valid throughout the British Empire."

XII. NATIONALITY

A memorandum prepared in the Home Office with reference to the nationality of children of British parents born abroad was considered by a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the following resolution, which was finally approved by the main Conference, was adopted:

"The Committee, having considered the memorandum prepared in the Home Office regarding the nationality of the children born abroad of British parents, commends the principle of the proposals contained therein to the favourable consideration of the Governments of the Dominions and India."

XIII. CONDOMINIUM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES

The Condominium in the New Hebrides was discussed by a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

XIV. THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

Several plenary meetings and several meetings of the Prime Ministers were devoted to a consideration of the question of the proposed Conference on the Constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire, and the following resolution was adopted:

"The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, having carefully considered the recommendation of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 that a special Imperial Conference should be summoned as soon

as possible after the War to consider the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire, have reached the following conclusions:

"(a) Continuous consultation, to which the Prime Ministers attach no less importance than the Imperial War Conference of 1917, can only be secured by a substantial improvement in the communications between the component parts of the Empire. Having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional Conference.

"(b) The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such longer intervals as may prove feasible.

"(c) The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, as well as the right of the latter to nominate Cabinet Ministers to represent them in consultation with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, are maintained."

XV. ADDRESS TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING

The Prime Minister was asked by the members of the Conference to present the following humble address to His Majesty the King:

"We, the Prime Ministers and other Representatives of the British Empire, speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, the Indian Empire and the British Colonies and Protectorates, desire, on the eve of concluding our meeting, to present our humble duty to Your Majesty and to reaffirm our loyal devotion to Your Throne. We have been conscious throughout our deliberations of a unanimous conviction that the most essential of the links that bind our widely-spread peoples is the Crown, and it is our determination that no changes

in our status as peoples or as Governments shall weaken our common allegiance to the Empire and its Sovereign.

"Knowing Your Majesty's deep interest in all that touches Your people's happiness, we trust that our labours in this time of world-wide unrest may be satisfactory to you and conduce to the welfare and safety of Your dominions as well as to the peace of the world.

"We pray that Your Majesty and the Queen may long be spared to enjoy the affection of Your subjects and to see all classes equally recovered from the strain and sacrifice of the War."

XVI. RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES

The Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representatives of India desire to put on record their deep appreciation of the large amount of time and work devoted in a time of heavy strain by the Prime Minister and his colleagues in His Majesty's Government to the Conference. They look with great satisfaction upon their meetings, which have, in their opinion, made clear the lines of common action in Imperial and foreign affairs and still more firmly established the free co-operation of the peoples of the Commonwealth.

XVII. APPRECIATION OF WORK OF SECRETARIAT

The Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the Representatives of India desire to put on record their great appreciation of the work of Sir Maurice Hankey and other members of the British Secretariat. They consider that his efficiency and that of his staff have contributed in an invaluable degree to the success of the Conference, and they hope that his assistance may be available at future sessions for many years to come. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and his colleagues also desire to express, on behalf of the British Secretariat, their warm acknowledgment of the cordial and most efficient co-operation of the Dominion and Indian Representatives on the Secretariat.

APPENDIX I

OPENING SPEECHES

20th June, 1921

OPENING SPEECH BY MR. LLOYD GEORGE

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Gentlemen, I bid you all a hearty welcome to Great Britain and to Downing Street. It was only with great unwillingness that I asked you to postpone our first meeting until to-day, and I hope it has not caused any serious inconvenience to anyone. I am deeply grateful to you for meeting my own personal difficulty by postponing the Conference for a few days.

Since we last met, there are some notable gaps in the British Empire Delegation. Our last meetings, I think, were held in Paris at the famous Peace Conference. My old friend, Sir Robert Borden, has laid down the cares of office, after long and sterling service throughout the War and throughout the making of peace, both to his own great Dominion and to the Empire. I relied a great deal upon his sane and ripe judgment. I am glad to hear his health is much restored and I am sure we can count on him still for many years of valuable service in any work which he decides to undertake. In his place we welcome his successor, Mr. Meighen, who is no stranger to our counsels, because he was with us at the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet in the summer of 1918, though this is his first appearance as Prime Minister.

By General Botha's death the whole Empire has sustained a heavy loss. He was a king of men, one of the greatest and most striking figures of our time, and I feel certain that history will endorse our high contemporary esteem of his breadth of vision and nobility of character. South Africa and the Empire are fortunate in that his mantle has fallen on his dis-

tinguished colleague, General Smuts, who has already played a great part in Imperial Councils during the War and in the making of the peace.

Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey are very old friends. I believe that we three enjoy the unenviable distinction of being the only Prime Ministers who took part in the War and who, so far, have survived the troublesome years of peace, and I am rejoiced to see both of them looking as young and fit as ever.

Let me also extend a most cordial greeting to His Highness the Maharao of Cutch and to Mr. Sastri, who have come here as representatives of the Indian Empire. We shall, I know, find them wise and cogent interpreters of the Indian point of view in the great questions which we have to discuss.

May I also express our regret that the Premier of Newfoundland has not found it possible to be present at our deliberations.

The Conference falls at a time of great stress in this country and of serious trouble in many parts of the world. It was inevitable that the nations which had put forth such colossal efforts and sustained such unparalleled losses of life, limb and treasure during the War, should feel all the consequences of overstrain and exhaustion. The systems which perplex the statesmen of all the belligerent countries at the present time are due to the condition in which the nations of the world have been left by the great War. The nerve exhaustion and heart strain which characterize such cases produce a feverish restlessness and a disinclination to steady labour which aggravate the disease and retard recovery. Never did statesmanship in all lands demand more patience and wisdom. The years that followed the Napoleonic wars produced similar or even worse experiences. In this country the distress amongst the population was very much greater after the Napoleonic wars than it is at the present moment. As a matter of fact, in spite of great unemployment and a good deal of labour unrest, there is no actual privation amongst the population, and I attribute that very largely to the self-sacrifices made by the more well-to-do of all classes in order to share their better luck with their

less fortunate fellow-countrymen. But still there is no doubt at all that the War has produced a state of things from which it will take years to recover. There are European countries where the poverty and the actual distress is appalling and we are doing our best out of our spare means to assist. But in spite of a good deal that is discouraging, I am confident the world is slowly working through its troubles; there is an increasing disposition to face and accept the facts industrially and internationally. The natural disinclination of human nature to admit unpleasant facts has, at home, provoked industrial troubles, and abroad, fierce outbursts of protest. But gradually the world is passing through its usual experience of first of all denying the existence of palpable realities and then settling down to act upon them. It is a distinctly encouraging fact in the international situation that there is an increasing impatience with those who, from whatever motive, seek to keep the world in a state of turmoil and tension. There is a widening and deepening conviction that the world must have peace, if it is ever to recover health. Some of the most troublesome and menacing problems of the peace have either been settled or are in a fair way of settlement. You must have watched with close interest the developments of the last couple of years in Europe, the series of conferences and gatherings and assemblies of all kinds where we were trying to carry out the terms of the Peace Treaty, and to settle the various difficulties that arose in consequence.

There were two questions that gave us great anxiety. One was the question of the disarmament of Germany and the other was the question of reparation. There were other important questions, but these were the two questions around which most of the controversies centred. The disarmament of Germany, I think, may be stated to be a settled problem. The German fleet has disappeared, and so has the Austrian. The German army has disappeared as a great powerful force. It numbered millions; it now numbers little more than 100,000 men. It had tens of thousands of guns, great and small; it has now got a few hundreds. It had an enormous number of

machine-guns and trench mortars; these have gone. Millions of rifles—they surrendered about 30 million rounds of big ammunition—all that has gone. It is true they have still got some rather irregular formations which we have not succeeded in completely getting rid of. It is not so much Prussia that is giving us trouble as Bavaria. That difficulty will, I think, be overcome in a very short time. So that the problem of disarmament, which was a very vital one because so long as Germany had a big army and big armaments there was no guarantee of peace, will disappear.

The other problem is the problem of reparation. No one knows better than Mr. Hughes the practical difficulties surrounding that problem. It is not a question so much of adjudicating claims; it is a question of how you are to transfer payment from one country and make it in another. As Mr. Hughes knows, that problem baffled all our financial experts and the financial experts of all countries in Paris, and it is only after two years that we hit upon an expedient which seems on the whole to have given satisfaction to all moderate and practical men in European countries. So far as we have been able to gather, that is the view of the Dominions. We shall probably hear something about it, because they have a very direct concern in it. Germany has accepted a very practical plan of liquidating her liabilities. France has accepted; Italy has accepted; and the public opinion of this country has also accepted; so that the two most troublesome problems are either settled or in a very fair way of being adjusted.

There are two remaining difficulties, one of which is the fixation of the boundaries of Poland, partly in Lithuania, and now in Silesia. I am not going to anticipate what will be said upon that subject; therefore I am only mentioning it. The second difficulty we have had has been the making of peace with the Turkish Empire. Those are the two great outstanding difficulties, but I am very hopeful in regard to both of them. Once those two are settled, then I think we may say that peace has been made; but until then we cannot say, in

spite of the fact that we have signed Treaties of Peace, that peace has been made and established in the world.

The first essential of peace—a stable peace—and reconstruction is that we should stand by our Treaties. There are those who grow weary of these great responsibilities, and who speak as though it were possible to renounce them in this quarter or in that without injustice to other peoples or detriment to ourselves. I venture to say that such arguments are as short-sighted as they are false. The nations and peoples of the world have realized their interdependence in a measure far greater than ever before the War, and the League of Nations—whatever may be thought of the provisions of the Covenant—stands as witness to their realization of that truth. No progress can be made towards the rehabilitation of Europe, or the establishment of permanent peace in the world, except upon the basis of acceptance of Treaties and an enforcement of Treaties. There may be relaxations here and there, following the discovery of new conditions, with the consent of all parties. We have had some relaxations of that kind—and I think they are wise modifications of the Treaty—in the matter of allowing more time for payment, and more time for disarmament; and in the prosecution of war criminals we made a concession to German national susceptibilities. There have been questions of that kind where, by the consent of all the Powers, there have been modifications. But the Treaties must stand where such consent is not forthcoming, and no signatory should have the right to override any part of a Treaty to which we are all parties. The British Empire from end to end is bound by honour and by interest alike to the Treaties which it has signed. We have appended our signatures—all of us—and we must honour those signatures. Unless Treaty faith is maintained, an era of disorganization, increasing misery and smouldering war will continue, and civilization may very easily be destroyed by a prolongation of that state of things.

I propose to call on Lord Curzon, on his return, to give the Conference a comprehensive survey of foreign affairs, and I

will not anticipate his detailed statement now. But I should like to refer very briefly to one of the most urgent and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan. There is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competition of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East. Our Alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor in that direction in the past. We have found Japan a faithful ally, who rendered us valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. The British Empire will not easily forget that Japanese men-of-war escorted the transports which brought the Australian and New Zealand forces to Europe at a time when German cruisers were still at large in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. We desire to preserve that well-trying friendship which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the open door. Not least amongst these questions is the future of China, which looks to us, as to the United States, for sympathetic treatment and fair play. No greater calamity could overtake the world than any further accentuation of the world's divisions upon the lines of race. The British Empire has done signal service to humanity in bridging those divisions in the past; the loyalty of the King Emperor's Asiatic peoples is the proof. To depart from that policy, to fail in that duty, would not only greatly increase the dangers of international war; it would divide the British Empire against itself. Our foreign policy can never range itself in any sense upon the differences of race and civilization between East and West. It would be fatal to the Empire.

We look confidently to the Government and people of the United States for their sympathy and understanding in this respect. Friendly co-operation with the United States is for us a cardinal principle, dictated by what seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated by instinct quite as much as by reason and common sense. We desire to work with the great

Republic in all parts of the world. Like it, we want stability and peace, on the basis of liberty and justice. Like it, we desire to avoid the growth of armaments, whether in the Pacific or elsewhere, and we rejoice that American opinion should be showing so much earnestness in that direction at the present time. We are ready to discuss with American statesmen any proposal for the limitation of armaments which they may wish to set out, and we can undertake that no such overtures will find a lack of willingness on our part to meet them. In the meantime, we cannot forget that the very life of the United Kingdom, as also of Australia and New Zealand, indeed, the whole Empire, has been built upon sea power—and that sea power is necessarily the basis of the whole Empire's existence. We have, therefore, to look to the measures which our security requires; we aim at nothing more; we cannot possibly be content with less.

I do not propose to deal in any detail with the agenda for this Conference to-day. We have no cut-and-dried agenda to present. We will discuss that amongst ourselves. The British Government has been under some suspicion in some quarters of harbouring designs against this gathering as a Conference. We are said to be dissatisfied with the present state of the Empire, and to wish to alter its organization in some revolutionary way. Gentlemen, we are not at all dissatisfied. The British Empire is progressing very satisfactorily from a constitutional standpoint, as well as in other ways. The direct communication between Prime Ministers, established during the War, has, I think, worked well, and we have endeavoured to keep you thoroughly abreast of all important developments in foreign affairs by special messages sent out weekly, or even more frequently when circumstances required. Indeed, at every important Conference either here or on the Continent, one of the first duties I felt I ought to discharge was to send as full and as complete and as accurate an account as I possibly could, not merely of the decisions taken, but of the atmosphere, which counts for so very much. I have invariably, to the best of my ability, sent accounts, some of them of the

most confidential character, which would give to the Dominions even the impressions which we formed, and which gave you information beyond what we could possibly communicate to the press.

Another change, which has taken place since the War, is the decision of the Canadian Government to have a Minister of its own at Washington—a very important development. We have co-operated willingly with that, and we shall welcome a Canadian colleague at Washington as soon as the appointment is made. We shall be glad to have any suggestions that occur to you as to the methods by which the business of the Dominions in London, so far as it passes through our hands, may be transacted with greater dignity and efficiency, though you will all, I think, agree that the Empire owes much to Lord Milner and Lord Long for their services in the Colonial Office during a period of great difficulty and stress.

We shall also welcome any suggestions which you may have to make for associating yourselves more closely with the conduct of foreign relations. Any suggestions which you can make upon that subject we shall be very delighted to hear and discuss. There was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; to-day the Empire is in charge of Downing Street.

On all matters of common concern we want to know your standpoint, and we want to tell you ours.

I will give you my general conception of the mutual relationship in which we meet. The British Dominions and the Indian Empire, one and all, played a great part in the war for freedom, and probably a greater part than any nation, except the very greatest Powers. When the history of that struggle comes to be written, your exertions side by side with ours will constitute a testimony to British institutions such as no other Empire in history can approach or emulate. In recognition of their services and achievements in the War the British Dominions have now been accepted fully into the comity of nations by the whole world. They are signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and to all the other Treaties of Peace; they are members of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and their

representatives have already attended meetings of the League; in other words, they have achieved full national status, and they now stand beside the United Kingdom as equal partners in the dignities and the responsibilities of the British Commonwealth. If there are any means by which that status can be rendered even clearer to their own communities and to the world at large we shall be glad to have them put forward at this Conference.

India's achievements were also very great. Her soldiers lie with ours in all the theatres of war, and no Britisher can ever forget the gallantry and promptitude with which she sprang forward to the King Emperor's service when war was declared. That is no small tribute both to India and to the Empire of which India is a part. The causes of the War were unknown to India; its theatre in Europe was remote. Yet India stood by her allegiance heart and soul, from the first call to arms, and some of her soldiers are still serving far from their homes and families in the common cause. India's loyalty in that great crisis is eloquent to me of the Empire's success in bridging the civilizations of East and West, in reconciling wide differences of history, of tradition and of race, and in bringing the spirit and the genius of a great Asiatic people into willing co-operation with our own. Important changes have been effected in India this year, and India is making rapid strides towards the control of her own affairs. She has also proved her right to a new status in our councils; that status she gained during the War, and she has maintained it during the peace, and I welcome the representatives of India to our great Council of the Empire to-day. We shall, I feel sure, gain much by the fact that her sentiments and her interests will be interpreted to us here by her own representatives.

I have given you my view of our relationship. May I just remind the Conference of what our unity has meant. The War demonstrated—I might say, revealed—to the world, including ourselves, that the British Empire was not an abstraction but a living force to be reckoned with. Who would have believed before the War that the Empire outside Great Britain would,

in an hour of emergency, have raised two millions and more soldiers and sent them to the battlefield to serve the common cause, side by side with the United Kingdom? Even the ardent soul of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in his most glowing moments, never predicted so impressive a rally to the Flag. The opportune revelation of the reality of the British Empire has, in my judgment, altered the history of the world. Those of us who know—and many if not most of us sitting at this table were here during the most critical hours of the War and sat at this same table—those of us who know how narrow the margin was between victory and defeat, can proclaim without hesitation that without these two million men, that came from outside the United Kingdom, Prussianism would probably have triumphed in the West and the East before American troops arrived on the stage, and Lord Curzon, who is at this moment discussing with M. Briand, the Prime Minister of France, the execution of a victorious Treaty, would have been discussing how best to carry out the humiliating conditions dictated by the triumphant war lords of Germany.

The reign of unbridled force would have been supreme, and this generation would have had to spend its days in interpreting and enduring that calamitous fact in all spheres of human activity and influence. The unregulated unity of the British Empire saved France, Britain and civilization from that catastrophe.

Our present troubles are bad enough. Victory has its cares as well as defeat. But they are ephemeral and will soon be surmounted. Defeat would have reversed the engine of progress, and democracy would have been driven back centuries on its tracks. If I may venture to quote what I said at the Imperial Conference of 1907 when Sir Thomas Smartt and I first met—I think we two and the present Colonial Secretary are the only survivors—I ventured to say, in reference to the Empire:

“We agree with our Colonial comrades of the Dominions that all this unity is worth concerted effort, even if that effort at the outset costs us something. The federation

of free commonwealths is worth making some sacrifice for. One never knows when its strength will be essential to the great cause of human freedom, and that is priceless."

I venture to say that that prediction has been gloriously proved by great events.

The British Empire is a saving fact in a very distracted world. It is the most hopeful experiment in human organization which the world has yet seen. It is not so much that it combines men of many races, tongues, traditions and creeds in one system of government. Other Empires have done that, but the British Empire differs from all in one essential respect. It is based not on force but on goodwill and a common understanding. Liberty is its binding principle. Where that principle has not hitherto been applied it is gradually being introduced into the structure.

It is that willing and free association of many nations and peoples which this Conference represents. Think of what we stand for in this room to-day. First of all the long political development of the British Isles, with all its splendours and its pains, the crucible from which the framework of the whole great structure has emerged. Canada, British and French; South Africa, British and Dutch—both now great Dominions whose unity is due to the free and willing combination of two proud races in a single nationhood. Australia and New Zealand, British civilizations both, but planted and developed with a genius of their own by the sheer enterprise and grit of their peoples in the furthest antipodes. India a mighty civilization, whose rulers were known and respected throughout the western world before the first English post was planted on Indian soil. Side by side with these the wonderful varied colonies and protectorates in their different stages of development, which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is here to represent. In all the marvellous achievement of our peoples which this gathering reflects I am most deeply impressed by the blending of East and West—India with her far descended culture and her intensely varied types, so different from ours, present in this room to concert a common policy with us in

the world's affairs, and to harmonize, as we hope, still more completely her civilization and ours. It is our duty here to present the ideals of this great association of peoples in willing loyalty to one Sovereign, to take counsel together for the progress and welfare of all, and to keep our strength both moral and material, a united power for justice, liberty and peace.

OPENING SPEECH BY MR. MEIGHEN

MR. MEIGHEN: I think we might utilize a little more time to-day in hearing statements from some of us of a general character and then proceed to lay down the agenda. As far as I am concerned, I do not think that anything I might say in advance of our discussion of concrete subjects would be of sufficient importance to warrant a day or even half-a-day's adjournment for preparation. I have listened to the illuminating introduction of the Prime Minister, and I cannot bring myself to think that such a pregnant and impressive address will not receive full publication.

It is unfortunate that the obligation of speaking first should fall upon me, the least experienced representative of the Dominions, but it is well that the traditional order of precedence be followed.

The Prime Minister referred to conditions in the British Isles, which, of course, we all from the various Dominions watch with great interest. The words of encouragement which he gave were very welcome to my ears. In Canada we do not suffer in the same degree from unemployment, but none the less we have much more than the normal. The extent and proportion of our agricultural population is such that we have in our belief less unrest than in most countries, and we feel also that our comprehensive and reasonably generous policy towards returned men, particularly to those entering upon agriculture, has reduced the evil in that respect.

The information that the Prime Minister has given as to the progress of peace negotiations, or rather the re-establishment of actual peace upon the basis of the peace treaties, is indeed

encouraging. I feared myself that he would not be able to make quite so gratifying a report.

As to the observations he made on the principles to be kept in mind in our deliberations on the Japanese Treaty and its renewal, we cannot over-estimate their importance. Possibly in the outlying Dominions we are not disposed to give the same attention to one feature which he draws attention to, the paramount necessity of seeing to it that no step is taken that leaves out of mind the importance of mitigating racial divisions. What I have to say as to this subject will, of course, be more appropriate later. All I can do now is to assure you that I, representing Canada, approach this question with a full sense of responsibility, and in seeking to interpret what I believe is the prevailing opinion of my country on the subject, I do so with a firm resolve to reach, if it can be reached, common ground with all representatives here.

The Prime Minister referred to suspicions that had been generated of designs on the autonomy of the Dominions, conspiracies to bring about revolutionary changes in our Constitutional relations. I may say that I do not think any responsible representative of any Dominion, I am quite certain of Canada, requires to have his mind cleansed of evil thought in that respect.

It is due to the Conference, and particularly the Prime Minister, that I should gratefully acknowledge here his striking and memorable words in referring to the services rendered by the British Dominions and India during the late War. No finer expression of the feelings of the people of the British Isles has been uttered, and I feel that his valued tribute will be long remembered throughout the length and breadth of the Empire.

There can be no doubt as to the value of Conferences such as this. The whole progress of the world, particularly since the War, has emphasized the value of conferences. Indeed, it is the method that has been incorporated as the very basis of the new order which the world is seeking to establish whether under the name of the League of Nations, or under

some other name or under no name at all. For ourselves, of course, for this Britannic Commonwealth of nations, this method or principle has a peculiar significance. We are united by the history of our being, by a mutual trust, and by a fundamental intention to preserve a common allegiance. We therefore confer under conditions particularly favourable to free and open communication one with another, and in an atmosphere of complete mutual confidence.

There are two conditions of success that I think of importance, though perhaps they are only partly under our control. If our conclusions are to be sound, and being sound, to be acted upon, they must be accorded not only general support, but intelligent support throughout the countries we represent. It is therefore essential that we fully inform the public of our proceedings. There may, in respect of some questions, be limitations; we shall indeed at times be bound to respect what may be called the right of privacy of Governments and peoples other than our own. The problem is not a simple one, but I venture to suggest that it is better in the long run to err on the side of publicity than on the side of secrecy. The other condition is that such conferences as these should be as frequent and as regular as the growing necessities of inter-Dominion and inter-Empire relations demand. Time, I know, is important. It is difficult for Canadian Ministers to be absent, and that difficulty is accentuated in the case of Ministers of other Dominions. The expeditious despatch of business while here will assist all round.

I shall reserve any further remarks until we reach the discussion of the definite subjects that are to be brought before us.

21st June, 1921

OPENING SPEECH BY MR. HUGHES

MR. HUGHES: I desire to congratulate you on the admirable review of the position that you presented to us yesterday. I am sure it was most valuable as well as most interesting. We were all very glad to learn from you, Sir, that though the

adjustment of those matters which arose out of the War is not yet complete, all our obligations, and our ex-enemies' obligations under the Treaty, were in a fair way of being fulfilled. We recognize that there are difficulties, and that it is not easy to satisfy those who preach a counsel of perfection, but I think we ought to congratulate you and the Government on having, during these last two years, weathered a great storm full of menacing possibilities, and though it would savour of too much optimism to say that we had yet reached the haven, still, on the whole, we have much to be thankful for. I very sincerely congratulate you as the head of the Government of the United Kingdom.

You have asked us to consider and review the situation as it presents itself to us, and I think we may do this with advantage before we pass on to the discussion of the various questions, or, indeed, decide the order in which we are to discuss them. The circumstances of this Conference are in themselves sufficiently remarkable. This is the first time we have met since the dark shadow of the great War has been lifted, and we are showing to the world and to the various parts of the Empire that those counsels which we took together during the War were not ephemeral expedients, but that we are resolved to continue along that path in company, being guided by each other's counsel and believing firmly that in co-operation and in unity lies the safety of all, and, in no small degree, the peace and welfare of the world.

Well, Sir, we are here—some of us have come very great distances, and all have come at great personal inconvenience. Some of us, like Mr. Massey and myself, have come 12,000 miles. We have each given our views to our representative Parliaments as to what this Conference intends, or hopes, to do. Much is expected from us, and I do venture earnestly to hope that this Conference will do something which will convince the people that we have found a practical and sure way of bridging that apparently impossible chasm which divides complete autonomy of the several parts of the Empire from united action upon matters affecting us all.

That we must do something is essential if this Conference is not to be a last magnificent flare of a dying illumination. I am sure, Sir, you will realize how difficult it is for us to leave a Parliament for five or six months. I shall not, I hope, be suspected of trespassing upon the sacred domain of domestic politics if I ask you just to conjure up in that vivid Celtic mind of yours—as I do in mine—the possibility of your being away for six months.

Now, amongst the great problems that are to be considered three stand out. You referred to all of them yesterday. They are:—Foreign Policy in general, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in particular, and Naval Defence. There are other problems, of course, which are intimately associated with these. If we are to give effect to the principle, which I take it has already been accepted, viz., the right of the Dominions to sit at the Council table on a footing of equality, and to discuss with you and the other representatives the question of the Foreign Policy of the Empire—these also must be not only considered, but settled. I do not think I am misinterpreting the opinions of all my friends here when I say that this voice, this share, in the Council of the Empire in regard to foreign policy must be a real one, must be one of substance and not merely a shadow. This involves the creation of some kind of machinery, and here we come to a very difficult position, to which I shall refer very shortly later.

We are now asked to deal with foreign policy, and in order that we may do this, you have said that Lord Curzon would review the present position of foreign affairs. We shall await that statement with great interest. The whole Empire is concerned in foreign policy, though this was for many years regarded as the sole prerogative of Great Britain. Wars are hatched by foreign policy. No one is able to say that any act affecting foreign nations will not, in the fullness of time, lead to war. No one is able to say that the most apparently trivial and innocent action will not involve us in international turmoil, and in the fullness of time bring us to the bloody plains of war. So, when we see on every side the British line—

or, if you like, the line of this Commonwealth of British nations—being lengthened and the line of defence necessarily thinned, the points of potential danger multiplied—we are naturally uneasy. We have seen that a cloud no bigger than a man's hand can cover the whole heavens. And so, Sir—I speak only for myself, of course—I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I have singled these things out it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy, but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious.

Now, if we are to have an effective voice in the foreign policy of this country, we must first of all know precisely how we stand, and the reasons for the policy adopted and the extent to which we are committed to it. I start with the assumption that our right to decide foreign policy is not denied. Very well, let us consider the thing under two heads—first, in regard to matters of foreign policy as they now present themselves before the British Government, and, second, in regard to policy in the future. We can express our opinions, and if needs be modify the present foreign policy by a full discussion and expression of opinion. Decisions can be registered and given effect to. But the position in regard to policy in the future is very difficult. Everyday a new situation arises or may arise. How is it to be dealt with? We shall be scattered to the four quarters of the earth. How are the Dominions to have an effective voice on foreign policy when, as things stand, they can only be told after things have been done and are not consulted beforehand? That is a question which we shall have to consider. I stated, Sir, at the outset that other matters than those three of which I spoke—Foreign Policy in general, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and Naval Defence—will arise intimately related to these, and that we shall have to discuss them.

I come to one now. You yourself said yesterday, Sir, that direct communication between the Prime Minister of Great

Britain and his colleagues overseas had worked well. So it has; that is to say, the principle has worked well; but I think I ought to tell you, Sir, that it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance. This arises through the great delay in the transmission of messages.

I am not going into details now—I have set this matter down on the agenda—but I want to say that it is absolutely essential, if we are going to have any effective voice in foreign policy, that we shall be in the closest possible touch with you and with each other, and that we shall know, not when the thing is done, but before the thing is done, what is intended, or what is desired to be done. This is essential because in foreign policy, as, indeed, in many cases in domestic policy, you cannot delay. Action is imperative. A thing that is possible to-day is impossible to-morrow, and action must be taken. So, if we are going to have a real voice in foreign policy, then we must have improved communication—means whereby you will be able to communicate quickly with your colleagues overseas, and they with you and with each other. That is absolutely essential. When we come to that item on the agenda paper, I shall show you, in one or two ways, how some improvement may be made. But I confess that all I can suggest falls very far short of that ideal condition of things which one would desire.

Now I leave foreign policy in general, and come to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Here we are dealing with a matter definite and urgent. It is not a thing to be settled in the future, but now. The British Government has only postponed settlement in order that the matter might be dealt with round this table. It is an urgent matter. It must be settled without delay. The attitude of Australia towards it has been quite clearly stated. We have not a clean slate before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we should have a Treaty with Japan, the position might be very different. We have not. For many years a Treaty has existed between

Japan and Britain. Its terms have been modified, but in substance the existing Treaty has been in force for a long time. No doubt it cannot be renewed precisely in its present form. It must conform to the requirements of the League of Nations. But the case for renewal is very strong, if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia, as you will quite understand, this Treaty with Japan has special significance.

Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But there are certain difficulties which must be faced. One of these arises out of the attitude of America towards this Treaty. I am sure I state the opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm corner in their hearts for America. They see in America to-day what they themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a *sine quâ non* that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of America. It ought to do this specifically, but if not specifically then by implication so clear and unmistakable that he who runs may read. It is perfectly true that the present Treaty does this by implication, but not so plainly as to preclude misinterpretation. In any future Treaty we must guard against even the suspicion of hostility or unfriendliness to the United States. I hope you are not forgetting, Sir, that there are many who seek to misinterpret the intentions of this country, and to confound them we must put in plain words what are our intentions. That being so, and subject to that condition—which is not a new condition at all, because Japan has accepted the position for many years—Australia is very strongly in favour of the renewal of the Treaty. As I have said, the Treaty clearly must conform to the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, and it must have regard to the circumstances of the world to-day, but I think it ought to be renewed; I am strongly in favour of its being renewed. I think from every point of view that it would be well that the Treaty with Japan should be renewed. Should we not be in a better position to exercise greater influence over the Eastern

policy as an Ally of that great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy? Now, if Japan is excluded from the family of great Western nations—and, mark, to turn our backs on the Treaty is certainly to exclude Japan—she will be isolated, her high national pride wounded in its most tender spot. To renew this Treaty is to impose on her some of those restraints inseparable from Treaties with other civilized nations like ourselves. We will do well for the world's peace—we will do well for China—we will do well for the Commonwealth of British nations to renew this Treaty. We want peace.

The world wants peace. Which policy is most likely to promote, to ensure, the world's peace? As I see it, the renewal of the Treaty with the Japanese Empire. Now let us consider America's objections to the renewal of the Treaty. Some of these relate to the emigration of Japanese to America; but the hostility to Japan, more or less marked, that exists in America to-day, cannot be wholly accounted for by this fact. As it is vital in the interest of civilization that a good understanding should exist between America and ourselves, we should endeavour to do everything in our power to ascertain exactly what it is to which America takes exception in this Treaty. We ought not to give her room for criticism which the world could support. We must make it perfectly clear that the Treaty is not aimed against her, and that it could never be used against her. War with America is unthinkable. As the contingency is quite an impossible one, it need not be seriously considered. Yet it is well that the attitude of Australia should be made quite clear.

Whether it would be wiser to invite a Conference with America and Japan, to ascertain what would be mutually acceptable, is a suggestion which I throw out. If one were quite sure that America desired, or was prepared to accept, what would form a reasonable basis of an Alliance with Japan, then I certainly would strongly press the suggestion. But in any case we ought to try and ascertain precisely what America's views are on this most important matter.

Now I turn from the consideration of the Anglo-Japanese

Treaty, Sir, to a question of supreme importance which you raised yesterday, and it is one which is related both to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and to Naval Defence—I mean the question of disarmament. You said, Sir, and I am sure the world will be very glad to read those words of yours, that you would welcome any suggestion and discuss with any Power any propositions for disarmament or limitations of armaments. Your words come most opportunely. I think this is the psychological moment. We ought not to underestimate the value of this Conference—it is no use denying the fact that in America they do distinguish between England and the Dominions in a very marked way—and a suggestion coming from you backed by the Dominion Prime Ministers might gain a hearing where the voice of England alone failed. After all, the distinction which Americans draw between us is easy to understand. History partly explains it. They see, too, in us replicas of themselves. They see us struggling and fighting towards the goal that they have already attained. And I think they are right in supposing that, subject to that determination which we have to achieve our destiny in company with each other and with Britain, we resemble so many Americas. We are free democracies. We want peace. We at least are free from the suspicion of Imperialistic ambitions. The world, tired of war, is yet neurotic, its nervous system so disturbed by war that, while it cries aloud for peace, force is the first thing to which it turns to redress its grievances. You cannot expect, you cannot hope for any more favourable moment than the present. If you fail to secure agreement for the limitation of armaments now, how can you expect to do so in the years to come? The appalling race for naval supremacy has already begun, although the fires of the Great War are not yet cold. It creates interest in the various countries where this suicidal race is run. This vicious rivalry grows by what it feeds on. Every year it becomes more difficult to stop. Speak therefore now on behalf of this gathering of Prime Ministers. Let us give the world, weary of war and staggering beneath its crushing burdens, a lead. Invite the United

States of America, Japan and France to meet us. We cannot hope that the world will beat its sword into a ploughshare, but at any rate it can stop building more ships. Let us stop naval construction and naval expenditure other than that necessary for the maintenance of existing units without prejudice to what may be agreed upon hereafter. In this matter, the first step is everything. If the world resolves to stop making any further preparations for war, everything is possible; until that step is taken, we are only beating the air.

Such an invitation issued with such authority behind it would, I think, find great support in America, and I hope and believe in Japan too. In ten years' time, in five years' time, the position will be that both these countries will be poorer. They cannot continue such a competition indefinitely. If they persist, we and all the great nations of the world must follow their example. What hope does such a prospect hold out to the war-weary world? To stop naval construction pending a permanent settlement of the basis for naval power will not prejudice their interests. The relative strength of each will not be affected by stopping now. I do most strongly urge you to set an example, speaking as you will be able to do on behalf, not merely of England, but on behalf of all those free nations whose representatives are gathered here. Let us show to the world that these young nations gathered round this table have resolved to make their entrance into world politics by setting an example which the world has long wanted. I am not without hopes that such an invitation on your part, and such an example on ours, would be provocative of great good and prove to be the turning point in the world's history.

I come now to the last point with which I intend to deal at length, and that is Naval Defence. Whatever may be agreed upon, one thing is clear, that we must have such naval defence as is adequate for our safety. Naturally the amount of force necessary to ensure our safety in a world which has agreed to suspend naval construction, a world in which the three great Naval Powers have, for example, come to such an understanding as would have the force and effect of an alliance,

would be much less than in a world which resounds with the clang of hammer beating into shape bigger and still bigger navies. That applies, too, to the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but in any case we must have such naval defence as is necessary for our security. The War and the Panama Canal has shifted the world's stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world.

With an agreement between three Great Naval Powers—or, at worst, between two—then the force necessary to defend this Empire by sea—and that it rests on sea power is certain, and I am never tired of repeating this most significant fact to those who are apt to forget how the British Empire came into being and has been maintained—would be much less. But whatever it is we must have it.

And now one word about the part of the Dominions in Empire defence. You, Sir, said some time ago that Britain had paid so dearly for victory and was groaning under such a crushing burden of debt that it could no longer alone be responsible for the defence of the Empire by sea as it had heretofore, and that the other parts of the Empire must do their share. To that doctrine I subscribe without reservation. I think it is the corollary of our admission into the councils of the Empire to determine the foreign policy. The foreign policy determined or approved by us at this Conference may lead to war. In any case the foreign policy of a nation must be limited by its power to enforce it, whether that power be wholly resident in itself, or come from an alliance, or from the League of Nations. The ambitions of men and nations are curbed by their material power. In our case, sea power is, and must always be, the determining factor of our foreign policy. Now we cannot fairly ask for the right to decide the foreign policy of the Empire, and say that we will have no part whatever in naval defence, we will not pay our share. If

you ask me what is our share, I say frankly that I am not prepared at this moment to indicate it. We can do that when we come to deal with the matter in detail, but one principle seems to emerge and it is this. I do not think that our share *per capita* should be as great as Britain's share *per capita*, because Britain has Crown Colonies, and dependencies, and India to defend. But whatever is our fair share should be borne upon a *per capita* basis by all the Dominions. That, I think, is the only fair and proper basis. If the converse be conceded for a moment, and some pay more *per capita* than others, then I do not understand the basis of union amongst us. Dangers to the Empire or to any part of it are to be met surely by unity of action. That is at once the principle upon which the Empire rests, and upon which its security depends. The Dominions could not exist if it were not for the British Navy. We must not forget this. We are a united Empire or we are nothing. Now who is to say from what quarter dangers will come to any of us? It comes now from the East and tomorrow from the West. But from whatever quarter it comes we meet it as a united Empire, the whole of our strength is thrown against the danger which threatens us. If some Dominions say "we are not in any danger, you are, you pay; we will not, or cannot, contribute towards naval defence," an impossible position is created. I cannot subscribe to such a doctrine. It is incompatible with the circumstances of our relationship to Britain and to each other, it menaces our safety and our very existence, it is a negation of our unity.

I need hardly say that I do not believe that the Dominion quota for naval defence should be expressed in terms of a money contribution, but in terms of Dominion Navies. This is a point upon which the Admiralty has expressed itself very strongly, and the suggestion of monetary contribution is not to be seriously considered. In any case, we shall be able to discuss the matter when naval defence is being dealt with.

I have nothing further to say on those matters to which you referred yesterday, but reference to one other point may be permitted. It is well that we should know each other's

views. We ought not to discuss things in the dark. It has been suggested that a Constitutional Conference should be held next year. It may be that I am very dense, but I am totally at a loss to understand what it is that this Constitutional Conference proposes to do. Is it that the Dominions are seeking new powers, or are desirous of using powers they already have, or is the Conference to draw up a declaration of rights, to set down in black and white the relations between Britain and the Dominions? What is this Conference to do? What is the reason for calling it together? I know, of course, the Resolution of the 1917 Conference. But much water has run under the bridge since then. Surely this Conference is not intended to limit the rights we now have. Yet what new right, what extension of power can it give us? What is there that we cannot do now? What could the Dominions do as independent nations that they cannot do now? What limitation is now imposed upon them? What can they not do, even to encompass their own destruction by sundering the bonds that bind them to the Empire? What yet do they lack? Canada has asserted her right to make treaties. She has made treaties. She is asserting her right to appoint an Ambassador at Washington. Are these the marks of Slave States, or quasi-sovereignty? In what essential thing does any one of the great Self-Governing Dominions differ from independent nations? It is true there is a sentiment, a figment, a few ancient forms: there is what Sir F. Pollock calls the figment of the right of the British Parliament to make laws affecting the Dominions. Supposing the British Parliament should make a law to-morrow which would take from me the very position in which I stand, namely, a representative of a Parliament that exists and was brought into being by a British Statute. I suppose that would apply to you, General Smuts, and to you, Mr. Meighen. They could pass that law, and although we might be here as individuals, so far as legal or constitutional status is concerned we should have ceased to exist. But, as Sir F. Pollock says, this power of the British Parliament is a figment, a shadow. Either it must limit our

rights of self-government, or it must weaken the bonds of Empire, or it must simply content itself with asserting rights and privileges and responsibilities that are ours already and that none question. In effect, we have all the rights of self-government enjoyed by independent nations. That being the position, what is the Constitutional Conference going to do? The proposal to hold a Constitutional Conference is causing considerable anxiety, at any rate in Australia. So far from anticipating that it is to give us greater power, some fear it will take away some of the powers that we have, and my difficulty is, and has been, to try and allay those doubts, which are very strongly held. I think every one of us is confronted with the same position. I think even this Conference is surrounded with clouds of suspicion. Our right to a name is in question. If we call ourselves a Conference it is wrong: if we call ourselves a Cabinet it is wrong—a Council is still worse. I am sure between General Smuts and myself there is, in fact, very little difference, if any. But, nevertheless, I say that we are treading on very dangerous ground, and I say this to him. We have achieved this wonderful progress—and it is wonderful progress—along certain lines. Is he not satisfied with the progress we have made? The difference between the status of the Dominions now and twenty-five years ago is very great. We were Colonies, we became Dominions. We have been accorded the status of nations. Our progress in material greatness has kept pace with our constitutional development. Let us leave well alone. That is my advice. We have now on the agenda paper matters which mark a new era in Empire government. We, the representatives of the Dominions, are met together to formulate a foreign policy for the Empire. What greater advance is conceivable? What remains to us? We are like so many Alexanders. What other worlds have we to conquer? I do not speak of Utopias nor of shadows, but of solid earth. I know of no power that the Prime Minister of Britain has, that General Smuts has not. Our presence here round this table, the agenda paper before us, the basis of equality on which we meet, these things speak

in trumpet tones that this Conference of free democratic nations is, as Mr. Lloyd George said yesterday, a living force.

OPENING SPEECH BY GENERAL SMUTS

GENERAL SMUTS: I should like to associate myself with what has been said by the Prime Minister of Australia in regard to the speech which you made yesterday, and, in particular, speaking on behalf of South Africa, I should like to thank you very, very much for the reference you made to General Botha. General Botha was not only a great South African, but a great man, and his name will remain as one of the greatest men in the history of the British Empire, and I think the references made to him yesterday were fully justified. You opened yesterday, Prime Minister, in a speech, if I may say so, of such power and brilliance, that it is very difficult for us, in fact, impossible for me, to follow on, but we agreed yesterday that the Prime Ministers should each make a general preliminary statement, and so I proceed to make a few remarks upon the topics on which we are called upon to deal here.

I think a discussion like this may be useful, because it will disclose in a preliminary and general way the attitude taken up by the Dominions on the topics which we have come here to discuss. I shall not attempt to break fresh ground in the few remarks I am going to make. I am going to adhere more or less to the tenor of what I said in the South African Parliament when the subject matters of this Conference were under debate. What I said was generally approved in Parliament and by the public in South Africa, and I shall therefore adhere to what I said there. I said on that occasion that what the world most needs to-day is peace, a return to a peaceful temper and to the resumption of peaceful and normal industry. To my mind that is the test of all true policy to-day. Peace is wanted by the world. Peace is wanted especially by the peoples of the British Empire. We are a peaceful Empire, our very nature is such that peace is necessary for us. We have no military aims to serve, we have no militaristic ideals,

and it is only in a peaceful world that our ideals can be realized. It should, therefore, be the main, in fact, the only object of British policy to secure real peace for the Empire and the world generally. Now the Prime Minister stated in his speech what progress has been made towards the attainment of this ideal. He pointed out that some of the matters which gave us the greatest trouble in Paris had been settled. The question of reparations, which was, perhaps, the most difficult and intricate with which we had to deal in Paris, has finally, after some years of debate and trouble, been eliminated, in a settlement which, I venture to hope, will prove final and workable. That is a very great advance. The other great advance that has been made—and it is an enormous advance—is the final disarmament of Germany. That the greatest military Empire that has ever existed in history should be reduced to a peace establishment of 100,000 men is something which I considered practically impossible. It is a great achievement, so far-reaching, indeed, that it ought to become the basis of a new departure in world policy. We cannot stop with Germany, we cannot stop with the disarmament of Germany. It is impossible for us to continue to envisage the future of the world from the point of view of war. I believe it is impossible for us to contemplate the piling up of armaments in the future of the world and the exhaustion of our very limited remaining resources in order to carry out a policy of that kind.

Such a policy would be criminal, it would be the betrayal of the causes for which we fought during the War, and if we embarked on such a policy it would be our undoing. If we were to go forward into the future staggering under the load of military and naval armaments whilst our competitors in Central Europe were free from the incubus of great armies, we should be severely handicapped, and in the end we should have the fruits of victory lost to us by our post-war policy. Already circumstances are developing on those lines. Already under the operation of inexorable economic factors we find that the position is developing to the advantage of Central

Europe. The depreciation of their currencies, the universal depreciation of currencies, and the unsettlement of the exchanges are having the effect of practical repudiation of liabilities on the part of a large part of the Continent. If we add to our financial responsibilities and have, in addition, to pile on the fresh burdens of new armies and navies I am afraid the future for us is very dark indeed, and we shall in the long run lose all we have won on the field of battle.

Armaments depend upon policy, and therefore I press very strongly that our policy should be such as to make the race for armaments impossible. That should be the cardinal feature of our foreign policy. We should not go into the future under this awful handicap of having to support great armaments, build new fleets, raise new armies, whilst our economic competitors are free of that liability under the Peace Treaty. The most fatal mistake of all, in my humble opinion, would be a race of armaments against America. America is the nation that is closest to us in all the human ties. The Dominions look upon her as the oldest of them. She is the relation with whom we most closely agree, and with whom we can most cordially work together. She left our circle a long time ago because of a great historic mistake. I am not sure that a wise policy after the great events through which we have recently passed might not repair the effects of that great historic error, and once more bring America on to lines of general co-operation with the British Empire. America, after all, has proved a staunch and tried friend during the War. She came in late because she did not realize what was at stake. In the very darkest hour of the War she came in and ranged herself on our side. That was, I believe, the determining factor in the victory of our great cause.

Since the War we have somewhat drifted apart. I need not go into the story—I do not know the whole story—it is only known to you here. There are matters on which we have not seen eye to eye, to some extent springing from what happened at Paris and also from mistakes made by statesmen. But these mistakes do not affect the fundamental attitude

of the two peoples. To my mind it seems clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk together with America. In saying this I do not wish to be understood as advocating an American alliance. Nothing of the kind. I do not advocate an alliance or any exclusive arrangement with America. It would be undesirable, it would be impossible and unnecessary. The British Empire is not in need of exclusive allies. It emerged from the War quite the greatest Power in the world, and it is only un wisdom or unsound policy that could rob her of that great position. She does not want exclusive alliances. What she wants to see established is more universal friendship in the world. The nations of the British Empire wish to make all the nations of the world more friendly to each other. We wish to remove grounds for misunderstandings and causes of friction, and to bring together all the free peoples of the world in a system of friendly conferences and consultations in regard to their difficulties. We wish to see a real Society of Nations, away from the old ideas and practices of national domination or Imperial domination, which were the real root causes of the great War. No, not in alliances, in any exclusive alliances, but in a new spirit of amity and co-operation do we seek the solution of the problems of the future. Although America is not a member of the League of Nations, there is no doubt that co-operation between her and the British Empire would be the easy and natural thing, and there is no doubt it would be the wise thing.

In shaping our course for the future, we must bear in mind that the whole world position has radically altered as a result of the War. Europe is no longer what she was, and the power and the position which she once occupied in the world has been largely lost. The great Empires have disappeared. Austria will never rise again. Russia and Germany will no doubt revive, but not in this generation nor in the next; and when they do, they may be very different countries in a world which may be a very different world. The position, therefore, has completely altered. The old viewpoint from

which we considered Europe has completely altered. She suffers from an exhaustion, which is the most appalling fact of history; and the victorious countries of Europe are not much better off than the vanquished. No, the scene has shifted on the great stage. To my mind that is the most important fact in the world situation to-day, and the fact to which our foreign policy should have special regard. Our temptation is still to look upon the European stage as of the first importance. It is no longer so; and I suggest we should not be too deeply occupied with it. Let us be friendly and helpful all round to the best of our ability, but let us not be too deeply involved in it. The fires are still burning there, the pot is occasionally boiling over, but these are not really first-rate events any more. This state of affairs in Central Europe will probably continue for many years to come, and no act on our part could very largely alter the situation. Therefore, not from feelings of selfishness, but in a spirit of wisdom, one would counsel prudence and reserve in our Continental commitments, and that we do not let ourselves in for European entanglements more than is necessary, and that we be impartial, friendly and helpful to all alike, and avoid any partisan attitude in the concerns of the continent of Europe. Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Far East and to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are to my mind the world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems we are, as an Empire, very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions border on the Pacific; India is next door; there, too, are the United States and Japan. There, also, is China, the fate of the greatest human population on earth will have to be decided. There, Europe, Asia and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted. I ask myself, what will be the character of that history? Will it be along the old lines? Will it be the old spirit of national and imperial domination which has been the undoing of Europe? Or shall we have learned our lesson? Shall we have purged our souls in the fires through which we

have passed? Will it be a future of peaceful co-operation, of friendly co-ordination of all the vast interests at stake?

Shall we act in continuous friendly consultation in the true spirit of a Society of Nations, or will there once more be a repetition of rival groups, of exclusive alliances, and finally, of a terrible catastrophe more fatal than the one we have passed through? That, to my mind, is the alternative. That is the parting of the ways at which we have arrived now. That is the great matter, I take it, we are met to consider in this Conference. If we are wisely guided at this juncture, this Conference may well become one of the great landmarks in history. It comes most opportune. The American Senate has already made the first move in a unanimous resolution calling for a Conference of the United States, the British Empire and Japan. Japan has been a consistent supporter of the League of Nations. She is one of the Great Powers with a permanent seat on the Council, and she has, so far as I can gather, consistently been a power for good in the Councils of the League of Nations. The British Empire, again, is not only one of the strongest influences behind the League, but she is honestly and sincerely feeling her way to a better ordering of international relations. China is not only a member of the League, but has been elected a member of the Council at the last meeting of the Assembly at Geneva. All the great parties concerned in the Pacific and in Pacific policy are, therefore, pledged to friendly conference and consultation in regard to what is the most important, possibly the most dangerous, next phase of world politics. They are all pledged to the new system of conference and consultation, either by membership of the League and its Council, or, in the case of America, by the resolution which the Senate has just passed. It is now for this Conference of ours to give the lead and guide the Powers concerned into a friendly conference, or system of conferences, in regard to this great issue. This, I submit, is the great opportunity presented to this Conference, and I trust that our deliberations will be exploited to the full for the good and future peace of the world. As you said yester-

day, Mr. Prime Minister, the British Empire involves the great question of East and West, the relations of East and West. That great question is now coming to a head. There is no doubt that the British Empire is more vitally interested than any other country in this, for she has her feet planted on all the continents. By her great position she is called upon to act as the peacemaker, the mediator, between East and West, and nowhere else has she such scope, such opportunity, for great world service as just here. Great rival civilizations are meeting and great questions have to be decided for the future. I most heartily applaud what you said yesterday on this point, and I trust that difficulties on this most thorny path will not prove insuperable to us. You spoke yesterday most eloquently on the Peace Treaty, the sacredness of the Peace Treaty, and the obligation to carry out the Peace Treaty.

There is one chapter in that Treaty which, to my mind, should be specially sacred to the British Empire. That is the first chapter on the League of Nations. The Covenant may be faulty, it may need amendment in order to make it more workable and more generally acceptable, but let us never forget that the Covenant embodies the most deeply-felt longings of the human race for a better life. There, more than anywhere else, do we find a serious effort made to translate into practical reality the great ideals that actuated us during the War, the ideals for which millions of our best gave their lives. The method of understanding instead of violence, of free co-operation, of consultation and conference in all great difficulties which we have found so fruitful in our Empire system, is the method which the League attempts to apply to the affairs of the world. Let us, in the British Empire, back it for all it is worth. It may well prove, for international relations, the way out of the present morass. It may become the foundation of a new international system which will render armaments unnecessary, and give the world at large the blessings which we enjoy in our lesser League of Nations in the Empire.

I have spoken at length already, Prime Minister, and there-

fore I do not wish to refer to the other great matter which we are met here to consider, and which Mr. Hughes touched upon, namely, constitutional relations. We shall come to a very full discussion of that subject, and, therefore, I do not wish to say any more at this stage.

OPENING SPEECH BY MR. MASSEY

MR. MASSEY: In the first place, Prime Minister, I want briefly to take advantage of what you referred to as our "unenviable privilege," speaking for myself, the privilege of having the longest record as Prime Minister of any of those who sit around the Council Board to-day, and on that account I want to add a few words to what you have said with regard to an old friend, General Botha. During the very few months that I was acquainted with General Botha I came to regard him as one of the best men I ever met, a great man, undoubtedly, and, in addition, a great British statesman. If he had been with us to-day it goes without saying he would have been invaluable in assisting to solve some of the difficult problems with which we are face to face. I feel confident of this, that it will be a very long time before his services are forgotten, either by South Africa, with which he was more intimately associated, or with the citizens of the British Empire wherever they may happen to be. I want, too, to express my regret that we have not with us on the present occasion men who did great work in days gone by. I refer to Lord Milner, Lord Long, better known to us as the Right Honourable Mr. Walter Long, and Sir Robert Borden. I hope that their retirement from Empire service is only temporary, but, in any case, I trust, and I know it, that when we require their advice and counsel, their services to the Empire will always be willingly and faithfully given.

I think I ought to say a word of welcome to those who are met in this room for the first time, and I feel confident that they will do credit to those behind them who have honoured them with their confidence, and that their coming here will be an acquisition to the Conference which I hope and believe will make for better things so far as the Empire is concerned.

And now, Prime Minister, I want to refer, briefly, to the very fine speech which we, the members of this organization, had the opportunity of listening to yesterday.

I want to say that I look upon it as the most important speech delivered since the War, and a speech which, to the British citizens of the Dominions, will give great satisfaction, and not only to them but to the citizens at the heart of the Empire, the United Kingdom itself. It will give confidence to a number of people and a very large number of citizens who are anxious about the present position and feel a certain anxiety with regard to what may happen at this Conference. The speech was candid, outspoken, and well expressed, and it gave the impression, which I have not the very slightest doubt it was intended to convey, that the Prime Minister intends to place the whole of his cards upon the table, take us, who are the representatives of the Overseas Dominions, into his complete confidence and ask for our assistance in settling the difficulties which at present appear to confront us. The speech, in my opinion, struck the right note, and it will give, I am quite sure, more confidence to people overseas and to citizens generally than the Prime Minister himself imagines could possibly be the case. Ever since the signatures of the representatives of the Dominions were attached to the Peace Treaty at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, there has been a feeling on the part of many intelligent men and women that the future of the Empire may possibly have been endangered thereby. What I mean is this, that I have seen it stated repeatedly, as a result of the signing of the Peace Treaty, which, of course, included the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Dominions of the Empire had acquired complete independence, and, in case of the Empire being involved in war—which I say heaven forbid, and I say it with all my heart and soul—any one of the Dominions might refrain from taking part or assisting the Empire in any way. I do not agree with that view, and I go upon the principle that when the King, the Head of the State, declares war the whole of his subjects are at war, and that must be the

case if some of the best constitutional authorities are right. That is one of the causes of anxiety at the present time. There is the other as a logical sequence of the first, that any Dominion—I won't say Dependencies, Dependencies are in a different position—but any Dominion may, on account of what has taken place, enter into a treaty with any foreign country irrespective of what the Empire as a whole may do. I am not now referring to a treaty entered into for commercial purposes, that is quite another matter. As I understand the position, any Dominion may make a commercial arrangement with any foreign country, but the treaties of which I am thinking and of which many other people are thinking are treaties involving war or peace or foreign policy as the case may be. These latter are the treaties which, I understand, in existing circumstances, a Dominion has not the right to enter into. I bring this up; now I had thought of waiting for another year, but one never knows what may happen during twelve months. Personally, I doubt if it will be possible to hold the Conference which was intended for next year, for reasons which may not perhaps have occurred to many here present. I think I am right in saying there will be an election in Australia next year. I am not authorized to say this, but I have heard it said that possibly Canada will have an election next year. That I do not know, but I do know this, that New Zealand must face an election next year.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many years have you?

MR. MASSEY: Three years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many years have you?

MR. MEIGHEN: Five years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many years does your Parliament last?

MR. HUGHES: Three years.

MR. MASSEY: We are in the same year, so when Australia has an election New Zealand has an election. I am suggesting that we shall probably have a number of elections next year, and therefore it may not be possible to hold an Imperial Conference for any purpose whatever.

MR. HUGHES: I am glad you mentioned that. That is one of the practical difficulties. I think I told you, Sir, it would be impossible for me to come next year.

MR. MASSEY: I was referring to constitutional questions which are causing difficulties at present, and I should like to see them cleared up. I think we are in a dangerous position—a position which may bring friction in a year or two's time or in the years to come. I think it should be faced now, and we should arrive at an understanding as to exactly where we are. There is another point. The Imperial War Cabinet has been referred to on a number of occasions to-day and yesterday, and I read with a great deal of interest an article by Lord Milner in one of the papers yesterday morning, I think *The Times*. I may say I agree thoroughly with the opinion expressed by Lord Milner in regard to the Imperial War Cabinet. I believe it did magnificent work, and I hoped that it would become a permanent institution, modified, of course, as required by a period of peace. The Imperial War Cabinet was suitable for a period of war. I do not mean to say we should go on the same lines. We are here to-day, and I think I am right in saying we do not even know what to call ourselves, and there is a great deal in a name. A Conference means consultation and consultation only, but a Cabinet also carries with it the right to recommend some definite course to the Sovereign. Of course, behind it all there is the responsibility on the part of each representative of the Dominions particularly, or even of the United Kingdom, to the Parliaments behind us; we must take the responsibility of our actions; but I think most of us, all of us, here to-day are experienced politicians, and I am quite sure that we are not likely to go too far. There is another difficulty. The representatives of the Dominions and India meet the representatives of the United Kingdom in conference, but we have no right to join in any recommendation that may be made to the Sovereign in regard to any course which requires his assent and which may be thought desirable. Now, I am not anxious about this. I have absolute confidence in the

good sense of British people and British statesmen, but still there is the anomaly. There is something there that wants to be put right. Using a term which is often used, it is not democratic. I do not know whether these matters can be discussed and dealt with during the present Conference, and I am calling it a Conference for want of a better name. What I object to is what the name Conference implies. I do not know whether we are able to deal with it during the term of the present Conference, or whether we are not, but I do think the matter should be settled, and not left over indefinitely. We sometimes talk about what we have gained in recent years, and we have gained a great deal. There is no question about that. We have gained in status and in other ways. We stand in quite a different position from that in which the Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire, including India, stood ten years ago, but we have gone back as compared with what was the case two years ago when the Imperial War Cabinet was in existence.

MR. HUGHES: I do not quite follow where we have gone back.

MR. MASSEY: We have lost the right which we had then on war matters, and even other matters, to assist in making a recommendation to the Sovereign, the Head of the State, in regard to any course of action which we thought desirable and which required his assent. I may be wrong in the view I take, but I feel so strongly about it, and I have discussed it with my colleagues in New Zealand, though I have not mentioned it in Parliament except by way of a brief hint. I went no further with my own Parliament, but I would not be justified in allowing this Conference to pass without bringing it up. I may say that I believe thoroughly and strongly in the partnership of nations. It does not matter what you call it—a family of nations, a Commonwealth of Nations, or anything else, so long as the partnership is applied. I believe thoroughly and firmly in that; but even a partnership of nations, any more than a nation, cannot stand still. We must either progress or decay. There is no ques-

tion about that, and I hope those who are entrusted with the management of the public affairs of the Empire itself, and of the countries of the Empire, will see that no decay takes place. There is one point I must acknowledge in this connection, and it is this. While I have called attention to the anomaly, I admit, and am thoroughly of opinion, that there is a far stronger power in the British Empire to-day than any words that may be placed upon paper, either printed or written—that is, the sentiments of the British people, the patriotic sentiments of the British people. I am not merely speaking of Anglo-Saxons or Europeans, or any one race. I am speaking of the British people right through the Empire, including the native races. You cannot go beyond sentiment. And I am quite sure that as soon as they understand what is taking place or its possibility, if only its possibility, they will see that these matters, which may appear small at the time, are rectified without waiting too long.

I want to say something about naval defence. It has been referred to by Mr. Hughes, and I may say that there is no difference of opinion between Mr. Hughes and myself in regard to the necessity for naval defence. The storm centre has changed undoubtedly during the last few years, so far as it is possible to judge by appearances, and many of us fear that the next war—and I wish I were optimistic enough to believe we had seen the last of wars, but I am not—we fear that the next naval war will be fought in the Pacific. Human nature has not changed very much in the last 5,000 years, and although we have profited by the lessons of the War, and I would like to think that the lessons of the War would prevent war, that the suffering that the people of Europe endured, the tremendous loss of life, the misery they endured, I would like to think that these, taken together or any one of them, would prevent war in the future. I am not looking forward to war in the immediate future. There are clouds on the horizon it is true, some of them perhaps no bigger than the proverbial man's hand, but they are there, and they may bring war sooner than we expect. The wish, however, is not father to the thought.

I hope the indications may come to nothing, and no one will be better pleased than myself if they come to naught, but so far as naval defence is concerned—I am speaking of the Empire now, a chain of countries right round the globe, Dominions, Dependencies, and the Empire within an Empire, India, as well as the United Kingdom—whatever may happen in the future, I do hope that there will be a sufficient naval force kept in order to maintain the connexions between the different parts of the Empire, and that was where there was a danger of our losing the last War. In connexion with submarine warfare in its worst days, about 1917, before the hydrophone and depth charge had been perfected, when the ships were being sunk faster than we were able to turn them out, there was a danger then of the connexions being cut between the different Dominions and the heart of the Empire particularly, or even between the different countries of the Empire outside the United Kingdom itself, and if the connexions had been cut we should certainly have lost the War—nothing could have saved us. Fortunately, things turned out as some of us were optimistic enough to expect, but again we have to think of the future, and we have to remember the lessons of the last War. I know, of course, there are great changes—great improvements, if you can call them improvements—in the instruments of war. Probably different methods, but we can only go as far as our knowledge allows us, and I hope this point will not be lost sight of. If it were possible—for my feeling about war is so strong, and I have no doubt it is shared by everyone present—if it were possible for me by one stroke of the pen to strike out the possibility of war, I would do it without hesitation, but it is not. We know, every one of us, that there are countries in the world to-day, densely-inhabited countries, that are only kept within their own boundaries, and kept from inflicting injustice on their weaker neighbours, by the fact that if they did it would probably bring down on them a stronger Power than themselves.

Mr. Hughes referred to the financial side of the question and the upkeep of the British navy of the future. I do not suppose

that New Zealand is in any better financial position than any other country. We have not been exactly crippled, but we feel the result of the War expenditure, and we are likely to feel it for some time to come. But for all that—I speak on behalf of New Zealand—I take the responsibility of saying that New Zealand will find its fair share of the money necessary to provide a navy strong enough in comparison with other navies to defend the Pacific in case of attack. I hope it will not be necessary, but it is only right that I should express what I feel, and I feel very strongly after seeing what took place on the last occasion in the Southern Pacific upon the outbreak of war. We have an idea of the possibilities that the future may bring forth, and while I have a great deal of respect for the opinion of General Smuts, I do think it would be unwise to leave the countries of the Empire—which means the Empire itself—absolutely unprotected. So far as America is concerned, I hope that we shall be able to join with America in that friendly co-operation which you, Sir, referred to in your address yesterday. I would go the length of saying that so far as I am concerned, I am prepared to join in any well thought out alliance with America. Personally, I do not think that is possible, but whatever happens I hope the time will come when America and Britain will join together, if for no other purpose and with no other object than that of keeping the peace of the world and preventing war.

General Smuts expressed the opinion that we should do without alliances. I am sorry, but I am not able to join in that opinion. So far as our Treaties are concerned we must stand by them even if for the time being they do not seem to be to our advantage. With regard to the Treaty which was signed two years ago at Versailles, and which provided that we—I am speaking of the Empire now—should come to the assistance of France in case of necessity—I do not know whether legally that Treaty stands. I doubt it, because America has withdrawn from the position which she then took up. But so far as we are concerned I have no doubt about our moral obligation. Our reputation for fair and honest dealing is one of our

best assets and must be maintained at all costs. Then we must ask ourselves this question: We have got through the worst war the world has ever witnessed—I hope the world will never see another like it—but if Britain had been compelled to stand alone in that War, the question that must occur to each and everyone of us would be “Could Britain have been successful?” I doubt it. With all the confidence that I have in the might and power of Britain and the patriotism of her people—and their patriotism was proved by the fact that one million British citizens—the flower of the Empire—gave their lives to save the Empire—I doubt if by ourselves we could have stood up against the Powers of Central Europe and have come out successfully during that War.

With regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, this is probably one of the most important things we have to deal with. I declined even to my own Parliament to discuss details of many matters which I felt confident would be brought up before this Conference comes to an end. I took my Parliament into my fullest confidence so far as the proposed Japanese Treaty was concerned, and I told them that in my opinion, with whatever modifications may be necessary, I was quite prepared to support its renewal. It is only right to admit that, in saying that, I am guided to a certain extent by what took place during the War period. There was one period of the War, very soon after the War broke out, when New Zealand had 10,000 men ready to send to the front, and the ships and equipment ready to send them, and information reached us from an official source—that the Pacific was not safe. I had an instinct that it was not safe, but that information decided me, so far as it was possible for a Prime Minister to decide, and I appealed, perhaps in strong terms and by strong methods which I thought justified at the time, to the British Government to send us protection for these 10,000 men before they were sent out into the Pacific, knowing that there was a strong German squadron in those waters. The strength of that squadron was proved by what happened afterwards, when they met two quite good British ships—I will not say battle-

ships or even big battle-cruisers, but they met two strong British warships—and sank them with a loss of 1,600 men. The ships were the “Good Hope” and, I think, the “Monmouth.”

MR. CHURCHILL: Yes, that is right.

MR. MASSEY: They were there and it was quite impossible to find out when our transport was ready to sail, where the German squadron was located. I felt that I could not take the responsibility of sending these men off without protection. However, the British Government—I think Mr. Churchill was the head of the Admiralty at that time—acceded to our request, and arrangements were made with Japan to send out a strong battle-cruiser, not a battleship, with 12-inch guns, and a powerful British cruiser, the name of which I have forgotten but which had been the flagship of the China squadron.

MR. CHURCHILL: It was the “Minotaur.”

MR. MASSEY: When those two ships came we were perfectly safe. I think our anxiety was justified by the fact—and there are very few men to-day who will not recollect it—that that was the trip upon which the “Sydney” sank the “Emden.” By that time, by the way, the Australian ships had joined ours, and in the Indian Ocean there were about twenty-eight ships or more carrying troops totalling probably 28,000 men. I will say that we were justified in New Zealand in our anxiety for the safety of those men. My support of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty does not in the very slightest affect the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our future fellow-citizens, and it is only fair to say that our legislation on the subject has never been found fault with by either the Japanese or any other race. Personally I do not think there will be another war during this generation. It is only right to say so, but wars have come up very unexpectedly and it is not well to leave the necessary preparations until the last moment. I trust that so far as naval defence is concerned, and it is on naval defence that the safety of the Empire of the future rests, we shall not be found unprepared.

There is just another point arising out of the proposed re-

newal of the Japanese Treaty and it is this. Supposing Japan had been on the other side? I do not mean to say that is possible, because there was the Treaty, but the Treaty as it is to-day did not compel Japan to come into the War in the circumstances in connexion with which the War was fought. But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New Zealand would have been able to send troops to the front, neither could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for the soldiers and sailors or food for the civil population of Britain. It would not have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in connection with the renewal of the Treaty. I am prepared to take the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any wrong impression on that point. I am quite prepared, as I said, to join with America to prevent war, but I must put the position as it occurs to me and as my experience dictates, and I do not think any apology is necessary for my doing so.

There are several points referred to in the address by the Prime Minister which must come up again before the Conference comes to an end, and I was very glad to hear what was said about reparation. Apparently I missed the report of the negotiations: in all probability the negotiations took place between the time I left New Zealand and before I arrived here.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That is so, I think.

MR. MASSEY: I should be very glad indeed to hear a statement made—not merely on my own account, for I know it will be of interest to everyone present—of what the exact position is so far as reparation is concerned.

LORD CURZON: If we circulate the short statement upon that question it might save trouble.

MR. MASSEY: Thank you, that will be good enough for me.

LORD CURZON: I will certainly let you have it.

MR. MASSEY: I want briefly to refer to some matters which I think should be dealt with. The League of Nations has already been referred to. I do not know what the future of

the League of Nations is going to be or what effect it will have in preventing war. I should like to think it would do all that it was intended to do by its promoters, but we know, most of us, in past history that attempts to prevent war have failed. The Holy Alliance, arising out of the Congress of Vienna, was just one, and had a similar intention to the League of Nations. I do not want to say the League of Nations is beyond hope, because I know better, but the Holy Alliance did fail. I do not want to find fault with the League of Nations—but until we change human nature I am afraid it will be impossible to prevent war, much as we should like to do it.

Then there is the Imperial Shipping Committee set up in pursuance of a resolution passed at a previous Imperial Conference. I refer to what is termed the Imperial Shipping Committee, but I understand it is only a temporary arrangement. In the first place, I thought it was to be a permanent organization, but so far it is only temporary. I do not know when its term of office comes to an end, but I do want to emphasize that the matter of communication between different parts of the Empire is probably one of the most vital things that this Conference could deal with. It is the old story of the highways. If we do not have good highways between different parts of the Empire, then we shall find ourselves in very serious trouble, and there is a very great deal of dissatisfaction at present with the manner in which shipping matters between different countries of the Empire are being dealt with or arranged. I do not want to make difficulties, but I think the position should be faced and some better arrangements made. I want to say a few words about the holding of future Conferences. One of the difficulties is, as Mr. Hughes and myself well know, that it is a long journey from Australia and New Zealand to the heart of the Empire, making it almost impossible to attend these gatherings yearly, and I think these Conferences should be held yearly, but if anything is going to be done in that way, we can look forward to improvements in wireless and improvements in the cable system, yet anything that we do at present must be

based upon steamships and railways. Something ought to be done, and while I do not want to commit the country to it, it may resolve itself into a question of subsidies so that we may get our mails carried, and passengers carried, and our products carried from one country to the other at the lowest possible rates consistent with fair profits, and so far as mails and passengers are concerned, in a very much shorter time than it is taking at present.

There is just one word I want to say regarding another subject, and I am only going to refer to it by way of emphasizing the necessity of something being done. I mean the difficulty in the New Hebrides, where there is a dual form of Government. I am sure most of the members of the Conference understand the position in the New Hebrides and the conditions under which the people are governed at present. The present system is absolutely unworkable, and getting into a worse condition all the time. I do not know what to suggest—except that it might be possible to arrange an exchange of territory so as to provide one Government for these islands; that ought to be a matter to be put before the French Government. There is no question about the fertility of the islands. There is quite a large area, and a large native population rapidly diminishing in number.

In conclusion, I would like to say a word on behalf of the Dominions. I have the utmost affection for the heart of the Empire. It is the Mecca of every British citizen; but I do think that, in the interests of both the statesmen of the United Kingdom and the people of the Dominions, that meetings should be held periodically in the overseas countries of the Empire. If my suggestion is given effect to, it would give the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill—not both perhaps together—an opportunity of visiting the Dominions. You cannot govern the Empire from the windows of Downing Street. I do hope the opportunity will be taken by statesmen at present in the United Kingdom to visit the overseas countries of the Empire, and they will then understand the views of these countries and the aspirations of their peoples. I do not

think that there is anything else I want to say at this juncture. I had no idea that I should take up so much time. I should just like to say this. The people in New Zealand never before seemed to appreciate to the same extent the importance of the Imperial Conference until this occasion. They were perhaps never so enthusiastic on any previous occasions. There was practically no opposition to my coming to London, and the one point that was impressed upon me in Parliament and at the public meetings which I attended a few days prior to leaving the Dominion—the one point that was impressed upon me—was to stand for unity of Empire, and if I stood by that they would forgive all my shortcomings in other directions. I have nothing more to say, Prime Minister, and again I thank the members of this Conference for listening to me so attentively as they have done.

OPENING SPEECH BY THE HONOURABLE
SRINIVASA SASTRI

THE HONOURABLE SRINIVASA SASTRI: In the memorable speech to which we listened yesterday, you made a striking allusion to the generous enthusiasms and noble ideals for humanity which the War has kindled everywhere. India, let me assure you, is actuated by these enthusiasms and ideals in the same measure as other parts of this Empire. That the British Empire is the most fitting exponent of these enthusiasms and ideals we realize, and it is the peculiar good fortune of India to remain within the British Empire and take part in the work that we need ever increasingly for the realization of these noble aims and purposes.

The Princes for whom my friend, His Highness the Maharao of Cutch, will speak, and the peoples of India whom it is my privilege to represent here to-day, send their hearty allegiance to the Central Council of Empire on this occasion. We made our contributions to the conduct of the recent War; we sent you supplies of wheat, making dangerous inroads on the scanty stocks of our own people. We made munitions for the soldiers to use on the field of battle, we made money contri-

butions out of our poverty, and we sent you men to the tune of 1,274,000, which comes up to over one-half of the total overseas forces employed in the War.

Of these contributions, Prime Minister, you made handsome acknowledgment yesterday, and please accept our gratitude for the honourable mention of that fact in your speech. We, His Highness the Maharao of Cutch and I, consider it a privilege to sit at this table where history is made, and if I may strike a somewhat personal note, not being employed in the service of the Government, never having taken a share in the administration of public affairs, I consider it my particular good fortune to sit alongside with statesmen who have for generations moulded the destinies and fashioned the fortunes of their kind; but the Maharao of Cutch and I cannot fail to remember that the position we occupy here is not comparable by any means to the position occupied by our colleagues from the Dominions. They are called here by virtue of their being Prime Ministers. We come by nomination from our Government. We realize that that marks a great difference in our status, although not in the privileges to which we have been admitted at these meetings. We hope that next year, or the year after, our successors, who will take our places here, will come by a better right. The person who represents in the place of His Highness more than one-third of British territory in India will probably be chosen by the Chamber of Princes by election, and the man who takes my place may likewise be elected by the Central Legislature of the land. We have not yet acquired full Dominion status, but we realize we are planted firmly on the road to the acquisition of that status.

The Government of India Act of 1919 forms a great landmark in the growth of Indian constitution. There is nothing in our previous history with which it can be compared, either in importance or in magnitude. The Princes' Chamber, which is going to play a great part in the evolution of India, does not form an integral part within the law of our constitution. The constitution proper of British India, inaugurated by His

Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, not long ago, has shown a sense of responsibility and loyalty to the Empire, which, in my judgment, is second to none of the Parliaments within the Empire. The new Councils have worked better than we expected under the wise and sleepless watch of the Secretary of State for India. The reforms of a political character that have just been started in India are doing great work in placing us alongside the other parts of the British Empire. I must say that we have our troubles. Non-co-operation has only to be mentioned to bring to your mind an idea of the perils in which we have to live. I am happy to say that Lord Reading, our new Viceroy, may be trusted fully, as recent experience has proved, to deal with this great danger.

There are many subjects to which the Dominion Prime Ministers have alluded, to which also, perhaps, I may be expected, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, to say a few words, but I will forbear. There are two topics of high domestic importance to which, perhaps, this meeting will permit me to allude, as they will not take up much time. The first question to which I will draw your attention is one in which the deepest feelings of my Mohammedan fellow-countrymen are engaged. I will not say much on that topic, as all the issues are at present in full vividness in your minds. On the Maharao of Cutch and myself, who are Hindoos, there rests a very peculiar duty of voicing the feelings of our Moslem fellow-subjects on this occasion. I will only venture on this remark—that in any arrangements that may be made for the future of the Turkish Empire, statesmen of the United Kingdom will have to remember that they must show as much chivalry and tenderness as may be expected from a mighty victor. I have no manner of doubt in my own mind that you will be actuated by these considerations, which are always present to those who have inherited the great traditions of British prowess and the still greater traditions of British sportsmanship.

There is another subject of great importance which I must mention—that is the status enjoyed by Indians in the Domin-

ions of the British Empire. In noble words you described this Empire, Sir, as a Confederation of Races into which willing and free peoples had been admitted—willing and free peoples; consent is incongruous with inequality of races, and freedom necessarily implies admission of all people to the rights of citizenship without reservation. In impressive and far-seeing words the Prime Minister of South Africa alluded to the establishment of everlasting peace. Peace means a stable and unalterable relationship between communities—based on honourable equality and recognition of equality of status. To embody this ideal, there are deductions from it now in actual practice; we are going to submit, I mean our Indian Delegation, for the consideration of this Cabinet, a resolution, the terms of which I understand have already been communicated to you. This is a resolution that will be regarded in India as the test by which the whole position must be judged. I won't say more than that. It is of supreme importance that that subject should be considered and disposed of satisfactorily at this meeting, and it is of the most urgent and pressing importance that we should be enabled to carry back a message of hope and of good cheer. There is no conviction more strongly in our minds than this, that a full enjoyment of citizenship within the British Empire applies, not only to the United Kingdom, but to every self-governing Dominion within its compass. We have already, Sir, as you are aware, agreed to a subtraction from the integrity of the rights of the compromise of 1918 to which my predecessor, Lord Sinha, was a party, that each Dominion and each self-governing part of the Empire should be free to regulate the composition of its population by suitable immigration laws. On that compromise there is no intention whatever to go back, but we plead on behalf of those who are already fully domiciled in the various self-governing Dominions according to the laws under which those Dominions are governed—to these people there is no reason whatever to deny the full rights of citizenship, it is for them that we plead; where they are lawfully settled, they must be admitted into the general body

of citizenship and no deduction must be made from the rights that other British subjects enjoy. It is my unfortunate part to have drawn prominent attention to what we consider a great defect in the present arrangements. It may seem to be of comparatively trifling importance to the other issues we have to consider. I only plead that there should be no occasion for small bickerings, no occasion for mutual recriminations amongst us. We have great tasks. Let little things be got out of the way. I only wish that all our common energies should be bent towards realizing more and more within the Empire and extending further and further outside the British Empire, those generous ideals of progress to which, Sir, you gave such inspiring and, if I may say so, such alluring expression yesterday.

STATEMENT BY MR. CHURCHILL ON THE COLONIES ETC.

MR. CHURCHILL: The Prime Minister has asked me to give a brief statement to the Conference, or meeting, however we are to define it, about the Colonies and possessions which are administered directly under the Colonial Office, and I need hardly say that if I were to attempt to give you a picture of the condition of these States I should occupy an enormous amount of time, because each one is a story in itself full of interest and full of romance. In every one of these Colonies there are problems similar to those in larger States, though on a smaller scale. In some cases, indeed, they are more complex than those which are found in great States, because in many of them there are great differences of race. Their finances are also complicated. Some are so exiguous that the sale of postage stamps to those who take an interest in philately is an important feature in their revenue. The production of turtles is in one case almost the staple source of export and of revenue. Others are great, wealthy, prosperous Protectorates, exporting forty million or fifty million pounds' worth of goods to this country, and supplying Great Britain, and to a certain extent the Empire, with the raw materials of some of their essential and vital industries.

As long as the War lasted, practically all the Colonies and Dependencies were very prosperous, but with the arrival of the happy conditions of peace a wave of depression has fallen upon almost every one of them so far as their trade is concerned. During the War we got our tin from Malaya, plumbago from Ceylon, wolfram from Hong Kong, mahogany for frames of aeroplanes from Honduras, fine cotton for their wings from the West Indian Islands. The sugar producing Colonies were prosperous beyond their dreams. The oils and fats of West Africa, which used largely to go to Germany, were useful to us, and their loss was crippling to the Germans. The Falkland Islands industry of whaling was stimulated for War purposes, and they benefited thereby. Moreover, during the War, when human passions were at such a volcanic pitch, we were happily spared the cataclysms of nature. The hurricanes, earthquakes, droughts, which from time to time ruin the economic margin on which some of the Colonies exist, were happily absent, and it almost looked as if Nature were holding her hand to leave the field entirely free for the devastating activities of man.

But the creeping paralysis of depression has spread to almost all the Colonial industries which flourished during the War. The tin on which Malaya depends so much cannot now obtain a price which covers the cost of production. Nigerian tin is in the same position. The price of rubber does not cover the cost of production. We have been approached with pressure to enforce schemes of a compulsory limitation of output, but we have not felt able to accept such schemes. From almost every one of the Colonies complaints are coming in that its principal products cannot now be sold at a profit. Even the sugar Colonies, principally Jamaica and British Guiana, are in difficulty about the disposal of their crop. The cotton crops of Uganda and Nyasaland have suffered very heavily from the fall in prices and the same would have been true of West Africa but for the broad-minded action of the British Cotton Growing Association, which, rather than discourage the native producer by a sudden overthrow in the price at which

he has been led to hope to produce, have been purchasing cotton at a price which involves a loss to that Association of £400,000 or £500,000 in the present year. We are told that this period of depression is only a temporary phase. I do not know how far that is true. The decline in the consuming power of the world, which is making its effect felt on the highly organized industries of Britain and, I have no doubt, of the Dominions, is by repercussion producing a similar result upon the raw materials which are produced by our tropical dependencies, and practically every one of the budgets of these Colonies and Protectorates is going through a period of extreme financial difficulty and even crisis. The violent fluctuations in the value of money and the changes which affect the greatest States, operate with far more direct and unshielded force upon those smaller organizations, and therefore as far as the immediate situation of the present is concerned, we are passing through a stormy period in the economic and commercial life of practically all the Colonies. But if one leaves the immediate difficulties and turns to their great and undoubted wealth and potential capabilities, one cannot help feeling how magnificent is the asset which the British Empire possesses, and of which, pending the development of more responsible and representative forms of government in these Colonies, we in Great Britain and at the Colonial Office are the trustees.

My submission to the Conference is that we must not lose heart in any way about these splendid tropical possessions which we have, but endeavour to secure credit and money for them to give them that essential technical apparatus they require to develop their great resources. In them you find every conceivable product that the world knows of, and every contributing factor even to the most highly organized super-fine forms of industry. Nothing is lacking, and now that we see the American exchange is largely turned against us, and we have such great payments to make to them, we ought really more and more to turn our attention to trying to develop these wonderful hot-houses, these great tropical gardens and

plantations, so as to be able to purchase as far as possible the raw products that we want from them. How can any money invested in these places go out from the Dominions, or from the mother country? It can only go out in the shape of the products of labour. How can it return—in capital or interest or in profit? It can only come back in these raw materials which we especially and particularly need, and which may some day make us independent in the most remarkable way of many foreign lands.

I feel that this is a matter which, although it is confined to the Colonial Office and to this country at the present time, should more and more engage the sympathies and interest of the self-governing Dominions. I illustrate this particularly by the West Indies. In the summer of 1920 a trade agreement was made between the Canadian Government and representatives of all the West Indian Colonies. It is not merely a remarkable instance of Imperial preference, but it promotes unity with the Empire through the development of Imperial communications, which the Prime Minister will remember he and I have always considered one of the most promising lines along which we can advance, ever since the Conference which he, Sir Thomas Smartt, and I attended in the year 1907. Two lines of steamers, one entirely new, will now connect all the West Indian Colonies with the Dominion of Canada. I hope Mr. Meighen and the Canadian Government will advance with increasing confidence on this path, because it seems to me that, for all the greatness of Canada and its tremendous producing potentialities, it is not a complete entity without connexion with these semi-tropical islands. Compared to the United States, Canada lies wholly to the north with northern products, whereas the United States can produce all that Canada can produce, or very nearly all, and yet reaches down to Florida and regions which give her a semi-tropical sphere. But if the association between Canada and the West Indian Islands is developed and goes on, Canada becomes equipped with an immense range of products which makes her, from an economic point of view, a far more com-

plete entity, and therefore I look forward to everything which tends to promote a close association between these West Indian Islands and the Dominion. It is not only from the point of view of commerce alone, but they are among the most beautiful islands in the world. They are salubrious and balmy, and it might be they would be a place of agreeable resort at seasons of the year when the climate of Canada is sometimes rigorous.

MR. MEIGHEN: Bermuda is the chief one from that point of view, and Bermuda has declined to ratify the reciprocity agreement.

MR. CHURCHILL: We shall endeavour to use our influence as far as possible to secure the general acceptance of it. So far as the constitutional developments in the Colonies are concerned, progress has been continuous, and latterly, especially since the War, very rapid. We have every form of government, ranging from benevolent autocracies tempered by Downing Street, to two-Chamber systems, resting upon at least one of the Chambers being fully elected. For instance, the island of Bermuda celebrated its tercentenary of representative institutions dating from the day when the first general assembly of the islands was made, and therefore can boast a seniority which no existing State in Europe or America can disdain. In Mauritius there was a movement to promote an agitation for a retrocession of the island to France, but this movement has received a decisive check at the recent elections, in which all the retrocessionist candidates have been signally defeated. There has been a strong movement in Ceylon for a more popular control over the government of the Colony, following upon the movement which Mr. Montagu and his predecessors have driven forward, fostered, and nourished in India, and a new constitution has been granted which gives a majority in the Legislature to the unofficial element. In the Kenya Colony a new constitution has been granted giving an elective basis for the unofficial members of the Council, instead of the nominated basis which existed hitherto. Uganda has reached such a stage of development

that they have a Legislative Council with nominated membership. In Malta a novel experiment has been tried by my predecessor, and we hope it will succeed. Everybody knows the argument against giving Malta a Constitution. It was said you might as well give a Constitution to a battleship. We have arrived at a dyarchical system—two Governments in the island, one elective, dealing with Maltese affairs, and the other dealing with purely military and naval interests.

General Smuts will no doubt wish to discuss, and Sir Thomas Smartt also, the conditions which prevail in Rhodesia. I hope that a delegation of Rhodesians will arrive in this country before General Smuts has to leave. I have telegraphed about this. Of course, Rhodesia is a young organization to be trusted with full responsible government. Its population is smaller than Natal, when she obtained responsible government. On the other hand, the settlers are discontented with the present state of affairs. The Chartered Company is passing away, and it therefore has little incentive to spend money on the development of the country. I should like to say, if I may, that the work of this Chartered Company has been a very wonderful work for the British Empire. The shareholders have never received a penny in dividends, and they may never be able to secure more than a portion of their capital. A splendid region has been acquired and developed to a large extent, and it has all been done entirely by the voluntary effort of private capital. I hope, whatever arrangements are made, we shall not be animated by any spirit of prejudice towards this Company, who, I think, has rendered enormous service to the British Empire. As an alternative to responsible government, there is the question of the incorporation of Rhodesia in the Union. There can only be one destination for Rhodesia ultimately, and the only question we have to consider—I will not say the only question, but the main question—is, what is the psychological moment. One wants Rhodesia to be at man's estate before she joins the Union, and to join it willingly and as a partner. After all, Rhodesia is an enormous factor in the whole South African

situation. We must remember that they are very much inclined to resent anything like an attempt to dispose of their destiny over their heads.

The native question is, of course, a very serious one there, and I think I was quite right to try and get these Rhodesian delegates here at the time when General Smuts and Sir Thomas Smartt are here, in order to discuss the whole position with the Colonial Office. Also, we do not want to have any appearance of dictation. I trust that the conversations we shall have when they are here will result in some arrangement that is satisfactory.

We have gone on slowly developing Imperial communications. Of course, we have got very little money. The great expense of Palestine and Mesopotamia has thrown such burdens upon our backs that everything in regard to the Colonies has been very severely pruned. Still, we are developing.

In East Africa, I am hoping at last to make the deep water pier at Kilindini. When I left the Colonial Office in the beginning of 1908, I had already succeeded in getting it settled to make this deep-water pier. It was definitely settled. The Uganda Railway, built at enormous expense by the Imperial Government, stops forty feet short of deep water. With such a pier you would be able to unload from the ocean steamers on to the railway which runs up hundreds of miles to the great lakes, but these forty feet intervene, and everything has now to be unloaded from the steamers into lighters and from the lighters on to the railway. All articles are subject to a charge in which local vested interests are deeply concerned. I came back to the Colonial Office after thirteen years' absence, and I found still the same forty feet intervening. The same lighterage interests are deriving their profits, and the whole of the great transport of the War supplies was handled in this inefficient and wasteful manner. However, we hope now to take that up and give the Uganda Railway what it requires—its deep-water connexion. A new line, a feeder line, we hope to develop to the railway from the Uasin Gishu Plateau, which will tap the rich district now being opened up by the

soldier settlers, and will form the first link to the Congo Basin. A new line from Nyasaland to Chindio on the Zambesi has been constructed. An extension of the existing system to Lake Nyasa is now being considered, and in East Africa generally we are trying not only railways, but all forms of light transport, including road railways. I am not at all sure that the tank has not a part to play in some of these countries. I do not mean the war tank, but a caterpillar vehicle capable of collecting the produce from the scattered estates and bringing it to the railways.

The Northern Nigerian Railway which we carried through many years ago at the Colonial Office is now a very paying, prosperous proposition, and it is joined up with the Southern Nigerian Railway crossing the Niger by a fine bridge at Jebba. It reaches right up to Kano, with a branch to Bauchi. The bridge across the Benue River will contain a span 800 feet in length, and will be the third longest span in the British Empire. The whole of Nigeria is self-supporting. It is moving rapidly ahead. The natives are very prosperous. We have difficulty in getting them to come forward as soldiers, although the force maintained is a very small one, on account of the big wages to be obtained. The cost of export to Lancashire of cotton would be very much less if it were not that the local purchaser was attracted by the idea of being able to wear clothes in increasing abundance. There is no doubt that the two Nigerias will absolutely vindicate the exertions made on their behalf by the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. They constitute one of the most solid and valuable possessions of the British Crown, and will repay handsomely any further support by British credit which they may need. The extension of the Nigerian Eastern Railway, which at present consists of a line of 150 miles, is being taken in hand, and when complete the whole Eastern system will have 600 miles of line and will serve the rich tin mines. There are both coal and tin mines, and these are all capable of being worked, not by shafts, but by galleries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is the coal rich?

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Not compared to the best fields of England, but quite enough to run the whole of Nigeria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I mean the quality.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: The quality is fairly good, quite good enough. At the terminus of the Eastern Railway on the Nigerian coast an important wharfage scheme has been planned. We are spending on it half-a-million, not of our money, Nigerian money. The most important wharfage scheme is at Lagos, where $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions are being spent on the terminus of the main railway—1,800 feet of wharves built of concrete blocks, and so on. A deep-water harbour is contemplated at Secondee on the Gold Coast. Thus we are steadily developing, in spite of the difficulties of the present time, our great tropical possessions.

Coming to the other side of the world, a small but necessary extension of the Ceylon Government Railway has been undertaken to open up rice-growing districts and relieve the Colony from her dependence on oversea sources of food supply. Then we come to the Federated Malay States. Their railways were joined up with the Siamese Government Railways on the 1st July, 1918. The Federated Malay States railway system now comprises 950 miles of line, all built out of current revenue, and loans have been made to Siam by the Federated Malay States on easy terms to enable the connexion to be made between the two systems—a through train now runs from Singapore to Bangkok, and a further connexion is being made along the East Coast.

The Federated Malay States form a most important feature in our administration. The Conference will remember the gift of the battleship "Malaya" in the year 1912 just in the nick of time for it to be ready. It was the most powerful battleship then constructed. It was one of the five fast and powerful battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" type, and cost £3,000,000. Had our dreams of a great sea battle materialized there is no doubt that these ships would have played a very decisive part in turning the head of the enemy's line. In many other ways the Federated Malay States have voluntarily

come to our aid. They have given us more assistance than any other part of the Colonial Empire has been able to do. At the present moment they are hard hit on account of the tin and rubber prices prevailing, but I am sure these conditions are temporary. The modern world cannot get on without these commodities. Then I mention the name of the great port of Singapore, that is a matter which the Conference will have brought before them on other days when we discuss Pacific strategy generally, but it will certainly bulk increasingly largely in all our minds as the years go by.

Now, I have only one other topic which I wish to refer to because I do not want to trespass too long on the attention of the Conference. It was raised by Mr. Srinivasa Sastri this morning, the question of the Indian settlers in some of our Colonies, and no doubt that problem also occurs in South Africa to a certain extent. I think there is only one ideal that the British Empire can set before itself in this regard, and that is that there should be no barrier of race, colour, or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it. At any rate I do not feel able to adopt any lesser statement of principle in regard to the Colonies, but such a principle has to be very carefully and gradually applied because intense local feelings are excited, and there is no doubt that extraordinary social stresses arise when populations are intimately mingled in some of these new countries and brought into severe economic competition. The question reaches its most acute form in Kenya.

These matters are now being discussed, and I hope to find a means of overcoming difficulties in the application of the broad principles.

There is one other point which I should mention, that is the Tanganyika territory which was acquired in the War. It was wrecked in the War; and we had to form an entirely new Administration over the whole place. We have endeavoured to equip it with a Government not inferior to the German Administration which it had replaced, with the result, that in the present year, we shall have a considerable deficit on the

Colony's administration, and I am very sorry to say that of the £1,500,000 which I asked for, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unable to afford to give me more than £914,000, and I am afraid that in a year or two the state of the Tanganyika Territory will compare unfavourably with its progress and prosperity when it was in the hands of our late opponents. However, we will do the best we can.

I think, Prime Minister, although that is not by any means all I could say, because, frankly, I could go on all night talking of these places one by one—I think that gives the members of the Conference a view of that other enormous section of the British Empire, which, at any rate, ought to be present in our minds for the completeness of the discussion which is now in progress.

[NOTE: The report of the Conference, as published by the British Government, contains a statement by Mr. Balfour on the League of Nations (Appendix II), the report of the Imperial Air Communications Committee (Appendix III), a memorandum on the Intercommunication and Dissemination of News within the British Empire (Appendix IV), a report of a Conference on State-Aided Empire Settlement (Appendix V), a memorandum on Empire Patent (Appendix VI), a memorandum on the Nationality of Children Born Abroad of British Parents (Appendix VII), and the Reply from His Majesty the King to the Address from the Conference (Appendix VIII). Lack of space has made it necessary to omit them in this reprint.—*The Editors.*]

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-145 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
148. Certain Aspects of Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
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RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

PROPOSALS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, JULY 20, 1921 AND
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. LLOYD GEORGE
AND MR. DE VALERA



NOVEMBER, 1921

No. 168

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 47.

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I

PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

JULY 20, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 15, 1921)

The British Government are actuated by an earnest desire to end the unhappy divisions between Great Britain and Ireland, which have produced so many conflicts in the past and which have once more shattered the peace and well-being of Ireland at the present time. They long with his Majesty the King, in the words of his Gracious Speech in Ireland last month, for a satisfactory solution of "those age-long Irish problems which for generations embarrassed our forefathers, as they now weigh heavily upon us"; and they wish to do their utmost to secure that "every man of Irish birth, whatever be his creed and wherever be his home, should work in loyal cooperation with the free communities on which the British Empire is based."

They are convinced that the Irish people may find as worthy and as complete an expression of their political and spiritual ideals within the Empire as any of the numerous and varied nations united in allegiance to his Majesty's Throne; and they desire such a consummation, not only for the welfare of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Empire as a whole, but also for the cause of peace and harmony throughout the world. There is no part of the world where Irishmen have made their home but suffers from our ancient feuds; no part of it but looks to this meeting between the British Government and the Irish leaders to resolve these feuds in a new understanding honorable and satisfactory to all the peoples involved.

The free nations which compose the British Empire are drawn from many races, with different histories, traditions, and ideals. In the Dominion of Canada, British and French have long forgotten the bitter conflicts which divided their

ancestors. In South Africa the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State have joined with two British Colonies to make a great self-governing union under his Majesty's sway. The British people cannot believe that where Canada and South Africa, with equal or even greater difficulties, have so signally succeeded Ireland will fail; and they are determined that, so far as they themselves can assure it, nothing shall hinder Irish statesmen from joining together to build up an Irish State in free and willing cooperation with the other peoples of the Empire.

Moved by these considerations, the British Government invite Ireland to take her place in the great association of free nations over which his Majesty reigns. As earnest of their desire to obliterate old quarrels and to enable Ireland to face the future with her own strength and hope, they propose that Ireland shall assume forthwith the status of a Dominion, with all the powers and privileges set forth in this document. By the adoption of Dominion status, it is understood that Ireland shall enjoy complete autonomy in taxation and finance; that she shall maintain her own Courts of law and Judges; that she shall maintain her own military forces for home defence, her own constabulary, and her own police; that she shall take over the Irish postal services and all matters relating thereto, education, land, agriculture, mines and minerals, forestry, housing, labor, unemployment, transport, trade, public health, health insurance, and the liquor traffic; and, in sum, that she shall exercise all those powers and privileges upon which the autonomy of the self-governing Dominions is based, subject only to the considerations set out in the ensuing paragraphs. Guaranteed in these liberties, which no foreign people can challenge without challenging the Empire as a whole, the Dominions hold each and severally by virtue of their British fellowship a standing amongst the nations equivalent not merely to their individual strength, but to the combined power and influence of all the nations of the Commonwealth. That guarantee, that fellowship, that freedom the whole Empire looks to Ireland to accept.

To this settlement the British Government are prepared to give immediate effect upon the following conditions, which are, in their opinion, vital to the welfare and safety of both Great Britain and Ireland, forming as they do the heart of the Commonwealth.

- I. The common concern of Great Britain and Ireland in the defence of their interests by land and sea shall be mutually recognized. Great Britain lives by sea-borne food; her communications depend upon the freedom of the great sea routes. Ireland lies at Britain's side across the sea-ways north and south that link her with the sister nations of the Empire, the markets of the world, and the vital sources of her food supply. In recognition of this fact, which nature has imposed and no statesmanship can change, it is essential that the Royal Navy alone should control the seas around Ireland and Great Britain, and that such rights and liberties should be accorded to it by the Irish State as are essential for naval purposes in the Irish harbors and on the Irish coasts.
- II. In order that the movement towards the limitation of armaments which is now making progress in the world should in no way be hampered, it is stipulated that the Irish Territorial Force shall within reasonable limits conform in respect of numbers to the military establishments of the other parts of these islands.
- III. The position of Ireland is also of great importance for the air services both military and civil. The Royal Air Force will need facilities for all purposes that it serves; and Ireland will form an essential link in the development of air routes between the British Isles and the North American Continent. It is therefore stipulated that Great Britain shall have all necessary facilities for the development of defence and of communications by air.
- IV. Great Britain hopes that Ireland will in due course and of her own free will contribute in proportion to her wealth to the Regular Naval, Military, and Air Forces of the Empire. It is further assumed that voluntary recruitment for these Forces will be permitted throughout Ireland, particularly for those famous Irish regiments which have so long and so gallantly served his Majesty in all parts of the world.

- V. While the Irish people shall enjoy complete autonomy in taxation and finance, it is essential to prevent a recurrence of ancient differences between the two islands, and in particular to avert the possibility of ruinous trade wars. With this object in view, the British and Irish Governments shall agree to impose no protective duties or other restrictions upon the flow of transport, trade, and commerce between all parts of these islands.
- VI. The Irish people shall agree to assume responsibility for a share of the present debt of the United Kingdom and of the liability for pensions arising out of the Great War, the share, in default of agreement between the Governments concerned, to be determined by an independent arbitrator appointed from within his Majesty's Dominions.

In accordance with these principles, the British Government propose that the conditions of settlement between Great Britain and Ireland shall be embodied in the form of a Treaty, to which effect shall in due course be given by the British and Irish Parliaments. They look to such an instrument to obliterate old conflicts forthwith, to clear the way for a detailed settlement in full accordance with Irish conditions and needs, and thus to establish a new and happier relation between Irish patriotism and that wider community of aims and interests by which the unity of the whole Empire is freely sustained.

The form in which the settlement is to take effect will depend upon Ireland herself. It must allow for full recognition of the existing powers and privileges of the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland, which cannot be abrogated except by their own consent. For their part, the British Government entertain an earnest hope that the necessity of harmonious cooperation amongst Irishmen of all classes and creeds will be recognized throughout Ireland, and they will welcome the day when by these means unity is achieved. But no such common action can be secured by force. Union came in Canada by the free consent of the Provinces. So in Australia; so in South Africa. It will come in Ireland by no other way than consent. There can, in fact, be no settlement

on terms involving, on the one side or the other, that bitter appeal to bloodshed and violence which all men of good will are longing to terminate.

The British Government will undertake to give effect, so far as that depends on them, to any terms in this respect on which all Ireland unites. But in no conditions can they consent to any proposals which would kindle civil war in Ireland. Such a war would not touch Ireland alone, for partisans would flock to either side from Great Britain, the Empire, and elsewhere, with consequences more devastating to the welfare both of Ireland and the Empire than the conflict to which a truce has been called this month. Throughout the Empire there is a deep desire that the day of violence should pass, and that a solution should be found, consonant with the highest ideals and interests of all parts of Ireland, which will enable her to cooperate as a willing partner in the British Commonwealth.

The British Government will therefore leave Irishmen themselves to determine by negotiations between them whether the new powers which the pact defines shall be taken over by Ireland as a whole and administered by a single Irish body, or taken over separately by Southern and Northern Ireland, with or without a joint authority to harmonize their common interests. They will willingly assist in the negotiation of such a settlement, if Irishmen should so desire.

By these proposals the British Government sincerely believe that they will have shattered the foundations of that ancient hatred and distrust which have disfigured our common history for centuries past. The future of Ireland within the Commonwealth is for the Irish people to shape.

In the foregoing proposals the British Government have attempted no more than the broad outline of a settlement. The details they leave for discussion when the Irish people have signified their acceptance of the principle of this pact.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

10, Downing-street, S. W. 1, July 20.

II

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA

AUGUST 10, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 15, 1921)Office of the President, Dublin,
Mansion House, August 10, 1921

Sir: On the occasion of our last interview I gave it as my judgment that Dail Eireann could not, and that the Irish people would not, accept the proposals of your Government as set forth in the draft of July 20, which you had presented to me. Having consulted my colleagues, and with them given these proposals the most earnest consideration, I now confirm that judgment.

The outline given in the draft is self-contradictory, and "the principle of the pact" not easy to determine. To the extent that it implies a recognition of Ireland's separate nationhood and her right to self-determination, we appreciate and accept it. But in the stipulations and express conditions concerning the matters that are vital, the principle is strangely set aside, and a claim advanced by your Government to an interference in our affairs, and to a control which we cannot admit.

Ireland's right to choose for herself the path she shall take to realize her own destiny must be accepted as indefeasible. It is a right that has been maintained through centuries of oppression and at the cost of unparalleled sacrifice and untold suffering, and it will not be surrendered. We cannot propose to abrogate or impair it, nor can Britain or any other foreign State or group of States legitimately claim to interfere with its exercise in order to serve their own special interests.

The Irish people's belief is that the national destiny can best be realized in political detachment, free from Imperialistic entanglements, which they feel will involve enterprises out of harmony with the national character, prove destructive

of their ideals, and be fruitful only of ruinous wars, crushing burdens, social discontent, and general unrest and unhappiness.

Like the small States of Europe, they are prepared to hazard their independence on the basis of moral right, confident that, as they would threaten no nation or people, they would in turn be free from aggression themselves. This is the policy they have declared for in plebiscite after plebiscite, and the degree to which any other line of policy deviates from it must be taken as a measure of the extent to which external pressure is operative and violence is being done to the wishes of the majority.

As for myself and my colleagues, it is our deep conviction that true friendship with England, which military coercion has frustrated for centuries, can be obtained most readily now through amicable, but absolute separation. The fear, groundless though we believe it to be, that Irish territory may be used as the basis for an attack upon England's liberties, can be met by reasonable guarantees not inconsistent with Irish sovereignty.

"Dominion status" for Ireland every one who understands the conditions knows to be illusory. The freedom which the British Dominions enjoy is not so much the result of legal enactments or of treaties as of the immense distances which separate them from Britain and have made interference by her impracticable. The most explicit guarantees, including the Dominions' acknowledged right to secede, would be necessary to secure for Ireland an equal degree of freedom. There is no suggestion, however, in the proposals made of any such guarantees. Instead, the natural position is reversed; our geographical situation with respect to Britain is made the basis of denials and restrictions unheard of in the case of the Dominions; the smaller island must give military safeguards and guarantees to the larger and suffer itself to be reduced to the position of a helpless dependency.

It should be obvious that we could not urge the acceptance of such proposals upon our people. A certain treaty of free

association with the British Commonwealth group, as with a partial league of nations, we would have been ready to recommend, and as a Government to negotiate and take responsibility for, had we an assurance that the entry of the nation as a whole into such association would secure for it the allegiance of the present dissenting minority, to meet whose sentiment alone this step could be contemplated.

Treaties dealing with the proposals for free inter-trade and mutual limitation of armaments we are ready at any time to negotiate. Mutual agreement for facilitating air communications, as well as railway and other communications, can we feel certain also be effected. No obstacle of any kind will be placed by us in the way of that smooth commercial intercourse which is essential in the life of both islands, each the best customer and the best market of the other. It must, of course, be understood that all treaties and agreements would have to be submitted for ratification to the national Legislature in the first instance, and subsequently to the Irish people as a whole, under circumstances which would make it evident that their decision would be a free decision, and that every element of military compulsion was absent.

The question of Ireland's liability "for a share of the present debt of the United Kingdom" we are prepared to leave to be determined by a board of arbitrators, one appointed by Ireland, one by Great Britain, and a third to be chosen by agreement, or in default, to be nominated, say, by the President of the United States of America, if the President would consent.

As regards the question at issue between the political minority and the great majority of the Irish people, that must remain a question for the Irish people themselves to settle. We cannot admit the right of the British Government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest or at the call of any section of our population. We do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation. We agree with you "that no common action can be secured by force." Our regret is that this

wise and true principle which your Government prescribes to us for the settlement of our local problem it seems unwilling to apply consistently to the fundamental problem of the relations between our island and yours. The principle we rely on in the one case we are ready to apply in the other, but should this principle not yield an immediate settlement we are willing that this question too be submitted to external arbitration.

Thus we are ready to meet you in all that is reasonable and just. The responsibility for initiating and effecting an honorable peace rests primarily not with our Government but with yours. We have no conditions to impose, no claims to advance but the one, that we be freed from aggression. We reciprocate, with a sincerity to be measured only by the terrible sufferings our people have undergone, the desire you express for mutual and lasting friendship. The sole cause of the "ancient feuds" which you deplore has been, as we know, and as history proves, the attacks of English rulers upon Irish liberties. These attacks can cease forthwith, if your Government has the will. The road to peace and understanding lies open.

I am, Sir, faithfully yours,

EAMON DE VALERA

The Right Hon. David Lloyd George,

10, Downing-street,
Whitehall, London.

III

LETTER OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE

August 13, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 15, 1921)

10, Downing-street, S.W., August 13, 1921

Sir: The earlier part of your letter is so much opposed to our fundamental position that we feel bound to leave you in

no doubt of our meaning. You state that after consulting your colleagues you confirm your declaration that our proposals are such as Dail Eireann could not, and the Irish people would not, accept. You add that the outline given in our draft is self-contradictory, and the principle of the pact offered to you not easy to determine. We desire, therefore, to make our position absolutely clear.

In our opinion, nothing is to be gained by prolonging a theoretical discussion of the national status which you may be willing to accept, as compared with that of the great self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth, but we must direct your attention to one point upon which you lay some emphasis, and upon which no British Government can compromise—namely, the claim that we should acknowledge the right of Ireland to secede from her allegiance to the King. No such right can ever be acknowledged by us. The geographical propinquity of Ireland to the British Isles is a fundamental fact. The history of the two islands for many centuries, however it is read, is sufficient proof that their destinies are indissolubly linked. Ireland has sent members to the British Parliament for more than a hundred years. Many thousands of her people during all that time have enlisted freely and served gallantly in the Forces of the Crown. Great numbers in all the Irish provinces are profoundly attached to the Throne. These facts permit of one answer, and one only, to the claim that Britain should negotiate with Ireland as a separate and foreign Power.

When you, as the chosen representative of Irish national ideals, came to speak with me, I made one condition only, of which our proposals plainly stated the effect—that Ireland should recognize the force of geographical and historical facts. It is those facts which govern the problem of British and Irish relations. If they did not exist, there would be no problem to discuss.

I pass, therefore, to the conditions which are imposed by these facts. We set them out clearly in six clauses in our former proposals, and need not restate them here, except to

say that the British Government cannot consent to the reference of any such questions, which concern Great Britain and Ireland alone, to the arbitration of a foreign Power.

We are profoundly glad to have your agreement that Northern Ireland cannot be coerced. This point is of great importance, because the resolve of our people to resist with their full power any attempt at secession by one part of Ireland carries with it of necessity an equal resolve to resist any effort to coerce another part of Ireland to abandon its allegiance to the Crown. We gladly give you the assurance that we will concur in any settlement which Southern and Northern Ireland may make for Irish unity within the six conditions already laid down, which apply to Southern and Northern Ireland alike; but we cannot agree to refer the question of your relation with Northern Ireland to foreign arbitration.

The conditions of the proposed settlement do not arise from any desire to force our will upon people of another race, but from facts which are as vital to Ireland's welfare as to our own. They contain no derogation from Ireland's status as a Dominion, no desire for British ascendancy over Ireland, and no impairment of Ireland's national ideals.

Our proposals present to the Irish people an opportunity such as has never dawned in their history before. We have made them in the sincere desire to achieve peace; but beyond them we cannot go. We trust that you will be able to accept them in principle. I shall be ready to discuss their application in detail whenever your acceptance in principle is communicated to me.

I am yours faithfully,

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Eamon de Valera, Esq.,
The Mansion House, Dublin

IV

LETTER OF GENERAL SMUTS

AUGUST 4, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 15, 1921)

Savoy Hotel, London,

August 4, 1921

My dear de Valera: Lane duly reported to me the substance of his conversations with you and handed me your letter of the 31st July. He told me of your anxiety to meet and discuss the situation with Ulster Representatives. Since then I have, as I wired you yesterday, done my best to bring about such a meeting, but Sir James Craig, while willing to meet you in a Conference with Mr. Lloyd George, still remains unwilling to meet you in his absence, and nothing that I have been able to do or say has moved him from that attitude. If you were to request a meeting with him, he will reply, setting forth his position, and saying that Ulster will not be moved from the constitutional position which she occupies under the existing legislation; she is satisfied with her present status, and will on no account agree to any change.

On the other hand, both in your conversation with Lane and in your letter, you insist on Ulster coming in to a United Ireland Constitution, and unless that is done you say that no further progress can be made. There is therefore an *impasse*, which I do not at present know how to get over. Both you and Craig are equally immovable. Force as a solution of the problem is out of the question, both on your and his premises. The process of arriving at an agreement will therefore take time.

The result is that at this stage I can be of no further use in this matter, and I have therefore decided to adhere to my plan of sailing for South Africa to-morrow. This I regret most deeply, as my desire to help in pushing the Irish settlement one stage further has been very great. But I must bow to the inevitable.

I should like to add a word in reference to the situation as I have come to view it. I have discussed it very fully with you and your colleagues. I have also probed as deeply as I could into the Ulster position. My conviction is that for the present no solution based on Ulster coming into the Irish State will succeed. Ulster will not agree, she cannot be forced, and any solution on those lines is at present foredoomed to failure.

I believe that it is in the interest of Ulster to come in, and that the force of community of interests will over a period of years prove so great and compelling that Ulster will herself decide to join the Irish State. But at present an Irish settlement is only possible if the hard facts are calmly faced and Ulster is left alone. Not only will she not consent to come in, but even if she does, the Irish State will, I fear, start under such a handicap of internal friction and discordance that the result may well be failure once more.

My strong advice to you is to leave Ulster alone for the present, as the only line along which a solution is practicable; to concentrate on a free Constitution for the remaining twenty-six counties, and through a successful running of the Irish State and the pull of economic and other peaceful forces, eventually to bring Ulster into that State. I know how repugnant such a solution must be to all Irish patriots, who look upon Irish unity as a *sine qua non* of any Irish settlement. But the wise man, while fighting for his ideal to the uttermost, learns also to bow to the inevitable. And a humble acceptance of the facts is often the only way of finally overcoming them. It proved so in South Africa, where ultimate unity was only realized through several stages and a process of years; and where the Republican ideal for which we have made unheard-of sacrifices had ultimately to give way to another form of Freedom.

My belief is that Ireland is travelling the same painful road as South Africa, and that with wisdom and moderation in her leadership, she is destined to achieve no less success. As I said to you before, I do not consider one single clean-cut solution of the Irish question possible at present. You will have

to pass through several stages, of which a free Constitution for Southern Ireland is the first, and the inclusion of Ulster and the full recognition of Irish unity will be the last. Only the first stage will render the last possible, as cause generates effect. To reverse the process and to begin with Irish unity as the first step is to imperil the whole settlement. Irish unity should be the ideal to which the whole process should be directed.

I do not ask you to give up your ideal, but only to realize it in the only way which seems to me at present practicable. Freedom will lead inevitably to unity; therefore begin with Freedom—with a free constitution for the 26 counties—as the first and most important step in the whole settlement.

As to the form of that Freedom, here too you are called upon to choose between two alternatives. To you, as you say, the Republic is the true expression of national self-determination. But it is not the only expression; and it is an expression which means your final and irrevocable severance from the British League. And to this, as you know, the Parliament and people of this country will not agree.

The British Prime Minister has made you an offer of the other form of Freedom—of Dominion status—which is working with complete success in all parts of the British League. Important British Ministers have described Dominion status in terms which must satisfy all you could legitimately wish for. Mr. Lloyd George in his historic reply to General Hertzog at Paris, Mr. Bonar Law in a celebrated declaration in the House of Commons, Lord Milner, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, have stated their views, and they coincide with the highest claims which Dominion statesmen have ever put forward on behalf of their free nations.

What is good enough for these nations ought surely to be good enough for Ireland too. For Irishmen to say to the world that they will not be satisfied with the status of the great British Dominions would be to alienate all that sympathy which has so far been the main support of the Irish cause.

The British Prime Minister offers complete Dominion status to the 26 counties, subject to certain strategic safeguards which you are asked to agree to voluntarily as a free Dominion, and which we South Africans agreed to as a free nation in the Union of South Africa. To my mind, such an offer by a British Prime Minister, who—unlike his predecessors—is in a position to deliver the goods, is an event of unique importance.

You are no longer offered a Home Rule scheme of the Gladstone or Asquith type, with its limited powers, and reservations of a fundamental character. Full Dominion status, with all it is and implies, is yours—if you will but take it. It is far more than was offered the Transvaal and Free State, who fought for Freedom one of the greatest wars in the history of Great Britain, and one which reduced their own countries to ashes and their little people to ruins.

They accepted the far less generous offer that was made to them; from that foothold they then proceeded to improve their position, until to-day South Africa is a happy, contented, united, and completely free country. What they have finally achieved after years of warfare and political evolution is now offered to you—not in doles or instalments, but at once and completely. If, as I hope, you accept, you will become a sister Dominion in a great circle of equal States, who will stand beside you and shield you and protect your new rights as if these were their own rights; who will view an invasion of your rights or a violation of your status as if it was an invasion and a violation of their own, and who will thus give you the most effective guarantee possible against any possible arbitrary interference by the British Government with your rights and position. In fact, the British Government will have no further basis of interference with your affairs, as your relations with Great Britain will be a concern not of the British Government but of the Imperial Conference, of which Great Britain will be only one of seven members. Any questions in issue between you and the British Government will be for the Imperial Conference to decide. You will be a free member of

a great League, of which most of the other members will be in the same position as yourself; and the Conference will be the forum for thrashing out any questions which may arise between members. This is the nature and the constitutional practice of Dominion Freedom.

The difficulty in Ireland is no longer a constitutional difficulty. I am satisfied that from the constitutional point of view a fair settlement of the Irish question is now possible and practicable. It is the human difficulty which remains. The Irish question is no longer a constitutional but mostly a human problem.

A history such as yours must breed a temper, an outlook, passions, suspicions, which it is most difficult to deal with. On both sides sympathy is called for, generosity, and a real largeness of soul. I am sure that both the English and Irish peoples are ripe for a fresh start. The tragic horror of recent events, followed so suddenly by a truce and fraternizing all along the line, has set flowing deep fountains of emotion in both peoples and created a new political situation.

It would be the gravest reflection on our statesmanship if this auspicious moment is allowed to pass. You and your friends have now a unique opportunity—such as Parnell and his predecessors and successors never had—to secure an honorable and lasting peace for your people.

I pray God that you may be wisely guided, and that peace may now be concluded, before tempers again change and perhaps another generation of strife ensues.

Ever yours sincerely,

J. C. SMUTS

Eamon de Valera, Esq.,
Mansion House,
Dublin.

V

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA, AUGUST 24, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 27, 1921)

Dublin, Mansion House,
August 24, 1921

Sir: The anticipatory judgment I gave in my reply of August 10 has been confirmed. I laid the proposals of your Government before Dail Eireann, and, by a unanimous vote, it has rejected them.

From your letter of August 13 it was clear that the principle we were asked to accept was that the "geographical propinquity" of Ireland to Britain imposed the condition of the subordination of Ireland's right to Britain's strategic interests as she conceives them, and that the very length and persistence of the efforts made in the past to compel Ireland's acquiescence in a foreign domination imposed the condition of acceptance of that domination now.

We cannot believe that your Government intended to commit itself to a principle of sheer militarism destructive of international morality and fatal to the world's peace. If a small nation's right to independence is forfeit when a more powerful neighbor covets its territory for the military or other advantages it is supposed to confer there is an end to liberty. No longer can any small nation claim a right to a separate sovereign existence. Holland and Denmark can be made subservient to Germany, Belgium to Germany or to France, Portugal to Spain. If nations that have been forcibly annexed to Empires lose thereby their title to independence, there can be for them no rebirth to freedom. In Ireland's case, to speak of her seceding from a partnership she has not accepted, or from an allegiance which she has not undertaken to render, is fundamentally false, just as the claim to subordinate her independence to British strategy is fundamentally unjust. To neither can we, as the representatives of the nation, lend countenance.

If our refusal to betray our nation's honor and the trust that has been reposed in us is to be made an issue of war by Great Britain, we deplore it. We are as conscious of our responsibilities to the living as we are mindful of principle or of our obligations to the heroic dead. We have not sought war, nor do we seek war, but if war be made upon us we must defend ourselves and shall do so, confident that whether our defence be successful or unsuccessful no body of representative Irishmen or Irishwomen will ever propose to the nation the surrender of its birthright.

We long to end the conflict between Britain and Ireland. If your Government be determined to impose its will upon us by force and, antecedent to negotiation, to insist upon conditions that involve a surrender of our whole national position and make negotiation a mockery, the responsibility for the continuance of the conflict rests upon you.

On the basis of the broad guiding principle of government by the consent of the governed, peace can be secured—a peace that will be just and honorable to all, and fruitful of concord and enduring amity. To negotiate such a peace, Dail Eireann is ready to appoint its representatives, and, if your Government accepts the principle proposed, to invest them with plenary powers to meet and arrange with you for its application in detail.

I am, Sir, faithfully yours,

EAMON DE VALERA

The Right Hon. David Lloyd George,
10, Downing-street,
Whitehall, London.

VI

LETTER OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE, AUGUST 26, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 27, 1921).

10, Downing-street, London, S.W. 1,

August 26, 1921

Sir: The British Government are profoundly disappointed by your letter of August 24, which was delivered to me yester-

day. You write of the conditions of a meeting between us as though no meeting had ever taken place. I must remind you, therefore, that when I asked you to meet me six weeks ago I made no preliminary conditions of any sort. You came to London on that invitation and exchanged views with me at three meetings of considerable length. The proposals which I made to you after those meetings were based upon full and sympathetic consideration of the views which you expressed. As I have already said, they were not made in any haggling spirit. On the contrary, my colleagues and I went to the very limit of our powers in endeavoring to reconcile British and Irish interests. Our proposals have gone far beyond all precedent, and have been approved as liberal by the whole civilized world. Even in quarters which have shown a sympathy with the most extreme of Irish claims, they are regarded as the utmost which the Empire can reasonably offer or Ireland reasonably expect. The only criticism of them which I have yet heard outside Ireland is from those who maintain that our proposals have outstepped both warrant and wisdom in their liberality. Your letter shows no recognition of this, and further negotiations must, I fear, be futile unless some definite progress is made towards acceptance of a basis.

You declare that our proposals involve a surrender of Ireland's whole national position and reduce her to subservience. What are the facts? Under the settlement which we have outlined Ireland would control every nerve and fiber of her national existence; she would speak her own language and make her own religious life; she would have complete power over taxation and finance, subject only to an agreement for keeping trade and transport as free as possible between herself and Great Britain, her best market; she would have uncontrolled authority over education and all the moral and spiritual interests of her race; she would have it also over law and order, over land and agriculture, over the conditions of labor and industry, over the health and homes of her people, and over her own land defence. She would, in fact, within the shores of Ireland, be free in every aspect of national activity,

national expression, and national development. The States of the American Union, sovereign though they be, enjoy no such range of rights. And our proposals go even further, for they invite Ireland to take her place as a partner in the great commonwealth of free nations united by allegiance to the King.

We consider that these proposals completely fulfil your wish that the principle of "government by consent of the governed" should be the broad guiding principle of the settlement which your plenipotentiaries are to negotiate. That principle was first developed in England, and is the mainspring of the representative institutions which she was the first to create. It was spread by her throughout the world, and is now the very life of the British Commonwealth. We could not have invited the Irish people to take their place in that Commonwealth on any other principle, and we are convinced that through it we can heal the old misunderstandings and achieve an enduring partnership as honorable to Ireland as to the other nations of which the Commonwealth consists.

But when you argue that the relations of Ireland with the British Empire are comparable in principle to those of Holland or Belgium with the German Empire, I find it necessary to repeat once more that those are premises which no British Government, whatever its complexion, can ever accept. In demanding that Ireland should be treated as a separate sovereign Power, with no allegiance to the Crown and no loyalty to the sister nations of the Commonwealth, you are advancing claims which the most famous national leaders in Irish history, from Grattan to Parnell and Redmond, have explicitly disowned. Grattan in a famous phrase declared that "the ocean protests against separation, and the sea against union." Daniel O'Connell, the most eloquent perhaps of all the spokesmen of the Irish national cause, protested thus in the House of Commons in 1830:

Never did monarch receive more undivided allegiance than the present King from the men who in Ireland agitate the Repeal of the Union. Never, too, was there a grosser calumny than to

assert that they wish to produce a separation between the two countries. Never was there a greater mistake than to suppose that we wish to dissolve the connection.

And in a well-known letter to the Duke of Wellington in 1845, Thomas Davis, the fervent exponent of the ideals of Young Ireland, wrote:

I do not seek a raw repeal of the Act of Union. I want you to retain the Imperial Parliament with its Imperial power. I ask you only to disencumber it of those cares which exhaust its patience and embarrass its attention. I ask you to give Ireland a Senate of some sort, selected by the people, in part or in whole; levying their Customs and Excise and other taxes; making their roads, harbors, railways, canals, and bridges; encouraging their manufactures, commerce, agriculture, and fisheries; settling their Poor Laws, their tithes, tenures, grand juries, and franchises; giving a vent to ambition, an opportunity for knowledge, restoring the absentees, securing work, and diminishing poverty, crime, ignorance, and discontent. This, were I an Englishman, I should ask for England, besides the Imperial Parliament. So would I for Wales, were I a Welshman, and for Scotland were I a Scotsman; this I ask for Ireland.

The British Government have offered Ireland all that O'Connell and Thomas Davis asked, and more; and we are met only by an unqualified demand that we should recognize Ireland as a foreign Power. It is playing with phrases to suggest that the principle of government by consent of the governed compels a recognition of that demand on our part, or that, in repudiating it we are straining geographical and historical considerations to justify a claim to ascendancy over the Irish race. There is no political principle, however clear, that can be applied without regard to limitations imposed by physical and historical facts. Those limitations are as necessary as the very principle itself to the structure of every free nation; to deny them would involve the dissolution of all democratic States. It is on these elementary grounds that we have called attention to the governing force of the geographical propinquity of these two islands, and of their long historic association despite great differences of character and race.

We do not believe that the permanent reconciliation of Great Britain and Ireland can ever be attained without a recognition of their physical and historical interdependence, which makes complete political and economic separation impracticable for both.

I cannot better express the British standpoint in this respect than in words used of the Northern and Southern States by Abraham Lincoln in the First Inaugural Address. They were spoken by him on the brink of the American Civil War, which he was striving to avert:

Physically speaking (he said) we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. . . . It is impossible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before. . . . Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

I do not think it can be reasonably contended that the relations of Great Britain and Ireland are in any different case.

I thought I had made it clear, both in my conversations with you and in my two subsequent communications, that we can discuss no settlement which involves a refusal on the part of Ireland to accept our invitation to free, equal, and loyal partnership in the British Commonwealth under one Sovereign. We are reluctant to precipitate the issue, but we must point out that a prolongation of the present state of affairs is dangerous. Action is being taken in various directions which, if continued, would prejudice the true and must ultimately lead to its termination. This would indeed be deplorable. Whilst, therefore, prepared to make every allowance as to time which will advance the cause of peace, we cannot prolong a mere exchange of notes. It is essential that some definite and immediate progress should be made towards a basis upon which further negotiations can usefully proceed. Your letter seems to us unfortunately to show no such progress.

In this, and my previous letters, I have set forth the considerations which must govern the attitude of his Majesty's Government in any negotiations which they undertake. If you are prepared to examine how far these considerations can be reconciled with the aspirations which you represent, I shall be happy to meet you and your colleagues.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Eamon de Valera, Esq.,
Mansion House, Dublin.

VII

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA, AUGUST 30, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 5, 1921)

Dublin, Mansion House,
August 30, 1921

Sir: We too are convinced that it is essential that some "definite and immediate progress should be made towards a basis upon which further negotiations can usefully proceed" and recognize the futility of a "mere exchange" of argumentative notes. I shall therefore refrain from commenting on the fallacious historical references in your last communication. The present is the reality with which we have to deal. The conditions to-day are the resultant of the past, accurately summing it up and giving in simplest form the essential data of the problem. These data are:

1. The people of Ireland, acknowledging no voluntary union with Great Britain, and claiming as a fundamental natural right to choose freely for themselves the path they shall take to realize their national destiny, have, by an overwhelming majority, declared for independence, set up a Republic, and more than once confirmed their choice.

2. Great Britain, on the other hand, acts as though Ireland were bound to her by a contract of union that forbade separation. The circumstances of the supposed contract are notorious, yet

on the theory of its validity the British Government and Parliament claim to rule and legislate for Ireland, even to the point of partitioning Irish territory against the will of the Irish people, and killing or casting into prison every Irish citizen who refuses allegiance.

The proposals of your Government submitted in the draft of July 20 are based fundamentally on the latter premises. We have rejected these proposals, and our rejection is irrevocable. They were *not* an invitation to Ireland to enter into "a free and willing" partnership with the free nations of the British Commonwealth. They were an invitation to Ireland to enter in a guise and under conditions which determine a status definitely inferior to that of these free States. Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand are all guaranteed against the domination of the major State, not only by the acknowledged constitutional rights which give them equality of status with Great Britain and absolute freedom from the control of the British Parliament and Government, but by the thousands of miles that separate them from Great Britain. Ireland would have the guarantees neither of distance nor of right. The conditions sought to be imposed would divide her into two artificial States, each destructive of the other's influence in any common council, and both subject to the military, naval, and economic control of the British Government.

The main historical and geographical facts are not in dispute, but your Government insists on viewing them from your standpoint. We must be allowed to view them from ours. The history that you interpret as dictating union we read as dictating separation. Our interpretations of the fact of "geographical propinquity" are no less diametrically opposed. We are convinced that ours is the true and just interpretation, and as a proof are willing that a neutral, impartial arbitrator should be the judge. You refuse, and threaten to give effect to your view by force. Our reply must be that if you adopt that course we can only resist, as the generations before us have resisted.

Force will not solve the problem. It will never secure the ultimate victory over reason and right. If you again resort to force, and if victory be not on the side of justice, the problem that confronts us will confront our successors. The fact that for 750 years this problem has resisted a solution by force is evidence and warning sufficient. It is true wisdom, therefore, and true statesmanship, not any false idealism, that prompts me and my colleagues. Threats of force must be set aside. They must be set aside from the beginning, as well as during the actual conduct of the negotiations. The respective plenipotentiaries must meet untrammelled by any conditions save the facts themselves, and must be prepared to reconcile their subsequent differences not by appeals to force, covert or open, but by reference to some guiding principle on which there is common agreement. We have proposed the principle of government by the consent of the governed, and do not mean it as a mere phrase. It is a simple expression of the test to which any proposed solution must respond if it is to prove adequate, and it can be used as a criterion for the details as well as for the whole. That you claim it as a peculiarly British principle, instituted by Britain, and "now the very life of the British Commonwealth," should make it peculiarly acceptable to you. On this basis and this only we see a hope of reconciling "the considerations which must govern the attitude" of Britain's representatives with the considerations that must govern the attitude of Ireland's representatives, and on this basis we are ready at once to appoint plenipotentiaries.

I am, Sir, faithfully yours,

EAMON DE VALERA

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George,
10, Downing-street, Whitehall, London.

VIII

LETTER OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE

SEPTEMBER 7, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 7, 1921)Town Hall, Inverness,
September 7, 1921

Sir: His Majesty's Government have considered your letter of August 30, and have to make the following observations upon it. The principle of "government by consent of the governed" is the foundation of British Constitutional development, but we cannot accept as a basis of practical conference an interpretation of that principle which would commit us to any demands which you might present, even to the extent of setting up a Republic and repudiating the Crown. You must be aware that conference on such a basis is impossible. So applied, the principle of "government by consent of the governed" would undermine the fabric of every democratic State, and drive the civilized world back into tribalism.

On the other hand, we have invited you to discuss our proposals on their merits in order that you may have no doubt as to the scope and sincerity of our intentions. It would be open to you in such a conference to raise the subject of guarantees on any points in which you may consider Irish freedom prejudiced by these proposals. His Majesty's Government are loath to believe that you will insist upon rejecting their proposals without examining them in conference. To decline to discuss a settlement which would bestow upon the Irish people the fullest freedom of national development within the Empire can only mean that you repudiate all allegiance to the Crown and all membership of the British Commonwealth. If we were to draw this inference from your letter then further discussion between us could serve no useful purpose and all conference would be vain. If, however, we are mistaken in this inference, as we still hope, and if your real objection to our proposals is that they offer Ireland less than the liberty

which we have described, that objection can be explored at a conference.

You will agree that this correspondence has lasted long enough. His Majesty's Government must, therefore, ask for a definite reply as to whether you are prepared to enter a conference to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as The British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations. If, as we hope, your answer is in the affirmative, I suggest that the conference should meet at Inverness on the 20th instant.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Eamon de Valera, Esq.,
Mansion House, Dublin.

IX

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 16, 1921)

Sir: We have no hesitation in declaring our willingness to enter a conference to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations. Our readiness to contemplate such an association was indicated in our letter of August 10. We have accordingly summoned Dail Eireann that we may submit to it for ratification the names of the representatives it is our intention to propose. We hope that these representatives will find it possible to be at Inverness on the date you suggest, September 20.

In this final note we deem it our duty to reaffirm that our position is, and can only be, as we have defined it throughout this correspondence. Our nation has formally declared its independence, and recognizes itself as a sovereign State. It is only as the representatives of that State and as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people. As regards the principle of "government by consent of the governed," in the very nature of things it must be the basis of any agreement that will achieve the

purpose we have at heart—that is, the final reconciliation of our nation with yours. We have suggested no interpretation of that principle save its everyday interpretation—the sense, for example, in which it was understood by the plain men and women of the world when on January 5, 1918, you said:

The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war.

These words are the true answer to the criticism of our position which your last letter puts forward. The principle which I understood then to mean the right of nations that had been annexed to empires against their will to free themselves from the grappling hook—that is the sense in which we understand it. In reality it is your Government, when it seeks to rend our ancient nation and to partition its territory, that would give to the principle an interpretation that “would undermine the fabric of every democratic State and drive the civilized world back into tribalism.”

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, EAMON DE VALERA
10, Downing-street, Whitehall, London.

X

LETTER OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE SEPTEMBER 15, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 16, 1921)

Sir: I informed your emissaries who came to me here on Tuesday, the 13th, that the reiteration of your claim to negotiate with his Majesty's Government as the representatives of an independent and sovereign State would make conference between us impossible. They brought me a letter from you in which you specifically reaffirm that claim, stating that your nation “has formally declared its independence and recognizes

itself as a sovereign State"; and "it is only," you added, "as the representatives of that State, and as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people." I asked them to warn you of the very serious effect of such a paragraph, and I offered to regard the letter as undelivered to me in order that you might have time to reconsider it.

Despite this intimation, you have now published the letter in its original form. I must accordingly cancel the arrangements for conference next week at Inverness, and must consult my colleagues on the course of action which this new situation necessitates. I will communicate this to you as soon as possible, but as I am for the moment laid up here a few days' delay is inevitable.

Meanwhile, I must make it absolutely clear that his Majesty's Government cannot reconsider the position which I have stated to you. If we accepted conference with your delegates on a formal statement of the claim which you have reaffirmed, it would constitute an official recognition by his Majesty's Government of the severance of Ireland from the Empire and of its existence as an independent Republic. It would, moreover, entitle you to declare as of right acknowledged by us that in preference to association with the British Empire you would pursue a closer association by treaty with some other foreign Power. There is only one answer possible to such a claim as that.

The great concessions which his Majesty's Government have made to the feeling of your people in order to secure a lasting settlement deserved, in my opinion, some more generous response, but, so far, every advance has been made by us. On your part you have not come to meet us by a single step, but have merely reiterated in phrases of emphatic challenge the letter and the spirit of your original claim.

I am, yours faithfully,

Eamon de Valera, Esq.
Mansion House, Dublin.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

XI

TELEGRAM OF MR. DE VALERA

SEPTEMBER 16, 1921

(Reprinted from the New York Times, September 17, 1921)

Sir: I received your telegram last night and am surprised that you do not see that, if we on our side accepted a conference on the basis of your letter of September 7th without making our position quite clear, Ireland's representatives would enter the conference with their position misunderstood and the cause of Ireland's right irreparably prejudiced. Throughout the conference that has taken place you have defined your government's position. We have defined ours.

If the positions were not so definitely opposed there would indeed be no problem to be discussed. It should be obvious that, in a case like ours, if there is to be any result, the negotiators must meet without prejudice and untrammelled by any conditions whatever except those imposed by the facts as they know them.

EAMON DE VALERA

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George,
Gairloch, Scotland.

XII

TELEGRAM OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1921

(Reprinted from the London Times, September 19, 1921)

Sir: I have received the communication which you telegraphed to me last night. It is idle to say that a conference in which we had already met your delegates as representatives of an independent and sovereign State would be a conference "without prejudice." To receive them as such would constitute a formal and official recognition of Ireland's severance from the King's domains. It would indeed entitle you, if you thought fit, to make a treaty of amity with the King, but it would equally entitle you to make no treaty at all, to break off the conference with us at any point, and by

a right which we ourselves had already recognized to negotiate a union of Ireland with a foreign power. It would also entitle you, if you insisted upon another appeal to force, to claim from foreign powers by our implicit admission the rights of lawful belligerents against the King, for if we dealt with you as a sovereign and independent State we should have no right to complain of other powers following our example. These would be the consequences of receiving your delegates as the representatives of an independent State. We are prepared, in the words of my letter of the 7th, to discuss with you "How the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations."

We cannot consent to any abandonment, however informal, of the principle of allegiance to the King, upon which the whole fabric of the empire and every constitution within it are based. It is fatal to that principle that your delegates in the conference should be there as the representatives of an independent and sovereign State. While you insist on claiming that, a conference between us is impossible.

I am, yours faithfully,

Eamon de Valera, Esq.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Mansion House, Dublin.

XIII

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA, SEPTEMBER 17, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 19, 1921)

Sir: In reply to your last telegram just received, I have only to say that I have already accepted your invitation in the exact words which you re-quote from your letter of the 7th inst. We have not asked you to abandon any principle, even informally, but surely you must understand that we can only recognize ourselves for what we are. If this self-recognition be made a reason for the cancellation of the conference, we regret it, but it seems inconsistent.

I have already had conferences with you, and in these conferences and in my written communications I have never

ceased to recognize myself for what I was and am. If this involves recognition on your part, then you have already recognized us. Had it been our desire to add to the solid substance of Ireland's right the veneer of the technicalities of international usage which you now introduce we might have claimed already the advantage of all these consequences which you fear would follow from the reception of our delegates now. Believe me, we have but one object at heart—the setting of the conference on such a basis of truth and reality as would make it possible to secure through it the result which the peoples of these two islands so ardently desire.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George

EAMON DE VALERA

XIV

TELEGRAM OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE

SEPTEMBER 18, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 19, 1921)

Sir: I have received your telegram of last night, and observe that it does not modify the claim that your delegates should meet us as the representatives of a sovereign and independent State.

You made no such condition in advance when you came to see me in July. I invited you then to meet me, in the words of my letter, as "the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland," and you accepted that invitation. From the very outset of our conversations I told you that we looked to Ireland to own allegiance to the British Throne and to make her future as a member of the British Commonwealth. That was the basis of our proposal, and we cannot alter it. The status which you now claim in advance for your delegates is in effect a repudiation of that basis.

I am prepared to meet your delegates, as I met you in July in the capacity of "chosen spokesmen" for your people to discuss the association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth. My colleagues and I cannot meet them as the

representatives of a sovereign and independent State without disloyalty on our part to the Throne and the Empire. I must, therefore, repeat that unless the second paragraph in your letter of the 12th is withdrawn, a conference between us is impossible.

Eamon de Valera, Esq.
Mansion House, Dublin.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

XV

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA

SEPTEMBER 19, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 20, 1921)

Sir: We have had no thought at any time of asking you to accept any conditions precedent to a conference. We would have thought it as unreasonable to expect you as a principal to recognize the Irish Republic, formally or informally, as that you should expect us, formally or informally, to surrender our national position. It is precisely because neither side accepts the position of the other that there is a dispute at all, and that a conference is necessary to search for and to discuss such adjustments as might compose it.

A treaty of accommodation and association properly concluded between the peoples of these two islands and between Ireland and the group of States in the British Commonwealth would, we believe, end the dispute for ever, and enable the two nations to settle down in peace, each pursuing its own individual development and contributing its own quota to civilization, but working together in free and friendly cooperation in affairs of agreed common concern. To negotiate such a treaty the respective representatives of the two nations must meet. If you seek to impose preliminary conditions which we must regard as involving a surrender of our whole position, they cannot meet.

Your last telegram makes it clear that misunderstandings are more likely to increase than to diminish, and the cause of

peace more likely to be retarded than advanced by a continuance of the present correspondence. We request you, therefore, to state whether your letter of September 7 is intended to be a demand for a surrender on our part or an invitation to a conference free on both sides, and without prejudice should agreement not be reached. If the latter, we readily confirm our acceptance of the invitation, and our appointed delegates will meet your Government's representatives at any time in the immediate future that you designate.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

EAMON DE VALERA

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George,
Gairloch, Scotland.

XVI

LETTER OF MR. LLOYD GEORGE

SEPTEMBER 29, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, September 30, 1921)

Sir: His Majesty's Government have given close and earnest consideration to the correspondence which has passed between us since their invitation to you to send delegates to a conference at Inverness. In spite of their sincere desire for peace and in spite of the more conciliatory tone of your latest communication they cannot enter a conference upon the basis of this correspondence. Notwithstanding your personal assurance to the contrary, which they much appreciate, it might be argued in the future that the acceptance of a conference on this basis had involved them in a recognition which no British Government can accord. On this point they must guard themselves against any possible doubt. There is no purpose to be served by any further interchange of explanatory and argumentative communications upon this subject. The position taken up by his Majesty's Government is fundamental to the existence of the British Empire, and they cannot alter it. My colleagues and I remain, however, keenly anxious to make, in cooperation with your delegates, another

determined effort to explore every possibility of a settlement by personal discussion. The proposals which we have already made have been taken by the whole world as proof that our endeavors for reconciliation and settlement are no empty form, and we feel that conference, not correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding such as we ardently desire to achieve. We, therefore, send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in London on October 11, where we can meet your delegates as spokesmen of the people whom you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish National aspirations.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Eamon de Valera, Esq.,
Mansion House, Dublin.

XVII

REPLY OF MR. DE VALERA

SEPTEMBER 30, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, October 1, 1921)

Sir: We received your letter of invitation to a conference in London, October 11, "with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish National aspirations."

Our respective positions have been stated and understood, and we agree that conference, not correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our delegates will meet you in London on the date mentioned, "to explore every possibility of a settlement by personal discussion."

Faithfully yours,

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George

EAMON DE VALERA

XVIII

THE CHOICE FOR IRELAND

SPEECH BY MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT BARNESLEY

AUGUST 27, 1921

(Reprinted from the *London Times*, August 29, 1921)

I have to apologize for being so long in coming here to receive this honor, but although I promised to come when I had less to do I do not see that time coming. I am fairly hard worked. There has never been a time, I think, in the history of any country when Ministers were as hard worked. In other countries they solved the problem by working them in shifts—which they changed pretty frequently. In France, since I became Prime Minister, there have been seven Ministers, in Italy six, and Germany nine. That is one way of getting through your work, but in no country is the lot of a Minister a happy one. The burdens are great. The worries are immense. It is just like when you get a strong man who is ill for the first time. He is a problem for his friends and his relations, especially if his recovery is slow—if he is badly bruised, and has lost a lot of blood, and is weaker than he was, and cannot make out why he does not recover immediately—and somebody says to him, "It is that doctor of yours." "You will never do any good as long as you have that doctor. I know something about him, and they all know something about him. Try Dr. Brown." Then Dr. Brown is tried, and when he comes it is the same thing over again. In the end he is induced to try more doctors, and all sorts of patent medicines are recommended.

Believe me, that is not the way things are going to come right. You must have time, patience, steadiness, and, above all, a quiet life. No more excitement, please, at home or abroad. There are some people who did not have enough fighting in the war. They stopped fighting abroad and they had to begin it again at home, and for two years after the war we had constant excitement. We had a larger number of

industrial disputes than probably we ever had. We got through that period, and I am glad of it, in the interests of everybody. We have settled the greatest industrial dispute that probably this country has ever seen, and, I think, settled it in a way which is a precedent and which gives all parties a share in the prosperity in the industry itself. There is not much to share yet—but it will come. I am a hopeful sort of person, because in the long run I think it is right. I am a believer in Providence, and when I see dark clouds I say “they will scatter by and by and, thank God, the same old sun is there behind.” I want the people in this country in the dark hour of industrial depression to remember that England has passed through worse times and got through. We shall do so yet, and I want to proceed in that confidence. When I went over to France the other day I met a number of foreign Ministers and they said to me, “You are an extraordinary people; you are the queerest people in the world. You never do quite what we expect you to do, and never do the sort of thing that we do. You had a strike which lasted four months. You had over a million people out. You had two or three millions of unemployed, and you never had a row. We do not understand you, and if you do not mind me saying so (said one of the ablest of them) that is the sort of thing that gives us confidence in Britain.” We managed to keep our heads, and I want to say to-day that common sense, steadiness, and the calm courage which was shown during the war will pull us through. I have met foreigners who came here when we were doing fairly well in the war and found us growling and grouching about generals, statesmen, and all sorts of people. The same people came here in March and April, 1918, when our line was broken, and when we did not know quite what was going to happen, and they said to me, “It was a different country. The people were calm. There was no excitement. There was a deep resolution, which was imprinted on every countenance, and we knew you people meant to get through with it whatever it cost, and it gave us a much greater idea of what England meant in the crisis.”

It is that calm courage I want us to keep, and then we shall get through all our troubles in the end. The whole world is suffering from the results of the war. It is inevitable. You cannot expect a country that spent so many thousand millions, spent in murder, in destruction, and five years' industry of the world not arrested but concentrated on ruin—you cannot have that and expect everything to go on as if nothing had happened; as if we had simply been enjoying six weeks' holiday, and had come back from the seaside stronger and better with fewer coins in our pocket than when we started, but still with a good bank balance. That is not going to happen. All the world is suffering from depression. America for three years drew the surplus wealth of Europe into her system. She had only about two years of war. Still she is suffering from the greatest depression that she has ever witnessed. There are about three or four millions out of work. Why? The purchasing power of the world is depleted and depressed. The prosperity of a shop does not depend upon the goods inside it. You may have the same goods—more goods as a matter of fact—but there is no one to buy. You may have the same staff, the same direction, but that shop is poorer. Why? The people around are poorer—and that is what is happening now. The world is poorer because of the war. We are the shop of the world, and we are suffering accordingly, but human industry will fill up things not merely here but throughout the world. The world's needs are great. They were not supplied during the war. They are greater than ever, and gradually they will begin to buy. We may have to pass through rather bad times, but they will gradually get better. They will not get better for growling about them. They will not get better for attempting quack remedies. Do not rush into folly. Do not say, "If you only did this we should be all right, or if you only tried that we should be all right." That is the wrong way. Keep on the steady path of common sense and experience, keep up your courage and the world will come right.

There are lots of troubles about. There is Ireland. When-

ever you are short of troubles, there is always Ireland to fall back upon, and when you have troubles it has only waited its turn. It is an old sore, and it has broken out afresh. Many efforts have been made to heal it by statesmen of old, and statesmen of new, by statesmen of one party, and statesmen of another party, and by statesmen of no party. Up to the present they have not succeeded. Sometimes it is the fault of one country, and sometimes the fault of another. Sometimes it is the fault of both. You can lash prejudice into frenzy and unwisdom. We have all got prejudices. I have seen anti-Irish prejudices lashed into unwisdom. I have seen anti-English prejudices on the other side lashed into unwisdom. For God's sake let us clear aside prejudices. The nation that lives on prejudices is doomed, just like the man who lives on hatred. I have never seen a man with a vendetta that I would trust with any job. He has no sense, he has no restraint, he has no judgment. The man is always obsessed with his idea. Whether it is in public or in private, trust no man who has got a vendetta in business or in politics, and nations' vendettas are just the same. It is a sour pasture, hatred; there is no strength in it; there is no nourishment in it; there is nothing but disappointment in it. Let us sweep them on one side, whatever it costs, even when there is reason for them. No nation can flourish in a swamp of hatred, and that is why I should like to see them swept aside on both sides.

I am proud to think that Britain has risen above all its prejudices—and given the Ministry a fair chance to speak in the name of the people of Britain to settle. There are prejudices which you can rouse. The wrongs are not all on one side. The injuries are not all on one side. The insults are not all on one side. There are recent ones that you could lash. I am glad that the people of Britain have swept them all on one side and said:—"Let us settle this old trouble." And when we have proposed terms that have never been proposed before by any English statesman to Ireland, I am glad to speak in the name of Britain when we are making that offer. They are terms that have commended themselves, not merely

to Britain, but to the whole civilized world. I have never witnessed such unanimity. There are quarters where there has been a very great readiness to criticize the action of Britain towards Ireland, sometimes, I think, unfairly—I would not mind saying often unfairly—but even in those quarters the terms we have offered to Ireland are described as fair and generous, and as terms that ought to be accepted. I trust that common sense will prevail.

It is difficult to say anything at this juncture that can be of any use, but whatever our views are, I think we have made it quite clear that we cannot countenance separation. We can no more countenance the tearing up of the United Kingdom than America could countenance the tearing up of the United States in the 'sixties. Our position is the position of the greatest liberal statesman that probably lived in modern times, Abraham Lincoln. There is no question of ascendancy, there is no question of domination, there is no question of one race tyrannizing over another. Unity does not involve thralldom; it is often the best guarantee of liberty. If you had severance it would lead in Ireland itself to the most cruel and terrible civil war that Ireland has ever seen. Help would be rushed in from all sides, from every part of the world, to assist the parties who were fighting out the battle. We could not witness a civil war of that kind at our own door which would involve our own people throughout the Empire, and other people as well. If Southern Ireland is not satisfied with freedom, but insists on separation, then I fear all hope of an accommodation must be abandoned.

But I trust that common sense will prevail, and that good counsel will be heeded. We only want to do what is fair and right and just. Courage is of two qualities—the higher part of courage is the courage that knows when to settle and face settlement. There is the courage of the man that faces his country's foes to the death. There is the greater courage of the man who, when he sees that the time has come for seeking an honorable peace, faces his own friends' obloquy. That is the more difficult, that is the more rare. That is the

courage which the country demands, and I trust it will be forthcoming.

If Ireland has the right to separation, so has Scotland, so has Wales. I belong to the smallest nationality in these islands. There is a larger number of people in that small country conversing in the native language of the race than you have got in Ireland talking their language. There is a great living literature there, written by some of the most cultured men in these islands. In that country there is an emphatic nationality; it is a distinctive nationality, it is a proud nationality, and, if they claim to set up an independent republic, we have got a greater claim than anybody in the whole British Empire to do so. But we know it would be folly for Wales, it would weaken the United Kingdom, it would weaken the Empire, weaken this great instrument of human freedom, that has been forged by wise men and by great events, and no Welsh patriot outside a lunatic asylum—and Welsh patriots don't go there—would ever dream of demanding it.

Scotland has as distinct a nationality as any nation in the world. It was independent not so very long ago; it has a great history, a great tradition, a great literature; and although it has not a language of its own it has a most distinctive accent of its own, an accent so distinctive that it is enough to justify a claim for separation. But Scotsmen do not forward the claim. Why? Because they know that when you had a separate Wales and a separate Scotland and a separate Ireland and a separate England there were feuds and quarrels and wars and bickerings and raids and forays and destruction and death, each little country intriguing with foreign countries on the Continent in order to encourage them in a war upon their neighbors. Why, they got Frenchmen to conquer Wales, and we got Frenchmen to help us to prevail in England, and Scotsmen were always working in with Frenchmen. That is what happened then. And are we to split up this United Kingdom at the moment when its unity of aim, its unity of action, has saved the world? Nothing else could have saved


it. Are we to choose this moment to begin in Ireland tearing a bit off, a second bit here, and a third there, and leaving the Empire shattered into fragments with no vitality, no power, no prestige, no glory, and of no use to the world?

I have been presiding at an Imperial Conference where we had not only old nations but young nations—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa—young nations, gallant nations, proud nations, fearless nations. An Australian is as proud of being an Australian as an Englishman is of being an Englishman; a Canadian is as proud of being a Canadian as an American is of being a citizen of the United States of America. They have got a sense of nationhood; they have got the sense of being a separate and distinct people; but all the same they have got the great sense of pride of belonging to this the greatest family of nations in the world, known as the British Empire. In spite of all indications to the contrary, in spite of speeches, and in spite of letters, I believe that when the Irish people realize that the essence of freedom is theirs, the substance of freedom is theirs, that real freedom is offered to them, and all that they are asked to do is to come into the proudest community of nations in the world as free men, I believe you will find that that gifted people, who are not devoid of political instinct, and who have a great record in the past, and produced great men—that they will realize that their destiny is greatest as a free people inside a free federation of free peoples.

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WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS



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No. 169

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on page 78.

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I

INVITATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE

To the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

The following invitation was sent to Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy:

August 11, 1921

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions also should be discussed.

Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the Powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these Powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It

may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreements as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy, will govern the final decision.

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of * * * * * to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

To the Republic of China

August 11, 1921

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.

It is quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

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Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of the Republic of China to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions, in connection with the Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament, to be held in Washington, on the 11th day of November, 1921.

To Belgium, The Netherlands and Portugal

October 4, 1921

The invitation of the President of the United States to the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan to send representatives to a Conference to be held in the City of Washington on November 11, 1921, on the subject of Limitation of Armaments, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, has been graciously accepted. The Government of China has also been pleased

to accept the President's invitation to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

It is the earnest wish of this Government that with the facilities afforded by a Conference it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, by a practical effort to reach such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship.

In view of the interest of Belgium in the Far East, the President desires to invite your Excellency's Government to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions at the Conference, and I have the honor to enclose herewith the tentative suggestions as to the agenda of the Conference, relating to Pacific and Far Eastern questions, proposed by the Government of the United States.

II ACCEPTANCES

FRANCE

August 15, 1921

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Premier Briand authorizes me to express through you to the President his appreciation of the invitation to the Washington Conference on November eleventh and to say to the President that he shall have great pleasure in attending the conference in person as the head of the French delegation.

HERRICK

CHINA

August 18, 1921

On the 13th instant a note was received from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Peking transmitting the invitation of the President of the United States to the Government of the Republic of China to participate in a conference to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

A conference for the purpose stated meets with the hearty concurrence of the Government of the Republic of China. Since the conclusion of the War in Europe the fear is general that there may again be a recurrence of the horrors of war. Furthermore, the center of gravity in matters international has recently shifted to the Pacific and the Far East. China occupies an important place not only on account of the extent of its territory and the density of its population but also on account of its geographical position. The Pacific and Far Eastern questions as viewed by the Chinese people are questions affecting the peace of the world of the present day.

This Conference at Washington, called by the President of the United States for the promotion of peace, cannot but contribute in a large measure to the accomplishment of results that will enable the people of the world to enjoy prosperity and happiness and obtain permanent release from

the calamities of war. It is with special satisfaction that the Government of the Republic of China makes known its desire to cooperate on a footing of equality with other governments in this beneficent movement.

The American Government by declaring that it is not its purpose to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East gives evidence of its readiness to be fair to all without any preconceived bias. The Government of the Republic of China desires to take the same position, and will participate in the Conference in the spirit of friendship and with a cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of the sources of controversy as stated in the American Chargé's note and observe perfect frankness and cordiality in the exchange of views and in arriving at decisions to the end that the purpose of the President of the United States to promote universal peace may be fulfilled.

GREAT BRITAIN

August 22, 1921

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the invitation proffered to His Majesty's Government by the Government of the United States to participate in a conference at Washington beginning on the eleventh of November next for the discussion of the Limitation of Armaments and in connection therewith of the international problems presented by the Pacific and the Far East.

It is with sincere gratification that I have the honor on behalf of His Majesty's Government to request Your Excellency to convey to the United States Government our ready acceptance of their invitation to take part in this auspicious meeting with objects of which His Majesty's Government and the British nation are in wholehearted sympathy. It is the earnest and confident hope of his Majesty's Government that this conference approached, as it will be, by all concerned in a spirit of courage, friendliness and mutual understanding, may achieve far-reaching results that will be conducive to the prosperity and peace of the world.

JAPAN

August 24, 1921

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 13th of this month in which you intimate the gratification of the President of the United States at the cordial response which has been accorded to his suggestion of a conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament and cognate topics and in which you communicate the President's invitation to this Government to participate in such a conference to be held in Washington on the 11th of November next on the subject of Limitation of Armament in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed.

In communicating to you for transmission to the President the hearty and appreciative acceptance of this invitation by the Japanese Government, I would ask you to be good enough in the first place to say to Mr. Harding with what pleasure the Government see him take the initiative in this all important matter; his great office, the pacific traditions of your Republic, and his own high personal qualifications invest his act with a personal appropriateness, which must be universally felt and recognized.

The peace and welfare of the world have long been a chronic object of solicitude to the Japanese Government and people. That attitude has not remained a platonic policy—it has been followed out in action. It results naturally from this pacific attitude towards world problems, that government and people alike should warmly welcome the idea of the limitation of armaments, and the removal of the deadening burden on industry and cultural development which swollen and competitive armament create.

This Government is also completely sympathetic to the valuable suggestion advanced in your note, that it may well be desirable that the use of novel agencies of warfare should be controlled.

The discussion and removal of any causes of misunderstanding which may exist, and the arrival at an eventual agreement with regard to general principles and their appli-

cation which will ensure friendship and good mutual understanding between the nations, are regarded as of great value and importance. My Government would emphasize the preëminently vital interest which Japan has in the preservation of the peace of the Pacific and the Far East. She has devoted her utmost efforts towards securing its permanence and its maintenance might well be to her a matter of prime concern. She therefore, finds it accord entirely with her inmost desires, to reach in conference a measure of understanding which shall ensure peace being placed once for all upon permanent basis in these regions. It is earnestly hoped, therefore, in Japan, that the conference will secure really useful results and prove a practical success.

The Japanese Government gladly concur in the proposal of the United States Government that the scope of the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems shall be made the subjects for a free exchange of views prior to the assembly of the conference. They hope that the agenda of the conference will in this way be arranged in harmony with the suggestion made in the memorandum of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 26, 1921, bearing on the same subject, in order that the labors of the conference may meet speedily with the fullest measure of successful achievement.

The undersigned can not conclude without again expressing the thorough and hearty sympathy of his Government with the thesis, so clearly and justly stated in your note, of the crushing encumbrance and menace which modern armaments present to civilization. No efforts can be too unremitting to reduce that menace and encumbrance. In the full consciousness of this fact, the initiative of the President of the United States is warmly welcomed and deeply appreciated, and I would ask you so to assure the President.

Acceptances of the formal invitation to participate in a Conference on the Limitation of Armament were received from Italy on September 1, Portugal on October 12, The Netherlands on October 17 and Belgium on October 19.

III

AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION
OF ARMAMENT

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

- One.* Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed
- (a) Basis of limitation
 - (b) Extent
 - (c) Fulfillment.
- Two.* Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
- Three.* Limitation of land armament.

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

- One.* Questions relating to China.
- First: Principles to be applied.
- Second: Application.
- Subjects:
- (a) Territorial integrity
 - (b) Administrative integrity
 - (c) Open door—equality of commercial and industrial opportunity
 - (d) Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges
 - (e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway
 - (f) Preferential railroad rates
 - (g) Status of existing commitments
- Two.* Siberia.
- (similar headings)

Three. Mandated Islands.
(Unless questions earlier settled)
Electrical Communications in the Pacific.

Under the heading of "Status of Existing Commitments" it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

IV

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES AT THE OPENING OF THE
CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 12, 1921

Washington, November 12

MR. SECRETARY AND MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

It is a great and happy privilege to bid the delegates to this Conference a cordial welcome to the Capital of the United States of America. It is not only a satisfaction to greet you because we were lately participants in a common cause, in which shared sacrifices and sorrows and triumphs brought our nations more closely together, but it is gratifying to address you as the spokesman for nations whose convictions and attending actions have so much to do with the weal or woe of all mankind.

It is not possible to overappraise the importance of such a conference. It is no unseemly boast, no disparagement of other nations which, though not represented, are held in highest respect, to declare that the conclusions of this body will have a signal influence on all human progress—on the fortunes of the world.

Here is a meeting, I can well believe, which is an earnest of the awakened conscience of twentieth century civilization. It is not a convention of remorse, nor a session of sorrow. It is not the conference of victors to define terms of settlement. Nor is it a council of nations seeking to remake humankind. It is rather a coming together from all parts of the earth, to apply the better attributes of mankind to minimize the faults in our international relationships.

Speaking as official sponsor for the invitation, I think I may say the call is not of the United States of America alone; it is rather the spoken word of a war-wearied world, struggling for restoration, hungering and thirsting for better relationship; of humanity crying for relief and craving assurances of lasting peace.

It is easy to understand this world-wide aspiration. The glory of triumph, the rejoicing in achievement, the love of liberty, the devotion to country, the pangs of sorrow, the burdens of debt, the desolation of ruin—all these are appraised alike in all lands. Here in the United States we are but freshly turned from the burial of an unknown American soldier, when a nation sorrowed while paying him tribute. Whether it was spoken or not, a hundred millions of our people were summarizing the inexcusable cause, the incalculable cost, the unspeakable sacrifices, and the unutterable sorrows, and there was the ever-impelling question: How can humanity justify or God forgive? Human hate demands no such toll; ambition and greed must be denied it. If misunderstanding must take the blame, then let us banish it, and let understanding rule and make good will regnant everywhere. All of us demand liberty and justice. There cannot be one without the other, and they must be held the unquestioned possession of all peoples. Inherent rights are of God, and the tragedies of the world originate in their attempted denial. The world today is infringing their enjoyment by arming to defend or deny, when simple sanity calls for their recognition through common understanding.

Out of the cataclysm of the World War came new fellowships, new convictions, new aspirations. It is ours to make the most of them. A world staggering with debt needs its burden lifted. Humanity which has been shocked by wanton destruction would minimize the agencies of that destruction. Contemplating the measureless cost of war and the continuing burden of armament, all thoughtful peoples wish for real limitation of armament and would like war outlawed. In soberest reflection the world's hundreds of millions who pay in peace

and die in war wish their statesmen to turn the expenditures for destruction into means of construction, aimed at a higher state for those who live and follow after.

It is not alone that the world can not readjust itself and cast aside the excess burdens without relief from the leaders of men. War has grown progressively cruel and more destructive from the first recorded conflict to this pregnant day, and the reverse order would more become our boasted civilization.

Gentlemen of the Conference, the United States welcomes you with unselfish hands. We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate or apprehend no conquest. Content with what we have, we seek nothing which is another's. We only wish to do with you that finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone.

We wish to sit with you at the table of international understanding and good-will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer coöperation. The world demands a sober contemplation of the existing order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us.

I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national necessities. Our Republic would no more ask for these than it would give. No pride need be humbled, no nationality submerged, but I would have a mergence of minds committing all of us to less preparation for war and more enjoyment of fortunate peace.

The higher hopes come of the spirit of our coming together. It is but just to recognize varying needs and peculiar positions. Nothing can be accomplished in disregard of national apprehensions. Rather, we should act together to remove the causes of apprehensions. This is not to be done in intrigue. Greater assurance is found in the exchanges of simple honesty and directness among men resolved to accomplish as becomes leaders among nations, when civilization itself has come to its crucial test.

It is not to be challenged that government fails when the excess of its cost robs the people of the way to happiness and

the opportunity to achieve. If the finer sentiments were not urging, the cold, hard facts of excessive cost and the eloquence of economics would urge to reduce our armaments. If the concept of a better order does not appeal, then let us ponder the burden and the blight of continued competition.

It is not to be denied that the world has swung along throughout the ages without heeding this call from the kindlier hearts of men. But the same world never before was so tragically brought to realization of the utter futility of passion's sway when reason and conscience and fellowship point a nobler way.

I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Wholly free from guile, sure in our minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. So I welcome you, not alone in good-will and high purpose, but with high faith.

We are met for a service to mankind. In all simplicity, in all honesty and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world conscience refined by the consuming fires of war, and made more sensitive by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. In such an accomplishment there will be added glory to your flags and ours, and the rejoicing of mankind will make the transcending music of all succeeding time.

V

ADDRESS OF THE HON. CHARLES E. HUGHES
TO THE CONFERENCE

It is with a deep sense of privilege and responsibility that I accept the honor you have conferred.*

Permit me to express the most cordial appreciation of the assurances of friendly coöperation, which have been generously expressed by the representatives of all the invited Governments. The earnest desire and purpose, manifested in every step in the approach to this meeting, that we should meet the reasonable expectation of a watching world by effective action suited to the opportunity, is the best augury for the success of the conference.

The President invited the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions also would be discussed. It would have been most agreeable to the President to have invited all the powers to take part in this conference, but it was thought to be a time when other considerations should yield to the practical requirements of the existing exigency, and in this view the invitation was extended to the group known as the principal allied and associated powers, which, by reason of the conditions produced by the war, control in the main the armament of the world. The opportunity to limit armament lies within their grasp.

It was recognized, however, that the interests of other powers in the Far East made it appropriate that they should be invited to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and, with the approval of the five powers,

*The permanent Chairmanship of the Conference.

an invitation to take part in the discussion of those questions has been extended to Belgium, China, The Netherlands and Portugal.

The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but rather to support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly to diminish and, if possible, wholly to remove, discernible sources of controversy. It is believed that by interchanges of views at this opportune time the Governments represented here may find a basis of accord and thus give expression to their desire to assure enduring friendship.

In the public discussions which have preceded the conference, there have been apparently two competing views; one, that the consideration of armament should await the result of the discussion of Far Eastern questions and, another, that the latter discussion should be postponed until an agreement for limitation of armament has been reached. I am unable to find sufficient reason for adopting either of these extreme views. I think that it would be most unfortunate if we should disappoint the hopes which have attached to this meeting by a postponement of the consideration of the first subject.

The world looks to this conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American Government that we should meet that expectation without any unnecessary delay. It is therefore proposed that the conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament.

This, however, does not mean that we must postpone the examination of the Far Eastern questions. These questions of vast importance press for solution. It is hoped that immediate provision may be made to deal with them adequately, and it is suggested that it may be found to be entirely practicable through the distribution of the work among designated committees to make progress to the ends sought to be achieved

without either subject being treated as a hindrance to the proper consideration and disposition of the other.

The proposal to limit armament by agreement of the powers is not a new one, and we are admonished by the futility of earlier effort. It may be well to recall the noble aspirations which were voiced twenty-three years ago in the imperial rescript of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It was then pointed out with clarity and emphasis that the intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labor and capital are for the major part diverted from their natural application and unproductively consumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though today regarded as the last word of science, are destined tomorrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their development.

Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less and less fulfill the object which the Governments have set before themselves. The economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments *à l'outrance* and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war materials are transforming the armed peace of our days in a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the calamity which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance. To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world—such is the supreme duty which is today imposed on all States.

It was with this sense of obligation that his Majesty the Emperor of Russia proposed the conference which was "to occupy itself with this grave problem," and which met at The Hague in the year 1899.

Important as were the deliberations and conclusions of that conference, especially with respect to the pacific settlement

of international disputes, its results in the specific matter of limitation of armament went no further than the adoption of a final resolution setting forth the opinion that the restrictions of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind, and the utterance of the wish that the Governments may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.

It was seven years later that the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Elihu Root, in answering a note of the Russian Ambassador suggesting in outline a program of the Second Peace Conference, said: "The Government of the United States, therefore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects for consideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference." It is significant that the Imperial German Government expressed itself as "absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament," and that the Emperor of Germany threatened to decline to send delegates if the subject of disarmament was to be discussed. In view, however, of the resolution which had been adopted at the First Hague Conference, the delegates of the United States were instructed that the subject of limitation of armament should be regarded as unfinished business and that the Second Conference should ascertain and give full consideration to the result of such examination as the Governments may have given to the possibility of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First Conference. But by reason of the obstacles which the subject had encountered, the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, although it made notable progress in provision for the peaceful settlement of controversies, was unable to deal with limitation of armament except by a resolution in the following general terms:

"The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and, inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question."

This was the fruition of the efforts of eight years. Although the effect was clearly perceived, the race in preparation of armaments, wholly unaffected by these futile suggestions, went on until it fittingly culminated in the greatest war of history, and we are now suffering from the unparalleled loss of life, the destruction of hopes, the economic dislocations, and the widespread impoverishment which measure the cost of the victory over the brutal pretensions of military force.

But if we are warned by the inadequacy of earlier endeavors for limitation of armament, we cannot fail to recognize the extraordinary opportunity now presented. We not only have the lessons of the past to guide us, not only do we have the reaction from the disillusioning experiences of war, but we must meet the challenge of imperative economic demands. What was convenient or highly desirable before is now a matter of vital necessity. If there is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no longer endurable, competition in armament must stop. The present opportunity not only derives its advantage from a general appreciation of this fact, but the power to deal with the exigency now rests with a small group of nations represented here, who have every reason to desire peace and to promote amity.

The astounding ambition which lay athwart the promise of the Second Hague Conference no longer menaces the world, and the great opportunity of liberty-loving and peace-preserving democracies has come. Is it not plain that the time has passed for mere resolutions that the responsible powers

should examine the question of limitation of armament? We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. The essential facts are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action. We meet with full understanding that the aspirations of mankind are not to be defeated either by plausible suggestions of postponement or by impracticable counsels of perfection. Power and responsibility are here, and the world awaits a practicable program which shall at once be put into execution.

I am confident that I shall have your approval in suggesting that in this matter, as well as in others before the Conference, it is desirable to follow the course of procedure which has the best promise of achievement rather than one which would facilitate division, and thus, constantly aiming to agree so far as possible, we shall, with each point of agreement, make it easier to proceed to others.

The question in relation to armament which may be regarded as of primary importance at this time, and with which we can deal most promptly and effectively, is the limitation of naval armament. There are certain general considerations which may be deemed pertinent to this subject.

The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, and, if competition continues, its regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out, and that is to end it now.

It is apparent that this cannot be accomplished without serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction, and building programs which are now under way cannot be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward, other ships will inevitably be built to rival them, and this will lead

to still others. Thus the race will continue, so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.

It is also clear that no one of the naval powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the powers. In considering the basis of such agreement and the commensurate sacrifices to be required it is necessary to have regard to the existing naval strength of the great naval powers, including the extent of construction already effected in the case of ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for its action. What one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort. I may add that the American delegates are advised by their naval experts that the tonnage of capital ships may fairly be taken to measure the relative strength of navies, as the provision for auxiliary combatant craft should sustain a reasonable relation to the capital ship tonnage allowed.

It would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation of naval armament that there should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a period of not less than ten years there should be no further construction of capital ships.

I am happy to say that I am at liberty to go beyond these general propositions, and, on behalf of the American delegation acting under the instructions of the President of the United States, to submit to you a concrete proposition for an agreement for the limitation of naval armament.

It should be added that this proposal immediately concerns the British Empire, Japan and the United States. In view of the extraordinary conditions, due to the World War, affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the

United States proposes that this matter be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

In making the present proposal the United States is most solicitous to deal with the question upon an entirely reasonable and practicable basis to the end that the just interests of all shall be adequately guarded, and the national security and defense shall be maintained. Four general principles have been applied:

1. That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
2. That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
3. That in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned;
4. That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

The principal features of the proposed agreement are as follows:

UNITED STATES

The United States is now completing its program of 1916 calling for ten new battleships and six battle cruisers. One battleship has been completed. The others are in various stages of construction; in some cases from 60 to 80 per cent. of the construction has been done. On these fifteen capital ships now being built over \$330,000,000 have been spent. Still the United States is willing, in the interest of an immediate limitation of naval armaments, to scrap all these ships.

The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted:

1. To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This includes six battle cruisers and seven battleships on the ways and in the course of building, and two battleships launched.

The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is fifteen. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.

2. To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not includ-

ing, the Delaware and North Dakota. The number of these old battleships to be scrapped is fifteen. Their total tonnage is 227,740 tons.

Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the United States, if this plan is accepted, is thirty, with an aggregate tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed) of 845,740 tons.

GREAT BRITAIN

The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall take action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the part of the United States.

It is proposed that Great Britain:

1. Shall stop further construction of the four new Hoods, the new capital ships not laid down, but upon which money has been spent. The four ships, if completed, would have a tonnage displacement of 172,000 tons.

2. Shall, in addition, scrap her pre-dreadnoughts, second line battleships and first line battleships up to, but not including, the King George V. class.

These, with certain pre-dreadnoughts which it is understood have already been scrapped, would amount to nineteen capital ships and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons.

The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great Britain (including the tonnage of the four Hoods, if completed) would be 583,375 tons.

JAPAN

It is proposed that Japan:

1. Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz., the Kii, Owari, No. 7 and No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, battle cruisers.

It should be observed that this does not involve the stopping of construction, as the construction of none of these ships has been begun.

2. Shall scrap three capital ships (the Mutsu, launched; the Tosa, the Kago, in course of building), and four battle

cruisers (the Amagi and Akagi, in course of building, and the Atoga and Takao, not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled).

The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under this paragraph is seven. The total tonnage of these new capital ships when completed, would be 289,100 tons.

3. Shall scrap all pre-dreadnoughts and battleships of the second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of ten old ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down or for which material has been assembled (taking the tonnage of the new ships when completed) would be 448,928 tons.

Thus, under this plan, there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three powers, sixty-six capital fighting ships, built and building with a total tonnage of 1,878,043.

It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan that their navies, with respect to capital ships, within three months after the making of the agreement, shall consist of certain ships, designated in the proposal, and number for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for Japan 10.

The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United States 500,650, of Great Britain 604,450, of Japan 299,700. In reaching this result the age factor in the case of the respective navies has received appropriate consideration.

REPLACEMENT

With respect to replacement, the United States proposes:

(1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until ten years from the date of the agreement.

(2) That replacements be limited by an agreed maximum of capital ship tonnage as follows:

For the United States, 500,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 500,000 tons.

For Japan, 300,000 tons.

(3) That, subject to the ten year limitation above fixed and the maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are twenty years old by new capital ship construction.

(4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons.

I have sketched the proposal only in outline, leaving the technical details to be supplied by the formal proposition, which is ready for submission to the delegates.

The plan includes provision for the limitation of auxiliary surface combatant craft. This term embraces three classes, that is:

(1) Auxiliary surface combatant craft, such as cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers and various surface types; (2) submarines and (3) airplane carriers.

I shall not attempt to review the proposals for these various classes, as they bear a definite relation to the provisions for capital fighting ships.

With the acceptance of this plan, the burden of meeting the demands of competition in naval armament will be lifted. Enormous sums will be released to aid the progress of civilization. At the same time the proper demands of national defense will be adequately met, and the nations will have ample opportunity during the naval holiday of ten years to consider their future course. Preparation for future naval war shall stop now.

I shall not attempt at this time to take up the other topics which have been listed on the tentative agenda proposed in anticipation of the conference.

VI

PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS,
NOVEMBER 12, 1921

(Reprinted from the *New York Times*, November 13, 1921)

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the naval armaments of the conferring nations. The United States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four general principles:

(a) The elimination of all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected.

(b) Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.

(c) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.

(d) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

Proposal for a limitation of naval armaments:

CAPITAL SHIPS—UNITED STATES

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under construction and on their way to completion. This includes six battle cruisers and seven battleships on the ways and building and two battleships launched.

(NOTE—Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of fifteen new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 618,000 tons. Total amount of money already spent on fifteen capital ships, \$332,000,000.)

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota.

(NOTE—The number of old battleships scrapped under Paragraph 2 is fifteen; their total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand total of capital ships to be scrapped is thirty, aggregating 845,740 tons.)

GREAT BRITAIN

3. Great Britain to stop further construction on the four new Hoods.

(NOTE—Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of four new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons.)

4. In addition to the four Hoods, Great Britain to scrap her pre-dreadnoughts, second line battleships and first line battleships up to, but not including the King George V. class.

(NOTE—Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of nineteen capital ships, certain of which have already been scrapped, with a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons. The grand total tonnage of ships scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375 tons.)

JAPAN

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz.: The Kii, Owari, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, battle cruisers.

(NOTE—Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction on any ship upon which construction has begun.)

6. Japan to scrap three battleships: The Mutsu, launched; the Tosa and Kago, building, and four battle cruisers, the Amagi and Akagi, building, and the Atoga and Takao, not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled.

(NOTE—Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of seven new

capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 288,100 tons.)

7. Japan to scrap all pre-dreadnoughts and capital ships of the second line. This to include the scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the Settsu.

(NOTE—Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of ten older ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The grand total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled is 448,928 tons.

FRANCE AND ITALY

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the period of this agreement except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter.

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to, then the United States, Great Britain and Japan agree that their navies, three months after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships:

LIST OF CAPITAL SHIPS

United States

Maryland	Arizona	Arkansas
California	Pennsylvania	Wyoming
Tennessee	Oklahoma	Utah
Idaho	Nevada	Florida
Mississippi	Texas	North Dakota
New Mexico	New York	Delaware
Total, 18	Total tonnage, 500,650	

Great Britain

Royal Sovereign	Barhan	King George V
Royal Oak	Malaya	Centurion
Resolution	Benbow	Ajax
Ramillies	Emperor of India	Hood
Revenge	Iron Duke	Renown
Queen Elizabeth	Marlborough	Repulse
Warspite	Erin	Tiger
Valiant		

Total, 22

Total tonnage, 604,450

Japan

Nagato	Fu-So	Haruna
Hiuga	Settsu	Hi-Yei
Ise	Kirishima	Kongo
Yamashiro		

Total, 10

Total tonnage, 299,700

DISPOSITION OF OLD AND NEW CONSTRUCTION

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

REPLACEMENTS

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this proposal to be as follows:

United States, 500,000 tons.

Great Britain, 500,000 tons.

Japan, 300,000 tons.

(b) Capital ships twenty years from date of completion may be replaced by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is seventeen years of age from date of completion. Provided, however, that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until ten years from the date of the signing of this agreement.

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction, and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of new construction, or if the date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agreement whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall apply to the ships of each of the powers party to this agreement.

(f) Each of the powers party to this agreement agrees to inform promptly all the other powers party to this agreement concerning:

(1) The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction.

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage.

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage.

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down.

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship.

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships including parts of hulls, engines and ordnance shall be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all powers party to this agreement.

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships, they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT

13. In treating this subject auxiliary combatant craft have been divided into three classes:

- (a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.
- (b) Submarines.
- (c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the following paragraph:

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft as specified in Paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons, fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers and vessels readily convertible from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this agreement regarding limitation of naval armaments that exceed 3,000 tons displacement and fifteen knots speed, and carry more than 4-5 inch guns.

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders and destroyers allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States, 450,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 450,000 tons.

For Japan, 270,000 tons.

Provided, however, that no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

18. (a) All auxiliary surface combatant craft whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter

shall be laid down during the period of this agreement, provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

19. (a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

(b) Submarines.

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States, 90,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 90,000 tons.

For Japan, 54,000 tons.

Provided, however, that no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement, provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed each power shall be as follows:

For the United States, 80,000 tons.

For Great Britain, 80,000 tons.

For Japan, 48,000 tons.

Provided, however, that no power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

LIMITATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION, AIRPLANE CARRIERS

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement, provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

SCRAPPING OF OLD CONSTRUCTION

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

AUXILIARY COMBAT CRAFT, REPLACEMENTS

26. (a) Cruisers seventeen years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is fifteen years of age from date of completion.

(b) Destroyers and flotilla leaders twelve years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is eleven years of age from date of completion.

(c) Submarines twelve years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to replace is eleven years of age from date of completion.

(d) Airplane carriers twenty years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is seventeen years of age from date of completion.

(e) No surface vessels carrying guns of calibre greater than 8 inches shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for auxiliary combatant surface craft.

(f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the powers party to this agreement.

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(h) Each of the powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all the other parties to this agreement concerning:

(1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new construction.

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage.

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage.

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down.

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship.

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts of hulls, engines and ordnance, will be constructed previous to the date of authorization or replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all powers party to this agreement.

(j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

AIRCRAFT

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

(NOTE—Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval aircraft.)

GENERAL RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF COMBATANT VESSELS OF ALL CLASSES

28. The powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

MERCHANT MARINE

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to govern its conversion features for war purposes.

VII

ADDRESSES DELIVERED BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 15, 1921(Reprinted from the *New York Times*, November 16, 1921)

MR. BALFOUR

MR. CHAIRMAN, you have invited those who desire to continue the discussion which began on Saturday last. I think it would be very unfortunate if we were to allow the events of Saturday to pass without some further observation on the part of those to whom you, Mr. Chairman, addressed your speech and if, for any reason which I shall venture to explain in a moment, I am the first to take up the challenge, it is because of all the powers here assembled the country which I represent, is, as everybody knows, the most intimately interested in naval questions.

Statesmen of all countries are beginning to discover that the labors and difficulties of peace are almost as arduous and require almost as great qualities as those which are demanded for the conduct of a successful war.

These struggles to restore the world to the condition of equilibrium, so violently interfered with by five years of war, is one that taxes and must tax the efforts of everybody. And I congratulate you, if I may, Mr. Chairman, on the fact that you have added the new anniversary which will henceforth be celebrated in connection with this movement toward reconstruction in the same spirit in which we welcomed the anniversary celebrated only a few hours ago, on the day on which hostilities came to an end. If the 11th of November in the minds of the allied and associated powers, in the minds perhaps not less of all the neutrals—if that is a date imprinted

on grateful hearts, I think November 12 will also prove to be an anniversary welcomed and thought of in a grateful spirit by those who in the future shall look back upon the arduous struggle now being made by the civilized nations of the world, not merely to restore pre-war conditions, but to see that war conditions shall never again exist.

I count myself among the fortunate of the earth in that I was present, and to that extent had a share in the proceedings of last Saturday. They were memorable, indeed. The secret was admirably kept. I hope that all the secrets, so long as they ought to be secrets, of our discussions will be as well kept. In my less sanguine mood I have doubts. But, however that may be, the secret in this case was most admirably kept, and I listened to a speech which I thought eloquent, appropriate, in every way a fitting prelude to the work of the conference which was about to open, or which, indeed, had been opened by the President, without supposing that anything very dramatic lay behind. And suddenly I became aware, as I suppose all present became aware, that they were assisting not merely at an eloquent and admirable speech, but at a great historical event. It was led up to with such art. The transition seemed so natural that when the blow fell, when the speaker uttered the memorable words which have now gone round and found echo in every quarter of the civilized world, it came as a shock of profound surprise: it excited the sort of emotions we have when some wholly new event springs into view, and we felt that a new chapter in the history of world reconstruction had been warily opened.

Mr. Chairman, the absolute simplicity of the procedure, the easy transition and the great dramatic climax were the perfection of art, which shows that the highest art and the most perfect simplicity are very often, indeed very commonly, combined.

Now, I said I would explain, if I was allowed, why I venture to rise first today to deal with the subject which is in all our hearts. As I have hinted, it is because the British Empire and Great Britain, these two together, are more pro-

foundly concerned with all that touches matters naval than it is possible for any other nation to be, and this not, believe me, for any reasons of ambition, not for any reasons drawn from history or tradition, but from the hard, brutal necessities of claims and obvious facts.

There never has been in the history of the world a great empire constituted as the British Empire is. It is a fact no doubt familiar to everybody whom I am addressing at the present moment, but has everybody whom I am addressing imaginatively conceived precisely what the situation of the British Empire is in this connection?

Most of my audience are citizens of the United States. The United States stands solid, impregnable, self-sufficient, all its lines of communication protected, doubly protected, completely protected from any conceivable hostile act. It is not merely that you are 110,000,000 of population; it is not that you are the wealthiest country in the world; it is that the whole configuration of your country, the geographical position of your country, is such that you are wholly immune from the particular perils to which, from the nature of the case, the British Empire is subjected.

Supposing, for example, that your Western States, for whose safety you are responsible, were suddenly removed 10,000 miles across the sea. Supposing that you found that the very heart of your empire, the very heart of this great State, was a small, a crowded island depending for overseas trade not merely, not chiefly, for its luxuries, but depending upon overseas communication for the raw material of those manufactures by which its superabundant population lives; depending upon the same overseas communication for the food upon which they subsist. Supposing it was a familiar thought in your minds that there never was at any moment of the year within the limits of your State more than seven weeks' food for the population, and that that food had to be replenished by overseas communication. Then, if you will draw that picture, and if you will see all that it implies and all that it carries with it, you will understand why it

is that every citizen of the British Empire, whether he comes from the far dominions of the Pacific or whether he lives in the small island in the North Sea, never can forget that it is by sea communication that he lives and that without sea communication he and the empire to which he belongs would perish.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, do not suppose that I am uttering laments over the weakness of my empire. Far from it. We are strong, I hope, in the vigorous life of its constituent parts. We are strong, I hope, in the ardent patriotism which binds us all together. But this strategic weakness is obvious to everybody who reflects; it is present in the minds of our enemies, if we have enemies. Do not let it be forgotten by our friends.

These reflections, with your kindness, I have indulged in in order to explain why it is that I am addressing you at the present time. We have had to consider, and we have considered, the great scheme laid before you by our Chairman. We have considered it with admiration and approval. We agree with it in spirit and in principle. We look to it as being the basis of the greatest reform in the matter of armament and preparation for war that has ever been conceived or carried out by the courage and patriotism of statesmen. I do not pretend, of course—it would be folly to pretend—that this or any other scheme, by whatever genius it may have been contrived, can deal with every subject; can cover the whole ground of international reconstruction. It would be folly to make the attempt and it would be folly to pretend that the attempt has yet been made in any single scheme as was clearly explained by the Secretary of State on Saturday. The scheme deals, and deals only, with three nations which own the largest fleets at present in the world. It therefore, of necessity, omits all consideration for the time being of those European nations who have diminished their fleets, and who at present have no desire, and I hope never will have any desire, to own fleets beyond the necessities that national honor and national defense require.

Again, it does not touch a question which every man coming from Europe must feel to be a question of immense and almost paramount importance. I mean the heavy burden of land armaments. That is left on one side to be dealt with by other schemes and in other ways.

What it does is surely one of the biggest things that has ever yet been done by constructive statesmanship. It does deal with the three great fleets of the world, and in the broad spirit in which it deals with those fleets, in the proportion of disarmament which it lays down for those fleets, the Government of the country which I represent is in the fullest and the heartiest sympathy with the policy which the United States has brought before us for our consideration. They have, as we think most rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider; and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defense against certain forms of attack, and little power of observation, little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed.

Taking those two as really belonging to one subject, namely, the battle fleet, taking those two, the battleships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to a battle fleet, we think that the proportion between these various countries is acceptable, we think the limitation of amounts is reasonable; we think it should be accepted, we firmly believe that it will be accepted.

In my view, the message which has been sent around the world on Saturday is not a message which is going to be received by those most concerned with cool approbation. I believe it is going to be received by them with warm, hearty approval, and with every effort at full, loyal and complete coöperation.

I think it would be ill-fitting on such an occasion as this if I were to attempt to go into any details. There are questions—and I have no doubt that the Secretary of State, our Chairman, would be the first to tell us that there are details which

can only be adequately dealt with in committee. At the first glance, for example, and I give it merely as an example, our experts are inclined to think that perhaps too large an amount of tonnage has been permitted for submarines. Submarines are a class of vessels most easily abused in their use and which, in fact, in the late war, were most grossly abused. We quite admit that probably the submarine is the defensive weapon, properly used, of the weak, and that it would be impossible, or, if possible, it might well be thought undesirable, to abolish them altogether. But the amount of submarine tonnage permitted by the new scheme is far in excess, I believe, of the tonnage possessed by any nation at the present moment, and I only throw it out as a suggestion that it may be well worth considering whether that tonnage should not be further limited, and whether, in addition to limiting the amount of the tonnage, it might not be practicable, and, if practicable, desirable, to forbid altogether the construction of those submarines of great size which are not intended for defense, which are not the weapon of the weaker party, whose whole purpose is attack and whose whole purpose is probably attack by methods which civilized nations would regard with horror.

However, there may be other questions of detail, questions connected with replacement, questions connected with cruisers, which are not connected with or required for fleet action. But those are matters for consideration by the technical experts, and however they be decided, they do not touch the main outline of the structure which the United States Government desires erected and which we earnestly wish to help them in erecting.

That structure stands, as it seems to me, clear and firm, and I cannot help thinking that in the broad outline, whatever may happen in the course of these discussions during the next few weeks, that structure will remain as it was presented by its original architects, for the admiration and for the use of mankind.

I have little more to say except this: It is easy to estimate in dollars or in pounds, shillings and pence the saving to the

taxpayer of each of the nations concerned which the adoption of this scheme will give. It is easy to show that the relief is great. It is easy to show that indirectly it will, as I hope and believe, greatly stimulate industry, national and international, and do much to diminish the difficulties under which every civilized Government is at this time laboring. All that can be weighed, measured, counted; all that is a matter of figures. But there is something in this scheme which is above and beyond numerical calculation. There is something which goes to the root, which is concerned with the highest international morality.

This scheme after all—what does it do? It makes idealism a practical proposition. It takes hold of the dream which reformers, poets, publicists, even potentates, as we heard the other day, have from time to time put before mankind as the goal to which human endeavor should aspire.

A narrative of all the attempts made, of all the schemes advanced, for diminishing the sorrows of war, is a melancholy one. Some fragments were laid before you by our Chairman on Saturday. They were not exhilarating. They showed how easy it is to make professions and how difficult it is to carry those professions into effect.

What makes this scheme a landmark is that combined with the profession is the practice, that in addition to the expression, the eloquent expression of good intentions, in which the speeches of men of all nations have been rich, a way has been found in which, in the most striking fashion, in a manner which must touch the imagination of everybody, which must come home to the dullest brain and the hardest heart, the Government of the United States has shown its intention not merely to say that peace is a very good thing, that war is horrible, but there is a way by which wars can really be diminished, by which the burdens of peace, almost as intolerable as the burdens of war, can really be lightened for the populations of the world. And in doing that, in doing it in the manner in which they have done it, in striking the imagination not merely of the audience they were addressing,

not merely of the great people to whom they belonged, but of the whole civilized world, in doing that they have, believe me, made the first and opening day of this congress one of the landmarks in human civilization,

I have said all that I propose to say, but if you will allow me I will read a telegram put into my hands just as I reached this meeting, this congress, from the British Prime Minister:

"Following for Mr. Balfour from Mr. Lloyd George:

"Many thanks for your telegram. If you think it will serve useful purpose to let them know, message might be published, as follows:

"'Government have followed proceedings at opening session of Conference with profound appreciation and wholeheartedly endorse your opinion that speeches made by President Harding and Secretary of State were bold and statesmanlike utterances, pregnant with infinite possibilities. Nothing could augur better for ultimate success of conference. Please convey to both our most sincere congratulations.'"

BARON KATO

Japan deeply appreciates the sincerity of purpose evident in the plan of the American Government for the limitation of armaments. She is satisfied that the proposed plan will materially relieve the nations of wasteful expenditures and cannot fail to make for the peace of the world.

She cannot remain unmoved by the high aims which have actuated the American project. Gladly accepting, therefore, the proposal in principle, Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament.

It will be universally admitted that a nation must be provided with such armaments as are essential to its security. This requirement must be fully weighed in the examination of the plan. With this requirement in view, certain modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels. This subject should be referred to special consideration by naval experts. When such modifications are proposed, I know that the

American and other delegations will consider them with the same desire to meet our ideas as we have to meet theirs.

Japan has never claimed, nor has intention of claiming, to have a general establishment equal in strength to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparations for offensive war.

M. BRIAND

MR. CHAIRMAN: I fully concur with what the President of the British delegation has just said, when at the beginning of his eloquent statement he said that this conference would be one of the great landmarks in the history of the world and of civilization. While I do not quite agree with him, at least not to the same extent, as to his feelings, as expressed, when he first heard the statement made by the representative of the United States, I may say for my own part that when coming here I felt quite sure that a great people like the United States could not have begun such a momentous initiative without having some definite, clear-cut purpose. I think, gentlemen, that we have no longer the right in those questions of peace and war, when we undertake to promise to the world that there shall be no more war, that there shall be everlasting peace—after the painful struggle from which we have just emerged—we have no right to let the people of the world hope for a final peace unless we have made up our minds to prepare and to decide upon the means that are most appropriate in order to realize these hopes.

Many conferences and congresses have already met in order to try to carry out this noble idea, and Mr. Balfour was quite right when he pointed out the great danger there was in looking at this question through the glass of idealism. But, Mr. Secretary, you have shown us the way; you have shown that it was no longer a question of groping for a way out of the difficulty; you have struck out boldly the opportunity for us by setting the example. I may say that we are back of you, Mr. Secretary.

Of course, during these difficult, arduous examinations of the details of the subject, upon which, after all, depends the practical realization, if it happens that we are taken out of the straight way and feel the temptation of using the devious paths, we on the part of France are ready to join our efforts to those of other men of good will and help in returning to the fair, straight road that would take us to our goal.

The question with which we have first to deal here is of course one that mainly concerns the great naval powers; but I may say for my part that I have listened with great joy to the very large, broad and general adhesion given in principle by the Governments of Great Britain and Japan. It is not that France feels entirely disinterested in this question. We shall have, I hope, an opportunity of saying this and showing it, but I may say now—and this will be carried out later on by figures and by demonstration—that we have already entered upon the right way and that we have already done something in the direction you indicate. The war has kept us down to a certain level, of course. It has prevented us from carrying out our plans for a weak fleet, perhaps too weak for the necessities of national defense.

But I will not dwell on this subject. I rather turn to another side of the problem to which Mr. Balfour has alluded, and I thank him for this. Is it only a question here of economy? Is it only a question of estimates and budgets? If it were so, if that were the only purpose you have in view, it will be really unworthy of the great nation that has called us here.

So, the main question, the crucial question, which is to be discussed here, is to know if the peoples of the world will be at last able to come to an understanding in order to avoid the atrocities of war. And then, gentlemen, when it comes on the agenda, as it will inevitably come, to the question of land armament, a question particularly delicate for France, as you are all aware, we have no intention to eschew this. We shall answer your appeal, fully conscious that this is a question of grave and serious nature for us.

The question will be raised—it has been raised, gentlemen—

and if there is a country that desires, that demands, that the question of land armaments should be raised, it is France. It will come in due time before the conference, and I hope that I shall enjoy the opportunity, and that I shall be able to state publicly in one of the meetings of this Conference what the position of France is, so that the United States and the world may fully know; and when I have tried to prove this, when you have listened to this demonstration, I am quite sure that you will be convinced, gentlemen, that France, after the necessities of safety and life have been adequately secured, harbors no thought whatever of disturbing the peace of the world. The time will come for this demonstration.

Today I will simply record, with great feelings of joy, the agreement that has already been reached here on this first great problem of the Conference, and express the wish that we shall come to a similar agreement upon all the other questions that await the conference.

SENATOR SCHANZER

The time has come and this Conference has been called not for general resolutions and for mutual advice, but for action.

You proved at once that you mean to carry out your suggestion into practical execution.

The first impression made by your statement concerning the limitation of naval armament is one of great sincerity, great force, great courage. You stated clearly and unhesitatingly to the conference and to the public opinion of the entire world the question of the limitation of naval armament as concerns especially the great naval powers, and you did it with a precision of facts, and of figures, thus affording a solid basis for discussion.

We shall not consider the technical side of the question which concerns especially the great naval powers. We only wish to express in the name of the Italian delegation our great satisfaction in the proposals for general order. We hope that your proposal when accepted will be the source of the most

beneficent economic consequences. The peace of the world cannot be permanently maintained if you do not consider the ways and means to re-establish the economic balance of the world.

Modern civilization is an economic civilization, and the modern world, in spite of the distances and natural barriers, cannot be conceived except as a single great economic system. This economic system has been shattered by the war. It is necessary now to revise it and get it into motion again.

We think that your proposal is the first effective step toward giving the world a release of such nature as to enable it to start the work of its economic reconstruction.

In respect to Mr. Balfour's reference to the question of French and Italian naval forces, may I be allowed to say a few words?

I think it rather difficult to separate the question of Italian and French naval armament limitation from the general question of the limitation of naval armaments of the world. Certainly as you have stated, Mr. Chairman, in your address, the question concerning the great naval powers must be considered in the first place, and you have stated that the United States proposes that this matter be left for the later consideration of the conference. So we wish and feel sure in accordance with your statement that the French and Italian naval question will be considered by the Conference before concluding the question involved in your proposal.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I express in the name of the Italian delegation the most fervent wish that the Conference, taking your proposal as its working basis, may lead to a result which would be extremely happy not only for the powers directly interested but for the entire world.

MR. HUGHES

GENTLEMEN: We have listened not only with gratification, but I may say with profound emotion, to these expressions, so cordial, of agreement in principle with the proposal that has been made on behalf of the United States with respect to

the limitation of naval armament. It will now be in order to consider the many details which must be associated with an exact agreement for that purpose.

There are subjects, it has been suggested here, which will appropriately be examined by naval experts, and it is the desire of the American Government that what has been proposed by that Government, with the suggestions that have been made by Mr. Balfour on behalf of the British Government, by Admiral Kato on behalf of the Government of Japan, and any other suggestions by way of modification or emendation or criticism that may be proper, shall all be thoroughly considered, to the end that after the most mature and careful deliberation we may accomplish the great purpose which this Conference in this matter has been assembled to achieve.

But while the time is now opportune for the consideration of these details, the great first step has been taken in this notable expression of approval in principle of what has been suggested by the American Government. And do I go too far in saying that we may commit this matter to a technical examination with the assurance, which I am very certain will be gratifying to the hearts of our people, that there will come out of this Conference an appropriate agreement for satisfactory, important, essential reduction of naval armament, to the end that offensive naval warfare will be no more and this great advance will be made to the accomplishment of an enduring peace?

If it is not desired to have further discussion of the matter which has been brought before us, I suppose it will be in order to adjourn to give opportunity for the consideration of the project to which I have referred. And may I add that I have no doubt that I express the wish of the Conference that at an opportune time Mr. Briand will enjoy the opportunity of presenting to the Conference most fully the views of France with regard to the subjects of land armaments, which we must discuss.

VIII
ADDRESSES DELIVERED BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 21, 1921

(Reprinted from the *New York Times*, November 22, 1921)

M. BRIAND

Gentlemen, you will readily admit that I, as a delegate of France, should feel moved when rising to speak from this full-sounding platform, whence every word that is said goes to the attentive and anxious ear of the world and of all civilized people.

I wish, first of all, to thank my colleagues of the Conference who, on the opening of this public meeting, so kindly allowed me to speak as the representative of my country.

I shall endeavor to make it appear to your eyes and to the eyes of the world with its true, genuine face, as it is, that will show you that she is ready, and I might say perhaps more ready than any other country, to direct her attention and her earnest will to whatever steps may be thought desirable in order to insure final peace for the world. Nothing for my colleagues and myself would be more pleasant than to be able to tell you this: We bring here sacrifices to the fullest extent possible. We have our own security insured. We lay down arms. We should be so happy to be able to make that gesture in order to participate in the final disarmament of the world.

Unfortunately, we cannot speak in this way. I say also, unfortunately, we have not the right to do so. I shall briefly explain later on for what reasons. I shall tell you, for France, that she wants to make peace. If you want to make peace, there must be two people, yourself and the neighbor opposite, To make peace—I am speaking, of course, of land armament—it is not sufficient to reduce effectives and decrease war

material. That is the physical side, a physical aspect of things.

There is another consideration which we have no right to neglect in such a problem, that touches vital questions which are of the most serious character for the country concerned. It is necessary that besides this physical disarmament there should be in those same circles what I shall call a general atmosphere of peace. In other words, a moral disarmament is as necessary as the material one.

I have the right to say this, and I hope to be able to prove it to you. And I have the right to say to you that in Europe, as it is at present, there are serious elements of instability, there are such conditions prevailing that France is obliged to face them, and to contemplate the necessary matters from the point of view of her own security.

I am now staying in a country many of the men of which have already enjoyed the opportunity of seeing France and knowing exactly what she is. They came to us in the most critical time of the war. They came and shed their blood—mingled their blood with ours, and they shared our life, and they have seen France, and they now know what France is. And certainly these men have contributed to enlighten their own countrymen, and they have done everything to dispel and drive away those noxious gases which have been spread about, and under which certain people have been trying to mask and to conceal the true face of France.

Here in this country you are living among States which do not know the entangled barriers and frontiers of Europe. Here you live in an immense expanse of space. You do not know any factions on your own land. You have nothing to fear. So that it is rather difficult for some of you—it must be difficult for some of you—to realize what are the conditions at present prevailing in Europe, after war and after victory.

I quite admit that every citizen of the United States should come and tell me this: "The war is won. Peace is signed. Germany has reduced her army to a great extent.

Most of her war material has been destroyed. What is it that prevents peace from now reigning in Europe? Why is it that France keeps such a considerable army, abundantly provided with war material?"

Of course, in saying this only certain people have got something at the back of their minds. They suggest that France also has some hidden thought—some hidden design. It has been said that France wanted to install in Europe a sort of military supremacy, and that after all she wanted to be so simply to take the place Germany occupied before the war.

Gentlemen, perhaps this is the most painful, heartrending and cruel thing that a Frenchman can hear.

And for them to say it, after the direful war from which we have just emerged—unprovoked war which we had to undergo—to be again in the cruel necessity to give to the world only the appearance that we have perfidious intentions and military design—this, gentlemen, constitutes, I may say, the most disheartening thing for us.

If we had not the full confidence of those that know my country, those that have seen it—they can testify that not one word of it is true. If there is a country that has deliberately turned her steps toward peace, that wants peace with all her heart, believes in it with her entire faith—if there is a country that does this, gentlemen, it is France.

Since the armistice we have had many disappointments. France has had to wait for certain realizations which she has not been able to get. She has seen Germany digress—haggle over the signature which had been given. Germany has refused to stand by her pledged word. She has refused to pay compensation due for the devastated regions. She has declined to make the gesture of chastisement that, after all, every man of sense would expect after the horrors that we have witnessed. Germany has refused to disarm.

At that time France was strong and Germany could not resist. Public opinion in France was naturally impatient; while under this provocation France remained perfectly cool.

There was not one gesture on her part to aggravate the situation. I may say here emphatically in the face of the world, we have no hatred in our hearts, and France will do everything she can. She will use every means to prevent between Germany and herself a recurrence of these bloody conflicts. She wishes for nothing else but that the two peoples should be able to live side by side in the normal conditions of peace.

But, after all, we have no right to forget. We have no right to abandon ourselves. We have no right to weaken our position; and were it only because we must avoid giving rise, in the bosom that would only be ready to take advantage of it, to certain hopes that would be encouraged by our weakness.

Gentlemen, I spoke a few moments ago of the moral aspect of disarmament, and I referred in my remarks to Germany. I do not want to be unjust; nothing is further from my mind. But we know there is in Germany, there is one part of Germany, that is for peace. There are many people, especially among the working classes, who want to work, who have had enough of this war, who have had enough of war altogether, and are most anxious to settle down in peace, and also to set to work. We shall do everything to help that Germany, and if she wants to restore her balance in the bosom of a pacific republic and democratic institutions, then we can help her, and we shall all be able to contemplate the future with feelings of security.

But, gentlemen, there is another Germany, a Germany which has not changed her mind and to which the last war has taught no lesson. That Germany keeps thoughts in the back of her mind; she has the same designs which she entertained before the war; she has kept the same preoccupations and she cherishes the same ambitions as the Hohenzollerns did. And how can we close our eyes to this? How can we ignore this state of things?

This, gentlemen, is happening at our very doors; we have only got to look. This is happening but a few miles from us, and we follow the thoughts of the Germans, or certain Ger-

mans, and the evolution which is taking place. And more than that, we have witnessed certain attempts to return to the former state of things.

Nobody could be mistaken about the real bearing of what was called the Kapp Putsch. We know very well that if it had succeeded, Germany would have returned to her pre-war state, and we do not know what might have happened, or, rather, we know too well what would have been the consequences of such a state of things.

Gentlemen, a volume has been published by no less a man than Field Marshal Ludendorff, who still enjoys great authority in many German circles, and who is followed by a great part of the élite in Germany, professors, philosophers, writers, etc. What do we read in this book? Gentlemen, I should not like to make too many quotations. I should not like to prolong this speech, and perhaps draw too much of your attention, but this is part of my brief, and if you are, like me, convinced that the moral element is of the utmost importance, you will allow me to read just two or three passages. This is the first quotation:

"It is necessary that we should learn to understand that we live in a warlike time, that struggle will remain forever for the single individual, as for the State, a natural phenomenon; and that the struggle is equally on the divine order of the world."

In the same book Marshal Ludendorff produces these terrible words of de Moltke on the 11th of December, 1919:

"Eternal peace is a dream. It is not even a beautiful dream, and war is one of the parts of the order of the world, such as it has been created by God. It is by war that are developed the noblest virtues of man, courage, disinterestedness, devotion to duty and the spirit of sacrifice, up to the abandonment of one's own life. Without war the world would sink in the morass of materialism."

And further, this is Marshal Ludendorff himself speaking now:

"It is for the political education of the German people, and it is an indispensable notion with the knowledge of this fact,

that in the future war will be the last and the only decisive means of policy; that thought, completed by the virile life of war, the Entente shall not be able to forbid the German people to entertain, although they are trying to take it away from us. War is the cornerstone of all intelligent policy. It is the cornerstone of every form of future even, and chiefly of the future of the German people."

And, lastly, Marshal Ludendorff says this:

"The warlike qualities of the Prussian and German army have been put to the proof on the bloody battlefields. The German people need no other qualities for their moral renovation. The spirit of the former army must be the germ which will allow this renovation to take place."

Such, gentlemen, are the words used by the highest German authorities who have preserved, and I can quite understand it, the full part, the great part at least, of the confidence of the German people, and that is what we are listening to now. After a war that has caused the death of millions of men, after the sore wounds that have been inflicted and that are still bleeding in the sides of the countries of Europe, that is the sort of thing that is being taught at the very door of France. How can you expect that France should close her eyes to such words?

I now come to the physical aspects of disarmament. I can quite understand that somebody might say it is not sufficient to harbor evil designs; to make war one must have appropriate means, because when it is a question of war enormous effectives are necessary; you must have the officers and non-commissioned officers; you must have plentiful material—rifles, guns, machine guns, artillery, etc.—and Germany has no longer any of these.

Germany, from the point of view of effectives, just emerging from the war, from a war where her men have been fighting for four years—and I should be the last to underestimate the valor of her soldiers—our soldiers have had to face and to fight the German soldiers, and they know to what point the German soldier is able to carry his heroism; but Germany

just issuing from the war, still has 7,000,000 men over there in Germany who have made the war. Of course, you will say they are not actually serving under the flag, they are not living in barracks. Certainly. Have these men any officers and non-commissioned officers ready to be marshaled to the field? Is it possible to mobilize such an army tomorrow?

To this question I answer "yes," and I am going to explain it. Since the war, since the moment peace was signed, Germany has constituted a force, a so-called police force, which was intended for the maintenance of public order. That force is called the *Reichswehr*. It is to include 100,000 men, and, in fact, does include 100,000 men. But what men? They are nearly all officers or non-commissioned officers. I mean, gentlemen, regulars, all having served in or having belonged to the old army. Therefore, the cadres are ready there, the officers and non-commissioned officers are ready to marshal the army of tomorrow.

And what is that army? Is it in conformity with the requirements of the Peace Treaty? Is it only for purposes of public order? No. There are a certain number of those of which I have to express the facts as they are.

According to secret instructions issued by the military authorities, the *Reichswehr* is to prepare not only for police purposes but also for war, and is to train for war, with the necessary rehearsals and manoeuvres.

There is something more. Germany has another denomination. There is another group called *Einwohnerwehr*. This group includes almost all the men of good-will who are ready to serve their country in time of need, and, instead of using it only to preserve internal order, it might be used for other purposes.

The danger was so real that the Allies were obliged to send an ultimatum to Germany to demand this force should be disarmed.

At another moment, under an organization called the *Orgesch*, which is the organization of war, the *Einwohnerwehr* acquired such strength and became such a threat that the

Prime Minister of Bavaria, animated by a spirit of revolt, informed the world that he had at his disposal and he could raise in a short time an army of 300,000, plentifully provided with rifles, machine guns and artillery. Well, that force has been disorganized. The German Government has done its duty, and nobody more than myself is ready to recognize it.

It is only a duty on my part, a mere duty, a mere sense of fair play. I stated it in my own Parliament. I am ready to recognize that the German Chancellor, Chancellor Wirth, is a man of good-will, animated by fair purposes, loyal and frank, and that he has applied every endeavor, acting with no small merit on his part, in order to really realize a state of peace, and honor the signature of Germany.

But this Government in Germany is any moment. While I may say that on our side we are ready to do everything in order to allow this great people to return to normal conditions of peace, and the German Government, as I said, dissolves the *Einwohnerwehr*, there is something else, gentlemen.

There is another force, which is called the *Chezheitz Politze*. That is also a police force. It includes 150,000 men. These are enlisted men. The force is composed exclusively of regulars, officers, and non-commissioned officers, or at least non-commissioned officers ready to undergo a new period of military service. We demanded the dissolution of this force, but what happened? The *Chezheitz Politze* disappeared, but another appeared in its place—*Schutz Politzei*; but it was just the same. That included 150,000 men. So that, instead of its being a local police force, it became a general police force at the disposal of the Central Government, that could be used anywhere on German territory; so that we come to a total of 250,000 men, and enough men that are real officers, ready to marshal the troops who are training, to be ready instantly in case of war. These men are constantly watched by the Government.

The Government keeps them under its hands. These 7,000,000 men have not returned to civil life, to civil occupations

entirely. They are grouped together in this marvelously ingenious way which the German people always have when they want to achieve their purposes. They are called *Frie Corps*, or former combatants' associations, and what not. Any day, any anniversary—and Germans are rather fond of anniversaries—is favorable in order to convene these men and marshal them, to see that you have got them under your hand ready to do the work that is to be done.

We are Frenchmen. We know that. It is happening at our door. And I will only give you an example to show you how rapidly these organizations might be put on a war footing. Just one second. When the Upper Silesian question reached a somewhat acute stage recently, within a few weeks, I might almost say within a few days, there were, out of these *Frie Corps* or other bodies, about 40,000 men ready with guns, machine guns, rifles, armored trains, and with most perfect military instruments, so that this force should have its full combatant value.

These are facts, gentlemen. I am not noticing them and bringing them here just to make my case better. They are facts that have been verified, and that everybody can ascertain for himself. Therefore, as a question of fact and from the point of view of effectives, Germany can rise in a few weeks, and perhaps almost in a few days and can begin to raise her 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 men with their officers again and the non-commissioned officers are ready to do the work.

Now I must ask the great people of the United States, so fond of justice, so noble in their purposes, to answer me when I tell them this: Suppose by your side, oh, American people, a nation which has been for years and centuries in bloody conflict with you; and suppose that this nation, you feel, is still ready, morally and materially, to enter into a new struggle. What would you do?

Would you turn away your eyes? Would you close your eyes to a danger that was threatening you? You that are said to be such a positive, such a precise people, would you close your eyes? Would you not desire to do everything in your

power in order to safeguard your life, and, what is more, your honor? Would you do anything to weaken yourselves? No. There is not one citizen in the whole United States who would not answer me: "No, never in the world!"

France is looking upon what is happening. France does not exaggerate. She is only watching and waiting.

I now come to the question of war material. We have been told that there was no more war material. It is true the commissions of control in Germany have done admirable work. A great many guns—artillery, I mean—have been destroyed. Some of the destruction has been supervised by the allied officers. It is real.

Other destruction has taken place, as we have been told. We might have a doubt. We are not quite certain. But we must give the opponents the benefit of the doubt, and we believe the destruction on that side is practically completed.

But the problem of war material is one that can easily be solved. You have seen, in the war, with what promptitude—and that was lucky, because if the help had not come so quickly we might have been down, finally—you have seen how quickly immense armies have come over to us, provided with the most modern material, and fought on our sides upon the battlefields.

Well, what is Germany but a vast country of industry—industrially organized? Germany always had two aims. The first was trade, commerce. And that is only natural. The second was war. All her industries, all her manufactures, have been working to the full during the war, and they have developed since.

Everything is ready in Germany, the plans, the designs and calibres. Everything is there ready to insure a steady manufacturing of guns, machine guns and rifles. Suppose that during a period of diplomatic tension, purposely protracted for a number of weeks, certain of the manufacturers, certain of the works, begin to fabricate, just at the beginning, just to start the war, just to set the war going, and then go on manufacturing guns and rifles and artillery; what would happen?

It is not only in Germany that industry can work to the full. You can make preparations outside. In fact, preparations have actually taken place. In fact, great captains of industry or great industrial magnates have bought important firms in Scandinavia and in other parts of Europe.

It is easy enough to fabricate these guns without our seeing it, outside of our supervision. You know very well that it is possible to build great railroads. You know very well that it is impossible to bring here the proof that Germany is not actually making or purchasing war materials.

It is different from the navy. It is rather difficult to lay the keel of a ship in the stocks, to prepare the dockyards without the world knowing it. But suppose that was possible, do you think you could launch a capital ship without somebody being on the spot and knowing what was happening? But the guns, the rifles, the machine guns—any instruments used on the field of battle—they can be manufactured and cannot be controlled with any measure of certainty.

Ah, gentlemen, this is not the first time in history that France has had to face a situation of this kind. We have known Prussia disarmed. And disarmed by whom? By Napoleon. Well, that Prussia, which seemed practically disarmed, which was harmless to all intents and purposes, we found her again on the battlefield and we were nearly bled white. How can we forget that?

Of course, we know what is often said of the French people. It is often said that we are a frivolous nation and that naturally, when the danger is passed, we turn our minds to other things—just as befits a frivolous people. Evidently, gentlemen, we are not the sort of men to keep our eyes steadily fixed on whatever is sad and depressing.

We have not been doing that since the war, but we have been too deeply wounded, I might almost say murdered, to forget the direful lesson which has just been taught us. Gentlemen, there are too many homes in mourning in the country, there are too many men in the streets that are disabled and maimed. Even if we wanted to forget, we could not.

Therefore, we have not the right and we do not intend to leave France defenseless. France must, to all intents and purposes, protect herself.

Such is the situation as far as we are concerned. You will grant me, gentlemen, that it is serious enough. But that is not all. What about the rest of Europe? Apparently Europe is at peace, although here and there on the ground certain volumes of smoke just arising seem to indicate that the fire is not extinguished everywhere. I might say that this fire is smoldering in certain parts of Europe and if France had not had an army, war would already have broken out in Europe again.

I will just draw your attention to one subject to which I may refer later on, and that is the subject of Russia. Russia is a country of 120,000,000 men, which is actually boiling over with anarchy. They have an enormous standing army, which is in theory 1,500,000 men but which has a practical strength of 600,000 men. What will Russia do? Who can say what will happen on that side?

About a year and a half ago there was a wild rush of Russia on Europe. Russia tried to rush Poland and through Poland to reach Germany, where some people were beckoning to her. Gentlemen, we had at that time terribly anxious hours in France. If the barrier had not held good, if that anarchic army had been able to join the people who were calling them on the other side, what would have happened? Where would France be and where would the rest of Europe be? Happily there was the French army, which was the soldier of order for its own account and for the sake of the world.

The situation in Russia is far from being settled. It is a sort of permanent anxiety to everybody. What will become of that enormous army? What could, or might, Germany do in order to equip Russia and exploit her? We know not. There are so many problems, economic, financial, etc., with which we have to deal that really, gentlemen, we do not know to which to turn; but the greatest problem of all, the greatest question, is life.

First of all, we must be able to live. That is sort of a question mark in France. Thanks to our allies, to whom our gratitude will remain everlasting—thanks to their efforts, we have been able altogether to insure the life, liberty and dignity of men, but, gentlemen, I trust you will certainly feel the weight of my argument and recognize that we are faced with a very terribly serious situation.

When we say we contemplate a reduction of naval armaments, when we discuss it with ourselves, heart to heart, we could have nothing in our minds. We are speaking between friends. There is no threat of war; if there is any menace to peace it is so far distant that you can hardly conceive it, and yet you have not assumed the right of ignoring this danger altogether. You intend to keep your navies to the extent necessary to defend your liberties and insure your life.

If you do that, gentlemen, on the sea, what shall we do when the danger is there at our doors and hanging over our heads? I may say that I have always been in favor of peace; I have assumed powers for the sake of peace in very difficult conditions. Where my country was feeling natural impatience at the state of things, I formally attached myself to the cause of peace. I fastened my heart on that noble task, and I may say that if ever peace is to be disturbed in the world, I shall not be the one to disturb it. But, gentlemen, precisely because I have urged everybody on the road of peace, because I have done everything in my power in order to obtain peace, I feel all the more the great weight of the responsibility which I have assumed, and if tomorrow, because I had been too optimistic, I saw my country again attacked, trampled under foot, bleeding because I had weakened her, gentlemen, I should be a most despicable traitor.

It is that situation which we have got to take into account, gentlemen, and the weight of the responsibilities with which we are burdened.

Only the other day the course of events turned in such a way that it certainly became acute, as you know, in Upper Silesia. I have already referred to this subject. Germany, which did

not think that the French people were ready to undertake a military operation, suddenly informed us that she was going to send the *Reichswehr* to the spot in Upper Silesia in order to preserve order.

These were momentous times for us, and, although I have been through many critical times in my life, I may say that no hour was perhaps of more importance than that, and that I clearly and definitely made up my mind, and I told Germany that such a thing was not possible, and that if Germany undertook a thing of the sort she would have to bear the consequences, and the language was understood.

But, gentlemen, if I had spoken without having the French Army back of me, what would my words have become? And if the event had actually taken place, what would have become of Europe itself? Europe is still in a troublous state. It is composed of young States, newly come to life. Who could say what such conflict might have become?

That is the problem and that was the problem, and the struggle did not take place because it was felt that there was still a sufficient force in Europe and in France to preserve order.

Quite recently another attempt has been made, a certain attempt at the restoring of the old order of things in the centre of Europe, that might have set fire to the powder magazine again. Nothing happened, because the Allies were in perfect understanding and the incident was peaceably settled.

Gentlemen, I give you these reflections for you to ponder over. You will see that there is nothing in that that would draw us aside from the path that leads to final peace. I apologize for having been with you so long and for having so trespassed upon your attention. Perhaps at another time the President will be less inclined to allow me to speak.

The thought of reducing the armaments, which was the noble purpose of this Conference, is not one from which we would feel disinterested from the point of view of land armaments. We have shown it already. Immediately after the armistice demobilization began, and demobilization began as

rapidly and as completely as possible. According to the military laws of France there are to be three classes of men: that is, three generations of young men under the flag. That law is still extant; that law is still valid. It has not been abrogated yet, and the Government has taken the responsibility to reduce to two years the time spent under the flag, and instead of three classes—three generations of young men—we have only two undergoing military service.

It is therefore an immediate reduction by one-third that has already taken place in the effectives—and I am speaking of the normal effectives of the metropolis, leaving aside troops needed for colonial occupation or obligation imposed by treaty in the Rhineland or other countries and plebiscites.

We do not think that endeavor was sufficient, and in the future we have plans in order to restrict further the extent of our armies. In a few days it is certain that the proposals of the Government will be passed in the Chamber, in order to reduce further the military service by half. That is to say, there will be only one class and a half actually serving. The metropolitan French army would be therefore reduced by half, but if anybody asks us to go further, to consent to other reductions, I should have to answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us to do it without exposing ourselves to a most serious danger.

You might possibly come and tell us "this danger that you are exposed to, we see it, we realize it and we are going to share it with you. We are going to offer you all means—put all means at your disposal in order to secure your safety."

Immediately, if we heard those words, of course, we would strike upon another plan. We should be only too pleased to demonstrate the sincerity of our purpose. But we understand the difficulties and the necessities of the statesmen of other countries. We understand the position of other peoples who have also to face difficult and troublous situations.

We are not selfish enough to ask other peoples to give a part of their sovereign national independence in order to turn it to our benefit and come to our help. We do not expect it; but

here I am appealing to your consciences, if France is to remain alone, facing the situation such as I have described—and without any exaggeration—you must not deny her what she wants in order to insure her security. You must let her do what she has to do, if the need arises and if the time comes.

I should be the last one here to try to restrict the noble endeavors which are being made here in order to limit armament in the Conference which has been convened, with such noble purposes in view, and I should like to be able to say that I foresee no limit, no restriction to your labors and to the results which you may achieve. Any question here can be debated and can be resolved upon, but I must draw your attention to one thing; moral disarmament of France would be very dangerous.

Allow me to say it will be most unjust. We do not enjoy the sufficient condition. We should be ready to do it, but the time has not come yet to give up our defense for the sake of final peace in Europe.

We have to know, however, that France is not morally isolated, that she still has with her the men of good-will, and the hearts of all people who have fought with her on the same battlefield. The true condition of a moral disarmament in Germany—I mean to say I am referring to these noxious elements of which I have already spoken—the true condition at this time of disarmament in Germany lies in the fact that it should be known over there that France is not alone, and then I feel quite sure that the poisonous propaganda of which I have spoken will simply run up dead against the wall; that it will not be able to go through, and that nobody anywhere will believe in it.

If those that still harbor evil designs know that, and if those that entertain happy ideas of peace—this working class that wants to return to a normal state of peace—if it is known in Germany that France is not morally alone, peace will come back much quicker; and the words of anger, the words of revenge, will be simply preached in the wilderness. It will be impossible for Germany to reconstruct a defensive army, and

she will be able to install democratic institutions, and then we can all hope for final conditions of peace.

Everything that France can do in this direction she will do. In fact, she has already done much. She did not hesitate to open conversations with the German Government in order to settle this painful question of reparation for the devastated regions. Everything has been done and will be done in order to restore normal conditions, and the hour will come when everything will be settled, but the hour has not come yet.

If by direction given to the labors of the Conference it were possible somewhere over there in Europe—if it were possible to say that the outcome of this Conference is indirect blame and opprobrium cast upon France—if it were possible to point out that France is the only country in the world that is still imperialistic, is the only country that opposes final disarmament, then, gentlemen, indeed this Conference would have dealt us a severe blow; but I am quite sure nothing is further from your minds and from your intentions.

If after listening to this argument, after weighing the reasons which you have just heard, you consider it then as valid, then, gentlemen, you will still be with us and you will agree with me and say that France cannot possibly do anything but what she has actually done.

MR. BALFOUR

Mr. Chairman, evidently this is not a fitting moment to deal at length or in detail with the great speech which has just come to its conclusion. It has been your privilege, and my privilege, to hear one of the great masters of Parliamentary oratory. We have heard him with admiration, we have heard him with a full measure of sympathy; but we have done much more, I think, than merely been the auditors of a great, artistic performance. We have heard something more than a great speech: we have heard a perfectly candid, perfectly lucid, perfectly unmistakable exposition of the inmost thoughts of the Prime Minister of our great ally.

He has told us, I believe without reserve, what are the

anxieties, what are the preoccupations, of the country over whose destinies he presides. He has told us what they fear and why they fear it. And nothing can be more useful, nothing can be more instructive to us of other nations, than to have this full revelation of the inner thoughts of one of our allied and associated statesmen.

We live under very different conditions from the French citizens, for whom M. Briand has so eloquently spoken. In the secure homes of America no terrors exist or can exist comparable to those which inevitably haunt the thoughts, waking and sleeping, of the leaders of French politics: For they have what neither you in America have nor we in England have. I do not venture to speak for the other nations represented around the table.

They have at their very doors the great country, great in spite of defeat, powerful in spite of losses, and of its policy, of the course which it means to pursue in the future, they necessarily remain in anxious doubt.

It is good for us all, I venture to say, from whatever nation we may be drawn, from whatever part of the great continent we come, that we should be initiated, as we have been initiated this morning, into the inner sanctuary of French policy.

It must be acknowledged, sorrowfully acknowledged, that the speech to which we have just listened is not hopeful for any immediate solution of the great problem of land armaments. And why is it—why is it that there is this great difference between land armaments and sea armaments? Why is it that we all here look forward with a confidence, which I think is not overrated, a serene confidence, to bringing about as a result of our deliberations some great measure, and under the guidance of the program laid before you by the United States Government? Why is it we are hopeful of coming to some solution of the great naval problem?

It is because, in the language of M. Briand, there has been, in matters maritime, a moral disarmament, and it is on the basis of the moral disarmament that the physical and material disarmament is going to be built. That is why we are hopeful about the naval question.

And why are we less hopeful about at least any immediate settlement of the military questions? It is because, as M. Briand has explained to you, in that case there has not been moral disarmament, because we have no assurance, or because the French Government, who watch these things closely, have no assurance either in Russia or in Germany that moral disarmament has made the degree of progress which would make material disarmament an immediate possibility.

I do not venture to offer an opinion of my own upon this question. I leave you to judge of the facts, as they have been expounded by one who has profoundly studied them and whose gifts of exposition cannot be excelled.

Only this I would say, for I need hardly tell you that I am not going to make a speech: M. Briand appears to have some fears lest France should feel herself in moral isolation. That would be a tragedy indeed.

That the liberties of Europe and the world in general, and of France in particular, should be maintained and guarded against the dominating policy of her eastern neighbor is the cause for which the British Empire fought and in which the British Empire still believes. Killed on the field of battle, we lost nearly a million men. I am talking of the British Empire now. We lost nearly a million men. We lost well over two million men in addition, maimed and wounded.

We grieve over the sacrifice; we do not repent it. And if the cause of international liberty was worthy of this immense sacrifice from one of the allied powers—I speak not of others, it is not my right to speak for them—if it deserved and required this sacrifice from one of the allied and associated powers, and if we at all events have not changed our views, either as to the righteousness of the war or as to its necessity, how can it be otherwise than that if a similar necessity should again arise, if again the lust of domination, which has been the curse of Europe for so many generations, should threaten the peace, the independence, the self-development of our neighbors and allies, how should it be possible that the sympathies, once so warm, should become refrigerated, should become cold, and

that we who had done so much for the great cause of international liberty, should see that cause perish before our eyes rather than make further sacrifices in its defense?

Those are the thoughts which rise in my mind after hearing the great speech of M. Briand. I should only be interfering, I should only be weakening its effect, were I to dwell further upon it, and I will content myself, therefore, with thanking M. Briand for the admirable and candid account which he has given of the policy of his country, and wishing him and his country every success and every prosperity in that path of unaggressive prosperity which I hope and believe they are now entering.

SENATOR SCHANZER

Gentlemen, I am going to use the French language because I wish that the thought of the Italian delegation should arrive direct, and without the short delay of translation, direct to the French delegation across the table.

Gentlemen, we have listened with almost religious silence to the magnificent speech which M. Briand has delivered with warm eloquence to explain the position of France and the French point of view.

We are united to France, certainly, not only by the bonds of affinity and common race, but also by the brotherhood in art, by the fraternity of a long and glorious war which received a new and unforgettable consecration when the two peoples fought together on the same battlefields for the sacred defense of national liberty and for the cause of justice.

We listened with the greatest attention to the figures and documents quoted by M. Briand, and we found with great pleasure that France, in spite of the great difficulties, and within the limits of probability, was ready to contemplate the principle of limitation of land armament.

It is far from my mind to discuss what France considers indispensable for her national safety. That safety is as dear to us as it may be to them, and we are still morally by the side of our allies of yesterday and our friends of today.

I wanted to say this only, may I be allowed to express the

wish and the hope that the general limitation of land armament may become a reality within the shortest possible space of time? Italy has fought the war for the highest aims which a country can seek, but Italy is in her soul a peace loving nation. I shall not repeat what I had the honor to state at the first meeting of the Conference, but I should like to emphasize again that Italy is one of the surest factors of the world's peace, that she has no reason whatsoever of conflict with any other country, that she is following and putting constantly into action a policy inspired by the principle of maintaining peace among all nations.

Italy has succeeded in coming to a direct understanding with the Serb, Croat and Slovene people, and in order to attain such an end has made considerable sacrifices for the interest of the peace of Europe. Italy has pursued toward the successor countries to her former enemies a policy not only of pacification, but of assistance; and when a conflict arose between Austria and Hungary, a conflict which might have dragged into war the Danubian peoples, offered to the two countries in conflict her friendly help in order to settle the dispute. Italy has succeeded and in so doing has actively contributed to the peace of Europe.

Moreover, Italy has acted similarly within her own frontiers and has reduced her armed forces in the largest possible measure. She has considerably curtailed her navy expenditures in comparison to the pre-war time. The total amount of her armed forces does not exceed 200,000 men, and a further reduction to 175,000 men is already planned, and 35,000 colored troops.

Our ordinary war budget for the present financial year amounts to \$52,000,000, including \$11,000,000 expenses for police forces; the extraordinary part of the war budget, representing expenses dependent for the liquidation of the war, expenses therefore of a purely transitory character, amounts to \$62,000,000.

However, although we have all reduced our armaments to the greatest possible extent, we consider it necessary, for a

complete solution of the problem of limitation of armament in Europe, to take into consideration the armaments of the countries either created or transformed as a result of the war. The problem is not a simple one. It must be considered as a whole. It is a serious and urgent problem, for which a solution at no far distant day is necessary.

Gentlemen, I trust I have said all that is necessary to explain the Italian point of view. The United States in calling this Conference has taken a great and noble initiative, with the aim of creating sound guarantees for the safeguarding of the peace of the world.

In conclusion, may I express the desire and the hope that the conference, while taking into account the present difficulties, should give attention also to the problem of the limitation of land armaments, the solution of which is an essential condition for promoting throughout the world that atmosphere of peace which M. Briand has so clearly explained and without which it would be hopeless to anticipate that the economic and social reconstruction of the nations which have suffered most severely during and after the war may be fulfilled?

BARON KATO

It is needless for me to assure M. Briand that Japan has nothing but a most profound sympathy for the peculiarly difficult position which has been so clearly and so eloquently presented to us this morning. May I venture also to add Japan's appreciation of and sympathies for the great sacrifices in men and wealth made by France, the British Empire, Italy and the United States in the great war for the cause of peace, justice and harmony?

I would like to say this morning just a few words on land armament limitation. Japan is quite ready to announce her hearty approval of the principle which aims to relieve a people of heavy burdens by limiting land armaments to those which are necessary for national security and the maintenance of order within the territory.

The size of the land armaments of each State should be determined by its peculiar geographical situation and other circumstances, and these basic factors are so divergent and complicated that an effort to draw final comparisons is hardly possible. If I may venture to say it, it is not an easy task to lay down a general scheme for the limitation of land armaments, as in the case of limitation of naval armaments. Nevertheless, Japan has not the slightest intention of maintaining land armaments which are in excess of those which are absolutely necessary for purely defensive purposes, necessitated by the Far Eastern situation.

BARON DE CARTIER

Mr. President, being still under the spell of the thrilling and convincing speech delivered by M. Briand, I would just like to state briefly the point of view of Belgium on the question of limitation of land armaments.

Belgium, trusting in the undertaking given by the powers that guaranteed her neutrality, remained for three-quarters of a century faithful to a policy of peace and limitation of armament. The tragical events of 1914 were for her a terrible awakener. While she was aspiring to nothing but peace, while she was only anxious to accomplish her duties as a neutral State, war was carried on her own territory by the two powers that had not only taken the engagements with respect to neutrality, but to see that neutrality should be respected.

Devastation, fire, wanton devastation of her industries, murdering and wounding of her inhabitants, deportation of civilian population, heavy losses in her armies, were the reward of her peaceful policy and of the fulfillment of her international obligations.

The Treaty of Versailles put an end to this régime, which events had proved to be worthless and dangerous for her. Owing to her special geographical position and to her situation, Belgium is forced to remain in a certain position, and in 1920 she concluded with France a military agreement purely for defensive purposes, and in case of new, unprovoked ag-

gression on the part of Germany. She keeps her army down to a level that is strictly consistent with the requirements of her national security and she could not possibly proceed to a further reduction of her armament. And yet there is perhaps no State that is more sincerely peace loving. We have no hatred whatever, and we do not want to see war which has inflicted such painful sufferings upon us.

If I may refer to the words which King Albert of the Belgians, in his message to President Harding, used, I will say that the Belgian nation calls with her earnest wishes for the moment where the general situation will allow us to enter upon the path of limitation of armaments. She admires the initiative taken by the Government of the United States and wishes every success to the conference for the greater benefit of the whole world.

MR. HUGHES

I shall detain you, gentlemen, but a moment. It would not do justice to my own sentiment or to that of my colleagues of the American delegation if I did not, in a word, take part in this expression of the sense of privilege which has been felt in listening to this brilliant, eloquent, comprehensive and instructive address stating the position and policy of France.

No words ever spoken by France have fallen upon deaf ears in the United States. The heart of America was thrilled by her valor and her sacrifice, and the memory of her stand for liberty is imperishable in this country, devoted to the institutions of liberty.

It is evident from what M. Briand has said that what is essential at this time, in order that we may achieve the great ideal, is the will to peace. And there can be no hope of a will to peace until institutions of liberty and justice are secure among all peace-loving people.

May I say, in response to a word which challenged us all as it was uttered by M. Briand, that there is no moral isolation for the defenders of liberty and justice? We understand the difficulties: what has been said will be read throughout this broad land by a people that desires to understand.

The essential condition of progress toward a mutual understanding and a maintenance of the peace of the world is that we should know exactly the difficulties which each nation has to consider, that we should be able justly to appraise them, that we should have the most candid and complete statement of all that is involved in them, and then, with that full appreciation of the apprehensions, of the dangers, of all that may create obstacles in the path of the policy that we are most anxious to pursue, we should then plan to meet the case to the utmost practicable extent; and thus the will to peace may have effective expression.

We cannot go into a statement of detail now. Apparently the Conference is so organized that this matter may have an appropriate place in our discussion. We cannot foresee at the moment what practical measures may be available, but the expressions that we have heard from the representatives of the powers engaged in this Conference make us confident that here will be generated that disposition which is essential to national security, the final assurance of security which armies and officers and men and material can never supply, that is, the disposition of a world conscious of its mutual interests and of the dependence, upon the fact that if they desire, most ardently and wholly desire it, peace will be enduring among our people.

Is it the desire of the delegates that the matters suggested by the addresses that have been made and the subject itself of land armament should now be committed for the consideration of the Committee on Armament, consisting of the plenipotentiary delegates of the five powers? Assent is manifested, and it will be so ordered.

Is it now in accordance with your wish that we should adjourn subject to the call of the Chair?

Adjourned.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

- Nos. 1-145 (April, 1907, to August, 1919). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also a series of official documents dealing with the European War, the League of Nations, the Peace Conference, and with several of the political problems resulting from the War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.
146. International Labor Conventions and Recommendations. January, 1920.
 147. Some Bolshevik Portraits. February, 1920.
 148. Certain Aspects of Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part I. March, 1920.
 149. Certain Aspects of the Bolshevik Movement in Russia. Part II. April, 1920.
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 154. The National Research Council, by Vernon Kellogg; The International Organization of Scientific Research, by George Ellery Hale; The International Union of Academies and the American Council of Learned Societies, by Waldo G. Leland. September, 1920.
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 159. The Communist Party in Russia and Its Relation to the Third International and to the Russian Soviets. Part II. February, 1921.
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 161. Disarmament in its Relation to the Naval Policy and the Naval Building Program of the United States, by Arthur H. Pollen. April, 1921.
 162. Addresses on German Reparation by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George and Dr. Walter Simons, London, March 3rd and 7th, 1921. May, 1921.
 163. The Fiftieth Anniversary of the French Republic. June, 1921.
 164. Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol, signed at Saint-Germain-En-Laye, September 10, 1919. July, 1921.
 165. Addresses at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, by the Hon. Elihu Root. August, 1921.
 166. Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission; Terms of the "C" Mandates; Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920; Correspondence between Great Britain and the United States Respecting Economic Rights in the Mandated Territories; The San Remo Oil Agreement. September, 1921.
 167. Present Problems of the Commonwealth of British Nations: Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, held in June, July and August. October, 1921.
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
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